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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the nature of joint dividend-and-earnings signalling in announcements to 
the New Zealand Stock Exchange in the 1990s. Initially the Market Model is used to compute 
expected returns, and the abnormal returns derived from these are subjected to restricted least 
squares regressions to separate out a putative dividend signal from the concurrent earnings 
signal. But with the Market Model, the zero-value company returns associated with an absence 
of trading in thinly traded stocks are over-represented in returns distributions leading to problems 
of bias. New models are developed that explicitly exploit zero returns. The first alternative 
methodology entails friction modelling, which uses a maximum likelihood estimation procedure 
to find the relationship coefficients and the range of returns that “should” be considered as zero, 
and then proceeds to treat them as a separate category. The second alternative methodology is 
that of state asset models, which take a fresh new look at investor perceptions of the connection 
between movements in company returns and those of the concurrent underlying market. Zero-
value company returns cease to be zero in value, where a state model is rotated, or alternatively 
they can be modelled as an extra state. All three methodologies furnish some evidence of 
dividend signalling; but this evidence is highly dependent on small changes within the given 
methodology. 
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1 Introduction 
Is there a dividend signal? In an efficient market, the reaction to the advent of fresh news should 
be short and fast. The investigation will entail an event study in which the event is the 
announcement of dividends and the unit of measurement of the effect on share prices will be the 
cumulative (or single day) abnormal return. This can be understood as the element of surprise in 
the price change recorded at the time of the news release. The time of the news release will be 
known in the study as the ‘event window’. 
But life is not that simple. In New Zealand it is not practical to measure just dividend 
announcement events because they occur bundled up with earnings announcement events in one-
and-the-same news release. Therefore an investigation of dividend signalling effects must, by 
necessity, be an investigation of joint dividend-and-earnings announcement effects where there 
is the possibility of interactions between the two newsworthy items. 
For more than half a century, the connection between dividend policy and the value of the firm 
has been the subject of scrutiny resulting in a vast output of academic papers. This is a body of 
research that has many branches, many (but not all) of which are discussed at some length in 
Chapter 2, which is the thesis literature review. The particular branch of research effort to which 
this thesis belongs is the study of joint dividend and earnings announcements — which do not 
occur much in the United States, but are the commonest form of dividend disclosure in the 
United Kingdom, Australia and in New Zealand. 
Where the dividend signal must be distinguished from the signal of future company performance 
that investors infer from the concurrent earnings news, there is some statistical unbundling to be 
done. There has to be a method for discriminating between signals emanating from the dividend 
component of an announcement, and from the earnings component of the announcement. An 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression technique known as restricted least squares regression 
allows us to do this — once we have our abnormal returns. These abnormal returns are compiled 
from expected returns generated by the estimation of the Market Model on log return data in a 
set preliminary stretch of time known as the estimation period. So, effectively we have two 
linked methodologies — restricted least squares regression on cross-sectional abnormal return 
data and the Market Model (which is a time-series tool) for forecasting abnormal returns.  
Chapter 3 provides a fuller explanation of these linked methodologies along with the research 
question and some hypotheses. 
3 
However, the above linked methodologies have an Achilles heel.  This flaw is the fact that OLS 
regressions furnish biased coefficients in the presence of thin trading, which can be defined as 
either non-synchronous trading, or as the failure of a share to trade on a particular day — or even 
during entire rafts of days on end.  A review of papers examining the nature of thin trading and 
suggesting putative solutions for the econometric problems it causes is provided in Section 2.3 of 
Chapter 2, while Section 2.4 provides an introduction to the first of two potential solutions to the 
thin trading problem.  The first solution is a friction modelling methodology.  Given that this 
thesis breaks new ground in this respect, the subsections associated with Section 2.4 can only 
provide a review of how friction models have been applied in other contexts.  Section 2.5 then 
discloses a short review of studies employing state asset models — which constitute the second 
possible approach to working in the context of a thinly-traded market. 
Following Chapter 2 come the initial methodology and results chapters.  In the first instance, I 
adhere to the Market Model methodology used in prior studies — and which ignores the 
presence of thin trading.  Chapter 3 lays out the research questions pertaining to dividend 
signalling and explores Market Model methodology in detail.  Then Chapters 4 and 5, I table the 
results associated with this methodology.  
Chapter 6 then moves the study away from OLS regression and a Friction Model methodology is 
developed and employed. The underlying assumption is that zero returns and returns that 
arguably, should be considered to be the equivalent of zero returns, suppress the slope coefficient 
and thus distort the calculation of abnormal returns. Removing these zero returns from the 
estimation of beta increases its value. 
The final methodology to be put under the microscope entails a series of state asset pricing 
models, which employ OLS regression — but whose residuals have better characteristics. This 
occurs in Chapter 7.  Here I return to an OLS regression methodology, but this time, the data is 
partitioned into different ‘states’ according to whether the company returns and market returns 
are negative, zero or positive. As can be expected, when information about company returns (the 
dependent variable in the expected return estimation procedure) is employed in the form of extra 
variables on the right-hand side of the regression procedure of state asset pricing models, the 
correlation between it and market returns is significantly improved over the one furnished by the 
standard Market Model. In addition, the explicit incorporation of zero-value returns, as a discrete 
‘state’ into models developed in this chapter shows that earlier researchers may have 
misconstrued the nature of what is called the rotated four-state model. 
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This is then followed by a discussion of conclusions and limitations in Chapter 8, which, in turn, 
is followed by a bibliography and the appendices. 
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2 Literature Review. 
2.1 Chapter Introduction 
Dividend policy has been the subject of investigation and debate for almost 50 years, most of it 
conducted in the United States of America. Before regression analysis was applied by John 
Lintner in 1956 to the behaviour of a small group of American industrial companies, 
conventional wisdom held that dividends were good and should be maximized by firms wherever 
possible. Lintner, who showed that firms adopted and tended to adhere to optimal long-term 
dividend payout ratios which were relatively stable, suggested that managers would only raise a 
firm’s dividend if they were confident that the firm’s future earnings could be maintained at a 
consistently higher level in the future. An implication of this was that the announcement of a 
dividend increase might convey useful information about future earnings. Lintner’s work (and 
the work of Darling (1957) who confirmed the relationship between dividends and past and 
current earnings) opened a Pandora’s box of dividend-related phenomena, the validity of which, 
other researchers have spent years and decades debating closely.1 
In a series of papers at the beginning of the 1960s, Miller and Modigliani (in particular, Miller 
and Modigliani, 1961) provided a mathematically consistent theory of capital structure in which 
dividends were shown to be irrelevant to a firm’s value. But this did not appear to coincide with 
the observed behaviour of dividend policy-setters in a sufficiently watertight fashion. A 
competing theory, which stated that dividends directly contributed to the value of a firm, was 
produced by Gordon (1962).2 Gordon’s model for the valuation of a firm’s share price is still 
presented in current introductory finance texts. Hence, the current dilemma concerning the role 
                                                 
1 Lintner’s findings have been reconfirmed by a large number of studies over the decades. An excellent overview of 
work relating to the aspect of dividend stability is provided by Cahit Adaoglu of the Eastern Mediterranean 
University, in his (July 2000) working paper, “Instability in the Dividend Policy of the Istanbul Stock Exchange 
(ISE) Corporations: Evidence from an Emerging Market”. Early confirmations with respect to United States data 
were made by Brittain (1964), Brittain (1966), and Fama and Babiak (1968). McDonald, Jacquillat and Nussenbaum 
(1975) observed dividend policies in France; Chateau (1979) published results with respect to Canadian companies; 
Shevlin (1982) observed the stability of dividend policies in Australia. More recently Leithner and Zimmermann 
(1993) tested the dividend stability of West German (prior to Unification), British, French and Swiss companies; and 
dividend stability in the United Kingdom was further assessed by Lasfer (1996). Dividend policies in Japan were 
found to be stable by Kato and Loewenstein (1995), and also by Dewenter and Warther (1998), who compared the 
Japanese market with the market in the United States. Adaoglu himself however, observing firms on the Istanbul 
Stock Exchange, confirmed Glen, Karmokolias, Miller and Shah (1995), who found relatively unstable dividend 
policies in emerging markets. 
2 This has been shown to be based on at least one flawed assumption (Brennan, 1971), but has not been disproved to 
the satisfaction of all scholars. 
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of dividends in the discipline of Financial Economics was laid bare almost forty years ago. It is 
best summed up in the words of Black (1976)3: 
The harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with pieces that 
just don’t fit together. 
But the debate was, however, broadened by Miller and Modigliani (1961), who added several 
adjuncts to their assertion of dividend irrelevance to the firm’s value. One of these was the 
existence of tax clienteles. Investors would choose the kind of firm they wanted to invest in with 
respect to the firm’s dividend policy and thereby sort themselves into clientele groups. Investors 
who wished to accumulate long-term wealth would choose firms with low or zero dividend 
payouts, while those who wished to have a steady dividend income to meet short-term 
consumption needs would invest in firms with a tradition of high dividend payout ratios.4 
The existence and effects of tax clienteles have been analyzed by a large number of scholars. 
Brennan (1971), for instance, argued that the existence of a clientele effect would logically have 
no impact on the value of the firm, while Long (1978) and Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1982) 
presented evidence that it did. No clear, irrefutable resolution to this debate has yet emerged. A 
further kind of clientele has also been discussed by Black and Scholes (1974) and Pettit (1977): 
clientele groupings based on the transactions costs of share trading. 
The other important adjunct Miller and Modigliani posited was that a firm’s choice of dividend 
might be seen as a signal to investors (actual and potential), which contained hitherto unavailable 
information concerning the firm’s future earnings prospects. This conclusion was to be the 
starting point of a forty-year record of research into the existence and nature of signals putatively 
broadcasted in dividend announcements. 
But dividend research did not develop in isolation from other major developments. The 1950s 
and 1960s were fertile times in the development of financial economics. It was in this period that 
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) developed the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). This was 
also the time that the Efficient Markets Hypothesis was generated. This development in 
particular, provided stimulus for investigation of share price behaviour associated with dividend 
announcements. In fact, it was not until the tail end of the 1970s that a proper basis for a theory 
of dividend signalling was formulated. 
                                                 
3 Black (1976), p. 5. 
4 The payout ratio measures the dividend paid out as a percentage of net profit after tax available for potential 
distribution to shareholders. 
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However, research into dividend signalling has been very much dependent on the econometric 
tools at hand for conducting it.  Until recently the primary methodology employed in studies was 
the Market Model event study.  This entailed comparing the behaviour of a version of share price 
returns during an event window (in which a dividend announcement was made) with the 
behaviour of returns from a broader test period encompassing that test period.  The periodic 
return used was an abnormal return, which was generated by subtracting a market risk-adjusted 
expected return from the actual monthly (or later daily) return captured from closing prices.  This 
methodology has been found to be flawed when firms’ shares (for whatever reason) fail to trade 
in a timely manner in each specified trading period.  The flaw — which is the exaggeration of 
abnormal returns by the understating of expected returns — potentially makes a nonsense of 
event study research conducted on small markets such as the New Zealand Share Market.  When 
a firm’s shares do not trade over sequential periods, zero returns are generated; and when the 
shares trade only very infrequently, the numbers of these zero returns will be large.  This is a 
noteworthy issue because they are a major cause of non-normality in the residuals from the 
regression used to calculate the parameters of the standard Market Model.  This thesis 
investigates two strategies for overcoming this “thin trading” problem. Therefore the literature 
records associated with both of these items must also be considered in this chapter. 
Hence this literature review is laid out as follows. Section 2.2 deals with the broad sweep of 
dividend signalling research.  In Section 2.3 we traverse the thirty-year record of attempts to 
redress the problem of thin trading and that of a closely related problem known as 
nonsynchronous trading. This section also provides a background showing how the problem is 
faced — or has been finessed.  Section 2.4 then moves on to the use of friction modelling, which 
is grounded in the methodology of maximum likelihood estimation. I posit friction modelling as 
a possible solution to the econometric issues associated with the thin trading phenomenon.  This 
section provides an explanation of the methodology and explores studies which have already 
employed it. Then the final section, Section 2.5 looks at the literature associated with unrotated 
and rotated Asset State Models. These, I posit, provide an alternative way of handling the thin 
trading problem. 
2.2 Dividend and Dividend Signalling Research 
2.2.1 Section Introduction 
This Section covers almost fifty years of dividend signalling research in general, and the 
necessary methodological context in which it was conducted.  In Subection 2.2.2, early research 
associated with the development and testing of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis is surveyed. 
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This is followed in Subsection 2.2.3 by consideration of papers developing and/or supporting the 
need for a theory of dividend signalling. In Subsection 2.2.4, the evidence for and against the 
presence of a signal in dividend announcements is investigated in terms of short-term share price 
effects. (Many of the papers in this section use the Market Model outlined in Subsection 2.2.2). 
Then Subsection 2.2.5 discusses evidence as to whether the nature of future company earnings 
actually confirms the putative news content of the dividend signal. From there, Subsection 2.2.6 
concentrates on papers dealing with confounding events. The most salient of these is the 
announcement of earnings in conjunction with the dividend announcement. This, in the context 
of joint earnings and dividend announcements by New Zealand listed companies in the 1990s is 
the topic area of the current thesis. 
2.2.2 Early Papers (Both EMH and Non-EMH) Prior to a Theory of Dividend 
Signalling 
2.2.2.1 Subsection Introduction 
In spite of the foundations laid by Lintner (1956) and Miller and Modigliani (1961), much of the 
initial thrust in early dividend signalling research was provided by a desire to address a wider, 
more immediately attention-grabbing issue. This was the matter of whether markets were 
efficient or whether they contained systematic price-change behaviours which smart market 
operators could exploit to enrich themselves. In formal terms, this was the advent of research 
into the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). Subsection Two addresses research directly 
relating to the development and testing of the EMH, while Subsection Three deals with 
concurrent papers in the 1970s which addressed ramifications arising from Lintner (1956) and 
other early dividend papers, but which were not so intimately entwined with the testing of the 
EMH. Together these subsections pave the research path to the point at which dividend 
signalling research attained a theory of its own — which is canvassed in Section Three, 
following this one. 
2.2.2.2 The Efficient Markets Hypothesis 
The Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) was developed in the late 1960s. Up until the 1950s 
and 1960s, little research had been conducted into the price behaviour of stock exchanges. 
Indeed, in an essay pushed in 1993, Ray Ball, speaking of the status quo in 1968, stated5: 
                                                 
5 Ball (1999) p. 37. This essay was published as a chapter in “The New Corporate Finance” (Second Edition), edited 
by Donald H. Chew Jnr.  
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The prevailing view among academic economists, even at the University of Chicago, was that 
the stock market was not a proper subject of serious study. 
However, some work was being done by researchers with a statistical bent. In the absence of an 
economic theory of stock market pricing, observers of price behaviour noted that it moved more 
or less randomly. But if this randomness did indeed contain systematic patterns that could be 
predicted, then astute market participants could possibly make use of these to enrich themselves.6 
So the question that sat begging for an answer was: just how random were movements in share 
prices? At this time − and even today − forecasts of share prices based on technical analysis of 
charts of past price movements had (and have) credibility in the eyes of some market 
participants. 
It was a short step from thinking of investigating the randomness of price movements to 
formalizing the undertaking with a statistical hypothesis. Its name was the Random Walk 
Hypothesis. This proposed that the price of a share is independent of the share’s past prices and 
is determined by the market clearance of current supply and current demand. In addition, 
observation of past prices would provide no information about future prices. Early papers 
employing the Random Walk Hypothesis included Fama (1965), who set out to expose the 
futility of technical analysis, Samuelson (1965) and Mandelbrot (1966). 
The first actual usage of the term “efficient market” appeared in Fama (1965) where it was 
defined as7: 
…a market where there are large numbers of rational profit-maximizers actively competing, 
with each trying to predict future market values of individual securities, and where important 
current information is almost freely available to all participants… [and] on average, 
competition will cause the full effects of new information on intrinsic values to be reflected 
‘instantaneously’ in actual prices. 
EMH as a theory was specified in a very long paper in the Journal of Finance by Fama (1970). 
In overview, EMH states that changes in current share prices are based on investors’ assessment 
of new information; and that past news has already been fully impounded in past share prices 
and thus has no bearing on current price changes. Aside from the impact on supply and demand 
brought about by changes in available information by which investors can revise their opinion of 
a share’s value, changes in share price should follow a random walk. EMH is stated in three 
                                                 
6 Roberts (1959), p. 7 
7 Fama (1965), p. 4. This paper is cited in “The Theory of Stock Market Efficiency: Accomplishments and 
Limitations” by Ray Ball, which in turn, is a chapter in “The New Corporate Finance” Second Edition (1999), edited 
by Donald H. Chew. 
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versions — weak form, semi-strong form and strong form. In the weak form, current prices are 
independent of past prices. In the semi-strong form, current prices adjust rapidly (approaching 
simultaneity) to all new public releases of information; and in the strong form, current prices 
adjust to all new information whether released to the public or restricted to insiders. 
Given how plausible the EMH appeared to be, it was to be expected from this time onward, that 
it would receive rigorous testing. Indeed, over time, a number of anomalies have been 
documented, which cast some doubt on the validity of the hypothesis. But the hypothesis is not 
yet fully proven or disproved. Dividend signalling itself, as a branch of finance research, is a 
development with close links to the EMH debate. 
In a closely-related development, Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) were the first researchers 
to make use of an ‘event’ period over which price data measurements could be compared with, 
and distinguished from averaged data collected over a longer prior period.8 In fact, observations 
of many share-split ‘events’ and their associated uniform-length prior-period data adjuncts could 
be standardized as multiple observations of one event phenomenon at time zero (t0) to be 
analyzed in terms of the averaged data from the matched prior-period observations. This was the 
first use of what has come to be known as the Market Model. 
Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll used the Market Model to generate an abnormal performance 
index of monthly returns before and after share-split events with associated dividend 
announcements by US companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) between 
1927 and 1959. There were 940 announcement events in their sample. 
Fama et al found that share splits were deemed to be a favorable news event that fuelled 
investors’ anticipation of a related upcoming favorable dividend announcement. The two 
announcement items together could be interpreted as providing information to the effect that the 
firm’s prospects were excellent. The authors found evidence of a pre-emptive, quite steep rise in 
their index of cumulative average residuals over the preceding 29 months, but after the 
announcement event, prices had adjusted within the first month and the graph of the residuals 
flattened out. In the case of a relative decline in the dividend announced, the cumulative average 
residuals peaked at the time of the announcement and declined over the next year before leveling 
out.9 However, in the case of both dividend increases and dividend decreases, average residuals 
(that were not cumulated), quickly settled into a pattern that randomly fluctuated about zero. 
                                                 
8 Ball (1999) Op. Cit. 5, p. 38. 
9 Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969), p. 15. See figures 3b and 3c. The average residuals are depicted in figures 3a 
and 3b on page 14. 
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Fama et al interpreted these results as indicating that prices did adjust to new information in a 
rapid manner, thus supporting the concept of an efficient market. However, they did note their 
data set did not allow them a full examination of whether or not trading profits could be made by 
buying before the date of an announcement and selling afterwards. Nevertheless, it was clear that 
one could not, in any systematic manner, make a profit buying up shares after an announcement 
event and then reselling them.10 
Ball and Brown (1968), who picked up the concept of an event study from a 1967 working paper 
version of Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969), employed the Market Model on the publication 
dates of 2300 accounting earnings figures from 261 New York Stock Exchange-listed 
companies.11 These earnings figures were the figures given in company annual reports, which 
were provided by the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) database and 
COMPUSTAT monthly share price data between 1946 and 1966.12 For the shorter period 1957 – 
1965, they recorded an index of abnormal performance with a view to showing that investors 
absorbed and acted upon information from announcements of net income; and that prices would 
adjust fast to this new information. What they found was that prices associated with positive 
announcements tended to drift upward over the preceding twelve months; and that this drift did 
not taper off until beyond one month after the date of the announcement.13 Given that the data 
was monthly in nature, this amounted to a rapid adjustment to the earnings news contained in the 
just-published company income statement. 
The authors’ recording of twelve months of abnormal returns leading up to publication date 
implied that between 85 and 90 percent of the net earnings news information (with respect to the 
annual reports in their sample) was already captured before the release of the income statement. 
This caused them to conclude14: 
Since the efficiency of the capital market is largely determined by the adequacy of its data 
sources, we do not find it disconcerting that the market has turned to other sources which can 
be acted upon more promptly than annual net income. 
One of the possible candidates identified as such a source by Ball and Brown in their closing 
words, was the company dividend announcement. 
                                                 
10 Ibid, pp. 18 – 20. 
11 From here onward, the New York Stock Exchange will be referred to as the NYSE. 
12 The CRSP database was itself a new development at this time. It was set up in 1960 at the University of Chicago 
by James H. Lorie. It stored comprehensive data on all NYSE-listed companies and their shares from 1926 onwards. 
(Reported by Ball (1999) Op Cit. 5, p.39.) 
13 Ball and Brown (1968) p. 169. See Figure 1, “Abnormal Performance Indexes for Various Portfolios”. 
14 Ibid, p. 177. 
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Ball and Brown also made a further interesting point which relates to my current study of 
dividend announcements made concurrently with earnings announcements. This was that the net 
income figure stated in the bottom line of a company’s income statement contained no 
irrefutable, absolute truth within itself. Instead, earnings were definable only as an output figure 
obtained from applying a set of accounting procedures to a set of events with no further 
‘definitive substantive meaning at all’15: 
Net income is an aggregate of components which are not homogeneous. It is thus alleged to 
be a “meaningless” figure, not unlike the difference between twenty-seven tables and eight 
chairs. 
If the earnings figure had any value, then the value lay in its being a clue as to the underlying 
current financial health of the company and thus a potential diagnostic for guesstimating future 
company prospects. In this respect, the authors argued it would be dangerous to confuse a lack of 
substantive meaning with a lack of utility to investors. My thesis involves observation of an 
impact on investors of dividend figures relating to the near-future disbursement of cold, hard 
cash — figures possessing substantive meaning as future dollars in the hand, a more ethereal 
meaning as an indicator of company prospects, and a utility to investors which can vigorously be 
debated. 
The first important empirical paper concentrating solely on dividend announcements was Pettit 
(1972). Pettit set out to determine if dividend announcements could be associated with the 
behaviour of ongoing monthly abnormal returns. If they persisted, they would be evidence in 
contradiction of the EMH. His data set consisted of the dividend changes made by 625 NYSE 
quoted companies in the period January 1964 to June 1968. He used the Market Model to 
analyze both daily and monthly abnormal returns on shares held before, during and after a 
dividend announcement event. 
Pettit divided his sample into two groups depending on whether their actual quarterly earnings 
were greater or less than their expected earnings and then subdivided each group into subgroups 
with respect to the nature of their change in dividend (no change, omission, reduction, three 
magnitudes of increase, and initiation of dividend). His examination of the abnormal returns 
associated with each of these sub-groupings on a second sample of daily data led him to 
conclude that dividend announcements in all but the dividend-no-change category tended to have 
a greater impact on investors than did earnings announcements. He discovered that the related 
                                                 
15 Ibid, p. 160. Note that, in New Zealand, an income statement is formally known as a statement of financial 
performance. 
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abnormal returns (ARs) were significant only on the day of the dividend announcement (day t0) 
and on day t1. This finding was to be repeated over and over in later research. On the other hand, 
Pettit’s monthly data set did not furnish significant results at any time past the date of the 
dividend announcement. These results, Pettit argued, supported the rapid adjustment of prices to 
new information. This concept is a central tenet of the semi-strong form of the EMH. 
However, Charest (1978) recorded a persistence of both monthly and daily excess returns, 
relating to dividend announcements, for periods far beyond the day of a given dividend’s actual 
announcement. Charest’s paper was to be the start of a significant new branch of dividend 
signalling research — the investigation of post-announcement drifts.16 Using dividend 
announcements from the Standard and Poors Annual Dividend Record January 1947 – June 1968 
and CRSP monthly data, Charest found monthly and daily excess returns persisted with respect 
to shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange following announced dividend changes, 
indicating persistent market inefficiencies. 
Although his technique did not enable him to differentiate between impacts on earnings brought 
about by dividend and other forms of announcements, he noted the existence of positive drifts 
implying that the initial reaction to announcements of dividend increases tended to be an under-
reaction17: 
Even though the market appears to react briskly to dividend increase announcements, it may 
not react enough since we witness sizable post-announcement residuals. Indeed in years (+1) 
and (+2) we find an average abnormal upward adjustment of roughly 4% and 17 positive 
AR’s out of 24 [months]. Furthermore, the stocks’ average beta risk level hardly changes 
around dividend increases, keeping close to the 1.01 level. 
However, with respect to post-announcement drifts apparent in the event of dividend decreases, 
the average beta risk rose from 1.025 to 1.07 by the end of year (+2). Charest did find that 20 of 
the 24 monthly AR’s were negative and that there was an abnormal adjustment by the end of the 
                                                 
16 There has been a rich chronicle of research in the United States into the seasonal recurrence of abnormal returns 
associated with quarterly earnings announcements. This ranges from Jones and Litzenberger (1970) through to Ball 
and Bartov (1995), who provide an excellent who’s who of researchers in this field up till that time. In particular, 
Watts (1975), Foster (1977), and Griffin (1977) developed first-order moving average models showing the existence 
of serial correlation in seasonally differenced quarterly earnings; and their results were extended by Brown and 
Rozeff (1979), Bernard and Thomas (1990) and Bartov (1992), who reported a predictable (+ + 0 -) seasonal pattern 
over the four quarters sustaining an earnings drift discernible for up to four lags. Ball and Bartov (1995) went on to 
find that the day-of-the-week timing of earnings announcements was dependent on the nature of the earnings news 
(good or bad). 
17 Charest (1978), p. 306. 
14 
period of –0.69 percent. He also recorded an increase in the volatility of share prices over the 24 
months following the announcement of a dividend reduction. He commented18: 
We can provide no tested explanation as to why this would be the case. We can reason though 
that the implicit leverage of a stock generally increases when its price falls. Since dividend 
decreasing stocks see their prices fall quite a bit on the average, we can thus expect an 
upward reassessment of risk of such stocks. 
However, investigation of post-announcement drift in abnormal returns was not a feature of 
dividend signalling research in the 1980s even though Charest (1978) had erected a signpost to 
it. It was not until the mid-1990s that interest in the topic was properly kindled. However, this 
aspect of dividend signalling remains outside the purview of this thesis. 
2.2.2.3 Other Papers in the 1970s 
Using CRSP and COMPUSTAT data on 310 firms drawn from 1946 – 1967, Watts (1973) set 
out to determine empirically if dividends actually did function as a signal of upcoming earnings 
performance. He noted that previous researchers from Lintner (1956) onward were operating on 
the tacit assumption that the information content of dividends was an incontrovertible item of 
fact. In his introduction, he drew attention to the fact that this ‘information hypothesis’ was even 
widely recognized in texts on financial management. His regression of a time series of ‘future’ 
earnings on lagged variables representing current and past earnings and dividends, furnished a 
positive but weak connection between current dividends and future earnings; but that it was 
insufficient for the earning of anything more than trivial profits by investors. This gave Miller 
and Modigliani’s (1961) contention scant support. Watts dismissed the information content of 
dividends as economically inconsequential. 
Similarly, Gonedes (1978), using a COMPUSTAT and CRSP 285-firm data set from 1946 – 
1972, found that dividend announcements contained little information not contained in other 
contemporaneous announcements such as disclosures of extraordinary items. Gonedes’ approach 
was to compare the behaviour of the forecast error term at time t available from a version of 
Lintner’s (1956) model with changes in management’s predictive distribution of income for 
periods beyond time t. If there was unique information in the dividend announcement, then 
changes in the error term would be positively correlated with changes in income for periods 
beyond period t. But this was not the case. 
                                                 
18 Ibid, pp. 307 – 308. 
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Concurrently with Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969), Fama and Babiak (1968) had probed 
the nature of dividend setting by regressing dividend data from 392 firms drawn from a 19-year 
period 1946 – 1964 on prior observations as lagged variables . They found a significant 
relationship between announced and lagged dividends which implied that managers had a 
preference for relatively stable dividends smoothed towards a target payout ratio as explained by 
Lintner (1956). Therefore dividends could not be said to follow a random walk: they were 
systematically related to each other. This did imply, at a remove, that managers cared about what 
investors interpreted a dividend announcement to mean. Fama and Babiak followed Lintner in 
using change in earnings from period to period as their measure of share price return. 
Ross (1977) produced a general incentive-signalling model which was tested empirically with 
respect to dividends by Kalay (1980). Kalay, however, was unable to refute the existence of an 
information content or signal conveyed, in particular, by dividend cuts, since most of his sample 
of dividend-cutting firms cut their dividends at management’s discretion as distinct from 
involuntarily in response to constraints imposed by debt covenants. 
Two years earlier Charest (1978) had commented in a footnote upon a dividend-cutting 
behaviour which was strongly in line with Lintner’s finding concerning managers’ preference for 
a smooth transition to a target dividend payout ratio; and which also can be construed as 
providing roundabout evidence for the existence of dividend signalling. This behaviour was a 
reluctance to instigate what would essentially be a ‘bad-news’ announcement. Charest noted19: 
It was not uncommon for managers to break a stable dividend pattern by first delaying 
somewhat the announcement of the ‘normal’ dividend and then reducing or omitting the 
subsequent dividend. In such a case the time at which the delay becomes evident, not the 
delayed announcement, can be interpreted by a sharp trader as the point of dividend 
change.20 
However Charest was unable to go further than merely ‘entertain the suspicion’ that dividend 
increases and decreases transmitted information to investors on the ground that he was unable to 
separate the effects of earnings announcement and other confounding, synchronous 
announcement effects from that of the dividend announcement.21 Papers which were later to 
overcome the problems of this synchronicity are examined in Section 2.2.6 of this review. 
                                                 
19 Ibid, p. 299, Footnote 2. 
20 This point was taken up by Kalay and Loewenstein (1986), who confirmed the existence of a positive relationship 
between size of dividend reduction and the length of the delay of its announcement from the expected disclosure 
date. 
21 Charest (1978), Op. Cit 17, p. 306. 
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2.2.3 Dividend Signalling Theory: A Green Light for Research into Dividend 
Signalling 
2.2.3.1 Towards a Theory of Dividend Signalling 
Thus far in the research record, abnormal and excess returns associated with dividend 
announcements had been found; and post-announcement drifts had been recorded. It was 
inevitable that dividend announcement research would become recognized as a topic in its own 
right. This inevitability was underlined by Asquith and Mullins (1983) who tabled a set of 
raisons d’être for it. Further, a number of influential analytical papers provided a coherent tap 
root for a theory of dividend signalling 
2.2.3.2 Why Undertake Dividend Signalling Research? 
A succinct justification for dividend signalling research was provided by Asquith and Mullins 
(1983). They listed the following propositions22: 
1. Dividends are a transmission medium capable of broadcasting a signal to investors from 
managers concerning the latter group’s beliefs about the recent performance of their 
company and its future prospects. 
2. The signal transmitted in a dividend announcement provides a simple-to-understand 
company financial fitness report which is comprehensive in nature. On the other hand, other 
forms of company announcement, which tend to focus narrowly on some specific, 
specialized detail, lack this comprehensiveness. 
3. The announcement of a dividend obliges a firm to make a transfer of some of its wealth to 
the control of the shareholder — in the form of ‘cold hard cash.’ This transfer must either 
come from reserves the firm has on hand, or from funding newly raised in capital markets 
from investors who will only invest if they believe the company’s future prospects justify 
investment. 
4. Dividend announcements are highly visible compared with other announcements. 
5. Dividends, once initiated, become a periodic event upon which investors may come to rely. 
This differentiates the putative signal contained in dividend announcements from signals of a 
similar nature provided by the announcement of share repurchases, which tend not to have a 
regular, predictable timetable. 
                                                 
22 Asquith and Mullins (1983), p. 94. 
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2.2.3.3 Theoretical Models 
Bhattacharya (1979) developed a model based on the idea that the costliness to itself of a firm’s 
dividend payment made it a creditable signal of the firm’s financial outlook. Indeed, firms with 
profitable investment projects would be able, and keen, to pay higher dividends in order to 
segregate themselves from firms with less profitable prospects. Bhattacharya argued that when 
investors had only a short investment horizon, dividends would be high relative to expected 
earnings; but if investors intended to hold shares over longer periods, then the equilibrium ratio 
of dividends to expected earnings would be lower. 
Miller and Rock (1985) picked up the concept of costliness and argued that the relative cost of 
signalling any particular level of earnings would increase as the level of actual earnings achieved 
by a firm decreased. Noting that information asymmetry gave managers latitude to signal either 
correctly or duplicitously, Miller and Rock maintained that signalling would be worthwhile for 
profitable firms since the costs would be worth the effort of ensuring the market did not 
undervalue their shares. Conversely, the relatively higher cost of duplicitous signalling would be 
counter-productive for companies whose profitability was under threat. This latter proposition 
was countered by Ghosh (1993) who developed a theory of regret. 
A third signalling equilibrium model on this theme was produced by John and Williams (1985) 
who incorporated taxes and the concurrent issues of new shares. This equilibrium existed when, 
on the one hand, managers controlled dividends at an optimal dividend per share, and, on the 
other, investors paid the correct price in the market for the firm’s stock.23 John and Williams 
argued that managers with undisclosed inside knowledge of the firm’s robust prospects would 
use the signalling function of a dividend announcement in order to raise the share price so that 
when their firm issued new equity it could gain the benefit of a richer cash inflow. At the same 
time, the number of new shares issued would be minimized, thereby minimizing the dilution 
effect on current shareholders’ holdings. Dilution was a key variable. 
John and Williams’ model allowed for differences among firms in the marginal benefit to 
insiders of paying dividends. In the case of firms with excellent undisclosed prospects, investors 
would benefit from increased dividends and market-price-driven decreased dilution. These 
benefits would be balanced out, at equilibrium, by the increase in the personal taxes they would 
have to pay on the dividends received. In the case of firms with inferior undisclosed prospects, 
                                                 
23 John and Williams (1985), p. 1054. 
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the cost of a larger than appropriate dividend would wipe out any net benefit from reduced 
dilution. From this, the authors argued24: 
Consequently, there exists in the market a pricing function for stock that separates firms with 
more favorable inside information from those with less. In the resulting signalling 
equilibrium, firms with more favorable inside information optimally pay higher dividends, 
other things equal, and receive appropriately higher prices for their stock. 
The authors also argued that a firm in the posited state of equilibrium might, in fact, use new 
issues to both raise finance for project investments and also to fund the dividend. A couple of 
years later, Ambarish, John and Williams (1987) extended this dividend signalling model to link 
dividend signalling with both new share issues and capital investments. 
Hakansson (1982), on the other hand, provided an analysis of the information content of 
dividends in terms of a series of expansions of the dividend irrelevance proposition of Miller and 
Modigliani (1961). The propositions in Hakansson’s paper demonstrated that dividends do not 
provide useful new information when investors hold a homogeneous belief set; but if investors 
are heterogeneous in their beliefs, then dividend announcements do send a powerful signal.25 
In a paper documenting a behavioural analysis of managers, and which drew its data from a 
questionnaire survey, Ghosh (1993) posited a line of reasoning which reinforced the role of 
dividend signaling as a concept not regarded lightly by company insiders. Calling his line of 
reasoning a theory of regret, Ghosh advanced the proposition that managers in making dividend 
payout rate decisions with uncertain outcomes would experience regret if the outcome was worse 
than that of an alternative strategy, and pride, if it turned out to be superior. He proposed that a 
critical variable influencing a manager’s course of action was his or her subjective probability of 
success, where success or failures were measured as deviations from standard practice. 
From the responses to his questionnaire, Ghosh found that managers tended to reveal risk 
aversion in cases where they had a choice between paying a dividend now or cutting it now in 
order to achieve possibly greater profitability later via its redeployment now into the company’s 
investment projects. Risk aversion in this instance entailed playing safe with the dividend, and 
borrowing from external sources to fund investment. Conversely, Ghosh’s managers became 
risk-seeking when deciding dividend strategy in the context of losses. On average, they preferred 
to sustain on-going payments of high-risk dividends with borrowed funds. A refusal to cut 
dividends during periods of poor earnings enabled them to feel proud of their actions 
                                                 
24 Ibid, p. 1054. 
25 Hakansson (1982) p. 427. 
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retrospectively if their companies survived the difficulties and subsequently returned to 
profitability with stock price unscathed. Hence in both profitable and in unprofitable 
circumstances, managerial preference was for at least maintaining existing dividends — whether 
this be a risk-seeking or risk-averse course of action in the given context.26 The implication 
which may be drawn from Ghosh’s study is that managers appeared to be forging survival 
strategies, with the importance of the signaling function of a dividend announcement as a factor 
kept strongly in their minds. 
2.2.4 Short-term Price Effects Explored with the CAPM (Market) Model 
2.2.4.1 Subsection Introduction 
How actually did dividend announcements impact on share prices in the short term? If a 
signalling function was expected by investors, their immediate trading behaviour could be 
expected to push a firm’s share price upward or downward depending on their interpretation of 
the signal they believed was transmitted. If the signal implied future prosperity, then increased 
market demand would result in an increase in value. A signal with pessimistic implications 
would, conversely, decrease a share’s market price. This price effect was largely captured in the 
behaviour of abnormal returns (ARs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) generated by the 
Market Model. In terms of the evolving tree of research into a theory of dividend signalling, this 
is the tree’s main trunk. 
The short-term impact research record is dealt with under several subheadings. Subsection 
2.2.4.2 covers the extreme forms of announcement: the disclosure of dividend initiations from a 
background of a history of no dividend payments, and the disclosure of a cessation of dividends 
where the firm has made a tradition of distributing regular dividends. Subsection 2.2.4.3 then 
looks at papers in which increases and decreases relative to prior dividend distributions are 
examined. Subsection 2.2.4.4 then covers papers focusing on announcement-event induced share 
price volatility, while Subsection 2.2.4.5 looks at the impact on announcement-event abnormal 
returns of pre-existing price volatility and direction of price trend. Subsection 2.2.4.6 then takes 
into account the influence of company size, while Subsection 2.2.4.7 looks into intra-day price 
adjustments and finally, Subsection 2.2.4.8 deals with a paper examining the special case of 
                                                 
26 The line of thinking in which potential or actual losses produce risk-willing financial decision-making while 
receipt of positive gains fosters relatively risk-averse decision-making has been explored extensively over the past 
thirty years. One of the seminal papers in this genre was Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky’s paper, “Prospect 
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk” in Econometrica, March 1979, Volume 47, No. 2., pp. 263-291. 
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Japanese announcements where forward earnings and dividend projections are bundled up with 
current earnings and dividend disclosures. 
2.2.4.2 Impact of dividend Initiations and Omissions 
The first major empirical paper was Asquith and Mullins (1983), cited in Section 2.2.3.1 above. 
These authors examined the price behaviour of 168 NYSE- or ASE-listed firms initiating 
dividends after no prior dividend payouts, or at least none in the previous ten years.27 The 
dividend announcement data was obtained from Moodys’ Dividend Record, Standard and Poors’ 
Dividend Record, the Wall Street Journal and from the Centre for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP). The announcements were drawn from between the end of 1963 and 1980, which meant 
that the ten-year screening period extended back to the start of 1954.28 
Asquith and Mullins found the positive impact on share prices to be greater for firms which had 
not made earnings announcements either contemporaneously or within ten days of the dividend 
announcement as distinct from firms which did make such announcements. The subsample of 
firms issuing non-contemporaneous announcements furnished two-day excess returns of 4.7% 
(t = 5.88), while the equivalent result for firms issuing earnings announcements jointly or within 
the ten-day window was 2.5% (t = 3.08). The fact that a subsample of firms which had made 
other types of announcement either at the same time or within the ten-day window produced an 
even smaller, less spectacular result (1.6%, t = 1.78) enabled Asquith and Mullins to conclude 
that “other information appear[ed] to negate the impact at [sic] the dividend announcement by 
reducing the information content of the dividend announcement”.29 
                                                 
27 Asquith and Mullins (1983), op. cit. 22, pp. 79 – 82) noted that the disagreement among empirical studies, up to 
their time of writing, as to whether dividend announcements contained unique information stemmed from three 
sources. The first of these was inadequate recognition and control of other announcements, such as earnings 
announcements, occurring concurrently with the dividend announcement.  
The second source was the difficulty of isolating and controlling for investors’ expectations. Asquith and Mullins 
noted that prior studies tended to assume that any change in dividends was unexpected (a “naïve dividend 
expectations model”). They circumvented this problem themselves by concentrating on dividend initiations on the 
ground that initial dividends are likely not to have been expected. 
The third source of disagreement among prior studies is the relationship existing between the magnitude of 
dividends and the wealth effect. “Our results … suggest that previous studies may have underestimated the wealth 
effect of subsequent dividend increases.” The underestimation itself stemmed from a failure to determine with any 
accuracy investors’ expectations of dividends and from a failure to incorporate as a measure of the magnitude of 
dividend changes. Asquith and Mullins posed dividend yield and the size of dividend payout as appropriate ‘size’ 
variables. 
28 Ibid p. 83. 
29 Ibid p. 89. While Aharony and Swary (1980) demonstrated that dividend and earnings announcements were not 
perfect substitutes, Asquith and Mullins concluded that their own results indicated the two types of announcement 
may be partial substitutes with respect to information content. 
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Asquith and Mullins also recorded a positive and significant relationship between the magnitude 
of an initial dividend and the size of the excess return on the announcement day.30 Further, the 
authors noticed, once adjustments had been made for differences in the magnitude of ensuing 
dividend announcements, that subsequent dividend increases had an even larger effect. This was 
consistent with the presence of unique, valuable information inside the announcements. The 
positive impact of dividend initiations was reconfirmed by Wansley and Lane (1987). 
Healy and Palepu (1988), using 131 firms from Asquith and Mullins’ (1983) 168-firm 1969-
1980 sample, found that statistically significant abnormal returns (called market adjusted returns 
derived from CRSP equal-weighted market returns) were generated over not only the 
announcement and preceding day, but also over the first ten-day period following the 
announcement. However, returns beyond the tenth day after the event were statistically 
insignificant. On the other hand, the returns from three holding periods spanning the 60 days 
preceding the announcement were significant as well.31 Healy and Palepu concluded that this 
was evidence of investors anticipating the nature of the dividend announcement from other 
information sources in advance.32 
Healy and Palepu also observed the abnormal returns associated with dividend omissions. In this 
instance they used 172-firm observations from 1969-1980, and again obtained from CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT. In this instance, the abnormal returns were significant and negative on the 
announcement and immediately preceding day, and over the three holding periods spanning the 
preceding 60 days. However, neither the ten-day span following on from the two-day event 
period, nor the ten-day span after that yielded statistically significant results, although the 
recorded returns continued to be negative.33 
Ghosh and Woolridge (1991) focused on the impact of successive dividend omission 
announcements as a test for the information content of dividend announcements. They argued 
that the market reaction to consecutively occurring announcements should dwindle as non-
payouts came to be expected. Ghosh and Woolridge found that the first announcement tended to 
be associated with a statistically significant drop in share price, and that ensuing announcements 
did not have a significant impact. 
Phillips, Baker and Edelman (1997), studied the market’s reactions to discontinuation of stock 
dividends (known in New Zealand as bonus shares) by NYSE and AMEX-listed companies. 
                                                 
30 Ibid, p. 91. 
31 Healy and Palepu (1988), p. 156, Table 2. 
32 Ibid, p. 157. 
33 Ibid, pp. 156 – 157. 
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Generally firms that discontinued stock dividends generated statistically insignificant abnormal 
returns at the time of the announcement. However, a concurrent declaration of an increased cash 
dividend overwhelmed this tendency by generating significant positive abnormal returns. 
2.2.4.3 Impact of Dividend Increases and Decreases 
Divecha and Morse (1983) hypothesized that an announced increase in dividend payout would 
convey more favorable information to the market than an announcement of a decrease — if the 
increased payouts were associated with financing investment with externally generated funds. 
These authors observed the Abnormal Returns (ARs) generated by shares of 668 NYSE 
companies making 1039 payout change disclosures between May 1977 and February 1979, and 
found that firms in the increased-payout category did earn higher positive ARs than their payout 
decreasing counterparts. Divecha and Morse also found that a rise in dividend and a fall in 
payout ratio produced higher ARs than a rise in both variables. 
By way of contrast, Woolridge and Ghosh (1985), reporting case studies of two US companies, 
Gould Inc. and ITT in 1983 and 1984, showed that a company which announced a decrease in 
dividend payout could actually increase its share price on the day the cut was announced. The 
necessary condition for this outcome was a prior publicity campaign about the need for internally 
generated funds for a major investment project. 
Penman (1983) was another paper confirming that dividend announcements produced 
statistically significant excess returns on the date of the announcement and on the preceding 
day.34 Further 1980s decade empirical papers investigating the share-price-based market reaction 
of changes in dividends include Aharony and Swary (1980), Woolridge (1982), Benesh, Keown 
and Pinkerton (1984), Dielman and Oppenheimer (1984), Eades, Hess and Kim (1985), Roy and 
Cheung (1985), Aharony, Falk and Swary (1988), and Fehrs, Benesh and Peterson (1988). 
In the 1990s, there were a number of interesting papers. Impson (1997) investigated the 
difference between American public utilities and unregulated firms and found that investors 
punished utilities more severely for announcing dividend decreases than they did unregulated 
firms. He ascribed this phenomenon to two things. In part, it was a result of investors having 
segregated themselves into a clientele requiring high dividend yields, which then reacted to the 
lowering of those yields. And in part it was a reaction to the signalling of poor future earnings by 
                                                 
34 Penman (1983). See Table 6, p. 1194. Announcement Day (day zero) and the preceding two days furnish 
significant excess returns according to a t-test, but Day–2 loses its significance under an alternative cross-sectional 
correlation test. 
23 
a firm type whose earning power was bounded by statutory authority and therefore more 
restricted than that of unregulated firms. 
Waller, Bendeck and Bhargava (1999) examined the information content of sequences of 
multiple dividend reductions by a small and rather specialized sample of 284 firms fitting this 
announcement behaviour and listed on the NYSE from 1971 to 1989. Using a measure of 
standardized earnings changes (SEC), they showed that announcement-period abnormal returns 
were significantly related to SEC over the first two post-announcement years. In other words, a 
subsequent dividend reduction contained two years worth of information about future earnings 
performance. The authors concluded that the share price response depended on the timing of this 
subsequent reduction relative to the initial reduction.35 
While by the mid 1990s it was generally well established that a firm’s announcement of a 
dividend reduction would be punished with a lowered share-price by the market, there was still 
room for debate as to what this price-drop would be, and how it would differ over different 
magnitudes of announced dividend reduction. 
This issue was addressed by Christie (1994), who observed the effect of magnitudes of dividend 
reduction expressed as percentages. Christie found a U-shaped relation instead of the expected 
monotonic relation in which the share price punishment associated with omissions should exceed 
that of the worst percentage reduction. Indeed, dividend reductions of less than 20 percent 
elicited an average price fall of 4.95 percent, while reductions exceeding 60 percent (but less 
than 100 percent) engendered a fall of 8.78 percent; but the total omission of a dividend brought 
about an average fall of only 6.94 percent.36 Christie’s ensuing tests of investment-opportunity-
related and distress-related explanations of this U-shaped phenomenon were unable to account 
for it. His data set was 492 dividend omission announcements and 475 announcements of 
dividend reductions made by NYSE- and AMEX-listed firms between July 1962 and December 
1985. 
Amihud and Murgia (1997) provided a valuable contribution to dividend signalling research by 
showing, with respect to the behaviour of German firms and investors, that dividend signalling 
occurs even when dividends are taxed at a rate equal to or less than the rate on capital gains in 
the hands of investors. The finding of statistically significant averaged excess returns on days t-1 
and t0 at the time of a dividend announcement effectively scuttled Bhattacharya’s (1979) 
argument that (relatively high) taxes were a necessary condition, in terms of his model, for 
                                                 
35 Waller, Bendeck and Bhargava (1999), p. 44. 
36 Christie (1994), p. 460. 
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signalling to occur. Nevertheless, they noted that Bernheim and Wantz (1995) had shown that 
tax was an active ingredient in the signalling process. 
Germany, in the period under observation,37 had a system of imputation credits in place. Hence, 
the company paid tax on income at the company rate, while investors paid tax on any dividends 
they received at their own marginal rate. Where (with a partial exception in the case of 
foreigners) an investor’s marginal tax rate was below the company tax rate, the investor received 
the difference in the form of a tax credit. 
Further, German firms tended to announce their dividends at a later date than their 
announcements of earnings. Amihud and Murgia concluded that the content of the dividend 
signal definitely related to current earnings. They pointed out that earnings announcements 
would tend, in the German context, to provide an insufficiently clear picture of company health 
as German accounting standards allow for much less disclosure.38 
Travlos, Trigeorgis and Vafeas (2001) found ARs and Cumulative Abnormal Returns  (CARs) 
associated with dividend announcements made on the Cyprus Stock Exchange but were unable 
to determine with much confidence whether the announcement of cash dividends contained a 
signal relating to improved future levels of earnings or not.39 
2.2.4.4 Impact on Post-announcement Price Volatility 
Sant and Cowan (1994) found that the volatility of returns on a firm’s share price increased 
significantly in the aftermath of the omission of a dividend. Similarly the firm’s beta, the 
variance of actual earnings and the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts became larger. This 
confirmed Charest’s (1978) finding with respect to announced dividend reductions; and was in 
keeping with Venkatesh’s (1989) recording of a reduction in volatility in conjunction with 
dividend initiation announcements. 
2.2.4.5 The Impact of Pre-existing Price Volatility on Announcement Period 
Abnormal Returns 
Docking and Koch (1999) investigated the relationship between stock returns to investors and 
the market context in which the dividend announcement was made. What they measured was the 
sensitivity of mean cumulative abnormal returns (MCARs) associated with dividend 
announcements to a measure of recent market trend and also to a measure of share market 
                                                 
37 Amihud and Murgia (1997). The period investigated was 1988 – 1992. 
38 Ibid, p. 397. 
39 Travlos, Trigeorgis and Vafeas (2001) used 181 cash dividend announcements on the Cyprus Stock Exchange and 
its less formal forbear in the period 1985 – 1995. These announcements were made by 31 firms. 
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volatility over the same lead period. Initially they partitioned their 1962 – 1997 sample of 4,344 
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ company announcements separately by recent trend and then by 
recent volatility. This, however, yielded no significant results. But Docking and Koch did find 
significant systematic amplifications in their measured MCARs when they partitioned their 
sample by both market variables simultaneously. 
The trend and volatility variables were measured over a period of 29 days prior to the 
announcement (t-30 – t-2) while the MCARs were measured over days t-1 and t0. Trend was 
measured in terms of the period’s mean, and volatility was captured by its standard deviation; 
and both were divided into three levels. The top quartile of market means were classified as 
being the up market, while the middle two quartiles represented the normal market and the 
lowest quartile was the down market. The market volatility variable was classified in a similar 
manner into high, medium and low volatility. 
Docking and Koch found that MCARs associated with dividend-increase announcements made 
when the market had high volatility and normal or low market direction were significantly larger 
than when the market had medium volatility and an up trend. Similarly, dividend decreases 
partitioned simultaneously by the two market measures produced amplified negative MCARs in 
the up-high market category which were significantly different from those in the up-medium, up-
low, normal-high, normal-medium, normal-low, down-high and down-medium categories. 
Further, on a sample of 2,221 announcements for which data for six explanatory variables were 
available, Docking and Koch found that the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) associated with 
dividend increases were significantly related to the size of the firm (as measured by the log of the 
market equity). This relationship between company size and CARs drowned out the importance 
of a book-to-market ratio variable which was significant when the sample was partitioned by 
volatility alone. Size was also important when the sample was partitioned by market trend alone. 
In this instance it was significant when there was an up market or a down market. With respect to 
the down trend, larger firms generated larger CARs than did smaller firms upon increasing their 
dividend. When the market trend was normal, dividend yield was significantly related to the 
CARs. 
This clear picture with respect to the role of company size on CARs in the presence of trend and 
volatility tended to disappear when Docking and Koch turned their attention to announcements 
of dividend decreases. When these were partitioned by market direction alone, dividend yield 
was significant and negative with respect to CARs in all three directional categories. Size was 
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important in the down market; and both size and book-to-market ratio were significant when the 
market direction was normal. 
When the partitioning of dividend-decrease announcements was done on volatility in isolation, 
dividend yield again was significant over all three categories, while size had significantly 
positive relationship with CARs in the medium and low volatility markets. Size was replaced by 
a significant negative relation between CARs and book-to-market ratio when volatility was high. 
When the dividend-decrease sample was partitioned by both market variables, dividend yield 
was significant and negative under up-high and down-high (direction-volatility) conditions. 
However, the book-to-market ratio was the most important explanatory variable under the 
normal-high market configuration. 
2.2.4.6 Abnormal Returns and the Company Size Effect 
Towards the end of the 1980s a number of papers investigated the linkage between aspects of 
dividend signalling and firm size. In the United States, Eddy and Seifert (1988), using market 
value of a firm’s common stock as a proxy for the size variable, and Ghosh and Woolridge 
(1988), using the log of the market value of outstanding shares as their proxy, found that the 
dividend announcements of small firms tended to produce larger abnormal returns than those 
yielded by larger companies. 
Bajaj and Vijh (1990) observed the relationship between dividend announcement effects and 
firm size with respect to Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) concept of the existence of dividend-
sensitive clienteles. Then also examined the connection between dividend announcement 
surprises and dividend yield surprises (which are generally inseparable).40 They found that both 
phenomena were associated with larger measures of ARs for the lower-priced shares of small 
CRSP-listed companies than for large companies. This was because the presence of higher 
transactions costs would be likely to produce a stronger yield surprise effect while the relative 
lack of information produced at other times by such firms would intensify the information effect. 
Haw and Kim (1991) found that the smallest-sized firms in their study returned the highest ARs 
of all, but that these returns did not decline monotonically as the size of the firms observed was 
increased.41 Further, when they observed the impact of their company size variable on ARs 
associated with announcements of dividend decreases, it was only marginally significant.42 The 
                                                 
40 Bajaj and Vijh (1990), p. 195: “… [D]ividend surprises are perfectly correlated with dividend-yield surprises. 
Dividend-yield surprise is simply the dividend surprise divided by the preannouncement price.” 
41 Haw and Kim (1991), p. 338. 
42 Ibid, p. 340. 
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authors also recorded an increase in dividend yield of 1 percent associated with a 1.98 percent 
increase in AR on announcement date.43 
Across the Atlantic Ocean, Lonie, Sinclair and Power (1992) reconfirmed the finding by 
Chowdhury and Miles (1987) that small United Kingdom companies reduced their dividends 
more readily than their larger counterparts when under financial stress. Another UK paper, Fox 
and Green (1992) noted that small companies tended to have lower payout ratios than large 
companies. Further UK work was produced in this area by Marsh (1993). Abeyratna (1994) 
found that the earnings and dividend announcements of small UK companies tended to generate 
greater ARs than those of large UK firms. This was in line with the argument that small firms’ 
dividend announcements are more likely to have a greater surprise element to them (relating to 
the lesser likelihood of prior publicity in the financial media). 
Bajaj and Vijh (1995) investigated the role of company size in the occurrence of announcement-
related excess returns, volatility and excess trading volumes. They found indeed, that smaller 
firms tended to furnish relatively larger measures of all three variables. However, contrary to 
Kalay and Loewenstein’s (1986) finding that the rise in systematic risk (measured by beta) 
during the announcement period was too small to account for excess returns for firms generally, 
Bajaj and Vijh determined with a weighted least squares regression that the increased riskiness 
of smaller companies explained observed announcement period excess returns with a 1 percent 
likelihood of a type one error.44 They found a similarly strong relation between risk and excess 
volume with respect to firm size. They concluded that the investors who set the share price in 
and about the announcement period were ‘information-motivated’ and at least partially operating 
on private information. Also the excess returns they generated were viewable as ‘compensation 
for the risk borne during the information production’.45 
2.2.4.7 Intra-day Price Adjustments 
Patell and Wolfson (1984) observed the intraday speed of adjustment of share prices to earnings 
announcements and to dividend announcements on 96 firms listed on either the NYSE or AMEX 
in 1976 and 1977. While unchanged dividends elicited no response, these researchers found a 
significant ultra-short-term price reaction to earnings announcements and announcements of 
changes in dividend. This price reaction passed its peak within the first fifteen minutes of an 
                                                 
43 Ibid, p. 339. 
44 Bajaj and Vijh (1995), p. 274. 
45 Ibid, p. 277. 
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announcement’s publication. They found that the serial correlation associated with these 
announcements tended to extend into the following day. 
2.2.4.8 The Special Case of Japanese Announcements 
Conroy, Eades and Harris (2000) conducted an analysis of 3,890 joint dividend-and-earnings 
announcements of companies listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange over a period spanning 1988 
to 1993. This study was of interest because Japanese listed companies not only disclose their 
annual earnings and dividends jointly, but also bundle this with a formal estimate of projected 
earnings and dividend one year into the future. Furthermore, these disclosures are preceded in 
the Japanese financial press by analysts’ predictions of all four components of the compound 
announcement. The authors employed four measures of surprise (for current earnings, current 
dividend, and next year’s earnings and next year’s dividend) based on the difference between 
company figures and preceding analysts’ predictions; and their two-day cumulative abnormal 
returns spanning the announcement period (t0 and t1) were cumulated from returns on holding a 
share minus returns on a suitable equal-weighted market index. 
Given the wealth of evidence in the research record, in general, of the impact of earnings 
announcements on associated CARs, it was unsurprising that Conroy et al found that both 
current and next-year projected earnings produced statistically significant positive CARs; but it 
was interesting that current dividends were not significantly related to CARs of any sort. Instead, 
it was the one-year forward dividend projection that produced a significant and positive 
relationship. This configuration of results held up robustly when tested for sensitivity to a 
number of Japanese market-related phenomena including the preponderance of ‘keiritsu’ or 
mutually interlocked companies in the Japanese business world.46 Conroy et al interpreted their 
results as support for Miller and Modigliani’s proposition of dividend irrelevance. However a 
possible alternative interpretation might have been that investors in Japan were turning to the 
formal forward projection for the information signal that in other countries is furnished by the 
announcement of the current dividend only. Conroy et al did not discuss this possibility. 
                                                 
46 Conroy, Eades and Harris (2000), p.1202. The authors describe the keiritsu phenomenon as a grouping of 
companies bound together in an industrial grouping with strong horizontal and vertical linkages. This is cemented 
by the nature of each constituent company’s board, which is interlocked with all of the others by the fact of sharing 
directors drawn from the same pool of keiritsu insiders. Further, each keiritsu has at its centre, a financial institution 
such as a bank, which meets most of the group’s financing needs, thereby reducing the need for raising cash via 
issues of securities of any sort to outsiders.  
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2.2.5 The Relationship between Dividends Announced and the Quality of 
Earnings 
2.2.5.1 Section Introduction 
In Section 2.2.4, the relationship between the dividend announcement and short-term changes in 
share prices was observed and discussed. That section provided evidence that investors did 
indeed react to something contained within the announcement; and that this reaction entailed the 
buying or selling of the firm’s shares. But why should they bother? They would only do this if 
there was information implied in the dividend announcement to which they lend some credence. 
The information investors are most likely to base their desire for investment or disinvestment on 
is information about the firm’s future earnings prospects. In this new section, the evidence of a 
connection between the dividend announcement and real changes in company earnings levels is 
examined. In Subsection 2.2.5.2, the connection with past and current earnings is observed. In 
Subsection 2.2.5.3, attention is directed to the connection between the dividend announcement 
and future earnings. In Subsection 2.2.5.4, the variable, future earnings is used as a means of 
identifying categories of dividend announcement. In Subsection 2.2.5.5 the connection between 
the dividend announcement and future earnings volatility is examined. 
2.2.5.2 Relationship with Past and Current Earnings 
That there should be a connection between the level of an announced dividend and the firm’s 
ability to pay it at the time the payment falls due is common sense and unremarkable. 
Nevertheless, this connection needed to be formally established, and indeed was established by 
Lintner (1956). 
The connection was reconfirmed by Fama and Babiak (1968). They subjected change in 
dividends (as dependent variable) to a number of regressions in which current and subsequent 
earnings, cash flow, and capital expenditure, and even prior-period dividends were employed as 
independent variables. Of particular relevance was their confirmation of a statistically significant 
relationship between announced dividends and current earnings. Fama and Babiak’s share price 
return measure, which was to become pretty much the standard in ensuing research, were ARs 
and CARs generated by the Market Model.47 
Penman (1983) observed the predictive content of dividend announcements and compared them 
with the predictive power of earnings forecasts made by the given firm’s managers. He found 
                                                 
47 Pettit (1972), pp. 995 – 996. 
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that forecasts based on dividends were more accurate predictors of current earnings performance 
than were forecasts of earnings directly.48 
2.2.5.3 The Relationship between Dividends Announced and the Quality of 
Future Earnings 
In terms of dividend signalling, an insight into the nature of future earnings would be much more 
valuable to investors than just information about current earnings. There is now quite a rich 
record of papers in which faith in the existence of that insight appears to be justified. I start with 
Ofer and Siegel (1987). 
Ofer and Siegel determined that unexpected changes in dividends signalled information 
concerning future earnings. Ofer and Siegel used 781 dividend events and associated share price 
data from CRSP in conjunction with earnings forecast data provided from the Investment 
Brokers Estimate System data base (IBES) covering NYSE and AMEX firms in the period 1976 
– 1984. The focus of their observation was the change in analysts’ earnings forecasts occurring 
as a result of receipt of the dividend announcement. They showed that an unexpected dividend 
change did provide cues to analysts who altered their forecasts to rationally incorporate the 
information interpreted as residing in the dividend change. Ofer and Siegel found that the 
analysts’ earnings forecast errors displayed systematic errors in advance of the announcement of 
an unexpected dividend change; and that in the ensuing time interval between that announcement 
and the firm’s point of disclosure of actual earnings, the systematic element in forecast errors 
disappeared. This result suggested that Ofer and Siegal’s analysts were picking up a signal from 
the dividend announcement concerning the firm’s expected earnings performance.49 
Healy and Palepu (1988), who had obtained a sample of 131 initiation announcements and 172 
omission announcements and who had reported the generation of abnormal returns associated 
with both announcement types (discussed in Subsection 2.2.4.2) also systematically observed the 
relationship between each announcement and annual earnings for the preceding five years (ie, t-5 
to t-1) and the ensuing five years (t0 to t4), where the standardized measurement of annual 
earnings was the difference (deflated by the share price recorded two days before the dividend 
announcement) between earnings for year t and the previous year’s earnings figure. 
With respect to the initiation announcements, Healy and Palepu found that earnings changes in 
the year running up to the announcement (t-1) were positive and statistically significant; and that 
                                                 
48 Penman (1983), Op. Cit. 42, p. 1185. 
49 Ofer and Siegel (1987), p. 906. 
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the earnings growth continued in the year starting with the announcement (t0) and the following 
two years.50 With respect to their dividend omission sample, the authors found statistically 
significant earnings changes in all years over a five-year span starting from two years before the 
announcement date (t-2) through to three years afterwards (t0, t1 and t2). As one would expect, the 
earnings changes recorded prior to the omission announcement data were negative in sign. What 
was of special interest was that the direction of the earnings change was reversed for the second 
and third years (t1 and t2) afterward. The earnings changes recorded in these years were 
significant and positive.51 Healy and Palepu pondered that the two years of positive earnings 
changes might be attributed to a survival bias built into their data set by the fact that earnings 
data had to be available for a firm up to five years after the date of a dividend announcement.52 
Healy and Palepu went on to examine as to whether the future standardized earnings mentioned 
above could be shown to be evidence of an actual signal picked up by investors from the 
dividend announcement. Their argument is as follows: 
1. Abnormal returns at the time of the dividend announcement event are indicative of an 
investor reaction to an incentive (message) spurring them to buy or sell shares. 
2. The changes in standardized annual earnings for years t0, t1, t2, t3 and t4 are the message 
from the dividend announcement in their eventual confirmed outcome form. 
3. A significant positive relationship between points (1) and (2) indicate that an information 
signal concerning future earnings was transmitted and received. The occurrence of the 
returns in (1) confirms that investors took up the message; and the occurrence of the 
earnings pattern in (2) confirms the message content. 
In investigating the relationship between event period returns and future earnings, the authors 
also controlled for the impact of earnings changes in the immediately prior future period and for 
earnings information releases in the year leading up to the dividend announcement event. They 
ran a multiple regression for each year of future earnings data available. With respect to dividend 
initiations, standardized earnings changes (the dependent variable) were significantly related 
with event-period returns in the first two years (t0 and t1), but in none of the ensuing three years. 
With respect to dividend omissions, the first two years (t0 and t1) furnished similar results; and in 
                                                 
50 Healy and Palepu (1988) Op. Cit. 39, p. 159. See Table 3. It appears that the result for year t1 is only marginally 
significant; but the result for year t2 is much more strongly so. These results apply for both raw earnings changes 
and for earnings changes adjusted for industry type. 
51 Ibid p. 161. See Table 5. When earnings changes were adjusted for industry type, the earnings change for year t-2 
lost its significant status. 
52 Ibid, p. 163. 
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year four (t3) a significant negative relationship was recorded. With the exception of this last 
item (the year-four negative relationship) which is rather hard to interpret, these findings enabled 
the authors to claim that the information content of the dividend announcement did exist, was 
understood by investors with respect to the two years following the dividend announcement, and 
was acted upon.53 
Olson and McCann (1994), who ran a logit regression reconfirmed that there is a linkage 
between dividends and earnings. They found that firms which used dividends as a signal tended 
to have a higher growth in asset turnover, to be smaller in size, have lower growth in sales, and 
to use less leverage than non-signallers. This tendency was intensified in the case of firms which 
followed both signalling and residual dividend policies. 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1992), using COMPUSTAT and CRSP data for firms 
reporting at least one annual loss in the period spanning 1980 – 1985, found that earnings tended 
to rebound substantially after the initial loss year, irrespective of whether the firm chose to 
reduce its dividend or leave it unchanged. However, the future earnings levels of dividend-
reducing firms was significantly lower than those of the non-reducers.54 Therefore the signal 
within the dividend reduction announcement could be interpreted as a reduction in expected level 
of future earnings. This enhanced investors’ ability to use the firm’s subsequently-announced 
current earnings as a predictor of its future earnings. The data set De Angelo et al used in this 
instance, was restricted to 167 NYSE firms with a record of a prior ten years of positive earnings 
and dividend payouts. 
The next research findings of interest were furnished by Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995). 
This paper was largely concerned with post announcement share price drifts. But with respect to 
future earnings, the authors provided evidence that an announcement of an increased dividend 
could be interpreted as signalling that the current level of earnings would be sustained into the 
future. The data set in this instance was made up of 1972 – 1988 quarterly earnings data 
(obtained from COMPUSTAT) which were compared with a subsample of associated dividend 
announcements from the 1964 – 1988 NYSE/AMEX data set of dividend initiating and omitting 
firms used more generally in Michaely et al’s paper. The authors observed quarterly earnings 
                                                 
53 Ibid, pp. 165 – 169. Also see Table 7, p. 165. 
54 DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1992). These authors also published a paper two years earlier which, while empirically 
investigating the connection between financial distress and dividend policy with respect to 80 distressed NYSE 
firms, does not address the issue of dividend signalling. Nevertheless, they found that managers react to financial 
distress ‘with rapid and aggressive dividend reductions’ (p. 1430), and that managers prefer to reduce dividends 
rather than omit them altogether (p. 1424). See Harry DeAngelo and Linda DeAngelo, ‘Dividend Policy and 
Financial Distress: An Empirical Investigation of Troubled NYSE Firms’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 45 No. 5, 
December 1990. 
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figures for up to one year before and one year after the dividend announcement event. In 
particular, the quarterly mean earnings surprises associated with announcements of dividend 
increases were positive for all four quarters leading up to the event and continued to be so for the 
following three, but not the fourth.55 In the case of dividend-decrease announcements, the pattern 
of quarterly earnings surprises was uniformly negative over the preceding year and likewise for 
the first three quarters in the year following on from the event.56 With respect to earnings 
volatility, they found that dividend-increasing firms tended to enjoy greater long-term earnings 
stability than did a control set of unchanged-dividend announcers. 
A related paper, Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) went on to find, however, that increases 
in dividends were predictors of a concurrent rise in earnings to a new sustainable level, but that 
there was no significant connection between raised dividends and any growth in earnings over 
the next two years. (Watts (1973) had concluded that the relation was statistically significant, but 
economically negligible.) Their regression sample contained 4,996 firm-year observations from 
the NYSE and AMEX in the period 1979 – 1991. 
Nevertheless, Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) were able to corroborate Michaely, Thaler 
and Womack’s (1995) finding that the shares of firms announcing increased dividends generated 
significant excess returns during both the announcement event period and over the following 
three years. Putting these findings together, they observed57: 
This implies that if firms are sending a signal, (a) it is not a signal about future earnings 
growth and (b) the market doesn’t ‘get it’ Why firms would burn money to send a signal that 
is not received is, indeed, a mystery. 
The apparent absurdity of the situation deepened with the results obtained from the researchers’ 
observations of the growth behaviour of future earnings and excess returns associated with the 
set of dividend-reducing announcements in their sample. On the one hand, they observed a 
statistically significant pattern of earnings increases over the following two years — a finding in 
line with Healy and Palepu (1988) who found statistically significant earnings increases in the 
first two years after a dividend omission.58 On the other, the three years following the 
announcement did not furnish significant excess returns. In other words, there appeared to be 
                                                 
55 Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995), p. 590, Table 4, Panel A. An earnings surprise was defined as the 
difference between earnings before extraordinary items at time t0 and the equivalent figure for four quarters earlier 
(t-4), where this difference was deflated by the share price existing at time t-4. 
56 Ibid, p. 590, Table 4, Panel B. 
57 Michaely, Womack and Thaler (1997), p. 1009. 
58 Healy and Palepu (1988), Op. Cit. 39, p. 162. 
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real content in the reduced-dividend signal, but evidently nobody was picking up that aspect of 
the signal. 
Making use of Michaely, Thaler and Womack’s (1995) data set to explore a possible 
informational difference between dividend initiations and dividend increases, Benartzi et al 
showed that dividend initiating firms did indeed enjoy strong earnings growth in the two years 
following the initiation announcement whereas no such growth was associated with 
announcements of mere increases. Both dividend reductions and omissions, however, were 
followed up with improved earnings growth (i.e., a strong earnings reversal) over the same 
interval. 
It was inevitable that the work of Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) would attract ongoing 
attention. A major contribution in this respect was made by Nissim and Ziv (2001), using a 35-
year data set (1963 – 1998).59 
Initially Nissim and Ziv simply recalculated Benartzi et al’s method on their current data set and 
obtained results very much in line with those that Benartzi et al had published — that future 
earnings in years t1 and t2 were unrelated to any dividend announcement at time t0. However, 
Nissim and Ziv argued that these results, in the first instance, may have been bedevilled by a 
measurement error implicit in the dependent variable, ‘change in earnings in year t’,60 as a result 
of reliance on the assumption that earnings in a given year were unrelated to earnings in the 
previous year. This assumption was tenable if undeflated earnings were being put under scrutiny, 
but not when the variable under scrutiny was a change in earnings figure that had been 
standardized by being deflated by the market value of equity in the preceding year (Pt-1). The 
market value of equity in the preceding period must definitely be correlated with the value of 
earnings in that period. Nissim and Ziv addressed the measurement error by replacing Pt-1 with 
the book value of equity in the preceding year, Bt-1. 
The second methodological issue, Nissim and Ziv argued, was that Benartzi et al, in calculating 
the relationship between future earnings and current dividends, had omitted an important 
explanatory variable — the ratio of earnings to book equity in the previous period, ROEt-1. This 
                                                 
59 Nissim and Ziv (2001), pp. 2113 – 2115 and Table 1. These researchers used monthly CRSP dividend information 
for NYSE or AMEX-listed companies, and supplemented this with accounting and market value data from 
COMPUSTAT, and with analysts’ earnings forecasts from IBES. They started with 100,666 quarterly dividend 
observations provided by 2,216 firms; but given that more than one observation was possible in a year for a firm, 
this translated to a set of 31,806 firm-year observations. 
60 Ibid, p 2116. This variable was measured by (Et – Et-1)/P-1. Their solution was to replace the denominator, P-1 
(market value per share of common equity in the preceding period) by B-1, the book value per share of common 
equity. 
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variable was important, as research by Ohlson and Penman (1982) and Fama and French (2001) 
had shown not only that ROE was a predictor of change in earnings, but it was also mean 
reverting. Nissim and Ziv inferred from this that dividend changes, being positively aligned with 
ROE, would (all things being equal) be negatively correlated with the expected change in 
earnings. If this were true, then an identified absence of such a correlation would show that the 
announcement of a dividend change did contain future earnings information. Nissim and Ziv 
accordingly inserted ROEt-1 into their pooled regressions. 
Nissim and Ziv found that dividend-increase announcements did indeed signal an increase in 
future earnings that was statistically significant over the following four years. On the other hand, 
announcements of dividend reductions, when controlled for current and expected profitability, 
were uninformative about future earnings. They explained this asymmetry in terms of a variable 
which occurred only in the presence of current losses and potentially ongoing future non-
profitability — the managerial decision to take a once-only big bath.61 Big baths in conjunction 
with the rebalancing of a firm’s capital structure could facilitate a company’s fairly rapid return 
to financial health. Nissim and Ziv’s results were robust to a number of specifications of their 
variables. 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1996) set out to test the validity of the tenet that a dividend 
increase is a signal of future earnings growth by observing the dividend and price behaviour of 
NYSE firms which had had a history of at least 9 years of positive growth and dividend payouts 
followed from time zero onward by at least a four-year doldrums period of essentially zero 
growth. The dividend signal under scrutiny was the signal purported to be in the announcement 
made at time zero (t0). The authors related this, for two categories of announcer, to the following 
four years of reported earnings. Of the 145 firm-announcements in the sample, 99 actually 
increased the t0 dividend, while 44 left it unchanged from the previous period and only two firms 
(1.4 percent of the sample) reduced their dividend. The latter two categories were bundled as 
dividend non-increasers. 
With respect to the dividend-increasing firms at t0, DeAngelo et al recorded a statistically 
significant positive two-day CARs with a mean slightly larger than half of one percent of the 
                                                 
61 A big bath entails maximizing the declaration of losses in the current accounting period in the hope of minimizing 
related future losses. Usually fixed assets will be overvalued in a company’s balance sheet relative to their market 
value; and the big bath entails writing these down and declaring the write-down as a current period extraordinary 
loss. The benefit of such a move is that depreciation expense in future periods on these assets will be 
correspondingly lower. 
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share price.62 This indicated the announcements in the sample did provide evidence of a signal; 
and that at least some investors did react to its good news content. However, in terms of CARs 
cumulated from 15 days before the announcement event to 15 days afterwards, the change in 
value of a share was miniscule (seven tenths of one percent). The authors interpreted this as 
indicating that investors over the month span as a whole, were neither impressed nor 
unimpressed with the company’s future earnings prospects.63 In other words, the signal was a 
pretty weak one. 
When the cumulative earnings record for the ensuing three years (t1, t2 and t3) were examined, 
DeAngelo et al’s dividend increasers averaged an earnings decline of 8.2 percent, which was 
worse than the non-increasers’ decline over the same period (7.0 percent). The two declines were 
individually statistically significant,64 but the significance disappeared when they were directly 
compared. With respect, again, to the dividend increasers, the authors concluded that whatever 
signalling took place at t0 could be attributed to several possible causes (listed as explanations 5 
and 6 of a list of six in which the others were rejected)65: 
5 Because managers tend to be overly optimistic about company growth, they send signals 
that are overly optimistic about future earnings. 
6 Managers make only modest cash commitments when they increase dividends, which 
undermines the reliability of such signals. 
The authors found that only twelve of the dividend-increasing firms in their sample had 
managers who behaved overly optimistically (reason 5), while the managers of a further 63 had 
announced dividend increases averaging only 3.5 percent of earnings (reason 6). DeAngelo et al 
argued that any signal furnished by such a modest increment would be too small to be a reliable 
predictor of future earnings as it would not allow firms with superior prospects to be 
differentiated from those with inferior prospects.66 This conclusion was supported by their 
finding that the earnings performance of the dividend increasers could not be distinguished from 
that of the dividend non-increasers over the ensuing three years. 
                                                 
62 DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1996), pp. 357 – 358. See Panel A of Table 5. 
63 Ibid, pp. 358 – 359. The dividend increases were seen as importing “at most a modest amount of new information 
that would justify a higher equity value”. 
64 Ibid, p. 351. The dividend increasers’ earnings decline was significant, in terms of the growth adjustment model 
employed, at the one percent level of error. The non-increasers’ decline was significant at the five percent level of 
error. (See Table 2.) 
65 Ibid, pp. 342 – 343. 
66 Ibid, p. 386. 
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Lipson, Maquieira and Megginson (1998) picked up on and refined DeAngelo, DeAngelo and 
Skinner (1996) by focusing on a matched sample of dividend-initiating and non-initiating firms 
in the same industry that were recently listed on a stock exchange for the first time. The sample, 
drawn from 1980 – 1986 COMPUSTAT data, contained 99 dividend-initiators, for which 
earnings, sales and total assets data were available, and was matched with 99 non-initiators of 
equivalent size in the same industry. 
Lipson et al found that the dividend initiators did indeed signal an increase in earnings in the 
next year that was statistically significant at the one percent level of error, but this dropped to the 
ten percent level when future earnings were industry-adjusted. There was no significant 
relationship between the dividend initiation and second year earnings. But when future earnings 
were re-specified as ‘earnings surprises’, dividend-initiating firms generated strongly significant 
first and second-year surprises while the non-announcers did not.67 Lipson et al concluded that 
dividend initiating, newly-listed firms were taking the opportunity to signal their superiority over 
non-initiating rivals in the same industry niche who were also rivals for attention from the same 
investors. But like DeAngelo et al, Lipson et al found that the dividend commitment was a very 
small slice of company earnings — amounting to 5 percent. 
Best and Best (2000) observed the individual and joint impacts of earnings and dividend 
announcements on earnings forecast revisions for NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ firms over a 
fifteen-year period from January 1984 to December 1998. They found that dividend surprises68 
tended to have a statistically insignificant impact while the impact of earnings surprises were 
strongly significant for both revisions of current-year and next-year forecasts.69 Best and Best 
employed a restricted regressions methodology similar to that of Kane, Lee and Marcus (1984), 
but cited test statistics computed from White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent matrix in 
place of the F-tests used by Kane et al, Easton (1991) and Lonie et al (1996). 
With respect to dividend-surprise-earnings-surprise interaction effects, Best and Best found that 
good news announcements (where both surprises were positive) furnished significant positive 
slope coefficients when current-year and next-year forecast revisions were used as the dependent 
                                                 
67 Lipson, Maquieira and Megginson (1998), p. 43, Table 4. This finding in Panel A was confirmed by a test 
involving direct comparison of match pairs in Panel B of the table, where in two out of three measures of earnings 
surprise, the distinction was maintained with at most a 5 percent level of error. 
68 Best and Best (2000), p. 237. Dividend and earnings surprises were computed according to Aharony and Swary’s 
(1980) naïve expectations model.  
69 Ibid, p.243. The authors note that the failure of the principal dividend surprise variables (both positive and 
negative) to furnish significant slope coefficients in all but one instance in Table Three (p. 242) indicates “that 
dividend surprise does not drive earnings revisions as implied by earlier studies.” 
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variable, as did positive earnings surprises linked with no change in dividend.70 Interestingly, 
bad news announcements (where both surprises were negative) furnished a significantly negative 
slope coefficient with respect to revisions of next-year forecasts, which suggests that, in this 
instance, analysts tended to revise their forecasts less strongly downward than expected.71 More 
strongly and in the same vein, the interaction of no change in dividend and a negative earnings 
surprise produced a significantly negative coefficient with respect to both current-year and next-
year forecast revisions. When Best and Best used revisions of long-term forecasts (defined as 
covering the next five years) as their dependent variable, the only interaction variable to furnish 
a significant relation was the interaction of positive earnings and no change in dividend. The 
principal variable, negative earnings surprise also produced a significant positive slope 
coefficient. 
In New Zealand, Raj and Thurston (1995), who did not deal with announcement-based dividend 
signalling directly, ran regressions on three-months-lagged dividend yield and earnings yield 
data to determine if these had any ability to predict future earnings. Using data from 1980 to 
1993 they were unable to disprove the predictive powers of the two forms of lagged yield. 
A subsequent New Zealand paper, Vos and Tong (2001), which did focus on the relationship 
between dividend announcement and subsequent levels of earnings, also found no significant 
connection between dividend increases and the behaviour of earnings in the following two years; 
but a subsample of firms announcing dividend decreases furnished a statistically significant rise 
in earnings in the first year. This subsample, however, contained only 26 observations; and the 
entire data set, 138 firm-year observations from firms listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
in the 1990s.72 Having determined, in accordance with Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) that 
New Zealand dividends contain no message concerning future earnings increases, they tested for 
evidence of a signal of future earnings stability onward from the dividend announcement. Again, 
Vos and Tong found no significant difference in future earnings performance between dividend-
increasing firms and unchanged-dividend firms. 
                                                 
70 Ibid, Table Three, p. 242. 
71 Ibid, p. 236. Unexpected forecast revision (UEi), which is used as the dependent variable in the regressions 
reported in Table Three, is defined as the difference between actual forecast revision and expected forecast revision. 
72 Vos and Tong (2001), p. 175. The study used dividend and earnings data for companies listed on the New Zealand 
Stock Exchange with dividend payouts in two consecutive years (t0 and t-1) and five years of net profit (t-2 to t+2).In 
all there were only 51 firms. All dividend data is stated as having come from within a 1992-1996 time span. (But, 
given that two years of earnings data was required, this was possibly 1995?). The authors state that the earliest 
earnings data came from 1991 and the latest came from 1997, while the earliest dividend data came from 1992. The 
1992-1996 data was collected from Datex Ltd while earnings data for 1991 and 1997 were collected directly from 
company annual reports. 
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Vos and Tong also observed the relationship between the previous year’s (year t-1) and current 
year’s (year t0) earnings changes and the dividend announcement. While earnings changes in the 
current year were significantly correlated with positive dividend changes at the ten percent level 
of error, no such relationship extended back as far as year t-1. In other words, the only coherent 
message Vos and Tong found in New Zealand dividend announcements was a reinforcement of 
earnings information published for the same accounting period. Indeed this relationship was 
found to be stronger for final dividends than for interim (half-year) dividends; and the authors 
argued that this indicated that earnings led dividends and that there was greater certainty as to 
what end-of-year earnings were after they were established at the year-end.73 
In the manner of Healy and Palepu (1988), Ho and Wu (2001) studied the relationship between 
dividend initiations (and omissions) and future and past earnings by a sample of listed U.S. 
companies (1964 – 1995). What made Ho and Wu interesting was that they included an explicit 
examination of the impact of survivorship bias. This bias arises whenever samples are selected 
on the basis that companies do not become defunct within the study’s post-event horizon 
(usually a generous number of years). They argued that the bias could be mitigated by reducing 
the time-span obligatorily surrounding each dividend announcement. 
Ho and Wu found that initiations, while being associated with earnings increases over the 
previous four years, had no statistically significant connection with the nature of future earnings; 
where Healy and Palepu had found a falling off of earnings. Ho and Wu’s omissions were 
associated with two years of statistically significant future positive earnings growth, which was 
one year less than that found by Healy and Palepu, and was attributed to the inclusion of firms 
that subsequently were delisted. Survivorship bias, they argued, contributed to overstating the 
duration and significance of any relationship between announcements of either sort and post-
announcement earnings changes. 
Mozes and Rapaccioli (1998), noting that the experimental designs used by DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo and Skinner (1992), Leftwich and Zmijewski (1994), Brown, Choi and Kim (1994) 
and Carroll (1995) all relied on the assumption that the size of an increase in dividend paid out 
was related to the size of the increase in future earnings expected by firms’ managements, set out 
to scrutinize this relation, and found it to be faulty. While modest increases in dividend tended to 
                                                 
73 Ibid, p. 178. Vos and Tong argued in particular that dividend announcements followed earnings announcements: 
“These findings confirm that earnings lead dividends, not vice versa. That is to say that the final dividend 
announcements follow the earnings announcements and are more highly correlated to the final announcements than 
to the interim announcements.” This is an interesting statement given that in New Zealand, the announcement of 
both earnings and dividends is normally made simultaneously in the one disclosure to the New Zealand Stock 
Exchange, which is then published onwards. 
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precede a rise in company net earnings, the researchers furnished evidence that large dividend 
increases tended, actually, to be harbingers of long-term net earnings reductions starting the year 
after the announcement. This finding also threw into doubt the validity of a related assumption 
— that earnings decreases are signalled only by a preceding reduction in dividends (or dividend 
omission). 
Mozes and Rapaccioli used a chi-square test to show, with a one percent level of error, that firms 
with large dividend increases did indeed have different future earnings profiles from those of 
firms with only modest dividend increases. The authors then reconfirmed the existence of this 
difference with a logistic regression in which a reduction in current earnings (the dependent 
variable) was associated with dummy variables representing a reduction in last year’s earnings, 
an increase in last year’s dividend, and a continuous variable measuring the size of last year’s 
dividend increase.74 Mozes and Rapaccioli’s data set contained dividend and earnings 
information covering 681 firms from the CRSP and IBES data bases in the period 1980 – 1990.75 
Their definition of a large dividend increase was one that was greater than their sample’s mean 
dividend. 
Mozes and Rapaccioli (1998) also found that firms suffering a decrease in earnings in the year of 
the observed dividend announcement could be distinguished in terms of their future earnings 
performance by whether or not they reduced their dividend. A dividend reduction tended to 
presage ongoing future losses, while firms which held dividends constant did not necessarily 
suffer future decreased earnings.76 This finding fitted with firms having perhaps gambled 
successfully in terms of Ghosh’s (1993) theory of regret and only having reduced dividends 
when they know there was no hope of rescue from a fate of long-term lowered earnings. 
Further, Mozes and Rapaccioli showed that, while a large dividend decrease was a signal 
forecasting future earnings reductions, there was no such earnings signal apparent in small-scale 
dividend reductions. The authors also showed, that financial market analysts revised their 
earnings forecasts upon receipt of dividend announcements in accordance with the size of the 
dividend increase or reduction. This was in keeping with, and a refinement of Carroll’s (1995) 
finding that analysts’ forecasts became less dispersed upon receipt of a dividend announcement. 
                                                 
74 Mozes and Rapaccioli (1998), pp. 34 – 35. The intercept term in this logistic regression represented the dummy 
variable ‘increase in last year’s earnings’. The coefficient for this was also significant at the one percent level of 
error. 
75 Ibid, p. 37, Endnote 1: The IBES data base is one which has been constructed by a group of US academics for the 
furtherance of their own research, as implied by the acknowledgment, “In addition, the authors thank Lynch, Jones 
and Ryan for providing access to their IBES data base.” 
76 Ibid, p. 35. This difference was significant at the 3 percent level. 
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2.2.5.4 Categorizing the Announcement Signal by Subsequent Earnings Data 
Where most studies scanned forwards from the announcement date to determine the existence or 
nature of signalling, Brook, Charlton and Hendershott (1998) categorized subsequent cash flow 
information to throw light on the nature of a dividend announcement variable retrospectively. In 
other words, where other studies had used the size of horse as a device for checking the cart it 
might pull (and then judging the horse), Henderschott et al categorized a data set of carts and 
observed what types of horse might be found pulling them. An initial focal point in this study 
was the size of dividend announced (following at least four years of prior steady cash flow)77 
given either a permanent increase (PI) in subsequent cash flows, a temporary increase (TI), or no 
increase in cash flows (NI) as measured over the subsequent four years.78 A significant 
correlation between the status of subsequent cash flow and the size of dividend initiated could be 
ascribed to a premeditated act of signalling on the part of company managers. An insignificant 
correlation would point to the absence of premeditation. 
The median dividend increase of PI firms at 9.1 percent in Brook et al’s study turned out to be 
significantly larger than the 5.6 percent for NI firms and 4.5 percent for TI firms.79 Further, the 
PI companies continued to increase their dividends at the end of years 1, 2 and 3. But the most 
salient point in the authors’ eyes was that the initial announcement of an increased dividend at 
the end of year zero preceded the onset of permanently increased cash flows. Firms in this 
category were rewarded for the dividend increase by generating abnormal returns that were 29.3 
percent above those of the market in general in year 1, which was sustained at 15.3 percent and 
8.1 percent in years 2 and 3. Brook et al interpreted this as clear evidence of dividend signalling 
that was consistent with Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997). It was interesting, however, that 
this same company grouping also provided ARs over year zero of 17.5 percent80 all of these 
figures were significant at the one percent level of error with the exception of the third year 
return, which was still significant at the 5 percent level of a Type 1 error. 
The TI firms exhibited quite a different pattern. Unlike the PI firms, these had earned statistically 
insignificant abnormal returns in year zero; but had generated strongly significant abnormal 
                                                 
77 Brook, Charlton and Hendershott (1998), p. 48. Steady cash flow is defined as cash flow which does not vary 
outside 30 percent of the company’s average over the four years, i.e., year–3 to year0 
78 Ibid, pp. 47 – 48. A permanent increase (PI) in cash flows was defined as at least a 30 percent increase for each of 
the subsequent four years. A temporary increase (TI) was defined as at least a 40 percent increase in the first year 
followed by a lapse back to less than 20 percent increase in either the second or third year. A no-change company 
(NI) was defined as one with cash flows which increased less than 30 percent over the next four years, and which 
varied by less than 15 percent from year to year. The sample contained 101 PI firms, 45 TI and 34 NI firms. 
79 Ibid, p. 49. 
80 Ibid, p. 53, Table 4: Annual Abnormal Stock Returns. 
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return of 22.2 percent for shareholders over year 1 in the aftermath of announcing a dividend 
increase. In years 2 and 3, however, the TI firms faltered; and their abnormal returns became 
negative (but still weakly significant). This was in spite of it being retrospectively apparent that 
these firms had engaged in dividend-smoothing. 
With respect to the NI firms, no statistically significant abnormal returns were found in any of 
the years mapped even though there were small increases in the announced dividend in years 0, 1 
and 2 of a diminishing nature, which petered out in year 3. Actually, only in year 1 was there a 
statistically significant difference between the dividends (and also abnormal returns) of TI firms 
and NI firms. 
In sum, Brook et al found that investors heed signals in dividend announcements generally, and 
do act on them (although it was unlikely they would have been able to distinguish between PI 
and TI firms in year 1); and managers, aware of permanent increases in future cash flow, 
proactively signal this information in advance. 
2.2.5.5 Future Earnings Volatility 
Further work on post-announcement volatility was performed by Carroll (1995). He reconfirmed 
Sant and Cowan (1994) and Venkatesh (1989) in finding that dividend increases mapped onto an 
increase in future earnings and a decrease in future earnings volatility. With respect to dividend-
decrease announcements, Carroll recorded a decrease in future earnings and an increase in future 
earnings volatility. 
In the same paper, Carroll also assessed the accuracy of earnings forecasts issued by the firm, 
Value Line, before and after a dividend announcement event. The pattern of the results was 
congruent with those of the first leg. Value Line’s post-announcement-event forecasts for firms 
announcing dividend increases exhibited a smaller cross-sectional dispersion than its 
corresponding forecasts for the same firms made prior to the announcement event. Conversely 
there was an increase in the cross-sectional dispersion of earnings forecasts associated with the 
set of firms announcing dividend decreases.81 
According to Dyl and Weigand (1998), the information conveyed to the market by the initiation 
of dividends was a reduction in the risk of the firm. They reconfirmed that dividend initiations 
were associated with a significant reduction in the volatility of firms’ earnings from pre-
announcement levels. This drop was found to be valid on data derived from twenty-four 
quarterly earnings reports collected from before and after the announcement date — twelve each 
                                                 
81 Carroll (1995), pp. 294 – 295. 
43 
side. In other words, the variance of earnings over the ensuing three years was shown to be lower 
than that of the three years leading up to the announcement.82 
I will now turn to research concerning joint dividend-and-earnings announcements. 
2.2.6 The Problem of Confounding Events 
2.2.6.1 Section Introduction 
The problem of dividend announcement and earnings announcement effects confounding each 
other was known and discussed for quite some time before it was properly addressed. Charest 
(1978), for instance, noted that it prevented him from being able to assign the excess return of 
about one percent isolated in his study to the existence of a dividend signal. Aharony and Swary 
(1980) emphatically avoided it by choosing announcement observations where the disclosure of 
a dividend was separated from that of the period’s earnings by at least one and up to more than 
60 trading days. Asquith and Mullins (1983) similarly required a separation of at least ten days. 
In Subsection 2.2.6.2, the substitutability of the two announcement types is explored; and 
Subsection 2.2.6.3 looks at research concerning joint dividend and earnings announcements. 
2.2.6.2 Examinations of Proximate Dividend Announcements and Earnings 
Announcements 
In the same year that Asquith and Mullins published their paper, Penman (1983) noticed that 
dividend-related returns were still significant, but smaller, if the dividend announcement 
followed behind an earnings forecast. Conversely, when a dividend announcement preceded an 
earnings forecast, the earnings forecast-related excess returns were similarly depressed.83 
Penman used a sample of US firms 1968 – 1973, all of which had a history of dividend payouts, 
and all of which were increasing their dividend. Healy and Palepu (1988) similarly found that a 
preceding dividend initiation reduced the magnitude of share price reactions generated by an 
earnings announcement in the following year. This also held true when the preceding dividend 
announcement was of a dividend omission. In this instance the dampening effect was found to be 
statistically significant over the ensuing five years.84 
Venkatesh (1989) formally set out to determine whether dividend announcements and earnings 
announcements were complements or substitutes with respect to the information content of their 
signal. If they were substitutes, then earnings announcements following a company’s decision to 
                                                 
82 Dyl and Weigland (1998), p.34. 
83Penman (1983), op. cit. 42, p. 1195. 
84 Healy and Palepu (1988) op. cit. 39, p. 171. 
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initiate dividend pay-outs should signal less information than hitherto, which, in turn, would be 
discernible in terms of a lower level of event period returns.85 This was tested out on 1972 – 
1983 NYSE and AMEX data obtained from CRSP, COMPUSTAT and the Wall Street Journal 
Index. 
Venkatesh found a magnitude reduction that appeared to last over the long term. Returns 
associated with earnings announcements measured over 15 quarters were lower after a company 
initiated dividends. This result occurred irrespective of whether the dividend announcement 
preceded or followed the earnings announcement.86 Venkatesh also recorded a drop in the 
volatility of raw returns following the initiation of dividends, which the researcher ascribed to a 
downgrading by investors of the importance of other forms of company announcement and also 
the paying of less attention to rumour. Investors, instead, switched their search for useful 
portents to the dividend announcement.87 
Eddy and Seifert (1992) proposed that if earnings announcements and dividend announcements 
were indeed perfect substitutes, then a joint earnings and dividend announcement should not 
elicit a stronger reaction from investors than a single announcement of either dividends or 
earnings. Put to the test, joint announcements containing two items of ‘good-news’ produced 
significantly higher five-day cumulative standardized returns than did non-joint 
announcements.88 Earnings and dividend announcements were therefore not perfect substitutes. 
Eddy and Seifert also found that joint announcements containing opposed information (falling 
earnings with rising dividend or vice versa) should produce an average price reaction of zero. 
Their 1983 – 1985 data set on 1,111 firms was obtained from CRSP and COMPUSTAT files, 
and the Wall Street Journal Index. 
Brown, Choi and Kim (1994) investigated the impact of the time lapse between the end of the 
firm’s accounting period (in quarters) and the announcement of the period’s earnings and 
dividends. They found that the information content of earnings announcements decreased as the 
lapse, measured in days, became longer. However, this relation was reversed with respect to 
dividend announcements and announcement time-lapse. Brown et al found that the information 
                                                 
85Venkatesh (1989), p. 182. 
86 Ibid, pp. 186 – 187, See Panel A of Table 2: Before dividends were initiated, the average market adjusted return 
was 5.2 percent. Once dividends had been initiated, this dropped to a 14-quarter average of 3.83 percent when the 
earnings announcement preceded the dividend announcement, and 4.73 percent when the quarterly dividend 
announcement came first.  
87 Ibid, p. 176. 
88 Eddy and Seifert (1992), p. 211. See Table 1. This was confirmed by regression analysis incorporating a dummy 
for announcement type (joint or non-joint) and which also factored in the influence of the relative size of each of the 
joint announcement’s components. See p. 213. 
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content of dividend announcements was most clearly evident in a subsample of large firms. 
Since they had theorized that the directions of impact of earnings announcements and dividend 
announcements would conflict, the researchers chose to use non-contemporaneous 
announcements to avoid the cancelling effect. Effectively Brown et al were looking at the impact 
of time lapse on paired, but separate announcements following the close of an accounting period. 
Carroll (1995), who was mentioned with respect to the volatility of future earnings in the 
previous section, also investigated the association between earnings forecast errors and post-
dividend-announcement earnings announcement returns. In this instance Carroll again was able 
to conclude that announced increases in dividends reveal an increase in the level of expected 
future earnings; but the connection between the announcement and future levels of earnings 
variance was not significant.89 
Elfakhani (1998) set out to critically evaluate the role of dividend announcements where the 
announcement was made between 5 and 45 days after the earnings announcement.90 He 
identified three components within the dividend signal with respect to mitigating uncertainty — 
expected favorableness, direction and role — and ranked them in relative importance. The 
favorableness component simply entailed the announcement’s containing good news or bad news 
for the future in a quantitatively vague manner. Direction was a matter of dividend increase or 
decrease; and the role of a dividend announcement was to confirm, clarify or be ambiguous 
about the preceding earnings announcement. Of these components, Elfakhani found that 
favorableness was the most important. While this would imply that substitution between 
dividends and earnings announcements must therefore play a secondary role at best, Elfakhani 
was silent on this aspect. 
Mozes and Rapaccioli (1995), extending the work of Atiase (1985) on size with respect to the 
related field of the information content of company earnings announcements, concentrated on the 
interrelationship between dividend announcements, earnings announcements and firm size. They 
hypothesized that dividend announcements and firm size were independent of each other, and 
found this was clearly not so. In the first instance, the raw characteristics of the firms in their 
random sample of 500 firms from COMPUSTAT in 1980 – 1985 belied the assertion.91 The 
                                                 
89 Ibid, p.295 
90 Elfakhani (1998), pp. 224 – 225. Elfakhani used CRSP Master Daily Files and quarterly COMPSTAT tapes for 40 
quarters from 1 January 1976 to 31 December 1985. 
91 Mozes and Rapaccioli (1995). The researchers generated a random sample of 500 firms from 1980 – 1985 
COMPUSTAT data also available on CRSP tapes, which were categorized as large or small depending on whether 
their year-end market equity value was above or below the median for all firms on the COMPUSTAT tapes. 
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dividend-announcing firms had a mean size over twice that of the non-dividend-paying firms, 
and boasted a median size just over four times the median of the non-payers.92 
Mozes and Rapaccioli then examined the inter-relationship of earnings announcements, dividend 
announcements and company size with respect to the information content of separate dividend 
and earnings announcements in a more sophisticated manner with a series of regressions. Since 
the researchers’ sample included firms which paid no dividends at all during the sampling period 
(or alternatively announced dividends after making earnings announcements), the presence or 
absence of a preceding dividend announcement could be seen as modifying the information 
content of the subsequent earnings announcement. 
Mozes and Rapaccioli’s measure of information content in an announcement was a standard 
index (SI) generated from the abnormal returns associated with the earnings announcement event 
period deflated by abnormal returns from a matched average prior period.93 If this index was 
greater than unity, then the earnings announcement was deemed to contain information not 
available at other times. The basic relationship between earnings announcements and size was 
established by running a simple regression in which the SI was the dependent variable, and the 
natural log of market equity was employed as the independent variable, SIZE. That SI was not 
independent of SIZE was validated at the one percent level of error. 
The argument that firm size and dividend announcements were significantly related to each other 
was then tested by showing, in a multiple regression on the dependent variable SI, that the 
presence of a dummy variable representing the presence of a prior dividend announcement 
would produce a slope coefficient of the independent variable SIZEDE (size of a dividend-
paying company only) that would be insignificantly different from zero. This was found to be the 
case. In other words, the earnings announcement abnormal returns construct, SI, ceased to have a 
significant association with company size; but the dividend proxy variable, on the other hand, 
was significant. 
By contrast, in the same regression, if a variable representing the size of non-dividend-paying 
companies only, SIZND took on a positive value, the result of the initial simple regression would 
be confirmed via the presence of a significantly negative SIZND slope coefficient. (In this 
                                                 
92 Ibid, Table 1, p. 79: The 128 dividend payers had a mean size of $US 872 million and a median size, $US 284 
million. The 84 non-dividend-paying firms had a mean of $US 330 million and a median of $US 69 million. 
93 Ibid, The researchers’ method for constructing the standardized index (SI) entailed using the market model to 
generate ‘unexpected returns’ (or abnormal returns, the residuals of the model’s simple regression) for the 5-day 
period on and about the earnings announcement, which they squared and then divided by the square of the residual 
generated over an prior announcement-free 5-day period. The prior 5-day period figure was an average of the 5-day 
residuals over the preceding 25 weeks. 
47 
instance, SIZEDE and the dividend dummy would take on zero values.) Indeed, a significantly 
negative SIZND slope coefficient was generated. In other words, as company size increased, 
there was a decrease in the information content of the earnings announcement (in the absence of 
a prior dividend announcement). The researchers then strengthened these findings when they 
dropped the variable SIZEDE from the procedure. The intercept, the dividend dummy and 
SIZND all furnished slope coefficients significant at the 1 percent level. 
Mozes and Rapaccioli concluded from the above that a dividend announcement preceding an 
earnings announcement effectively robs the latter of all size-related information. From this, it 
follows that, whatever the size of the firm, such a dividend announcement contains all 
information conveyed by sources that are available exclusively to investors in large firms. They 
noted:94 
One implication of our results is that after the firm’s dividend announcement, investors in 
small firms do not have any informational disadvantage relative to investors in large firms. 
…[P]rice-based earnings forecasts will be equally accurate for small and large firms. 
2.2.6.3 Examinations of Joint Earnings and Dividend Announcements 
Joint announcements are actually the norm in Australia, New Zealand and in the United 
Kingdom. Given this fact alone, it was inevitable that considerable research effort would be put 
into the sorting out of the component effects bound together in simultaneous announcement 
events. 
The seminal paper of this sort, however, was on U.S. data. This was Kane, Lee and Marcus 
(1984). Given that U.S. firms do not generally make joint earnings and dividend announcements, 
they chose observations where the announcements were either simultaneous or separated by less 
than ten days in time, thereby providing a neat methodological counterpoint to that of Asquith 
and Mullins (1983). Kane et al controlled for the confounding effects of simultaneity (or 
contemporaneousness) by using dummies in their regression models representing the various 
permutations of possible movement-combinations of announced dividends and announced 
earnings. In particular they regressed the independent variables unanticipated dividends and 
unexpected earnings along with the dummies against the dependent variable, cumulative 
abnormal returns. 
Kane, Lee and Marcus found that all but one of their dummies were significant at the one percent 
level of error according to their t-statistics; whereas the unexpected dividend and earnings 
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change variables were not significant even at the five percent level. They interpreted this as 
evidence that investors do indeed take both sets of information into account rather than one of 
them alone. However, it is to be noted that their CRSP and COMPUSTAT-derived US data set 
contained only 352 observations, 96 of which had been selected precisely because there had been 
a dividend change of 5 cents or more per share. Nevertheless, Kane, Lee and Marcus’s finding 
was corroborated by Eddy and Seifert (1992), who compared contemporaneous and non-
contemporaneous dividend and earnings announcements in the U.S. 
In New Zealand, where dividends and earnings are normally announced together, Emanuel 
(1984) made a foray independently onto the same ground in the same year. Emanuel examined 
the effect of 1196 joint earnings and dividend announcements on returns (generated by the 
market model)95 using weekly share price data from the University of Auckland Share Price File. 
The announcements were made by 153 firms, covering all major industries, listed on the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange between 1967 and 1979. Emanuel found that the abnormal returns (AR) 
generated in the announcement week (week0) by jointly dividend and earnings-increasing (DI-
EI) firms were positive and validated by a t-test significant at the five percent level of error; and 
that the equivalent dividend and earnings-decreasing (DD-ED) results were negative and 
significant at the five percent level. Interestingly, he also found that when earnings were 
increased while the dividend was left unchanged (DNC-EI), the result was positive and 
significant. Conversely, the result associated with an unchanged dividend and a drop in earnings 
(DNC-ED) was negative and significant. This implied that the impact of earnings tended to be 
greater than that of dividends. 
Emanuel also plotted weekly cumulative average residuals (CAR) for six earnings-based 
portfolios over a period starting 50 weeks before week0 and ending 30 weeks after the 
announcement week.96 The two extreme cases of CAR drift were provided by the DI-EI firms, 
whose CARs rose sharply about week zero then climbed gradually, and the DD-ED firms whose 
CARs dropped sharply about week zero then oscillated a little before drifting downward. The 
remaining categories of joint announcement plotted intermediate courses, the DNC-EI company 
CARs rising at week zero from a negative value to a positive one, but afterwards oscillating 
closely around zero, while the DNC-ED and DI-ED company CARs consistently drifted 
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96 Ibid, pp 34 – 35, Figures 1 and 2. 
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downward from week-50. Of note was the fact that the DI-ED firms’ CARs were more negative 
than those for DNC-ED announcing firms. 
However, since he did not perform any analysis on his ARs and CARs beyond Z- and t-tests, 
Emanuel did not calculate the interaction effects between the two announcement components. In 
fact he did not look into the role of dividends in the joint announcement other than to say97: 
It is possible to argue that profits and dividends are proxies for more fundamental 
determinants of share prices, or that dividends have a capability to convey relevant 
information as managers are restricted with regard to statements they can make about the 
future earning capacity of the firm, and because earnings variability is likely to be greater 
than dividend variability. 
In the Australian context, where earnings and dividend announcements are also almost always 
simultaneous, Easton and Sinclair (1989) recorded the existence of statistically significant ARs 
to equity associated with the earnings component of the announcement. This finding was made 
where earnings were defined as unexpected earnings; but this finding remained robust when 
alternative definitions of earnings were tested. However, the effect on abnormal returns 
associated with the unexpected dividends component was much weaker, and dependent on the 
definition of earnings employed in the analysis. 
Easton and Sinclair derived these results from two sets of announcement portfolios. First they 
created five portfolios in which half-yearly unexpected dividends were systematically graded by 
size (and unexpected earnings by size left random); and second, they created five portfolios from 
the same dataset in which the unexpected earnings were graded by size (and dividends left 
random). Easton and Sinclair also noted that the unexpected earnings relating to the first half-
year have a more pronounced effect on cumulative abnormal returns than do the second half-year 
unexpected earnings. 
Easton (1991) adopted a system of dummy variables in the manner of Kane, Lee and Marcus on 
Australian data and found that there was an important relationship between earning and dividend 
contents of simultaneous announcements. Easton’s study used monthly abnormal returns 
calculated by the market model from a 60-month pre-announcement period. After cleaning his 
data to avoid any confounding influence brought about by share splits, bonus issues, rights issues 
and takeover bids within the final month to announcement day, he had a sample comprising 896 
half-yearly joint dividend and earnings announcements produced by a total of 339 companies 
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registered on the Melbourne Stock Exchange. The announcements occurred in the period 
covering the second half of 1978 through to the second half of 1980. 
Easton’s various measures of ‘unexpected change in earnings’ and ‘unexpected change in 
dividends’, which had strongly significant impacts on ARs when tested in a constrained 
regression, became jointly insignificant when tested in an unconstrained equation containing five 
dummy variables modeling the six major categories of joint announcement. This indicated that 
the separate earnings and dividend variables in the constrained regression produced upwardly 
biased results in the absence of interaction variables. He suggested that “studies of earnings and 
dividends would be improved if interaction effects were factored into the experimental design”98 
In the United States, Leftwich and Zmijewski (1994) examined the information content of 
simultaneous quarterly earnings and dividend announcements and found that the earnings 
component uniformly provided more information than did the dividend component, which was 
largely uninformative. However, when the earnings component entailed an increase in tandem 
with a dividend component entailing a decrease, the marginal information content of dividends 
became statistically significant. Leftwich and Zmijewski determined the unexpected component 
of earnings and dividend changes by a relatively complex method incorporating Value Line 
projections. 
In Britain, Abeyratna (1994) and Lonie, Abeyratna, Power and Sinclair (1996) showed that 
combinations of dividend changes (increases/decreases) and earnings announcements 
(increases/decreases) had a significant impact on firms’ share prices. Their results gave a clearer 
confirmation of the existence of signalling than any prior study was able to provide with respect 
to the phenomenon in the United States. Lonie et al divided their sample of UK listed companies 
into six categories according to whether their simultaneous earnings and dividends 
announcements entailed rises, falls or no change with respect to the size of earnings and to the 
size of dividend payout. Firms disclosing both dividend and earnings increases (DI-EI firms) 
produced statistically significant positive abnormal returns for each of three days: the 
announcement day and the day each side of it. On the other hand, firms which published 
decreases in both dividends and earnings (DD-ED firms) earned statistically significant negative 
abnormal returns on the day each side of the announcement day, but not on the day itself. Where 
the direction of earnings was counter to that of dividends, the size of abnormal returns (positive 
or negative) was less pronounced, and was statistically insignificant. 
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Then Lonie et al, using dummy variables in the manner of Kane, Lee and Marcus (1984), 
confirmed that the interaction effect between the dividend and earnings variables locked together 
in the joint announcements was indeed also significant. This was strongly in line with Easton’s 
(1991) Australian findings. They concluded that the magnitude as well as the sign of the earnings 
variable was important with respect to the power of the dividend variable as an information 
signaller. However, dividends remained inferior to current earnings as a signal in the eyes of 
market participants. Lonie et al also noted that companies announcing reduced earnings had a 
bias which entailed increasing the nominal dividend payout, and that almost 90 percent of 
dividend-reducing firms had concomitant earnings reductions.99 
I now move on from the record of dividend signalling research to consider the econometric fly in 
the ointment with respect to consideration of joint dividend-and earnings research in the context 
of New Zealand’s thinly traded market. This insect (econometrically speaking) is the bias-
inducing effect of thin trading. 
2.3 The Thin Trading Issue 
2.3.1 Section Introduction 
One of the factors predisposing distributions of daily returns on firms on the NZX towards non-
normality is that it is a relatively thinly-traded market, and the presence of the runs of zero-
returns associated with absence of trading biases the OLS beta coefficient downward.  Frequent 
absence of trades over stretches of time inside the Market Model estimation period is strongly 
likely to give rise to daily returns distributions that are not normal. Furthermore, procedures 
introduced to compensate for missing datapoints introduce autocorrelation into the groomed data 
series. When that happens, the time series observations are no longer independent of each other. 
This, in turn, makes a nonsense of any test that is dependent on the absence of any serial 
correlation in order to justify a null hypothesis. In other words, hypothesis testing performed in 
the presence of the data-grooming procedure will mechanically produce a spurious abnormal 
reaction to an announcement event where none may actually have existed. 
The importance of this current section is that it provides a background to the research and 
discussion in Chapters 6 and 7. A thin-trading effect is detected and corrected in the material 
concerning state models in Chapter 7 and the material concerning friction modelling in Chapter 6 
explicitly turns the thin-trading effect into an advantage in an event study context.  This section 
contains a review of the literature on thin trading in Subsection 0 in which it becomes clear that 
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attempts to correct for the effects of thin trading have not been deemed, by the subsequent 
research record, to have offered any real improvement upon employment of unadjusted OLS 
regression. The research record, does, however, make it quite clear that New Zealand is not alone 
in having a thinly traded market.  Then, in Subsection 2.3.3, I consider the record of specific 
daily proxies which either are used, or could be used to plug gaps in data series caused by an 
absence of trading, on a trading day, of a given company’s shares.  Then Subsection 2.3.4 
concludes this thin trading review with a short comment on the current heterogeneity in 
databases, globally, of the treatment of company return proxies for non-traded trading days. 
2.3.2 Thin Trading Papers 
There are actually two versions of trading thinness, which are closely related to each other. The 
first is where trades do occur within a measured period unit — say a month — but fail to occur at 
the end of it and therefore furnish a dubious measure of ‘closing price’ for the period. This is 
often called nonsynchronous trading. The second is where no trades at all occur within the period 
unit. 
The impact of thin trading on regression outputs was first identified by Fisher (1966), and is 
indeed, called by some researchers, the “Fisher effect”. Fisher observed that closing prices 
supposedly representing the market value of a security at the end of a measured period did not 
necessarily occur only from end-of-period trades, but could have been furnished by trades 
occurring significantly earlier, thereby introducing a time-dependent confounding factor into any 
index of closing prices compiled from them. This confounding influence came in the form of 
positive serial correlation in returns estimated from that index, which, in turn produced a 
misleadingly low variance of returns. Furthermore, for returns on the more thinly-traded shares 
in the index, beta estimates would be biased in a downward direction while those of strongly-
traded shares would be biased upward. The underlying problem was that thinly-traded shares, 
when sold, realised an ostensible return for the trading period which was not only the return on 
the period, but one cumulating all price change in one lump since they were last traded; and that 
could have been within or even before the period. 
Scholes and Williams (1977) investigated the first version of trading thinness — 
nonsynchronous trading. They theorised, in the case of thinly traded stock, that OLS estimates of 
α would be exaggerated relative to the true value of α and that the OLS estimate of β would be 
understated relative to its true value. Initially the authors provided a proof demonstrating that this 
should be so. Then they showed that the proof was indeed corroborated empirically on a sample 
containing all stocks listed on the NYSE and ASE between January 1963 and December 1975. 
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Several aspects of Scholes and Williams’ study are of particular interest. The first is that at the 
time of writing, daily opening and closing share price data had just become available to 
researchers eager to validate the CAPM (or the reverse) and the Market Model. To these 
researchers who were operating with data from the world’s biggest and most active economy, 
‘thin trading’ was defined as discontinuous trading within a day that entailed the closing trade for 
the day being some unknown time before the actual close of trade for the stock exchange for the 
day. This is not quite the same concept as the non-occurrence of any trade in a particular stock 
on a particular day. Nevertheless, the difference is surely simply one of scale. On a monthly 
basis, a day of zero trades in a stock would equate with just under an hour of no trades buried 
inside Scholes and Williams’ daily data. 
It is important to stress that Scholes and Williams were positing and testing for systematic bias 
caused by an unobserved time-lapse between the final trade and the close of the day — or to be 
more precise, the imprecisely measurable (at that time) interval between the final trade on day t-1 
and the final trade the next day, day t which also would occur at some point before the close of 
all trading. However, the authors dealt with trading days during which a particular stock 
registered zero trades by deleting both this and the ensuing day on which there was a trade from 
the data set. 
Scholes and Williams method for achieving an unbiased estimator of beta was as follows. Let 
ib+ , bi and ib−  be the beta estimates obtained from three separate regressions of the ith security’s 
return at time t, where the independent variable is, in turn, a one-period leading, concurrent, or 
one-period lagging return on the market index MR . Further, let SMρ  be the sampling estimator100: 
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The unbiased estimator of beta makes use of this serial-correlation coefficient rebranded as 
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100 Scholes and Williams (1977) p. 315, Equation 15. 
101 Ibid, p 317, Equation 20. 
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The unbiased estimator of alpha was: 
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When applied to their empirical data, the adjustment furnished results in which the generated α 
and β values were in line with those expected in theory. 
The second well-cited paper in the early literature was Dimson (1979). Noting that the Scholes-
Williams method required that the timing of trades be exactly known within the day and 
discarded price observations immediately following or preceding non-trading days, Dimson 
produced an alternative thin-trading adjustment. This adjustment, he argued, took better account 
of the incidence of non-trading periods — version two of trading thinness. 
Dimson’s method entailed the compilation of an aggregated coefficient, which was the sum of 
the betas obtained from a multiple regression employing the matching market return as one 
independent variable, along with one or more lagged market returns and one or more leading 
returns.102 In its simplest form (a matching and single lagged and single leading term only) for 
stock j, the method can be expressed: 
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Where, for t = -1. 0, +1, each b is the calculated estimate of β. 
However, twelve years later, Fowler, Rorke and Jog (1989) were to write of Scholes and 
Williams (1977)103 and Dimson (1979): 
While the Scholes and Williams … technique has been proven to be better than the [Dimson 
(1979)] technique in removing bias, the variance of the estimator produced by each method is 
large, so that the betas are imprecise. In fact, on the basis of variance, OLS procedures 
(although more biased) prove to be superior to either except for cases of extreme thinness. 
                                                 
102 Dimson (1979) p. 204. 
103 Fowler, Rorke and Jog (1989), p.24. 
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In the meantime, Fowler and Rorke (1983) argued that Dimson’s (1979) estimator of beta was 
not correctly specified. They proceeded to present a corrected version that furnished results 
identical to Scholes and Williams (1977). 
In the same year as Dimson published his paper, Fowler, Rorke and Jog (1979) investigated 
another aspect of thin trading — the relationship between thinness and the r2 generated by the 
Market Model. Citing Morin (1976), they noted that Canadian securities’ returns generated by 
the Market Model explained 18 – 20 percent of variation in actually observed returns, and that 
the model’s explanatory power was even lower in the case of thinly traded stocks. In other 
words, the use of thinly-traded stocks was associated with lowered r2 values. 
At the time of a preliminary draft in 1978, the authors recorded that only 20 percent of the firms 
in the index of the top three hundred companies on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE 300) could 
be considered “fat” (ie, consistently well-traded); and in terms of all companies listed on the 
exchange, this dropped to only six percent. Therefore the TSE (like the NZX in the current 
study) was characterised preponderantly as a market of thinly traded shares. 
With respect to the connection between thinness of trading and r2, the authors found a consistent 
diminishing pattern. Fat traders produced the highest average r2 and infrequent traders, the 
lowest. 
Fowler, Rorke and Jog also set out to determine, the relationship between thinness of trading and 
heteroscedasticity. Three tests were employed: a rank correlation test, a modified Bartlett test, 
and a Goldfield and Quandt test. The authors found that the rank correlation test failed to furnish 
any consistent relationship between thinness of trading and heteroscedasticity; but the latter two 
tests showed an increasing level of heteroscedasticity from fat to infrequent traders. 
Dimson and Marsh (1983) found that analyses of risk which did not take thin trading into 
account were likely to seriously overestimate the stability of the beta risk measures computed. 
First they set out to show analytically that thin trading produces a systematic bias with respect to 
stability. They ascribed the cause, in the first instance, to the fact that the size of the beta 
estimates, is biased downward, and this, in conjunction with the persistence of stretches of non-
trading, yields a spurious stability. The authors noted that this spurious stability may be the 
reason why betas in the French and Belgian markets, at the time they were writing their paper, 
were deemed more stable than those on stocks listed on the NYSE. 
Turning to monthly UK data from 1955 to 1979, Dimson and Marsh calculated simple regression 
betas based on five years of observations per regression, and found the mean of these betas was 
considerably less than unity. Given that this was an even-weighted mean, the preponderance of 
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small companies with patchy trading characteristics would be expected to produce this result; 
whereas a value-weighted mean calculation would have been expected to produce a result not 
significantly different from unity that might have disguised the presence of a thin-trading effect. 
In addition, the authors detected the presence of a questionable stability. 
However, the authors made use of the fact they knew the trading date inside each month to 
correct directly for the thin-trading bias and the spurious appearance of stability. Their method 
entailed entering uneven time intervals into their regressions — an interval being defined as the 
lapse in time from one actual closing trade till the final trade recorded in the following month. 
The authors then went on to show that UK betas, once adjusted for thin trading, are no more 
stable than the betas calculated on US stocks. All regress over time back to their mean. Dimson 
and Marsh also noted the existence of a trade-off between the number of observations in the 
estimation procedure and the risk of contamination from unconsidered external factors. Given 
that their regression runs contained five years (and later, 25 years) of monthly observations, there 
was plenty of scope for changes in commodity/service trading patterns, capital structure and a 
host of other firm-specific attributes. One should not necessarily expect a beta to remain 
stable.104 
Quite a different approach to removing thin-trading bias (denoted in their study as an 
“intervalling effect”) was furnished by Cohen, Hawawini, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb 
(1983a). Defining a differencing interval as the size of period for which a return is recorded (ie, a 
day, 10 days, 20 days …), they calculated an asymptotic estimator of beta. This asymptote was 
the value towards which an OLS beta would converge as the differencing interval was increased 
without limit. The authors showed that this asymptotic beta was a consistent estimator of the true 
beta. Cohen et al found in an empirical analysis that their results conformed with their theoretical 
expectations. The mean square error associated with the inferred asymptotic betas was 
effectively zero.105 
Seven months later Cohen, Hawawini, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1983b) produced an 
analytical model for calculating unbiased betas that was more in the tradition of Scholes and 
Williams (1977) and Dimson (1979). The model was a generalisation of Scholes-Williams 
technique, but did not require (as the Scholes-Williams one did) that a share must be traded at 
least once per period, every period. 
                                                 
104 Ibid, pp. 772 – 773 
105 Ibid, p.143, Table 4. 
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McInish and Wood (1985) proposed an alternative method for controlling for thin trading bias 
entailing the use of a linear programming model to construct portfolios in which the level of thin 
trading was held constant while other variables of interest were allowed to vary in value. The 
technique required three data inputs. The first was a measure of the average time between trades, 
which in their case was in minutes (the variable, MINTERVAL); the second was the market 
value of each firm in the sample; and the third component was the share price and market index 
data for estimating returns and betas. The authors claimed two advantages for the method. The 
first was that it did away with the need for beta estimates that control for thin trading bias; and 
the second was that it allowed for controlling the mean and higher moments of additional 
variables.106 
Jain (1986) used US daily price data from the CRSP file to calculate 17,473 runs of OLS-
generated Market Model regressions which were then re-run with a Scholes-Williams-
adjustment. Given that each observation was generated from 300 days of estimation data, the 
three matched sets of parameter observations were then employed to determine which of them 
proved the least biased and most efficient estimator of prediction error over the ensuing 300-day 
estimation period. Jain found that the Scholes-Williams correction was no better than OLS in 
terms of the distribution of prediction errors. 
Corrado (1989) constructed a nonparametric rank test that outperformed the standard parametric 
t-test under all but ideal conditions. Using daily return data from CRSP (1962 – 1986) on 600 
companies, he showed that it displayed a superior power over t-tests employing non-standardised 
and standardised excess returns in the detection of positive abnormal performance on day zero of 
an event study. The rank test was modified by Corrado and Zivney (1992), who adjusted for the 
occurrence of non-trading periods. Corrado’s rank test was further retested by Campbell and 
Wasley (1993) on NASDAQ data and found to perform robustly where OLS estimates with 
portfolio test statistics and standardised test statistics did not. 
Fowler, Rorke and Jog (1989) developed a set of related alternative techniques for obtaining 
consistent estimates of beta in the presence of thin trading. They noted in their introduction a 
point that is pertinent to the current study, which has made use of the NZX All Companies Gross 
Index107: 
                                                 
106 McInish and Wood (1985), p. 74. 
107 Fowler, Rorke and Jog (1989), p. 24. 
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Since all broad-based indices will include some thinly traded securities, this results in the 
combination of a partly thin index with a correctly observed stock price that … leads to 
upwardly biased beta estimates. 
As in their 1979 paper, the authors developed their arguments in terms of a unit period of one 
month, and defined three categories of security: ‘fat’ if always traded on the month’s closing 
day, ‘moderate’ if there is at least one trade every month, but not necessarily on the last day, and 
‘infrequent’ if there are months in which no trades take place. A ‘mixed’ market index will be 
one in which some of the component stocks are “moderate” in nature. Further, to make their 
method workable, Fowler, Rorke and Jog required prior knowledge of the last day of trading 
(within the month) for each stock. They developed a corrected beta estimate for a moderate 
security (in conjunction with a moderate index) from the covariance between two moderate 
securities and a further beta adjustment for infrequently traded stocks. With respect to infrequent 
stocks, the authors considered only those with sporadic non-trading months but never 
consecutive non-trading months. 
Fowler, Rorke and Jog’s techniques, when measured against OLS, Scholes-Williams’ (1977) 
method and Dimson’s (1979) technique, produced the smallest biases for every combination of 
stock type and index, and also the lowest regression mean squared error (RMSE). Further Fowler 
et al’s techniques provided the best trade-off between bias and variance. They noted that the 
Scholes-Williams technique worked well in a portfolio context; but for the calculation of 
individual stock betas, it furnished unreliable estimates.108 
Berglund, Liljeblom and Loflund (1989) used daily Helsinki Stock Exchange data (1977 – 1985) 
to compare OLS beta estimates with estimates produced by three alternative methodologies. The 
first of these was a generalized least squares regression on trade-to-trade returns; the second was 
a Bayesian estimator suggested by Vasicek (1973); and the third was four versions (differing by 
the number of incorporated leads and lags) of Cohen, Hawawini, Mayer Schwartz and 
Whitcomb’s (1983b) estimator. The methodology used by the authors entailed harvesting a series 
of betas from a first run on the data, which, grouped into three-year time-based subsamples, 
could be regressed against each other. The t-ratios and R2 statistics reported in permutations of 
this second run were then interpreted as indicative of the strength of a beta (of a particular 
method) as a predictor of future betas (by the same or an alternative method). The primary aim 
was to check on the stability of alternative beta measures. 
                                                 
108 Ibid, p. 32. 
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The most salient aspect of the choice of the Helsinki Exchange was that many of the stocks not 
only traded thinly, but tended to miss entire trading days. However, this appeared to make no 
difference. The authors found that OLS turned out to be the over-all best performer — even in 
the presence of missed trading days. Indeed, while various of the other beta estimators were 
superior to it and to each other in specific limited instances, none were able to improve upon it 
consistently. This was especially interesting given that Cohen et al’s estimator had been 
specifically designed to reduce bias in the presence of non-trading with concomitant, but lesser 
loss of efficiency. Further, the authors found that this estimator performed best when only one 
lead and lag were specified; and performed worse than any other estimator when five and ten 
leads/lags were specified. The improvement in unbiasedness was quite clearly swamped by its 
reduction in efficiency. 
The authors concluded that none of the methods developed for reducing the thin-trading bias in 
estimated betas, or combinations of them, were likely to furnish much improvement on the 
simple OLS estimator; and they noted109: 
… [A] great deal of care should be applied when such a combination is selected to prevent 
the introduction of additional complexity not matched by a corresponding increase in 
accuracy. 
Bartholdy and Riding (1994) turned to the thin market of New Zealand equities to run their 
check on Dimson’s (1979) and Scholes and Williams’ (1977). Interestingly, they found that OLS 
performed with less bias and lower variance than either the Dimson or the Scholes-Williams 
adjusted betas. 
Bartholdy and Riding examined monthly returns on New Zealand shares that were continuously 
listed throughout a six-year period from the start of 1982 till the end of 1987, computed from 
daily price information stored in the University of Otago SDS database — Bartholdy’s own 
university. This enabled the authors to apply and adapt Fowler, Rorke and Jog’s (1979) four 
categories to their 110 firms. Of these, only thirteen shares fell into ‘fat’ category with trades on 
98 percent of all trading days; and only six traded on all available days in the period. The 13 fat 
shares recorded an average trading lag (in days) till the end of the month of a mere 0.02 days. 
A second category Bartholdy and Riding called ‘moderately fat’, and which contained 35 firms, 
traded on 88.2 percent of the available days and recorded an average trading lag of 0.23 days. 
Their third category, ‘moderately thin’, contained 42 shares that traded on almost 53.7 percent of 
                                                 
109 Berglund, Liljeblom and Loflund (1989), p. 42. 
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market days with an average 2.44-day lag till the end of the month. The fourth category was the 
‘thin’ category. It contained 20 shares which traded, on average, on only 20.8 percent of possible 
trading days and had a mean month-end 7.23-day price lag that that meant that the price was 
already almost one and a half trading weeks out of date. 
The authors also varied their measure of market index to determine what impact this had on 
computed outputs. The most prominent of these were the value-weighted Barclays Index which 
was generated from price data from trades by the top forty listed firms. The other three were 
generated from Bartholdy’s own university’s price data resource. One was an all-companies 
index employing the last recorded price for each share, which incorporated the effects of 
thinness. The second, recognizing that the price adjustment pursuant to absence of trading would 
occur with the first trade after the dead patch, dropped out any company price observations that 
did not come from actual trading on both the date of observation and the preceding day. The 
third SDS index relaxed this two-day rule, requiring only that price data came from actual trades 
on the day under observation. The choice of market index turned out to be a significant factor in 
results. 
All market indices in conjunction with the thin category of shares produced miniscule beta 
estimates on average.110 The largest of these were consistently produced in conjunction with the 
SDS index compiled in accordance with the two-day rule; and the highest mean beta recorded 
(0.544) was obtained by a version of the Dimson technique with three-day leads and lags. This 
technique also provided the highest beta in association with New Zealand’s leading share market 
indicator of the time, the value-weighted Barclay’s index. It was a lowly 0.15. 
However, as the authors climbed higher through the Fowler, Rorke and Jog categories of 
thinness and fatness, the betas climbed too, for all estimation methods and all measures of the 
market index. With respect to the moderately thin grouping, the SDS index with the two-day rule 
again uniformly provided the highest beta estimates; but the highest of these (0.756) was 
furnished in conjunction with the Dimson technique compiled with only two leads and lags. This 
pattern continued to hold with respect to the moderately fat grouping as well (although here, the 
Dimson three-day lag and lead technique furnished the maximum beta). 
The results for the fat grouping broke the pattern. The highest betas were no longer necessarily 
all furnished by a particular market index; but for the Scholes-Williams technique and for 
Dimson with both two- and three-day leads and lags, the SDS with two-day rule maximized the 
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beta for these individual methods. But the highest over-all beta for fat shares (0.904) was 
furnished the SDS index with stale prices impounded in it in conjunction with OLS left 
unadjusted. 
The authors then estimated the biases relative to estimates based on synchronous data. These of 
grew monotonically larger in absolute size from the fat category to the thin. With respect to the 
fat grouping, OLS consistently produced a smaller bias than either the Scholes Williams or any 
of the Dimson adjustments on all market indices. This pattern maintained itself with one 
exception per category for both the moderately fat and moderately thin share groupings — where 
in both instances, the Dimson method with one day of lead and lag performed better than OLS in 
conjunction with one of the four market indices only. However, the pattern broke up with respect 
to the thin category. Here, the Dimson method with either two or days of lags and leads produced 
the least bias in conjunction with three market indices out of four; and OLS produced the least 
bias (0.007) in conjunction with the SDS index with the day rule relaxed. 
Interestingly, the market index which had performed best with respect to maximizing beta, was 
not appreciably better or worse than other market indices over the fat, and two moderate 
categories in minimizing bias. In terms of the thin category, it was clearly the worst performer 
with recorded biases of approximately four times the size of those furnished by other indices. 
Then Bartholdy and Riding looked at the means of the sum of squared deviations from their beta 
estimates based on synchronous data in order to judge the consistency of estimates provided by 
the combinations of beta estimation methods and market indices. For the fat, moderately fat and 
moderately thin categories, OLS provided the minimum mean value in conjunction with all 
choices of market index. This pattern held in conjunction with three of the four market indices 
for the thin grouping as well. OLS was clearly superior to the Scholes-Williams technique and to 
all versions of the Dimson method on this criterion. 
Finally, Bartholdy and Riding reinforced the above findings by estimating a correlation matrix of 
beta estimators furnished by the competing methods with respect to the thin trading category 
only. The Pearson correlation coefficients were uniformly significant at the one percent level of a 
Type 1 error for all correlations. This indicates that the betas furnished by the different methods 
are not likely to materially differ from each other. 
Cowan and Sergeant (1996) evaluated Corrado’s Rank test (the 1992 version) along with a sign 
test specified by Cowan (1992) and a parametric test specified by Patell (1976). The testing 
procedure was in accordance with a methodology published by Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen 
(1991). Cowan and Sergeant found that the parametric test in the presence of thin trading turned 
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out to be poorly specified while Corrado’s rank test performed well, so long as there was no 
increase in return variance on the event day. If event-day variance was greater than that observed 
on other days, then none of the available tests performed well in a consistent manner. 
2.3.3 Specific Daily Proxies for Returns on Days with no Record of Trades 
A number of different approaches have been tried in the matter of proxying the value of a 
company return for a day (or days) in which the company’s shares did not trade.  One possible 
way of doing this was by employing a ‘filling-down process’ in which the closing price on the 
day of the last day of actual trading is repeated for every day in which trading failed to happen. 
The purpose of this was to procure a zero return for each of these days of zero trading. This 
technique was used by Abeyratna (1994) and Lonie, Abeyratna, Power and Sinclair (1996) — 
one of which was a paper discussed in Section 2.2.6.3 above, but neither of which explicitly 
addressed the issue of thin trading.  This ‘fill-down’ technique was a way of repairing the holes 
in data series with a reasonable zero-value proxy.  But its employment in the the context of a 
particularly thin market would lead to the biases already discussed in any ensuing Market Model 
output. 
The choice of daily market-return proxy was a matter taken up by Kallunki (1997).  Kallunki 
noted that an earnings announcement-based event study in which he had been involved, Booth, 
Kallunki, and Martikainen (1996) had recorded that 33 percent of their sample of Finnish shares 
had not actually traded at all on the day of the announcement.111 In his current sample, drawn 
from all available stocks listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange (May 1976 – December 1990), 
the ten most thinly-traded had a probability of not trading on any particular day that ranged from 
43 to 80 percent, while the fattest stocks reduced this to between zero and three percent and the 
median probability was 17 percent.112 
The three data-grooming methods the authors investigated with respect to the handling of 
absentee trades were: 
1. The use of a bid quotation from the period as a price approximation; 
2. The shrinking of the abnormal return estimation period by removal of non-trading days 
so that abnormal returns could be recorded on the remainder and then subsequently 
setting the abnormal returns for these excised days to zero (which he called the “lumped 
return” method); 
3. The shrinking of the estimation period, as above, with one change with respect to how 
abnormal returns are allocated to the non-trading periods. The return calculated from 
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prices before and after a patch of non-trading periods is allocated in equal portions across 
all periods in the patch. Kallunki called this the uniform return procedure. 
Each of these methods entailed unwanted complications. The uniform and lumped return 
procedures would most definitely generate positive autocorrelation over patches of non-trading 
periods, while the use of bid quotations would give rise to negative autocorrelation attributable to 
the bid-ask bounce. Further, the lumped return method’s setting of zero values for non-trading 
periods would increase the kurtosis of the cross-sectional distribution of returns. In checking for 
this, Kallunki found that lumped returns were not normally distributed at the 5 percent level of 
error in terms of a Shapiro-Wilk test, while uniform returns did turn out to be normally 
distributed. Further, the uniform return procedure would allocate periodic returns arbitrarily large 
or small, dependent on the magnitude of the price recorded in the first subsequent trading period, 
which would affect the cross-sectional means. Similarly, the assignment to a single trading 
period of the full impact of price change at the end of a series non-trading periods would bias the 
means produced by the lumped return method. 
The author made use of Patell’s (1976) parametric standardised residual test statistic as modified 
by Boehmer, Musumecci and Poulsen (1991) in a series of tests on data in which a random event 
was specified and injected with an artificially enlarged return, and abnormal returns were 
generated in relation to it. With respect to the bid quotation method, one-tailed tests on this data 
had slightly exaggerated rejection rates, but two-tailed tests performed well. However the 
lumped return method had an exaggerated one-tailed test rejection rate. Further, Kallunki 
observed the behaviour of cumulative abnormal returns and found that all of the methodologies 
produced rejection frequencies that were accurate within a five percent level of error. Given this, 
all three methodologies could be seen as legitimate tools for dealing with the non-trading 
phenomenon if used in conjunction with the Boehmer, Musumecci and Poulsen (1991) 
modification of the Patell standardised residual test. 
Thin trading in the form of zero volume trading is a feature even of the world’s largest markets. 
However in the American context, the effect of it may have been masked by the way CRSP has 
dealt with it — and this may have conditioned the results in large body of Finance research 
conducted over the past decade or so. Effectively, in some instances, the CRSP has recorded a 
non-zero value closing trade in its files where no trade actually occurred at all. In an appendix to 
their paper on transaction costs, Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) performed an analysis of 
types daily trading (or absence of daily trading) of American stocks traded on the NYSE and 
AMEX and tracked by CRSP. 
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These authors noted that the CRSP takes account of broking specialists’ bid and ask quotations 
along with closing prices. The way this works is that the daily closing price will be established 
by a trade in which either a buyer chooses to transact at an existing ask quotation, or a seller sells 
at an exiting bid quotation. However, when no trade occurs in a day, the CRSP sets the stock 
value for the day at the midpoint between the closing bid and ask quotations of the day. This 
kind of averaging will have disguised the effect of thin trading in American studies. 
Lesmond et al categorised daily returns as falling into two classes (positive volume trading and 
zero-volume trading) and seven subclasses,113 each of which was associated with a particular 
level of a variable which can loosely be called ‘new information’. These subclasses are based on 
activity between investors and the specialists. 
There are four subclasses associated with positive volume trading in which the CRSP records 
positive or negative returns in two instances (1 and 2), and zero-value returns in the others (3 and 
4): 
1. The CRSP records a non-zero return. The closing bid quotation on day t0 is different from 
the closing bid from day t-1; and the closing ask quotation is also different from the 
previous day’s closing ask quotation. The final trades of both days were settled at either a 
bid or an ask price — but there was no shift between days from bid to ask, or from ask to 
bid. New information is present. 
2. The closing price of day t0 and of day t-1 are the same; and bid and ask quotations have 
remained unchanged over the two days. However, the CRSP records a non-zero return on 
the ground that the final transaction on day t0 is based on a buyer’s acceptance of an ask 
quotation whereas on day t-1, it was based on a seller’s acceptance of a bid quotation (or 
vice versa). Lesmond et al see this as being indicative of no new information being 
present. In accordance with Conrad, Kaul and Nimalendran (1991), they call this a “true” 
return of zero.114 
3. The closing price of day t0 and of day t-1 are the same, and it was based on a bid quotation 
that has not changed since day t-1 — or alternatively, on an unchanged ask quotation. 
This is also a “true’ zero return. The CRSP registers a zero return. 
4. There is no change in stock price between the two days; but the transaction is based on 
neither existing bid or ask quotations. This is indicative of liquidity trader activity and an 
absence of new information. Nevertheless the CRSP records a zero return. 
There are three subclasses associated with zero-volume trading on day t0 in which the CRSP 
records a zero-value return in only one instance (7): 
5. The CRSP records a non-zero return on the basis that specialists’ bid and ask quotations 
have changed since the close of day t-1 (when there was trading). This is indicative of the 
presence of new information. 
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6. The bid and ask quotations have not changed from day t-1, which did have an actual 
closing trade. The CRSP records a non-zero return on the ground that there is a change 
from a day t-1 trade price that was not the average of the closing bid and ask quotations to 
the average. There is no new information 
7. The CRSP records a zero return on the ground that there have been no trades on day t0 of 
day t-1 and the bid and ask quotations have not altered. 
Lesmond et al deemed five of the seven categories to be instances of what they called “effective’ 
zero returns. They went on to examine NYSE- and AMEX-listed stocks between 1988 and 1990 
for the frequency of zero returns and “effective” zero returns. The stocks were partitioned into 
size deciles. They noted that the smallest decile firms furnished effective zero daily returns on 54 
percent of all days on which the market was open for trading. The decile information for CRSP 
zero returns and effective zero returns is reported in Table 2-1.115 
Table 2-1: Company Size versus Incidence of Zero Value Returns in US Data. 
Size Decile CRSP Zero Returns (%) 
(3)+(4)+(7) 
Effective Zero Returns (%) 
(2)+(3)+(4)+(6)+(7) 
1 (Lowest) 43.69 54.09 
2 36.80 45.64 
3 33.34 40.61 
4 30.77 37.11 
5 27.58 33.59 
6 25.67 33.48 
7 21.69 27.74 
8 19.70 24.07 
9 16.04 18.69 
10 11.80 13.62 
   
2.3.4 Comment on Prior Research 
Effectively, the problem of thin trading has been recognised; but no universal panacea has been 
developed for working with it in Finance research. The promising modifications by Scholes and 
Williams, by Dimson and by others have not been found to have been any better than a simple 
OLS regression approach that ignores the existence of thin trading. More recently Kallunki’s 
(1997) investigation of alternative techniques for substituting values in for zero-trade days was 
interesting; but none of his methods coincided with the fill-down approach employed by 
Abeyratna (1994) and in Chapters 4 and 5 of the current study. Kallunki’s closest method to the 
fill-down approach was his “lumped return” method, where no-trade days were removed from 
the sample and expected returns were calculated on the remaining shrunken sample, while zero-
                                                 
115 Ibid, p. 1139. 
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value ARs were directly assigned to no-trade days. According to Abeyratna (1994) and the first 
methodology employed in the current study, the no-trade days were awarded a zero-observed-
return and were included in the expected return computation — which is quite inferior. 
Innovations offered in the next two sections and in chapters 6 and 7 remedy this shortcoming. 
But there is another, even more important finding in the research record discussed above. The 
CRSP has disguised the thin-trading effect in the United States by treating no-trade days the way 
that it does. The fact that there is no equivalent of CRSP in New Zealand massaging daily 
trading results in the same manner means that there is an important difference in the nature of the 
available data — and we cannot necessarily expect to estimate results that turn out to be the 
congruent from both data sources. 
2.4 A First Methodology Addressing the Thin Trading Effect:  
Models of Friction 
Friction models are relevant because the zero returns associated with an absence of trading on 
particular days, or over sequences of days of a company’s shares, can be modeled explicitly in 
terms of a zone of insensitivity that is inert to concomitant changes in market returns.  This zone 
of insensitivity is quarrantined, in a maximum likelihood procedure, so that the values of the 
parameter inputs into expected returns are not biased by it.  Further, the division of the 
dependent variable (company returns in log form) into three zones — one of which is 
‘insensitive’ — gives rise to viewing the dependent variable as a limited dependent variable.  A 
review of limited dependent variable (LDV) friction modelling literature is provided in this 
section, while the full explanation as to how this methodology fits the current study is provided 
in Chapter 6.  I will start with the history. 
The insensitivity of a dependent variable to small changes in the state of relevant independent 
variables has been called ‘friction’ in economics jargon for well over half a century. The usage 
was cited as being traditional by Rosett (1959), when he presented the first friction model, and, 
indeed, coined the term ‘friction model’ to describe it. He provided a succinct description of 
what the model does with respect to the embedded employment of the statistical methodology of 
maximum likelihood estimation116: 
The maximum likelihood method for estimating relationships with limited dependent variables 
is generalized to include relationships in which the dependent variable, over some finite 
range, is not related to the independent variables. 
                                                 
116 Rosett (1959), p. 263. 
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Effectively, the value of a given dependent variable changes in response to changes in value of a 
particular independent variable over most of its range, but not all of it. Over the finite range 
Rosett was referring to, the pressures for change on the value of a given dependent variable exert 
no effective influence on it, and the value does not change. Indeed, the marshaled influences for 
change cannot overcome the pressures for maintaining the status quo as the ‘friction’ is too great. 
However, the range exists between an upper bound and a lower bound. Above the upper bound, 
the pressure for an upward change in the dependent variable’s value overcomes this friction and 
it moves upward; and conversely, below the lower bound, the pressure for downward change 
overcomes the friction and the variable takes on new lower values. 
Figure 2-1: Schematic Diagram of a Friction Model. 
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The focus of Rosett’s interest was in mapping how changes of yield impacted on how much of 
an asset would be held by investors in their portfolios. His model is laid out in Figure 2-1117 
where the observed values of a response variable Y (asset holding) are plotted against an 
independent variable (yield). The observed y values are clustered close to the heavy black line 
and indeed are zero between the bounds αL and αU where pressure for change on Y is unable to 
overcome friction. The thin curve through the origin depicts the theoretical path of Y in the 
absence of that friction. 
The bounds, the slope of the line and the standard deviation of the underlying distribution are all 
parameters of the LDV Friction Model and are determined by maximum likelihood estimation. 
                                                 
117 Rosett (1959), Figure 1, p. 263. However, in Figure 2-1 above, the terminology used follows Figure 6.2 on p. 164 
of Maddala (1983) more closely than Rosett’s original figure’s terminology. However, Rosett’s and Maddala’s 
figures and mine are equivalent. Maddala (1983) provided an excellent summary of friction models in general. 
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Maximum likelihood estimation itself is a technique for determining parameter values that make 
the pattern of data we have observed most likely to have occurred in that particular pattern. A 
very useful aspect of it is that it does not require strict adherence to the linearity assumption 
required by OLS regression. It makes most sense if maximum likelihood estimation is explained 
from first principles. In terms of basic statistical analysis, we are often interested in determining 
the probability of an event Y conditional on the occurrence of X, which is expressed as ( )P Y X . 
X may be a variable denoting an event or a state. However, X might be replaced by “p” (for 
parameter), as it may actually be a parameter of the distribution of Y itself. Maximum likelihood 
estimation is about solving ( )L p Y , where L is the likelihood function of p given Y. 
2.4.1 General Review of Friction Model Literature 
DeSarbo, Rao, Steckel, Wind and Colombo (1987) developed a friction model to explain and 
forecast a firm’s product-pricing decision. The most interesting aspect of their modelling was in 
their computation of the upper and lower bounds delimiting the price-no-change continuum and 
a prediction of by how much a price change would be expected to exceed these bounds. A vector 
of variables, tX  was compiled to represent pressures that would cause decision-makers to revise 
the price upward, and a second vector, tY  was compiled representing price-reduction pressures. 
Each of these was modelled in terms of a simple OLS regression on a latent variable rt and lt 
from which the slope parameters could (notionally) be obtained, and for which it was assumed 
the error terms would be homoskedastic, uncorrelated over time and normally distributed: 
 1
2
t t t
t t t
r e
l e
β
γ
= +
= +
X
Z
 (2.5) 
The magnitude and direction of the pressure for price change, utilising Equation (2.5) above, 
(positive for an increase and negative for a price decrease) was: 
 t t tf r l= −  (2.6) 
The absolute value of tf  would have to be larger than the absolute values of the upper and lower 
bounds (denoted k1 and k2) to trigger a price-change decision. Hence the friction model was 
specified as: 
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In Equation (2.7) above, k1 and k2 do not necessarily have the same absolute value; and for the 
purpose of maximum likelihood estimation, which makes use of logarithms, these two bounds 
and tf  are treated as positive values. However, citing Dharmadhikari and Joag-dev (1985)118 
who found that the maximum likelihood function may be multimodal with more than one set of 
estimates, DeSarbo et al calculated the parameter values k1, k2,β , γ  and σ  via a controlled 
random search procedure modified from Price (1976).119 
DeSarbo et al then applied their methodology to 82 weeks of mortgage interest rate information 
from 15 Philadelphia banks and found that their friction model outperformed equivalent 
forecasting computations generated from OLS and a Box-Jenkins procedure.120 
Forbes and Mayne (1989) set out to examine the behaviour of the prime lending rate (compiled 
as the monthly average of US banks’ annualised daily prime rates). The prime rate tends to 
remain unchanged and therefore apparently unresponsive to changes in money market rates 
unless these move above or below some pair of tolerance limits. Their model was as follows, 
where CD is the price of 90-day certificates of deposit on the secondary market, and Pt is the 
prime interest rate: 
 1 0 1 1 2 2 , 1, 2jt j t t t tY P CD CD CD jα β λ λ λ− − −= − + + + =  (2.8) 
In Equation (2.8), Yjt was the expected change in the prime rate; and given the values of j in the 
above, the full formal friction model specification became: 
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 (2.9) 
                                                 
118 DeSarbo, Rao, Steckel, Wind and Colombo (1987), p. 308 
119 Ibid, p. 308 
120 Ibid, p. 312. With respect to the comparison with OLS, the friction model produced an Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) of 83.67 versus an AIC from OLS of 103.52. 
70 
In Equation (2.9) the error term, tε  had zero mean and variance 2σ ; and the boundaries of the 
prime rate’s no-change zone were provided by the values of jα  in Equation (2.8). The expected 
value of tP∆  in the case of positive changes in Equation (2.8) was ( )1 1 1t t tY p Rα β −= − − ; while 
( )2 2 1t t tY p Rα β −= − −  modeled the expected value where changes in tP  were negative. 
Forbes and Mayne’s use of first differences, tP∆ , with respect to the prime rate, reduced the 
complexity of the maximum likelihood function as the no-change zone value of the variable 
could be represented by the single point, zero. This was possible because there was only one set 
of primes and one matched data set of independent variables. 
Nevertheless, the nonlinear nature of the first-order derivatives of the log-likelihood function 
required that the Newton method be used for solving the likelihood equation iteratively. 
Forbes and Mayne used monthly data that were averaged from daily rates, and which covered 
US bank figures published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin for the decade from January 1977 to 
August 1987. 
Almekinders and Eijffinger (1996) used friction modelling to shed light on the US dollar – 
Deutschmark exchange rate (daily data) in the period February 1987 to October 1989 with 
respect to market interventions by the US Federal Reserve and the Bundesbank. In addition, they 
observed the US Federal Reserve’s interventions in the US dollar – Japanese yen market. 
Almekinders and Eijffinger stressed that central banks tended not to intervene very often on the 
ground that the main function of an intervention was to send a signal to private traders, alerting 
them to the banks’ preferred direction of exchange-rate change. Indeed, there were two good 
reasons behind this. First, while their intervention volumes could be in excess of a hundred 
million dollars, central banks never traded (and were not able to trade) more than a small 
fraction, by volume, of overall trading in any given day. Therefore the banks could not determine 
the market by brute force and had to rely on persuasion. Second, any attempt at 
micromanagement by frequent intervention would diminish the efficacy of the signalling 
function. 
In friction model terms, the default or ‘no-change’ policy was that of non-intervention by the 
central bank, while above an upper bound, +Θ  it would be expected to execute trades to drive 
the exchange rate down (from the central bank’s own perspective). Conversely the lower bound, 
−Θ  was defined as the point at which it intervened in the market to push an unfavourably low 
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exchange rate upward. The authors’ dependent variable was INV, the volume (in millions of 
dollars) traded by a particular central bank when intervening, and the full model was:121 
 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
+ +
- +
-
XΩ+µ -Θ if XΩ+µ >Θ ,
= 0 if Θ £ XΩ+µ £Θ ,
= XΩ+µ -Θ if XΩ+µ
INV
INV
INV −
 = < Θ
 (2.11) 
In (2.11) X was a matrix of explanatory variables, Ω  was a vector of coefficients, and µ  was a 
vector normal i.i.d. residuals. Underlying their use of the above formulation, Almekinders and 
Eijffinger used a GARCH-in-Mean model to characterise the stochastic process that the two 
exchange rates under investigation followed, finding that a random walk model with a GARCH 
error term fitted their data better than did a Gaussian random walk.122 One of their most 
important findings was that central banks intervene to lower exchange rate volatility. Therefore 
one of the banks’ functions clearly was to manage (and this usually meant minimise) uncertainty 
for market participants. 
Hashimoto and Takatoshi (2004) employed a friction model to examine contagion effects in 
Asian markets between exchange rates and share prices. Among their results, the authors found 
that the Thai exchange rate was sensitive to shocks in the stock markets of other Asian countries. 
With respect to the impact on exchange rates, Hashimoto and Takatoshi employed a dependent 
variable, y* which was the observed rate of change in a variable DRR, which was calculated 
daily, where DRR itself was defined as a measure of weighted five-day cumulative daily 
exchange rate changes. Their independent variables, denoted x′ in Equation (2.12), included 
differences in domestic and other Asian stock prices, and the difference between home and other 
Asian exchange rates. The authors’ friction model entailed the maximum likelihood estimation 
of an upper and a lower bound (a1 and a2) beyond which an exchange rate movement could be 
ascribed to spillover from the independent variables as distinct from just noise movement: 
                                                 
121 Almekinders and Eijffinger (1996), p.1374. The analyses of interventions in a particular foreign exchange market 
by each central bank were kept separate. 
122 Ibid, p. 1373. 
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In setting out to investigate the cost of raising capital in a pecking order theory context, Galpin 
(2004) used a friction model to map a firm’s financing function. The decision to raise new 
capital (either debt or equity represented by the subscript i), or to return it to investors, was 
dependent on the size of the associated transactions costs. Where *iNF  represented the capital 
financing decision and iτ  represented all transaction costs, Galpin’s model was: 
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τ τ
τ
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 (2.14) 
In Equation (2.14) the top line represents the decision to raise capital with the constraint that the 
amount raised must be greater than transaction costs, while the middle line describes the negative 
cash-flow case in which return of funds to investors is optimal; and the bottom line covers the 
situation where the raising of capital has insufficient value to the firm to overcome the related 
transaction costs. 
2.4.2 Friction Models relating to Dividend Research 
The papers cited in this section tend to be developments grounded in the work of Lintner (1956) 
which go on to investigate the presence and nature of dividend signalling — Cragg (1986) 
peripherally, and Kao and Wu (1994) in some depth. 
Cragg (1986) developed a measure of firms’ target dividend payout ratios and used friction 
modelling to model their perceived dividend-setting behaviour along the path toward that target. 
He started with Lintner’s (1956) concept that firms will leave their regular dividend unchanged if 
there is a danger that a proposed change of dividend might turn out to have been in the wrong 
direction. Hence any change occurring in the short-term future must be a justified change given 
managerial perceptions of risk. With respect to this existence of risk element, Cragg was also 
interested in the degree to which the dividend change decision would be sensitive to changes in 
the macroeconomic environment. His formulation of the target payout ratio ρ  for a firm j was: 
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In this regression the variable jN  was a one-period measure of per-share capital expenditure 
requirement; and the remaining three independent variables were the coefficients obtained from 
a prior interceptless regression of tY (national income), one-period change in national income 
( Y∆ ) and lagged earnings ( 1−tE ) on earnings at time t: 
 jtjtjtjtjjt EYYE εβββ ++∆+= −1210  (2.16) 
However, most of Cragg’s efforts went into satisfactorily defining the bounds delimiting the 
decision to leave dividends unchanged. (Above the upper bound, the firm would be likely to 
increase the dividend, while below the lower bound, the dividend would be expected to be 
reduced.) These bounds, jtLξ  (lower) and jtUξ  (upper) were determined from forecasts generated 
by Equation (2.15) on company j. Cragg’s model was somewhat complex, taking some 30 
specifications of equations to complete. In its final form Cragg’s friction model was: 
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Cragg then ran his model on a data set of 218 US companies whose fiscal years coincided with 
the calendar year and for which at least 20 years of continuous price information was available 
between 1959 and 1982 from spliced Compustat Industrials tapes. The companies were required 
to have made some dividend payments within the timespan; and indeed, the annual incidence of 
dividend-no-change decisions made by these companies ranged from a low of 9.1% in 1979 to 
55.7% in 1971. 
Cragg concluded that firms did indeed only change their dividends when there was only a low 
probability that the change would have to be reversed in the future. He noted123 that firms’ lower 
bound tended to vary to a much greater degree than their upper bound. In a signalling sense, this 
implied that firms are much more uncertain about when to cut dividends than they are about 
when to raise them. This certainly fits with the proposition that dividends are sticky in a 
downward direction (Lintner 1956), and that firms do not reduce dividends unless they are under 
financial pressure to do so. He noted that while neither bound depended on the company’s level 
of investment needs, they did vary substantially with changes in the parameters calculated for the 
firm’s earnings record. However although this variable and national income did appear to have a 
systematic impact on dividend policies by firm type, Cragg noted his model was not strongly 
enough specified to explain irrefutably the nature of this relationship. 
With respect to signalling theory, which was fairly well developed by 1986, Cragg pointed out 
that a number of questions about the role of dividend policy as a signalling device had not been 
answered satisfactorily by researchers such as Bhattacharya (1979, 1980). In particular, why 
should a firm invest a substantial amount of dividend cash in order to convey a signal when the 
same signalling function could possibly be achieved by maintaining a low but consistent 
dividend payout ratio? Given that Lintner (1956) had demonstrated that dividend decisions did 
indeed “follow an easily comprehended, simple pattern,”124 Cragg argued that the signalling 
function itself was theoretically very simple; yet it was clear that firms exhibited a wide range 
from low-cost to high-cost policies in their dividend choices. But with respect to his friction 
model he added the caveat that a more tightly specified model would potentially shed greater 
light on the signalling function. 
Kao and Wu (1994) developed a friction model examining the relationship between changes in a 
firm’s permanent earnings and its dividend policy, and found there was a positive relationship 
between the two variables. Kao and Wu’s model was developed from one formulated by Marsh 
                                                 
123 Ibid, pp. 204 – 205 and Table 10.4 (lower panel). 
124 Cragg (1986), p. 191. 
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and Merton (1987), that had no friction aspect to it, which, in turn, was developed grounded in 
Lintner (1956) and which had examined the same two variables in aggregate on a value-
weighted NYSE index and from CRSP data for the period 1927 – 1980. Kao and Wu themselves 
used quarterly share price and dividend data provided by COMPUSTAT on 454 firms 1965 – 
1986. The starting-point of the Kao and Wu model is shown in Equation (2.20). This was Marsh 
and Merton’s model with an extra final term added to account for post-announcement change in 
share price: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )
0 1 1 2
1 1
log log log
1 log log log
t t t t
t t t t
D a P D P
D P P
λ γ λ
γ δ ε
− − −
− −
= + + + −
+ − + − +
 (2.20) 
In Equation (2.20), tD  represents the desired (but unobserved) level of dividend that is a 
continuous variable which corresponds with the firm’s (unobserved) beliefs about future 
earnings, while D is the observed dividend that is paid and P the firm’s share price, which stands 
as Kao and Wu’s proxy for permanent earnings. The three parameters λ  γ  and δ  are also 
important. λ  represents the current adjustment of the dividend as a proportion of prior period 
permanent earnings (in other words, ‘smoothing’), while γ  represents an error-correction that 
moves the current dividend towards the long-run target payout ratio, and δ  is the coefficient 
which, if significant and positive, indicates that dividends contain an information signal.125 
While Cragg’s (1986) model was fairly traditional in containing three partitions (change down, 
no change, change up) and determined its bounds endogenously, Kao and Wu adopted a K-level 
model in which each observed value of the dividend paid, Dt was a discrete level. This meant 
that the continuous variable, tD  could be considered to be frozen into a ‘no-change’ state 
defined by its falling on or between actual observed values (log Dt) acting as boundaries. Hence 
in Kao and Wu, change was defined as a shift from one ‘no-change’ state to another across 
observations — or as they put it, a “stepwise movement of dividends over time”.126 The values 
of 0 , , , anda λ γ δ σ  were obtained by maximising the following log-likelihood function: 
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125 Kao and Wu (1994), p.48. 
126 Ibid, p. 45. 
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Here, Lj stands for each bound separating the K partitions, M is the number of dividend 
observations, while ( )Φ ⋅ is the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal variable, 
σ  the standard deviation of the error term, and dtj is a dummy variable with a value of one when 
the desired dividend falls within the jth partition, or zero otherwise.127 All of the parameters in 
Equation (2.20) were found to be strongly significant.128 
Then, with respect to dividend signalling, some of this output was redeployed to determine how 
well the signal δ  could be explained in terms of a number of company-specific variables 
including two measures of risk ( 2,β σ ), percentage change in equity financing ( CE∆ ), the 
debt/equity ratio (D/S), percentage change in net investments ( I∆ ), earnings volatility (VOL), 
earnings persistence (PER) and company size. The smoothing parameter from Equation (2.20), 
δ  was also included: 
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 (2.22) 
The coefficient b8 for the smoothing variable, λ  turned out to be negative and strongly 
significant, indicating that dividend smoothing positively enhances the dividend signal. Only two 
other independent variables furnished coefficients significant within a five percent level of error. 
These were market risk, β  and percentage change in net investments, I∆ . SIZE, however, was 
weakly significant at the ten percent level of error. 
More generally, Kao and Wu concluded that dividends are strongly related to the estimated level 
of a firm’s permanent earnings, and that dividend changes are reactions to both expected and 
unexpected changes in the latter. Further, they considered that their friction model had 
successfully coped with the estimation problem associated with the tendency of firms to leave 
their dividends unchanged from period to period. In addition, their results showed that the 
concept of dividend signalling did not conflict with Lintner’s (1956) concept of a partial 
adjustment towards a long-term target payout ratio. Instead, they found that their sample firms’ 
dividend-setting behaviour was consistent with both. 
 
                                                 
127 Ibid, pp 54 – 55. 
128 Ibid, p. 62. See Table 4. 
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2.4.3 A Friction Model relating to the Market Model  
Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) used a friction model to obtain estimates of effective 
transactions costs associated with marginal traders’ buying and selling shares. They argued that 
the method was a viable alternative to the use of the sum of the bid-ask spread and commission 
approach that was considered to be current orthodoxy. The friction model approach required 
only sets of time series of daily security returns. The incidence of zero returns (for days of either 
no change in price or even days on which the stock fails to trade at all) was a phenomenon that 
could be turned to good account in terms of a friction model approach as it was in the nature of 
investor decision-making for zero trades to occur where the potential return to be made was not 
expected to exceed a threshold imposed by the cost of the trade.129 
Lesmond et al’s model was specified in terms of two return variables. One was the “true” return 
*
jtR on a stock j predicted by the market model with the intercept suppressed, which would vary 
continuously with changes in the market. The second was the observed return on the stock, jtR  
which was subject to friction. The observed return would be zero unless the true return exceeded 
the bounds Ujα  and Ljα  (where Ljα  is expected to take on a negative value); and the difference 
Uj Ljα α−  measured the total round trip transaction cost for purchase and sale of stock j. The 
model was: 
 *jt j mt jtR Rβ ε= +  (2.23) 
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It is of interest that Lesmond et al’s model assumed that the market model was the correct model 
of security returns, and that the intercept term captures the effect of any misspecification of the 
market index relating to mean-variance inefficiency.130 However, Lesmond et al suppressed the 
                                                 
129 Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999), p.1115. The authors noted that zero returns are a frequent phenomenon, 
even with respect to firms listed on the NYSE and AMEX in the period they studied which was 1963 – 1990. They 
noted, “…[A]s much as 80% of the smallest firms returns are zero and some of the largest firms have 30% zero 
returns.” 
130 Ibid, p.1120. 
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intercept term in their model. The values of Ujα  and Ljα  were calculated, as in most other 
friction model studies, by maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). 
The current study adopts Lesmond et al’s model as a replacement for the Market Model in 
estimating expected returns and ARs. 
However, while Rosett and Lesmond et al employed one independent variable, the current study 
goes on to develop an LDV friction model employing multiple independent variables to model 
the trading reaction of investors in response to the event window announcement of dividend and 
earnings news. 
I now turn to a second methodology which provides some insight into and mitigation of the 
effect of thin trading. 
2.5 A Second Approach to Mitigating Thin Trading:  State Asset 
Pricing Models 
Norsworthy, Gorener, Morgan, Schuler and Li (2004), a conference paper presented at the 2004 
Canadian Economics Association Conference in Toronto, developed a four-state asset pricing 
model that — they argued — computed expected returns superior in accuracy to those computed 
by the Market Model and also multifactor models.131 The authors’ intention was to show that 
three properties of Kahneman and Teversky’s (1979) prospect theory were discoverable in the 
output of this superior expected returns analysis. The three properties were reference frame 
dependence, loss aversion, and, with increases in magnitude, diminishing sensitivity to marginal 
losses and marginal gains. While a full and serious consideration of prospect theory is beyond 
the purview of the current study, the first two characteristics are relevant as they have a bearing 
on reactions to the dividend-and-earnings announcement event.  
Norsworthy et al developed three versions of their model which they compared with the Market 
Model. 
The first version simply entailed the partitioning of returns by the nature of the company-return 
and market return combination. The four possible combinations of company return and matched 
market return (+ +, + — , — +, and — — ) each occupy a quadrant on the plane defined by 
                                                 
131 This conference paper was the successor to an earlier working paper, Norsworthy et al (2001) which was cited 
and tested out in a French context by Jokung and Meyfredi (2003). Norsworthy et al make the claim about 
superiority to existing multifactor models on the basis of comparing their results with those summarised and 
discussed by Cochrane (1999). A broad study of assets pricing models is outside the focus of interest of both 
Norsworthy et al and the current study — which is interested in the four-state model in terms of what it can tell us 
about dividend signalling. 
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market return and company return axes. Reference frame dependence could be demonstrated if 
this partitioning increased the model’s explanatory power over that of the Market Model on the 
ground that it would indicate that investors did pay heed to market context. Norsworthy et al 
found that the unimproved Market Model furnished a mean adjusted r2 0f 0.1646 with respect to 
the 100 firms for which they had data sets, while their partitioned model produced an adjusted R2 
of 0.5513. This was a three-fold improvement in explanatory power. Further, the coefficients of 
their partitioned model had tighter standard errors and lower p-values. This improvement is 
unsurprising if one takes into account that more information about the dependent variable is used 
in the calculation by the partitioning. 
The authors’ second and third models involved a rotation procedure which accounted for 
investor expectations of the daily return given the mean of past returns. With rotation and no 
further changes, the mean adjusted R2 went up to 0.6508132. In terms of their investigative 
intentions, the authors interpreted this as evidence that investors are strongly reference frame-
sensitive. 
Norsworthy et al’s CRSP data set contained daily returns for 100 companies from 1984 to 1998, 
of which 30 were Dow-Jones industrials, 30 were middle-range firms with market capitalisations 
of between $1 and $5 billion dollars, and 40 were deemed to be small companies listed on the 
Standard and Poors Small Cap Index. These last 40 had capitalisations of less than $1 billion. 
The authors’ results showed that, of the three firm categories, it was the very large firm 
subsample (Dow-Jones industrials), that reliably yielded the highest adjusted R2 statistics. 
Jokung and Meyfredi (2003) applied the four-state model, as described in Norsworthy et al’s 
earlier working paper version disseminated in 2001, to French data. Further, they proposed a 
third version of the model in which the axes were not rotated, but were translated. However, the 
effect of partitioning the data combined with translated axes was only a slight improvement on 
the effect of partitioning of the data alone. The rotated four-state model remained superior to 
both in terms of explanatory power. Jokung and Meyfredi used daily returns on 34 stocks 
contained in the French CAC40 Index from February 1997 to July 2002. Their prime purpose 
was to test the four-state model for the stability of its betas and they found that the unrotated, 
rotated and translated versions of the model all furnished betas that were more stable than those 
of the Market Model. They also observed a transfer between market risk and non-systematic risk 
                                                 
132 The two rotated models were very similar. The difference was the one had a symmetry requirement built into it. 
In terms of adjusted R2s obtained from the rotated procedure with symmetry, these were slightly inferior to those 
obtained without the symmetry requirement. The model with the symmetry requirement is ignored in the current 
study. 
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— the four-state model registered non-systematic risk (the size of the model’s alpha terms) as 
being much lower. 
But for the current study, the relevance of the rotated and unrotated partitioned models lies in the 
increased explanatory power of the computed expected returns. Norsworthy et al said of their 
model133: 
The 4-state APM [Asset Pricing Model] may also provide a more systematic framework for 
event studies. Specifically, taking into account the contemporary movement of the market by 
partitioning may make it easier to identify departures from the patterns expected on the basis 
of no-effects of a given event. A false event signal may be generated or a true event signal 
obscured by a contemporary change in the direction of market returns. 
The question to be asked at this point is, is there a discernible movement in company returns on 
day t0 that can be ascribed to the quality of an announced dividend in the joint dividend and 
earnings announcement environment? And in addition, there is a second question. What results 
are obtainable if a further ‘state’ is brought into the model to account for the presence of zero 
company returns? 
At this point I will move on to considering the the research question, the data and hypotheses, 
and return to examining the nuts and bolts of the basic method in more detail.  However I will 
leave further examination of friction model and state model methodologies until Chapters 6 and 
7. 
                                                 
133 Norsworthy et al, p. 32. 
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3 Research Question, Data Collection, Market Model Method 
and Hypotheses 
3.1 Introduction 
The question that is asked is, do investors in New Zealand react to joint dividend and earnings 
announcements made by listed companies in a manner that suggests they are acting in reliance 
upon a dividend signal? Observations of this reaction will primarily be restricted to short-term 
movements in share prices on the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) at and near the time of 
the announcement; and the units of measurement will be daily abnormal returns (ARs) and 
cumulative abnormal return (CARs) over a multi-day span. 
However, while earlier studies of joint dividend-and-earnings announcement signalling effects 
have made use of the Market Model with a restricted least squares regression component, this 
event study goes on to address possible shortcomings that have become apparent in an ‘off-the-
shelf’ employment of this methodology with respect to New Zealand’s thinly traded share 
market. While all three of the methodologies — Market Model, Friction Modelling, and State 
Asset Models — make use of expected and abnormal returns to at least some extent, the fine 
details of only the Market Model will be discussed in this chapter. The other two methods will be 
disclosed in detail in Chapters 6 and 7. 
The current chapter is laid out in the following manner. In Section 3.2 the research question 
(which is independent of methodology) is tabled. Section 3.3 discusses the sourcing and 
selection of data, and the cleaning that was necessary to bring it up to a useable standard. Next, 
in Section 3.4, the details of event study methodology (as applied to the detection of dividend 
signalling in New Zealand) are tabled and explained. Section 3.5 then ends the chapter by 
presenting the hypotheses that will be used throughout this thesis. 
3.2 The Research Question: Is there a Dividend Signal? 
This may be broken down into two groups of sub-questions: 
1. What is the nature of the signal sent in a joint dividend and earnings announcement? In 
particular, can it be defined as a promise of future company profitability that can be 
retrospectively verified? 
2. Can we detect the presence of a signal by observing how investors react to joint dividend 
and earnings announcements? What are these reactions in the short term? 
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The second of these two sub-question groups is what most of this part of this thesis spends its 
time answering. The disclosure to the market of new information, according to the Efficient 
Markets Hypothesis, should cause the share price to adjust swiftly to a new level. If the new 
information is a message in the form of a raised dividend that the company is going to be more 
profitable than hitherto, then that price adjustment will be upward. In terms of an event study 
based on Market Model methodology, this adjustment will be captured in terms of a statistically 
significant positive abnormal return (AR) on (or closely about) the day of the announcement. 
The fact that there is an upward jump in price can be construed as evidence investors do believe 
there is a dividend signal and that they are acting on it. But, so far, this is circular reasoning. 
If the investor reaction is indeed a reaction to specific dividend-related information, there should 
be a statistically significant relation between the nature of the information and the nature of the 
reaction. If there is no clear correlation, then investors cannot be said to be acting in reliance 
upon a signal. But if there is such a correlation, then they can be said to be acting in reliance. 
However, this does not tell us if the signal is a true one or not — it only shows us something 
about the trading investors’ belief sets concerning what an increase in dividends might mean. 
Now let us consider what the dividend signal might be signalling. This falls into the second 
group of sub-questions. Lintner (1956) argued that firms would only raise dividends if they 
believed they could sustain the dividend at the new higher level — which implied the 
expectation of a higher level of earnings in the future. Miller and Modigliani (1961), in 
conceptualising the dividend signal, posited that it was this expectation of improved long-term 
future earnings that was the signal’s content. However, a dividend signal cannot say such a thing 
— it may only imply it. It remains a hint which investors might pick up and act upon. The truth 
of it will be seen in the record of earnings furnished by the firm in subsequent years. This thesis 
looks at future earnings record — but only briefly. 
But managers, like the rest of us, are not omniscient beings and are not prescient. They may get 
their predictions wrong. But does that make a dividend signal which is acted upon as a signal any 
less true as a signal if it eventually turns out to have been misleading? I believe not. If there is a 
misleading signal, then it is a true, wrong signal. As pointed out by Miller and Rock (1985), 
paying dividends is costly to the firm; so therefore raising them to send a false signal would 
further harm mediocre profitability. Further, there would come a time when the raised dividend 
could no longer be sustained; and such a reduction appears to be seen by investors as a negative 
dividend signal and has definitely been associated with immediate falls in market share price 
(Aharony and Swary (1980), Woolridge (1982), Eades, Hess and Kim (1985), Healy and Palepu 
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(1988), and Christie (1994)). Therefore one would not ordinarily expect to find duplicitous as 
distinct from mistaken signalling. 
If markets are truly efficient, the AR recorded in response to a news disclosure should be a 
relatively isolated phenomenon. It will be larger than the ARs recorded on the days preceding it, 
and larger than those on the following days too. If there is a lazy drift of positive ARs of similar 
size that are significantly different from zero over some as yet unspecified number of days after 
the announcement, there is an implication that the share market is not efficient and that investors 
might be able to execute profitable trades, at leisure, as the share price slowly adjusts. This 
would be indicative of an inefficient market. Therefore, one of the important implications 
associated with the group 1 sub-questions is whether or not we are operating in an efficient 
market. Event study methodology, developed by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969), is closely 
related to, and reliant upon the concept of semi-strong market efficiency. If, in the period leading 
up to the announcement event, the share market is efficient and movements in prices (in the 
absence of the publication of new information) are random about a long-term mean, then one 
would expect ARs and CARs to be negligible and statistically indistinguishable from zero.134 
During the announcement period, however, there will potentially be a measurable AR (or CAR) 
spike as the share price adjusts to a new level incorporating the published information — if 
indeed there is any new information furnished in the announcement. Beyond that, if the New 
Zealand share market exhibits semi-strong efficiency, there will be a return to the pattern of 
negligible, statistically insignificant ARs as soon as the event period has passed. 
From these considerations it is possible to develop the series of hypotheses laid out in Section 
3.5. But before then it is necessary to develop the language in which they are couched. This 
entails defining variables and explaining in more detail how the Market Model works 
3.3 Selection of Data, its Sources, and the Cleaning of it 
In this subsection data sources are described and a rationale is provided for use of 1990s data; 
and then the data is described. 
3.3.1 1990s Share Price Data 
The daily share price data used in this study is drawn from the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
between the first trading day in January 1990 and the last trading day in December 1999. An 
                                                 
134 This long-term mean is proxied in the study by expected returns. Since these are calculated as a function of 
market returns, they are market risk-adjusted. However, they can only be generated over the period in which there is 
no publication of new information, which ends with the publication of the dividend and earnings announcement. 
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immediate reason for the choice of this decade was that the data was available in electronic 
archived form for almost all companies individually, and a gross value-weighted NZX All 
Companies Index. This data was published in CD-ROM form by a Wellington data collection 
firm, IRG Ltd.135 More recently, some extra data series were obtained directly from the NZX 
itself. 
This study started in the late 1990s and the data set was gathered at that stage and updated in 
2000. An interesting extension would be to investigate more recent data. 
3.3.2 Company Reports Data 
Throughout the 1990s, listed companies were required to furnish mid-year and end-of-year 
financial reports.136 These reports have been sourced for the current research from IRG CD-
ROMs containing all company disclosures to the Stock Exchange. The mid-year set of reports 
was known as an ‘interim result’ and furnished information relating to a company’s financial 
record for the six months since the start of the company’s year. The end-of-year set, released for 
dissemination by the NZX as a ‘preliminary result’, furnished information covering the 
company’s full financial year. Both sets of information were furnished with comparative figures 
from the previous interim or preliminary report published twelve months earlier. To avoid 
confusion, the terms ‘mid-year’ and ‘year-end’ will be used in place of ‘interim’ and 
‘preliminary’. 
Since the NZX was a small market and not all companies furnished dividends, it was necessary 
to collect dividend and earnings information from both preliminary (year-end) and interim (mid-
year) disclosures. This exposed the current research to the danger of treating, as if identical, two 
types of announcement as potentially different as apples and oranges. Hence, the calculation of 
percentage changes in dividends and earnings declared in mid-year announcements made use of 
the equivalent mid-year data from the previous company financial year (apples were compared 
with apples). Similarly, the percentage changes in year-end dividends and year-end earnings 
were based on the change from those in the preceding year-end announcement (oranges 
compared with oranges). 
                                                 
135 IRG Ltd’s full name is Investment Research Group Ltd. This firm has had a recent name change. The previous 
name was Datex Ltd. It is to be noted that where company information was not available electronically, the 
company concerned was not included in the sample. 
136 Semi-annual reports had actually been a requirement since 1973; however, the exact specification of the content 
of the half-year report was not formalised until 1976. Bradbury (1991) observed the half-year disclosures furnished 
by listed companies in the intervening period and found that interim dividend-paying firms had higher levels of 
interim disclosure. 
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The data contained in both mid-year and year-end reports was summary rather than 
comprehensive in nature, and tended to be unaudited; but nevertheless was sufficient to furnish a 
good snapshot of a company’s financial health in lieu of the formal, audited annual financial 
statements, which the company finalised and furnished on paper at a later point in time. 
With respect to dividends per share, both the mid-year and year-end announcements had a format 
which stated this explicitly along with the comparative figure for twelve months earlier. Hence, 
if a dividend was omitted, this information became known at the time of the particular 
announcement. Hence the non-publication of a dividend in itself had news value. This meant that 
it was feasible in the current study to report dividend omissions as an explicit information event, 
with the dividend of twelve months earlier standing in stark contrast to the absence of a matching 
figure for the period just ended. Kalay and Loewenstein (1986) made the point that the need for a 
dividend reduction tended to cause managers to delay announcing the drop. In the New Zealand 
context this would entail delaying the entire financial reports disclosure to the NZX, which 
enforces a time limit for these disclosures. Where a firm goes over the limit, it is warned — and 
with no disclosure forthcoming, delisted. 
The dividend-per-share data set was compiled from the announcements of all companies listed 
on the NZX between January 1990 and December 1999, which met the criteria listed in the 
following section. 
3.3.3 Cleaning the Announcement Data 
Not all announcements in the 1990s could be used, the following outlines the problems and the 
process of removing problematic announcements. 
In the first instance, the companies needed to have announced and paid dividends. Alternatively, 
they needed to have omitted a dividend following a previous payment. 
In the second instance, an individual company index of closing daily prices, adjusted for share 
splits and dividend pay-outs, was required to be on the CD ROMS provided by IRG Ltd. 
The third requirement was that there had to be no confounding event announced by the company 
within the announcement itself, or released the same day, published in the preceding ten days, or 
published in the ten days following the announcement (within the 21-day test period). 
Confounding data was checked for by compiling a list on an Excel spreadsheet of the 10,460 
release titles of all announcements (of every kind) made by the all of the dividend-announcing 
companies, sorted by chronological order for each company. The test period surrounding each 
mid-year and each year-end announcement was then vetted for the presence of unacceptable 
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announcements. In addition, the text of each individual dividend-bearing announcement was 
itself checked for any confounding data not disclosed in the announcement title. The following 
items caused a dividend announcement to be dropped from the sample: 
1. Announcements of special dividends 
2. Announcements of changes in capital structure with respect to debt 
3. Share buybacks and other announcements of capital reduction 
4. Earnings forecast announcements 
5. Bonus share issue announcements 
6. Rights issue announcements 
7. Announcements concerning options 
8. Announcements of impending take-overs 
9. Announcements of company revaluations 
10. Follow-up announcements of revisions of erroneous data in an announcement 
11. Requests published by the NZX requiring a company to explain unusual (and potentially 
suspicious) changes in the market price of its shares 
An initial tally of possible announcement events was 1910 announcements. This covered 
companies which made at least one dividend announcement in the 1990s. When there was no 
dividend after an initial year of dividend omission, the announcement was dropped from the tally 
(but the announcement in which the initial omission occurred was kept in). This dropped the 
number to 1048 possible observations. Removal of announcements contaminated with the listed 
confounding items dropped the available sample to 958 events. 
Dividend announcements were also deleted from the sample if the company was delisted within 
the ensuing six months or if a merger was in progress. 
The fourth requirement was that any mid-year or year-end announcement used in the sample 
must fall at least 111 market days after the preceding announcement, irrespective of whether the 
preceding announcement was ‘mid-year’ or ‘year-end’ in nature. This rule ensured that 110 days 
of closing prices free of contamination from prior announcements would be available for the 
Market Model’s estimation period and ten days of test period leading up to the day of the 
announcement. The nuts and bolts of this estimation process are discussed in Section 3.4. It is of 
note that this time-lapse requirement effectively removed all quarterly dividends from the 
sample. Hence, the Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd, New Zealand’s biggest listed 
company in the 1990s and a major contributor to changes in any market-weighted price index 
such as the NZX 40 and indeed, the NZX all ordinaries price index, does not feature in the 
sample past the end of 1995, which was the point at which this company’s dividends became 
payable quarterly. 
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A variation on this 110 days rule was as follows: 110 market days were required between the 
start of the available price index (usually 3rd January 1990) and the date of the first acceptable 
announcement if (and only if) the company was already listed earlier and had made at least one 
year’s worth of mid-year and year-end announcements back in the 1980s. This brought data-
points into the sample which would otherwise have been rejected simply because appropriate 
IRG Ltd price history indices did not extend back past the start of 1990, even though the relevant 
announcement data was available from the start of 1988 onward. 
After the 110-day rule was applied and several events were found to be contaminated by 
proximity to their company’s delisting, the final tally of usable events dropped from 958 to 948. 
Dividend data was collected from IRG Ltd’s archival versions of the announcements which 
survived the above weeding procedure. However, a further vetting procedure was needed. Over 
the decade from the start of 1990 to the end of 1999, the NZX made occasional changes to the 
content it required from companies in their mid-year and year-end financial results, and also 
altered the tabular format in which this data was formally presented to the public. In particular 
there was a significant change in disclosures mandated in 1995 which flowed through to 
announcements as of May 1996.137 
This 1995 disclosure and format reform had two implications concerning the data collection for 
this study. One of these concerned dividends and the other was related to earnings per share 
figures. The dividend implication (and a related dividend matter) will be dealt with first. Until 
May 1996, the year-end announcement contained dividend information concerning the final 
dividend only. From that time onward, the year-end announcement no longer reported the final 
dividend, but disclosed the cumulative annual ordinary dividend instead. The current study is 
based on the use of final dividends as distinct from cumulative dividends. Hence, latter-year final 
dividends needed to be separated out from the published cumulative data-points. IRG Ltd did 
furnish this information separately for most companies in the form of company-specific 
summary tables of ordinary dividend disbursements and, in addition, in the form of company-
specific diaries of payment data for dividends of all kinds. These extra IRG dividend information 
sources also served as a check on the accuracy of the archived announcements, which from time 
to time contained contradictory data and/or clerical transcription errors. 
With respect to mid-year dividend data, some companies furnished more than one ‘interim’ 
(mid-year) dividend in a financial year. A case in point was Cavalier Corporation Ltd. 
                                                 
137 See the New Zealand Stock Exchange Listing Rules, issued by the Exchange in September 1994 and updated in 
1995. In particular, see Appendix 1 (Rule 10.4), revised April 1995. 
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Throughout the 1990s, this company paid a first interim dividend in February/March which was 
announced in the company’s mid-year financial result published in February. Cavalier 
Corporation then paid out a second interim dividend in December, which was quite independent 
of the final dividend announced in August and usually paid in November. As the study in hand is 
about dividend signalling in a joint dividend-and-earnings announcement context, ‘second 
interim’ dividends announced at times other than in mid-year and year-end announcements are 
excluded from the data set. Hence, the cents per share dividend (DPS) figure associated with an 
mid-year financial results announcement is not the cumulative interim dividend, but simply the 
individual dividend item (incremental dividend) disclosed in the mid-year announcement. 
The second change was in the disclosure of earnings per share (EPS) information. Prior to 1996 
when the reform took effect, EPS information was not explicitly stated at all. It was missing 
from the summary tables provided as part of the announcement, and usually not stated in the 
accompanying text. But from May 13th 1996 onward, the missing EPS information was 
disclosed in both mid-year and year-end announcements.138 
With respect to the missing information prior to mid 1996, the general public had to make do 
with disclosures of profit before and after extraordinaries, and before and after unusual items. If 
investors wanted to estimate earnings per share for themselves, they had to undertake the 
separate exercise of seeking out numerical data on companies’ outstanding shares elsewhere. 
This time-based inconsistency was solved in the study by calculating an earnings per share data 
point to match each dividend announcement data point in the sample prior to May 1996. Again, 
the information came from IRG Ltd, which furnished a capital table for each company, 
containing the required summary figure of ordinary shares outstanding as of the end of the 
company’s financial year. The EPS estimate was calculated by dividing this figure into an 
earnings figure available in the actual year-end or mid-year announcement. This earnings figure 
was net profit after tax and before adjustment for extraordinaries. In the case of year-end 
announcement EPS calculations, the shares figure was concurrent. In the case of mid-year 
announcement EPS calculations, the relevant shares figure was the one available for the end of 
the previous company year. It is to be noted that EPS is secondary in importance in this study as 
the thrust of the investigation is the impact of dividend information and how it interacts with 
earnings information irrespective of how that earnings information was packaged for publication 
to investors. It may well be the case that investors made use of some alternative measure of 
                                                 
138 The final two non-disclosing announcements in the sample were both dated May 8th 1996. 
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company earnings performance such as net profit after tax and before (or after) extraordinaries 
unadjusted for the number of shares outstanding. 
3.3.4 Other Announcement Complications and Resolutions 
The 948 observations were gathered from 127 listed companies in accordance with the 
guidelines laid out in the previous subsection. However, several more aspects of the selection 
process become cogent at this point. The first is that there are entities other than formally 
constituted companies with listings on the NZX; a second, that some companies have multiple 
listings on the NZX; and a third is that some companies are listed on more exchanges than just 
the NZX. 
With respect to the first of these issues, the sample was restricted to company observations. This 
meant that observations relating to NZX-listed trusts, that would otherwise have been eligible, 
were excluded. Although a small number of trusts such as the Kiwi Income Property Trust and 
the National Property Trust appeared to perform like limited liability companies and did pay 
dividends, they were deleted from the sample on the assumption that investors might behave 
differently with respect to trusts. 
The second issue was slightly more complex. Where a listed company split itself into a series of 
separate share-issuing entities within one group, and the share-issuing entities were autonomous 
companies, the individual entity observations were included in the sample. The only relevant 
instance of this in the 1990s was when Fletcher Challenge Ltd redesigned itself as Fletcher 
Challenge Ltd Forest Division, Fletcher Challenge Ltd Energy Division, Fletcher Challenge 
Paper Division and Fletcher Challenge Building Division. Each of these ‘Divisions’ was a large 
company, by New Zealand standards, in its own right. However, where a firm separately listed 
more than one type of ordinary share, only one type was included in the sample. There was one 
example of this. Air New Zealand Ltd in the 1990s had ‘A’ shares which any New Zealand 
investor could buy and ‘B’ shares for overseas investors. The ‘B’ shares have been ignored in 
this study. 
The third complication arose from the advent of listing on multiple exchanges. A small number 
of significant New Zealand companies are listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and in 
the United States in addition to being leading lights on the NZX and in the New Zealand 
economy. Conversely, a number of companies with listings elsewhere and head offices located 
offshore, are listed as foreign companies on the NZX. This ‘foreignness’ is to some extent, an 
artificial construct. One company, Macraes Mining Company Ltd, was a New Zealand firm 
which switched to being foreign by administrative decision. The Guinness Peat Group and 
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Goodman Fielder Ltd are examples of foreign companies with tremendous economic influence 
in New Zealand and a large role on the NZX. In all, nine companies of this sort were included in 
the sample because they could furnish NZX price histories and files of locally released 
announcements.139 
3.3.5 Representative Sample 
The 127 companies in the data set cover all areas of legitimate commercial activity conducted in 
the private sector in New Zealand. A descriptive list is provided in Appendix B This list 
contains, for every announcement observation, the company’s name, the acronym under which it 
was listed, its industry code (as defined by the NZX in its annual “Sharemarket Review” — and 
later, the annual “Fact Book”), and a brief description of its principal activities which was 
sourced from “The New Zealand Company Register”. In addition, the list contains the calendar 
date of each announcement and whether it was made mid-year or at the company’s year-end. 
3.4 Event Study Methodology - and how it pertains to this Study 
3.4.1 Section Introduction 
The method used in Chapter 5 of this thesis (but not later) is the event study as used by Kane, 
Lee and Marcus (1984), Easton and Sinclair (1989), Easton (1991) and Lonie, Abeyratna, Power 
and Sinclair (1996) to separate out the earnings and dividend components in half-yearly financial 
disclosures to the NZX and the nature of the associated change in share price. The key concept in 
event study methodology is an abnormal return. This is a measure of how a share price can be 
deemed to react to the specific stimulation provided by the arrival of the news item that is the 
‘event’ of the event study. ARs are calculated via a CAPM-based mechanism called the Market 
Model, which furnishes risk-adjusted expected returns. The AR on the day of the announcement 
(or some CAR spanning the time of the announcement) is then used as the regressand in a cross-
sectional regression on independent variables based on earnings per share and dividends per 
share. The Market Model entails a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression employing the 
natural log of company returns as the dependent variable and the natural log of returns on the 
market index (also referred to as market return) as the independent variable. 
These concepts are expanded upon in following subsections: 
3.4.2 How the investor reaction to an event is defined. 
3.4.3 Definition of the terms used to explain time periods. 
                                                 
139 Although these foreign companies can be deleted from the sample, the primary results tabled in the next chapter 
include them. But they were found to make no appreciable difference to the results. 
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3.4.4 Calculation of company and market returns. 
3.4.5 Calculation of risk-adjusted expected returns and abnormal returns. 
3.4.6 Check if there is any significant change in returns on any day in the test period. 
3.4.7 Define change in earnings ( EPS∆ ), change in dividends ( DPS∆ ) and associated 
dummy variables. 
3.4.8 Specification of the Restricted Least Squares (RLS) regression procedure to 
determine the relationship between dividends and earnings announcements and 
abnormal returns. 
Some technical details and software used are in Appendix D. 
3.4.2 How an Investor Reaction to an Event is defined 
The primary focus of the study is on the presence and nature (or absence) of the event window 
spike in ARs. It will furnish evidence of an investor reaction to a joint dividend-and-earnings 
signal simply by being present and measurable. But is it always present? And does it change its 
nature in response to the conjunction of dividend characteristics and earnings characteristics 
announced? In other words, are investors influenced by the interaction of dividend and earnings 
information presented together in a single announcement? And if so — how? For the purpose of 
hypothesis testing, the maximum probability of a Type One error (hereafter ‘Type 1’) will be 
five percent.140 
The investigation will primarily be cross-sectional in nature rather than in depth with respect to 
particular companies; and the main methodological vehicle will be the event study as described 
below. 
3.4.3 Time Period Terms 
The time period terms used in the study are depicted in Figure 3-1. All time periods are relative 
to the day of the announcement, and so it is considered as day zero, denoted t0. An event window 
(not shown) is typically either just the day of the announcement or a small number of days 
centred on the day of the announcement. In the study, three-day and one-day event windows will 
be employed. The event window is used to determine investor reaction to the announcement. The 
test period is a larger span of days centred on the day of the announcement, denoted t-10:t10, and 
incorporate the event window. This is not included in the regression to find the relationship 
between the market index and the company return as leakage of the announcement may have 
occurred in this period before the announcement. The test period has been set in this study at ten 
days before day t0 and ten days afterward, totalling 21 days. Its main purpose to to provide a 
background against which the behaviour observed within the event window can be compared. If 
                                                 
140 This error occurs when the alternative version of a hypothesis is allowed, when the null form was an accurate 
representation of underlying phenomena.  
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ARs are small and uninteresting in the test period outside the actual event window and there is an 
AR spike in the event window itself, then the contrast of the spike relative to the lowlands on 
either side of it is indicative of an investor reaction to the news in the event window. The last 
term of note is the estimation period. This is the period in which risk-adjusted expected returns 
are formulated and calibrated. It is one hundred days prior to the test period, and is denoted t-110 
to t-11. One hundred days is chosen as it is a reasonable trade-off between having sufficient points 
in the regression for it to be trustworthy and not excluding too many announcement/events from 
the study because of the presence of a previous announcement. An estimation period may not 
include a previous announcement event as this could be seen as contaminating the calibration of 
expected returns used in determining the abnormal returns in the test period and event window. 
Figure 3-1: Time Period Terms. 
 
t-110 t-11 t-10 t10t0 
Announcement 
day 
Estimation period Test period 
 
3.4.4 Company Returns (Rit) and Market Returns (RMt) 
Company Returns (Rit) can be thought of as the proportional change in adjusted daily closing 
share price (Pit).141 The subscript ‘i’ will be used to denote a particular company’s 
announcement, and the subscript ‘t’ to refer to a particular day. The returns are computed in 
terms of the natural log of the price on day ‘t’ divided by the price on the preceding trading day 
‘t-1’: 
 
1
ln itit
it
PR
P
−
 =   
 (3.1) 
The natural log of returns should help to overcome the skew to the right in returns. Analogous to 
Equation (3.1), the return on the market for the same period is calculated from the New Zealand 
                                                 
141 The adjusted closing priced series is furnished by IRG Ltd. The daily closing prices have been adjusted for the 
effects of stock splits and dividend payments. 
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Stock Exchange’s daily all-companies gross index, the NZX Index,142 as the natural log of the 
index value for day t divided by the previous day’s index value: 
 
1
ln MtMt
Mt
PR
P
−
 =   
 (3.2) 
In this equation, RM is the return on the market (proxied by the gross index) and PM is the gross 
index’s closing value. 
3.4.5 Calculation of Expected Returns and Abnormal Returns 
The supposed underlying concept of using the Market Model is to remove the ‘noise’ of changes 
in the market. It uses OLS regression to find the relationship between the market return and a 
particular company’s return on the basis that this relationship is assumed to be linear: 
 ( ) ( )it i MtE R Rα β= +  (3.3) 
This can be read as the expected return for the company associated with announcement i on day t 
is equal to some intercept or offset term (α) plus a slope coefficient (β) times the market return 
for the same day. As stated earlier, this is a simplification of the standard CAPM. It differs from 
the CAPM only in that the CAPM subtracts a proxy of the risk-free rate of return from both 
market returns and company returns. Given the linearity assumption implicit in the Market 
Model, a measure of the accuracy or predictive power of the relationship between the market 
return and the company return is the r² statistic.143 
The abnormal return is simply the actual return minus the expected return: 
 ( )it it itAR R E R= −  (3.4) 
                                                 
142 Two matters should be dealt with here. In the 1990s, the New Zealand Stock Exchange was not called the NZX, 
but was the NZSE. References to NZSE have been updated to the more modern nomenclature — NZX. Second, this 
gross index is adjusted for dividend payouts and is calculated in the following manner. Each company’s last sale 
price of the day is multiplied by the company’s current number of shares on issue, and the result is summed up over 
all companies. This numerator is then divided by the sum of each company’s opening price for the day (again 
adjusted for dividends and multiplied by the company’s current number of shares.) The result is then multiplied by 
the end-of-day index for the previous day. (NZSE: “The Fact Book for the Year Ended 31 December 1997,” p.5.) 
143 An excellent background text with respect to OLS regression is Damodar Gujurati’s “Basic Econometrics” (Third 
Edition). 
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In the estimation period ARit would be described as a residual. CARs are simply the sum of the 
ARs over the specified time period. The use of addition is appropriate here as returns have been 
calculated in logarithmic form. 
3.4.6 A Check for Significant Change in Returns on any Day in the Test 
Period. 
Once output datasets of abnormal and excess returns have been generated, t-tests will be 
employed to determine whether or not the mean of the ARs for any particular day in the window 
differs significantly from zero. The ARs will then be summed into cumulative abnormal returns, 
CARs with respect to a three-day event window, the full test period and other cogent subsets of 
it. 
3.4.7 Change in Earnings (∆EPS), Change in Dividends (∆DPS) and Dummy 
Variables 
This event study looks at the relationship between the company’s earnings and dividends 
simultaneously announced in the company report and their effect on the share price as shown by 
the abnormal return. 
In an announcement event in which dividends per share (DPS) and earnings per share (EPS) are 
disclosed simultaneously, we immediately have two sets of variables to contend with. The first 
are the first-order variables, which are formulations of the relevant characteristics of the two 
announced items independent of each other. The second set contains interaction variables, which 
are formulations of the possible combinations of earnings change and dividend change 
considered jointly. 
The two first-order independent variables are change in dividend per share, DPS∆  and change in 
earnings per share, EPS∆ . In the company’s announcement disclosure to the New Zealand 
Stock Exchange (NZX), the dividend is announced in terms of cents per share; but we are not 
interested in a raw figure, but in some measure of improvement or deterioration of a firm’s 
dividend performance. If we assume that the equivalent DPS in cents announced last year is a 
reasonable expected value for the DPS in cents that will be announced today, then the difference 
when we subtract last year’s from this year’s figure will be a raw measure of unexpected 
dividend change. However, to allow for standardisation across firms of different sizes and 
different sizes of dividend, DPS∆  is compiled by calculating the percentage change in DPS 
from the company’s last announcement of the same type (ie mid-year or end-of-year 
announcement): 
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 ANNOUNCED LAST YEAR
LAST YEAR
DPS DPS
DPS
DPS
−
∆ =  (3.5) 
This compilation accords with Abeyratna (1994) and Lonie, Abeyratna, Power and Sinclair 
(1996). It is elegant in that it can be interpreted as a simple percentage change. However, it has 
an annoying drawback. If there was no dividend announced (or paid) in the year prior to the 
current announcement event, then DPS∆ is not defined as the ratio has a denominator of zero. 
This knocks consideration of dividend initiations and resumptions (after periods of dividend 
omissions) out of the sample available for statistical analysis unless some arbitrary value is 
assigned to them — which, if assigned, distorts the results. 
In Chapters 6 and 7 of the study, an alternative compilation is adopted which enables dividend 
initiations and dividend resumptions to be included in the sample. This alternative compilation is 
explained in some detail in Chapter 5, Subsection 5.5.1 where it is used for the first time. The 
second first-order variable is EPS∆ . It is compiled in the study in the same manner as DPS∆  — 
and where DPS∆  is later recompiled with Pt-1 as a deflator, EPS∆  is similarly treated. 
We now turn to the compilation of variables covering the nature of possible dividend-and-
earnings interaction effects — the dummy variables. An announced dividend will fall into one of 
three possible categories: a dividend which has increased in magnitude over the one announced 
twelve months earlier (DI), a dividend that has decreased relative to twelve months previously 
(DD), and an announced dividend with no change in magnitude to its predecessor (DNC). 
Similarly, the announcement of earnings per share must either increase (EI), decrease (ED) or 
remain unchanged (ENC). These give rise to nine possible permutations of changes in dividends 
and earnings, but only the first two rows of Table 3-1 make economic sense. 
Table 3-1: Nine Announcement Classifications. 
DI-EI DD-EI DNC-EI 
DI-ED DD-ED DNC-ED 
DI-ENC DD-ENC DNC-ENC 
 
With respect to the bottom row, occurrences of an “ENC” announcement are likely to be 
extremely rare. There are two reasons for this. Company profits cannot be tied by fiat to rigidly 
specified amounts, but instead fluctuate; and, second, the number of shares (and convertibles and 
options) a company has outstanding is relatively unlikely to remain static. Therefore reported 
earnings effectively go up or down, even if the reported changes may be relatively small. 
Dividends, on the other hand, are ordained by company policy and can be increased, decreased 
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or kept at a constant level per share by company decision. Hence the permutations investigated 
in the study will be restricted to the following: 
Table 3-2: Six Announcement Classifications actually used. 
DI-EI DD-EI DNC-EI 
DI-ED DD-ED DNC-ED 
 
Of these, the DI-EI combination and the DD-ED combination would be expected to produce the 
starkest impact on the behaviour of ARs (and CARs), as they contain pairings that pull in the 
same as distinct from opposing directions. With respect to the two DNC combinations, one 
would expect the dividend to have little influence on investors, but for there to be some influence 
emanating from the rise or fall in earnings; but that this influence would be muted down by the 
‘DNC’ aspect. With respect to the DD-EI and DI-ED combinations, the component changes pull 
in opposite directions. In these cases, one would expect that the impact on ARs would be 
strongly cancelled down by the countervailing influences. 
Finally, a more general nomenclature can be applied to these dividend-and-earnings 
combinations. The DI-EI category of announcement, containing increases only, could be 
considered to be unadulterated good news for investors. DI-EI is often referred to as the ‘good-
news’ category, while the DD-ED grouping by the same logic is known as the ‘bad-news’ 
announcement-type. Where one component rises and the other one falls, (DD-EI and DI-ED), the 
shorthand terminology is ‘mixed-news’ or ‘mixed-message’. ‘Mixed-news’ (or message) is 
extended to cover the final two announcement types (DNC-EI and DNC-ED) on the basis that 
dividends and earnings are still behaving in a dissimilar manner. 
From these the dummy variables are as defined in Table 3-3: 
Table 3-3: Dummy Definitions. 
Category Dummy variable English summary 
DI-EI D1 Good news. 
DD-ED Regression intercept term Bad news. 
DI-ED D2 
DD-EI D3 
DNC-EI D4 
DNC-ED D5 
Mixed news or 
mixed message. 
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3.4.8 Restricted Least Squares (RLS) Procedure 
In the second tier of estimations, the event-window AR (or CAR if cumulated) for each 
company/event will be treated as an observation in the set of ARs for all company/events, and 
used as the regressand in a cross-sectional regression involving measures of change-in-dividend 
and change-in-earnings as independent variables. This methodology has been employed fairly 
widely; and with respect to dividend signalling in a joint announcement context, has been used 
by Kane, Lee and Marcus (1984), Easton and Sinclair (1989), Easton (1991) and Lonie, 
Abeyratna, Power and Sinclair (1996). But the use of forecast errors as a measure of impact 
attributable to dividends harks back to Gonedes (1978), who found it to be insignificant. 
Gonedes used the errors associated with a regression based on Lintner (1956). 
At this point, analysis of the joint nature of the dividend-and-earnings announcement will begin. 
The primary tool for this will be the RLS regression procedure utilising three-day event window 
CARs as the dependent variable or alternatively, with ARt0 as the dependent variable (CAR3Day 
is shown): 
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( )
( )
1 2 3 1 4 2
5 3 6 4 7 5
1 2
1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5
3
3
3
i CAR day DPS EPS D D
D D D
ii CAR day DPS EPS
iii CAR day D D D D D
α β β β β
β β β ε
α β β ε
α β β β β β ε
= + ∆ + ∆ + +
+ + + +
= + ∆ + ∆ +
= + + + + + +
 (3.6) 
In this RLS procedure, ∆DPS and ∆EPS are the procedure’s first-order variables. The remaining 
independent variables (all called D) are interaction dummies, each representing one of the 
combined dividend-change and earnings-change categories as defined in Table 3-3. 
The three regression runs of a restricted least squares procedure comprise an unrestricted 
regression and two restricted regressions. The differences among these lie in the exclusion of one 
of the types of independent variable — first-order or interaction dummy. The unrestricted 
regression employs both first-order and interaction dummy variables together, while the first 
restricted regression run employs the first-order variables alone and the second, the interaction 
dummies alone. 
The joint significance of the first-order variables will be measured by a first-order F-statistic 
employing the residual sum of squares from the unrestricted run (i) and from the restricted 
regression with interaction dummy variables only (iii): 
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 (3.7) 
In the formula below, m is the number of restrictions (degrees of freedom associated with 
regressors omitted from the restricted run), N the number of observations and K the number of 
degrees of freedom lost in the unrestricted regression, which is the number of its regressors plus 
its intercept. The term RSS denotes the residual sum of squares (error sum of squares) from either 
the unrestricted or restricted equation. 
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 (3.8) 
The joint significance of the interaction dummy variables will be measured by the interaction F-
statistic, which is calculated from the residual sum of squares from the unrestricted run and the 
restricted run incorporating first-order variables only: 
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 (3.9) 
The interaction F-test is: 
 
( )( )
( )
( )
UNRESTRICTEDRESTRICTED EQN ii
EQN ii
INTERACTION
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−    =    − 
 (0.10) 
With respect to both first-order and interaction F-tests, the benchmark for rejection of the 
relevant null hypothesis will be found from an F-distribution, given the appropriate degrees of 
freedom information. 
The interaction dummy variables, which have been ‘restricted’ out of Equation (3.9) (but shown 
in Equation (3.7) above), relate to the relevant permutations of direction-change in announced 
dividends and in the earnings jointly announced with them. Given n relevant direction-change 
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categories, the unrestricted equation will contain n-1 dummy variables, as the regression’s 
intercept term will furnish a coefficient modelling the relationship between the dependent 
variable and the nth dividend-and-earnings direction permutation. 
In the first instance, a simpler restricted least squares procedure in Equation (3.11) will be set up 
to investigate the effect of the direction of change in earnings only. This will entail setting up 
one dummy variable, ‘E’. All announcements containing a rise in earnings from twelve months 
earlier will be assigned the value ‘1’ while all those containing a fall in earnings will be assigned 
a zero. In the unrestricted run of the procedure, the coefficient of the intercept will capture the 
relationship between falling earnings and the dependent variable, CAR3Day. 
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 (3.11) 
The second restricted least squares procedure in Equation (3.12) will ignore the direction-of-
earnings content of announcements and employ two dummy variables, ‘D’. One will represent a 
rise in dividend and the second will proxy a state of no change in dividend from twelve months 
earlier. The coefficient of the intercept will capture the relationship between a fall in dividends 
and the dependent variable, CAR3Day. 
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 (3.12) 
Once the direction of the two announcement items have been separately considered, they will be 
considered jointly. This will entail a five-dummy restricted least squares procedure 
(Equation(3.7)) covering the six dividend and earnings announcement directions permutations. 
The statistical significance of each discrete category and the DPS∆  and EPS∆  variables 
separately will be determinable from the regression’s t-statistics. Further checks for statistically 
significant differences among the earnings and dividend classifications will be performed with 
nonparametric analysis. In particular, the Kruskal-Wallis test will be used. 
In conjunction with all of the above, since mid-year announcements are being considered along 
with year-end announcements, some form of testing should be done to check whether the former 
100 
produce CARs indistinguishable from those of the latter. This will be achieved by use of the 
Kruskal-Wallis test. 
3.5 Hypotheses 
3.5.1 Hypotheses Governing the Testing of Abnormal Returns 
Much of the planned research lends itself to clear, falsifiable hypotheses in the sense of Karl 
Popper’s use of the term. In this subsection, these will be built up in a sequential manner which 
parallels the presentations of results in ensuing chapters. 
But before the study investigates three-day CARs, a simpler, humbler analysis of the behaviour 
of announcement day ARs will be investigated. The first hypothesis takes into account that the 
‘good-news’ announcement of increases in both dividend and earnings (DI-EI) will be likely to 
be associated with a positive AR on announcement day, while the ‘bad-news’ announcement of 
joint decreases (DD-ED) is likely to produce a negative AR. 
H01: The abnormal returns generated on the day of the announcement and grouped by 
direction of change of dividend and direction of change in earnings category will 
be indistinguishable from zero at the five percent level of error. 
HA1: The abnormal returns generated on the day of the announcement, and grouped by 
direction of change of dividend and direction of change in earnings category, will 
be significantly different from zero at the five percent level of error. 
This hypothesis also covers the four mixed-message announcement categories. In all four 
instances, one would predict in advance that the null hypothesis will not be rejected on the 
ground that the good and bad news components of the joint message would cancel each other out 
in investors’ minds — and their consequent behaviour in the market would show no clear 
consensus. A failure to reject the null hypothesis can be interpreted as investors acting upon a 
dividend signal in opposition to the concurrent earnings signal. The action here amounts to a lack 
of action when averaged out. The primary tool available for testing each of the six categories 
separately covered by the hypothesis is the t-test. 
However, so far, Hypothesis H01 has only covered the nature of the AR recorded on the day of 
the announcement without providing a context in which it can be seated. A significant AR on 
announcement day only becomes interesting if it is seen to be a spike on an otherwise flat plain 
of insignificant ARs generated beforehand and afterwards, as expected in terms of the semi-
strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. But with a minor change in its date reference, 
the hypothesis can be adapted to account for the predicted behaviour of ARs (in each category 
grouping) on each discrete other day in the 21-day test period. When the daily t-statistics and 
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their associated p-values are lined up for all 21 days in chronological sequence, the pattern of AR 
behaviour and significance (or lack of it) can be seen by eye. 
3.5.2 Hypotheses Governing the Testing of CARs 
So far we have made the assumption that short-term reactions to information releases will occur 
on the day of the release. This may, however be a little restrictive. We can expect investors to 
become aware of the release of information to the NZX at various times about the temporal point 
of the actual release. Lonie, Abeyratna, Power and Sinclair (1996) employed a three-day span on 
their British data in this respect, which in terms of event study methodology is called a three-day 
‘event window’. In the current study too, the event window will be extended to encompass the 
day beforehand and the day afterwards. Hence, the alternative hypothesis can be restated with 
another minor change of wording: 
HA2: The mean three-day CAR generated over the days spanning the public release of 
the announcement (days t-1, t0 and t1) and grouped by direction of change of 
dividend and direction of change in earnings category, will be significantly 
different from zero at the five percent level of error. 
3.5.3 Hypotheses Governing the Joint Significance of Dividend and 
Earnings Announcement Combinations 
In the previous two subsections, the existence of significant ARs and CARs associated with 
different categories of joint announcement was postulated; but the hypotheses related only to 
each of the six individual dividend-change-with-earnings-change categories separately. Now it is 
time to posit that the different dividend-and-earnings interactions are significant as a group and 
have an impact on investor behaviour that is distinguishable from that of the magnitudes of 
earnings change and dividend change. It is to be noted that, in a joint announcement context, 
these last two magnitude variables will confound each other unless there is some mechanism for 
separating their impacts out. A broad (but as yet inadequate) hypothesis covering this issue is as 
follows: 
HA3: The market reacts to interactions between dividend-change and earnings-change 
published in a joint announcement in a manner distinguishable from the separate 
impacts of percentage change in earnings announced and percentage change in 
dividend announced. 
In itself, this HA3 lacks precision. However, a more appropriate hypothesis is reliant upon 
information about the method by which it is to be tested. The method (with respect to the Market 
Model methodological approach) is Restricted Least Squares (RLS) regression and its associated 
first-order and interaction F-tests. The first-order F-statistic provides a measure of the joint 
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significance of the two autonomous first-order variables, while the t-statistics associated with 
each allows for judgement of that particular variable’s unique contribution to that joint 
significance. Similarly, the RLS’s interaction F-statistic provides a measure of the joint 
significance of the six paired-change combinations in concert, while their individual t-statistics 
enable judgement on each of the six separately within the group. These give rise to two 
hypotheses with respect to F-testing: 
HA4: The first-order variables, ∆DPS and ∆EPS are jointly related to CARs generated, 
during the three-day event window, by investor activity following joint 
announcements, as recorded by a first-order F-statistic that is significantly 
different from zero at the five percent level of significance. 
HA5: The six paired dividend-and-earnings combinations (DI-EI, DD-ED,  
DD-EI, DI-ED, DNC-EI and DNC-ED) modelled by five interaction dummy 
variables are jointly related to CARs generated during the three-day event 
window, by investor activity following joint announcements as recorded by an 
interaction F-statistic which is significantly different from zero at the five percent 
level of error. 
These two hypotheses can then be narrowed in scope to consider the individual significance of 
any one of the independent variables in the unrestricted equation. For these, the decision 
criterion is the t-statistic and its associated p-value furnished by the regression procedure 
associated with the unrestricted equation. There are eight of these, so only one will be cited by 
way of example: 
HA6: The three-day CAR generated when the dividend-and-earnings interaction 
category DI-EI (represented by the dummy variable D1), will greater than zero at 
the five percent level of error. 
The hypotheses associated with Friction Model and State Model Methodologies are essentially 
the same set as above — with minor changes to allow for methodological differences. 
The next chapter commences the tabling of results. 
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4 Descriptive Market Model-based Results 
4.1 Chapter Introduction 
In this chapter, the characteristics of the data generated by application of the Market Model are 
discussed. In Section 4.2, the distribution of the announcement events through the 1990s decade 
is discussed, while Section 4.3 discloses the characteristics of dividends announced and (later) 
paid. The final section, Section 4.4 discusses the characteristics of earnings per share. 
4.2 Distribution of Company/events through Time 
Table 4-1 shows how the company observations were distributed throughout the 1990s. The 
count for each year is broken down by dividend and earnings combination (the variable, 
DPSEPS). In the table, ‘DD’ denotes a dividend reduction, ‘DI’ a dividend increase, ‘DNC’ an 
unchanged dividend from a year ago, ‘ED’ an earnings decrease, and ‘EI’ and earnings increase. 
Panel A shows the composition of the full sample, while Panels B and C provide this information 
for the mid-year and year-end subsamples. 
Table 4-1: Number of Announcements in Dataset by Year, Dummy Classification and Announcement 
Type. 
PANEL A: Full Sample (948 Observations) 
 DPSEPS 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total 
DD-ED 3 10 12 11 15 21 23 26 37 24 182 
DD-EI 1 3 1 5 7 2 3 8 4 4 38 
DI-ED 1 3 4 6 4 21 13 8 11 9 80 
DI-EI 8 11 27 39 42 43 38 34 41 28 311 
DNC-ED 9 13 7 13 12 23 40 35 28 17 197 
DNC-EI 2 13 17 16 12 13 14 14 16 23 140 
Total 24 53 68 90 92 123 131 125 137 105 948 
  PANEL B: Mid-year Subsample (432 Observations)  
   DPSEPS 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total 
DD-ED 2 3 5 4 6 10 10 12 16 10 78 
DD-EI  1 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 2 13 
DI-ED   2 1  10 9 3 2 3 30 
DI-EI 4 5 10 18 20 12 20 17 17 12 135 
DNC-ED 5 8 3 8 7 14 16 17 14 8 100 
DNC-EI  7 8 9 4 9 9 7 12 11 76 
Total 11 24 29 41 40 56 65 58 62 46 432 
  PANEL C: Year-end Subsample (516 Observations)  
   DPSEPS 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total 
DD-ED 1 7 7 7 9 11 13 14 21 14 104 
DD-EI 1 2  4 4 1 2 6 3 2 25 
DI-ED 1 3 2 5 4 11 4 5 9 6 50 
DI-EI 4 6 17 21 22 31 18 17 24 16 176 
DNC-ED 4 5 4 5 5 9 24 18 14 9 97 
DNC-EI 2 6 9 7 8 4 5 7 4 12 64 
Total 13 29 39 49 52 67 66 67 75 59 516 
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The dispersion of annual totals in all panels of Table 4-1 cannot be ascribed to any one cause. A 
possible reason for the low figures for the first two years may have been the prolonged recession 
in New Zealand following the 1987 Crash. However, in later years, the shift by some companies 
to quarterly reporting and the publication of confounding announcement data will have randomly 
reduced the possible datapoints down to the stated totals. 
4.3 Characteristics of Dividend Announced and Paid 
Table 4-2 furnishes the average dividend announced in the 948 dividend-and-earnings 
announcements. The figures are in New Zealand cents. The mean dividend, at 6.28 cents per 
share, is not large. It is to be noted, in the bottom row, that the range of averages throughout the 
1990s is also quite tight with a minimum (5.35 cents) in 1990 and a maximum (7.03 cents) in 
1995. Indeed, there was little overall growth in dividends in the final four years of the 1990s. 
Table 4-2: Average Dividend Per Share in Cents from 1990 to 1999. 
PANEL A: Full Sample (948 Observations) 
 
DPSEPS 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Overall Average 
DD-ED 5.13 2.10 1.63 1.66 2.99 6.40 1.96 3.91 4.79 6.26 4.00 
DD-EI 12.00 0.67 0.75 4.44 4.98 9.50 8.67 14.13 5.13 2.63 6.86 
DI-ED 6.00 6.83 2.13 3.88 4.00 11.47 5.20 7.20 4.64 4.93 6.70 
DI-EI 5.10 9.25 8.02 10.68 6.96 6.99 10.67 6.09 6.64 7.05 7.88 
DNC-ED 4.94 5.71 6.14 3.92 5.42 4.46 7.07 5.66 6.56 5.85 5.81 
DNC-EI 4.88 4.27 4.88 5.77 11.38 5.15 4.11 5.92 6.14 6.62 5.96 
Overall 
Average 5.35 5.19 5.46 6.93 6.41 7.03 6.75 6.08 5.86 6.23 6.28 
 PANEL B: Mid-year Announcement Subsample (432 Observations) 
 
DPSEPS 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Overall Average 
DD-ED 4.69 2.00 1.40 2.13 2.27 7.57 2.70 6.08 2.92 4.32 3.97 
DD-EI  2.00 0.75 2.50 3.21 6.00 15.00 1.00 2.00 0.75 3.18 
DI-ED   1.75 1.00  6.58 5.38 9.33 6.13 7.67 6.06 
DI-EI 8.19 9.00 8.08 10.11 6.05 5.98 8.41 5.81 8.03 7.00 7.56 
DNC-ED 4.80 6.17 4.96 2.74 2.93 4.31 6.27 5.10 6.39 6.59 5.20 
DNC-EI  3.93 5.22 5.31 22.00 4.11 3.44 7.14 5.40 6.68 6.07 
Overall 
Average 6.01 5.41 5.13 6.43 6.32 5.65 6.00 5.84 5.67 6.04 5.87 
  PANEL C: Year-end Announcement Subsample (516 Observations)  
   
DPSEPS 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Overall Average 
DD-ED 6.00 2.14 1.79 1.39 3.47 5.34 1.38 2.06 6.21 7.64 4.01 
DD-EI 12.00 0.00  4.93 6.31 13.00 5.50 18.50 6.17 4.50 8.78 
DI-ED 6.00 6.83 2.50 4.45 4.00 15.92 4.80 5.92 4.31 3.56 7.08 
DI-EI 2.01 9.46 7.99 11.16 7.79 7.38 13.19 6.37 5.65 7.08 8.12 
DNC-ED 5.13 4.98 7.03 5.80 8.90 4.69 7.61 6.19 6.73 5.19 6.44 
DNC-EI 4.88 4.67 4.58 6.36 6.06 7.50 5.30 4.69 8.38 6.56 5.84 
Overall 
Average 4.79 5.00 5.71 7.34 6.48 8.18 7.50 6.30 6.02 6.38 6.62 
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This was related to a similar stasis in profitability in terms of earnings per share (Table 4-4 
below). Both may have had their origins in macro-economic factors. Although the last four years 
were boom years for the United States and British economies (in spite of the flow-on impact of 
the Russians defaulting on their bonds in 1998), relatively tight monetary policy in New Zealand 
kept growth down. In particular, the East-Asian economic crisis (that began in 1997) pushed 
New Zealand towards a recession which was avoided in the neighbouring Australian economy 
by virtue of looser macro-economic policies. 
With respect to the nature of dividends in terms of the type of announcement in which they were 
embedded, the final column of Table 4-2 contains the overall average dividend per share for the 
decade. The largest is 7.88 cents, achieved by the subset of announcements containing dividend 
and earnings increases (DI-EI category). 
The second largest pay-out magnitude in Panel A of Table 4-2 (6.86 cents) was associated with 
announced decreases in dividends in conjunction with earnings increases (DD-EI category). It is 
possible that firms making this kind of announcement decided that retention of funds for positive 
net present value projects was preferable to raising or maintaining a dividend that, when reduced, 
was still relatively generous by New Zealand standards. The absolute size of the reduced 
dividend might even have been posited as a factor mitigating possible adverse investor reaction 
to the ‘reduction’ aspect. The number of observations of this sort, however, was quite small (38 
in Table 4-1). 
It is of interest that the third highest average dividend in Table 4-2 (6.7 cents) was paid by firms 
who decided to increase dividends in spite of falling earnings. This was just under a cent greater 
than the averages for the two categories of announcement containing no change in dividend. This 
does suggest an underlying belief, on the part of the decision makers in these 80 instances, that 
the earnings decline was going to be only temporary. Another interpretation of what is going on 
here is provided by Ghosh (1993) whose theory of regret posited that managers prefer to avoid 
cutting dividends (and even borrow to do so) if they think it is at all possible to manoeuvre their 
firm through the difficult times to a future return to profitability without dividend cuts and any 
associated share price drops. The theory entails managers knowing they would be proud if they 
succeed in doing so and feeling regret if their strategy turns out to be the wrong one. Managers 
are perceived as being risk-averse with respect to dividend policy — given that reducing a 
dividend is considered to be shackled to taking risks with the company’s share price. This also 
fits with Partington (1989) who recorded that slightly more than 93 percent of Australian firms in 
his sample believed a dividend reduction would adversely affect their share price, and also Baker 
and Powell (1999). 
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The smallest average dividend in Panel A of Table 4-2 (4.0 cents) was furnished by the 
announcement combination in which both dividends and earnings were reduced (DD-ED 
category). 
When the sample was observed as separate mid-year and year-end subsamples, the ranking of the 
averages by announcement type changed slightly. In the year-end subsample in Panel C, the 
largest average magnitude was furnished by the DD-EI announcements, with the DI-EI average 
in second place and the DD-ED average furnishing the smallest magnitude, as before. However, 
a more interesting phenomenon was the difference in magnitude between mid-year and year-end 
dividends. The year-end dividends were uniformly bigger.144 This may be observed in the final 
columns of Panels B and C. 
Next, the percentage changes (from twelve months earlier) in announced dividends were 
scrutinised. The averages are provided in Table 4-3. In this table, the final column shows the 
average dividend change by announcement category; and a distinction is made between 
reductions upon an existing dividend stream, and omissions, which are defined as the 
announcement of no dividend at all. This is a 100 percent drop from the level of the dividend 
announced at the equivalent time in the company’s previous financial year. 
A distinction is also made between increases upon an existing dividend stream and the initiation 
or resumption of dividends where no dividend occurred at the equivalent time in the previous 
company year. In Table 4-3, dividend initiations and resumptions are arbitrarily assigned a value 
of 1000 percent; but because any assigned value would still be arbitrary, no overall annual 
averages incorporating these initiation percentages is reported in the bottom rows of the three 
panels.145 
With respect to the full sample in Panel A of Table 4-3, the average rise in the dividend of DI-EI 
announcements was 53 percent, which was larger in absolute magnitude than the fall of 35 
percent in the DD-ED announcements. It is of interest that the 80 DI-ED announcements 
averaged a 46 percent increase in dividend. It is to be remembered, however, that the absolute 
magnitudes of the announced dividends were not dollars, but only a few cents, which made large 
percentage changes relatively less remarkable. 
 
                                                 
144 With respect to DD-EI announcements, the difference between mid-year (3.18 cents) and year-end (8.78 cents) 
was quite large; but the number of announcements (38 in total) was very small. 
145 In the next chapter, percentage change in DPS ( DPS∆ ) was used as a first-order variable in the Restricted Least 
Squares regression procedure. Any percentage change arbitrarily applied may change the nature of the results of the 
procedure. Therefore observations of initiations and resumptions were deleted from the sample. 
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Table 4-3: Average of Percentage Change in Dividend Per Share (DPS) from Twelve Months Earlier. 
PANEL A: Full Sample (948 Observations) 
   DPSEPS Type 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Avg 
DD-ED Reductions -0.28 -0.41 -0.38 -0.19 -0.43 -0.31 -0.37 -0.41 -0.37 -0.29 -0.35 
 Omissions  -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 
DD-EI Reductions -0.14 -0.50 -0.85 -0.35 -0.16 -0.37 -0.45 -0.31 -0.30 -0.45 -0.34 
 Omissions  -1.00  -1.00 -1.00   -1.00  -1.00 -1.00 
DI-ED Increases 0.09 0.23 0.38 0.23 0.96 0.31 0.44 0.77 0.69 0.42 0.46 
 Initiations   10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
DI-EI Increases 0.41 0.30 0.55 0.61 0.57 0.36 0.58 0.51 0.75 0.42 0.53 
 Initiations 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
DNC-ED  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DNC-EI  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 PANEL B: Mid-year Subsample (432 Observations) 
 DPSEPS Type 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Avg 
DD-ED Reductions -0.26 -0.33 -0.39 -0.22 -0.46 -0.25 -0.39 -0.35 -0.36 -0.33 -0.34 
  Omission  -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 
DD-EI Reductions  -0.50 -0.85 -0.38 -0.14 -0.60 -0.21 -0.33 -0.20 -0.50 -0.39 
  Omission     -1.00   -1.00  -1.00 -1.00 
DI-ED Increases   0.25   0.44 0.28 1.08 0.10 0.11 0.42 
  Initiations   10.00 10.00  10.00 10.00   10.00 10.00 
DI-EI Increases 0.39 0.26 0.45 0.52 0.65 0.40 0.62 0.40 0.54 0.30 0.49 
  Initiations 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
DNC-ED  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DNC-EI   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 PANEL C: Year-end Subsample (516 Observations) 
    DPSEPS Type 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Avg 
DD-ED Reductions -0.33 -0.42 -0.38 -0.17 -0.40 -0.36 -0.35 -0.49 -0.37 -0.26 -0.36 
 Omission  -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 
DD-EI Reductions -0.14   -0.34 -0.17 -0.13 -0.57 -0.31 -0.34 -0.40 -0.31 
 Omission  -1.00  -1.00 -1.00   -1.00  -1.00 -1.00 
DI-ED Increases 0.09 0.23 0.50 0.23 0.96 0.20 0.65 0.46 0.86 0.55 0.48 
 Initiations   10.00 10.00 10.00   10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
DI-EI Increases 0.43 0.33 0.62 0.67 0.48 0.34 0.55 0.64 0.91 0.51 0.57 
 Initiations 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
DNC-ED  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DNC-EI  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  
When the record of percentage changes in dividend for mid-year and year-end subsamples were 
examined separately (Panels B and C of Table 4-3), the patterns observed did not appear 
markedly different from each other — with the caveat that the dividend increase categories, DI-
EI and DI-ED increased six and eight percentage points at the year-end over the mid-year 
figures. Further, while the DD-ED mean percentages remained pretty constant, the DD-EI 
average rose eight points from -39 percent in the mid-year to a year-end level of -31 percent. In 
other words, dividend reductions tended to be more muted at the end of the company year than at 
its midway point. 
However, when these trends were subjected to a Kruskal-Wallis test, the result revealed, with 
one exception, no significant differences (at the five percent level of a Type 1 error) in the 
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magnitude of either dividend or percentage change in dividend. The exception was the DI-ED 
category after observations of dividend initiations and resumptions had been deleted 
(χ2 = 7.7831, Pr > χ2 = 0.0053) which left 42 year-end and only 22 mid-year observations for the 
procedure. Nevertheless, the possibility of a differential in investor reaction to the two 
announcements timings is not ruled out by this lacking of a significant quantitative difference. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979 and 1984) demonstrated that financial decision makers are 
strongly influenced by the context in which information is presented to them,146 and there may 
well be a contextual distinction between mid-year and year-end announcements. 
Figure 4-1 shows the dispersion of DPS∆  in percentages over time. There is no evidence of any 
dramatic changes in the decade. The large clumping of observations at zero is merely indicative 
of the large number of DNC (no change in dividend) observations in the sample. The proportion 
of DNC observations (35.5 percent) is just over one third of all observations available to the 
study. This is certainly indicative of a preference for a fixed dividend policy. 
Figure 4-1: Dispersion of ∆DPS over Time. 
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4.4 Characteristics of Earnings per Share 
The equivalent tabulation of earnings information is provided in Table 4-4. Given that the EPS 
figures released in mid-year announcements only cover profits generated during the first half of 
the company year, one would expect the year-end average EPS figures reported in the bottom 
                                                 
146 Kahneman and Tversky (1979), pp. 263 – 291. Also, Kahneman and Tversky. (1984), pp 341 – 350. A direct 
application of their work in the discipline of Finance was provided by Shefrin, and Statman (1984.). 
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rows of Panel C to be close to double those of the mid-year equivalents in Panel B. This is 
certainly evident from May 1996 onward. However, it does not appear to be the case over the 
first five years. As mentioned in the previous subsection of this chapter, EPS figures were not 
explicitly reported in the twice-yearly company announcements to the NZX (as released by the 
Exchange to the investing public, and archived by IRG Ltd) till 1996. The relative flattening of 
the mid-year/year-end differential over the first five years may have been a function of the 
necessarily approximate EPS estimation calculation. In particular, the number of shares 
outstanding used in mid-year calculations was the figure obtained from the end of the previous 
company year. This will have had the effect of inflating the mid-year EPS figures relative to the 
year-end figures. However, since the calculation of mid-year percentage change figures are 
always calculated with respect to the previous mid-year EPS figure, and the year-end percentage 
change likewise with respect to the previous year-end EPS on record, this inflation should not be 
a problem. 
Table 4-4: Average of Earnings Per Share (EPS) in Cents from 1990 to 1999. 
PANEL A: Full Sample (948 Observations) 
            DPSEPS 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Avg 
DD-ED 15.01 7.89 6.24 -0.24 9.10 10.54 3.97 10.90 9.06 9.47 8.19 
DD-EI 49.41 9.47 5.83 26.92 18.87 70.03 16.00 36.56 14.25 12.30 24.66 
DI-ED 20.40 18.29 5.01 9.72 11.94 25.01 11.40 14.05 10.56 9.74 14.89 
DI-EI 16.61 35.52 24.19 26.15 23.22 20.10 21.65 14.06 15.25 15.83 20.60 
DNC-ED 7.87 12.91 12.42 13.09 10.58 9.72 15.14 10.87 12.63 12.88 12.21 
DNC-EI 21.38 11.44 15.49 16.18 31.61 19.47 11.76 14.73 13.80 16.06 16.48 
Overall average 15.05 16.40 16.24 18.22 19.54 18.11 14.35 14.02 12.47 13.29 15.54 
 PANEL B: Mid-year Subsample (432 Observations) 
   DPSEPS 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Avg 
DD-ED 13.42 7.72 2.47 4.50 7.08 9.81 2.03 8.52 3.26 4.55 5.65 
DD-EI  5.43 5.83 6.57 14.19 39.93 18.98 3.72 3.66 4.95 10.79 
DI-ED   3.96 3.84  13.56 11.22 10.28 7.58 12.23 11.03 
DI-EI 24.56 27.49 16.98 20.89 13.77 12.68 14.44 8.37 13.77 11.24 14.88 
DNC-ED 6.45 12.30 8.60 8.40 8.51 7.83 9.01 7.75 6.72 9.58 8.39 
DNC-EI  8.24 13.54 11.66 52.09 10.87 7.17 14.53 10.52 9.89 12.87 
Overall average 14.30 13.42 11.38 14.06 15.71 11.31 9.81 8.90 8.47 8.96 10.97 
 PANEL C Year-end Subsample (516 Observations) 
   DPSEPS 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Avg 
DD-ED 18.19 7.96 8.93 -2.95 10.44 11.21 5.46 12.93 13.49 12.98 10.10 
DD-EI 49.41 11.49  32.01 22.38 100.13 14.51 47.51 17.77 19.65 31.87 
DI-ED 20.40 18.29 6.05 10.90 11.94 35.41 11.81 16.32 11.23 8.49 17.20 
DI-EI 8.65 42.21 28.44 30.67 31.82 22.97 29.66 19.76 16.30 19.28 24.98 
DNC-ED 9.64 13.89 15.29 20.60 13.46 12.66 19.22 13.81 18.54 15.81 16.14 
DNC-EI 21.38 15.17 17.22 22.00 21.37 38.80 20.03 14.93 23.65 21.71 20.76 
Overall average 15.69 18.87 19.85 21.69 22.49 23.80 18.83 18.46 15.77 16.66 19.37 
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The average percentage change in EPS figures are provided in Table 4-5. The immediate item of 
note, with respect to the full sample in Panel A, is that the DI-EI category of announcements is 
associated with a 240 percent increase in earnings per share while the DD-ED category is 
associated with an 81 percent drop in EPS. These are the extremes. They will have been 
amplified by the inclusion of announcement observations in which there were dividend 
initiations and dividend omissions. Quite clearly, a dividend would be initiated or resumed if the 
company was achieving and forecasting good profitability; while a dividend would be dropped 
altogether if actual and foreseen future profits were negative. 
Table 4-5: Average Percentage Change in Earnings Per Share from 1990 to 1999. 
PANEL A: Full Sample (948 Observations) 
 
DPSEPS 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Avg 
DD-ED -0.25 -0.41 -0.70 -0.99 -0.59 -0.70 -0.93 -0.39 -1.33 -0.78 -0.81 
DD-EI 0.26 0.10 0.29 0.34 1.34 0.19 0.52 0.63 0.41 0.42 0.59 
DI-ED -0.04 -0.26 -0.28 -0.17 -0.29 -0.29 -0.52 -0.15 -0.20 -0.68 -0.33 
DI-EI 1.09 1.70 5.34 1.57 0.63 2.06 2.76 6.79 0.91 0.93 2.40 
DNC-ED -0.40 -0.17 -0.24 -0.25 -0.30 -0.47 -0.71 -0.29 -0.31 -0.16 -0.38 
DNC-EI 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.67 0.25 0.75 0.13 0.45 0.45 0.20 0.42 
Overall average 0.23 0.34 2.07 0.65 0.27 0.55 0.40 1.76 -0.10 0.05 0.61 
 PANEL B: Mid-year Subsample (432 Observations) 
 
DPSEPS 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Avg 
DD-ED -0.17 -0.28 -0.95 -0.75 -0.48 -0.75 -1.37 -0.43 -2.21 -0.52 -1.01 
DD-EI  0.12 0.29 0.24 2.51 0.36 0.00 0.96 1.02 0.71 0.99 
DI-ED   -0.33 -0.07  -0.39 -0.66 -0.15 -0.29 -0.46 -0.43 
DI-EI 0.95 2.31 10.64 1.84 0.69 0.37 4.69 1.36 0.71 0.83 2.31 
DNC-ED -0.28 -0.17 -0.19 -0.26 -0.31 -0.59 -1.33 -0.28 -0.34 -0.11 -0.47 
DNC-EI  0.26 0.50 0.41 0.19 0.84 0.12 0.42 0.57 0.26 0.41 
Overall average 0.19 0.47 3.61 0.78 0.42 -0.13 0.83 0.31 -0.33 0.15 0.50 
 PANEL C: Year-end Subsample (516 Observations)  
 
DPSEPS 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Avg 
DD-ED -0.40 -0.47 -0.52 -1.13 -0.66 -0.64 -0.59 -0.35 -0.66 -0.96 -0.66 
DD-EI 0.26 0.09  0.37 0.46 0.03 0.78 0.53 0.21 0.12 0.37 
DI-ED -0.04 -0.26 -0.23 -0.19 -0.29 -0.21 -0.22 -0.16 -0.18 -0.79 -0.27 
DI-EI 1.23 1.19 2.21 1.34 0.58 2.72 0.61 12.22 1.05 1.00 2.47 
DNC-ED -0.55 -0.18 -0.28 -0.24 -0.28 -0.29 -0.29 -0.31 -0.28 -0.21 -0.29 
DNC-EI 0.46 0.72 0.42 1.01 0.29 0.55 0.14 0.47 0.09 0.16 0.42 
Overall average 0.27 0.23 0.93 0.54 0.16 1.11 -0.03 3.03 0.09 -0.03 0.70 
  
The DD-EI group in Panel A of Table 4-5 had a much more modest increase in EPS of only 59 
percent averaged over the decade, suggesting that dividend-setters in these firms believed that 
the generated cash flows were perhaps just too small to be diverted from reinvestment to 
disbursements to investors. Similarly, the DI-ED group had the smallest drop in EPS of all 
earnings-decreasing categories, at 33 percent. The magnitude of this EPS reduction suggests that 
111 
the decision to increase the dividend in the face of a decline in earnings was tenable if the 
decline was relatively muted (and thought to be temporary). There is an element of optimism 
here. The DI-ED drop of 33 percent in earnings was slightly smaller than the 38 percent drop 
registered in the DNC-ED observations which may suggest that 33 percent was close to the 
boundary at which (on average), optimism evaporated, to be replaced by a more cautious 
conservatism. 
Similar patterns are evident with respect to the mid-year and year-end subsamples in Panels B 
and C. However, a Kuskal-Wallis test for magnitude differences (in percentage change in EPS) 
between the two announcement timings failed, with one exception, to find any differences 
significant at the five percent level of error. The exception was provided by the DD-EI category 
(χ2 = 4.84, Pr > χ2 = 0.028), where the mean percentage increase in earnings from the previous 
mid-year to the current mid-year was 99 percent; but the corresponding year-end percentage 
change was only 37 percent. 
However, this announcement category contained only 38 observations (13 mid-year and 25 year 
end datapoints) which renders the result a little unreliable. Nevertheless, a failure to find 
significant differences in percentage earnings change magnitudes does not rule out the possibility 
of perceptional distinctions in the minds of investors who may well subjectively include a 
temporal ingredient in the way they subjectively frame announcement information for decision 
processing.147 
While the behaviour of the mean changes in EPS does not appear to differ too much between the 
early part of the decade up till May 8th 1996 and from then until the end of 1999, the dispersion 
of observed changes most certainly does. The datapoints for EPS∆  are plotted by time in Figure 
4-2. It is clear that the EPS approximation used in the first half of the decade produced much 
more homogeneous results than the published figures available in the second half. These would 
have taken into account a number of items not available in the announcement disclosure such as 
the value of options and convertible bonds outstanding. 
Because this change in variance may well have a major effect on future computations, separate 
estimations will be made with respect to each half of the data set. Also a dummy variable 
regression equivalent of a Chow test is reported in that chapter, in Section 5.5. 
                                                 
147 We return here to the concepts of decision making under risk, and the concept of framing, discussed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979 and 1984). 
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Figure 4-2: ∆EPS plotted by Time. 
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The date that the last announcement (in the data set) not containing DPS information was 
published was May 8th 1996. The date of the first to do so was May 13th 1996. May was the 
month that the NZX’s new disclosure regulations came into force.   
The information revealed about dividend and earnings announcements in this chapter has been 
restricted to a description of the information which will be codified for use as independent 
variables in the next chapter. So far, nothing has been stated about the nature of the study’s chief 
dependent variable, the one-day AR and the three-day CAR (apart from a description of their 
construction). In the next chapter, this dependent variable is studied in depth; and Restricted 
Least Squares regressions are employed to determine whether there is indeed an investor reaction 
to a joint dividend-and-earnings message — and if so, cast light on its quantitative nature. 
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5 Market Model-based Results 
5.1 Chapter Introduction 
As discussed in the methods and data chapter, the number of announcement observations 
available for use was 948. I intend now to show how these announcement events have impacted 
on share prices in terms of ARs and CARs generated over the twenty-one days of the test period, 
including the announcement date (t0). Narrowly speaking, t0 is the point in time that is of 
particular note, the actual event day. There is no absolute reason for restricting the event window 
to just that one day. In the current study, the publication of the joint dividends and earning 
announcement by the New Zealand Stock Exchange on day t is used as the official point of 
release; and, as this information does not necessarily reach all interested investors directly or on 
the same day, day t1 is included in the event window. Further, day t–1 is also included on the 
ground that there may be some information leakage from the company between its dividend 
decision and the New Zealand Stock Exchange’s release of it. 
Just one day is possibly too restricted a span in which to register the immediate impact of an 
information disclosure which has to be picked up by market participants and acted upon via their 
brokers (if they are small investors) or the finance departments of larger investors. Lonie, 
Abeyratna, Power and Sinclair (1996) designated days t0 and t-1 jointly as the announcement 
period on the ground that dividend information may have been disclosed to the market one day 
before its publication in the financial press (in their case, London’s Financial Times). They noted 
that if the “information-content hypothesis is correct and the stock market is efficient, the two-
day CAR should be significantly different from zero.”148 By contrast, Pettit (1972) found 
significant ARs on days t0 and t1. Therefore, in this chapter, the emphasis is going to be on a 
three-day event window (t-1, t0, t1.) 
The results in the chapter are laid out in a pattern which is established with respect to the 
t-testing of ARs and CARs in Sections 5.2 and 5.3, and which is repeated with respect to 
Restricted Least Squares regressions in Section 5.4. The pattern will not be repeated 
exhaustively; but should be sufficiently discernible to provide a sense of structure. In full, it 
starts with scrutiny of the sample as an undistinguished whole, and moves on to examining the 
apparent effect of the impact of the dividend component of the announcement (ignoring 
earnings-related confounding effects) and, separately, the apparent influence of the earnings 
component (ignoring the existence of the dividend component). Then the pattern entails 
                                                 
148 Lonie, Abeyratna, Power and Sinclair (1996), p. 35. 
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investigating the sample in terms of all six dividend-and-earnings categories to reveal the full, 
systematic effect on ARs and CARs of the putative interaction in investors’ minds between the 
earnings and dividend components published in joint announcements. 
In Section 5.2, I will present a picture of one-day ARs. An observation of these will quickly 
establish the existence of markedly different market responses with respect to whether an 
increase or decrease in dividends has been announced, or whether announced earnings have gone 
up or gone down. It will be noted that announcements of dividend initiations (defined loosely as 
the payment of the dividend where no dividend occurred previously)149 and dividend omissions 
are statistically distinguishable from the more general dividend increases and dividend decreases, 
of which they are subsets. 
In Section 5.3, the record of t-test results for three-day CARs is covered in accordance with the 
study’s selection of a three-day event window. The purpose is to show that event window CARs 
differ in the significance of their t-test results from the pattern exhibited by their neighbours. 
In Section 5.4 the regression results, concerning three-day CARs are presented. This section 
starts with simple regressions concerning the variables, percentage change in earnings from that 
announced in the previous announcement (of the same type) ∆EPS and percentage change in 
dividend from the dividend announced at the equivalent time last year, ∆DPS. Then dummy 
variables are developed for earnings changes (alone), and then for dividend changes (alone); and 
the section culminates in a restricted least squares procedure (RLS) accounting for the first-order 
variables and all six relevant earnings-and-dividend combinations. Then in Section 5.5 a small 
experiment is conducted with respect to the compilation of EPS data and how it affects the RLS 
regression results in general while Section 5.7 is a brief wind-up. 
5.2 The Patterns Discernible in Abnormal Returns (ARs) 
A reasonable place to start is with an analysis of the behaviour of daily abnormal returns (ARs) 
generated by the full sample. This is shown in terms of daily AR means in Table 5-1, which also 
contains maxima, minima, standard deviation and t-test information for each day. The 
accompanying figure, Figure 5-1, is a plot of the means; and where there is a mean that is 
significantly different from zero, it is circled. This is the first of seven such table and graph pairs 
in this section, all of which employ a common scale from negative 2 percent to positive 2 
percent, allowing for direct visual comparisons. 
                                                 
149 This definition includes dividend resumptions, including resumptions following as little as one year of no 
dividend being announced. 
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When all of the announcement events are considered collectively in Table 5-1 and Figure 5-1, 
there is no market reaction to dividend and earnings announcements apparent in this sample. The 
plotted means form virtually a flat line. There is, however, a statistically significant negative AR 
on the third day after the announcement date, which can be dismissed as random. 
When the sample is partitioned into dividend categories (in the meantime completely ignoring 
the existence of movements in the earnings component), a definite pattern emerges. Panel A of 
Table 5-2 and the prominent upward spike in Figure 5-2 show that announcements of dividend 
increases, irrespective of the earnings joint component, furnished significant positive ARs on 
every day of the event window (days t-1, t0 and t1). These peak on the announcement day with a 
mean of 1.33 percent with a t-value of 4.98 and associated error of less than one ten-thousandth 
of a percent. The AR for day t-1 is not quite so spectacular, but still has an associated error of less 
than one percent. A small fly in the ointment is a small positive AR significant at the five percent 
level on day t-5, for which there is no immediate explanation — although concerns about insider 
trading on the New Zealand market will be considered in Appendix H. Nevertheless, the day 
zero result here allows us to reject, with respect to DI category AR observations, the null 
hypothesis repeated here for convenience: 
H01: The abnormal returns generated on the day of the announcement and grouped by 
direction of change of dividend and direction of change in earnings category will 
be indistinguishable from zero. 
Similarly, when all announcements containing dividend reductions (irrespective of the earnings 
joint component) are considered together in Panel B of Table 5-2, a strongly significant negative 
AR of 1.76 percent occurs at the announcement date (t-value = 3.86 with a 0.0002 error), which 
is represented by the strong downward spike in Figure 5-2. Again there is an AR, significant this 
time with less than a one percent error, on day t-5. The sign of its mean is negative. These results 
are similar to those found by Kane, Lee and Marcus (1984), Easton (1991) and Abeyratna 
(1994). Again we can reject the null hypothesis that DD category ARs are not significantly 
different from zero in value on the day of the announcement. 
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Table 5-1: Abnormal Returns over the Test period - Full Sample (Bold type indicates significant at the 5% level of error). 
Day -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2  -1 0 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Count 948 948 948 948 948 948 948 948 948 948 948 948  948 948 948 948 948 948 948 948 948  
Min -0.2024 -0.1340 -0.1392 -0.0609 -0.2191 -0.3022 -0.1844 -0.2420 -0.1065 -0.1906 -0.4674 -0.2410  -0.1735 -0.2362 -0.1405 -0.1009 -0.1486 -0.1534 -0.2046 -0.1182 -0.2116  
Max 0.2861 0.2339 0.1121 0.1303 0.1250 0.1206 0.2111 0.1205 0.1488 0.1864 0.3594 0.2449  0.2761 0.1100 0.1995 0.1229 0.1641 0.2543 0.1555 0.2189 0.1724  
Mean -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0009 0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0008 0.0003 -0.0006  -0.0008 -0.0017 -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0002  
+ve/-ve 0.9036 1.0170 0.9152 0.9506 0.9466 0.9466 0.8810 0.9466 0.8960 1.0213 1.0000 0.9426  0.8772 0.8960 0.8625 0.9036 0.9036 0.9036 0.9152 0.9791 0.9874  
St Dev 0.0225 0.0221 0.0203 0.0188 0.0199 0.0232 0.0215 0.0204 0.0199 0.0229 0.0535 0.0360  0.0278 0.0233 0.0232 0.0201 0.0223 0.0237 0.0212 0.0222 0.0207  
t-test -0.1910 0.1766 -0.6268 0.5553 0.3028 -1.2181 0.9290 -0.1207 -0.1711 1.0204 0.1655 -0.5293  -0.8885 -2.1970 -1.0375 -0.2521 -1.1861 -0.1185 -0.6997 -0.5136 0.3308  
p-value 0.8486 0.8599 0.5309 0.5788 0.7621 0.2235 0.3531 0.9040 0.8642  0.3078 0.8686 0.5967  0.3745 0.0283 0.2998 0.8010 0.2359 0.9057 0.4843 0.6077 0.7408  
Figure 5-1: Mean Abnormal Returns over the Test Period. 
-0.0200
-0.0150
-0.0100
-0.0050
0.0000
0.0050
0.0100
0.0150
0.0200
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 
Circled means are significantly different from zero at the 5% level of error. 
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Table 5-2: Abnormal Returns over the Test Period - Dividend Increases, Dividend Decreases, Dividend No Change. 
Day -10 -90 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2  -1 0 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Panel A DI                                               
Count 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391  391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391  
Min -0.2024 -0.0679 -0.1392 -0.0536 -0.0593 -0.0781 -0.0594 -0.2420 -0.0693 -0.0600 -0.4674 -0.1486  -0.1430 -0.0905 -0.0950 -0.1009 -0.1486 -0.1507 -0.0876 -0.1144 -0.0657  
Max 0.1693 0.2339 0.1121 0.1303 0.0708 0.1206 0.0919 0.1141 0.1037 0.1238 0.3594 0.1632  0.2077 0.0998 0.1995 0.0954 0.1369 0.1248 0.0913 0.2189 0.0769  
Mean 0.0003 0.0010 -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0023 0.0016 0.0011 0.0002 0.0030 0.0133 0.0035  -0.0021 -0.0009 0.0000 -0.0014 -0.0005 -0.0016 -0.0005 0.0015 0.0008  
+ve/-ve 1.0051 0.9453 0.8443 0.8443 0.8889 1.1366 0.8186 0.9261 0.8186 1.1250 1.4747 1.1366  0.7773 0.8271 0.8018 0.8018 0.9073 0.8018 0.8981 1.0155 0.9648  
St Dev 0.0226 0.0256 0.0199 0.0182 0.0164 0.0200 0.0172 0.0215 0.0179 0.0197 0.0529 0.0320  0.0253 0.0200 0.0228 0.0182 0.0201 0.0207 0.0183 0.0222 0.0153  
t-test 0.2464 0.7689 -0.7831 -0.3084 -0.1310 2.2437 1.8635 0.9831 0.2370 3.0440 4.9808 2.1883  -1.6088 -0.8685 -0.0033 -1.5204 -0.4692 -1.5744 -0.5890 1.3632 1.0271  
p-value 0.8055 0.4424 0.4341 0.7579 0.8959 0.0254 0.0631 0.3262 0.8128 0.0025 0.0000 0.0292  0.1085 0.3856 0.9974 0.1292 0.6392 0.1162 0.5562 0.1736 0.3050  
 Panel B DD                           
Count 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220  220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220  
Min -0.1303 -0.1340 -0.0903 -0.0609 -0.0920 -0.3022 -0.1844 -0.0567 -0.0880 -0.1906 -0.4088 -0.2410  -0.1630 -0.2362 -0.1405 -0.0883 -0.1353 -0.1534 -0.2046 -0.1160 -0.2116  
Max 0.2861 0.0806 0.0822 0.1288 0.1184 0.0768 0.2111 0.1035 0.1488 0.1864 0.1547 0.2204  0.2761 0.1100 0.1296 0.1229 0.0863 0.1417 0.1555 0.1195 0.1724  
Mean -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0005 0.0004 0.0012 -0.0067 0.0007 0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0019 -0.0176 -0.0048  0.0035 -0.0038 -0.0007 0.0009 -0.0024 0.0015 -0.0012 -0.0011 -0.0028  
+ve/-ve 0.7460 1.2222 1.0000 1.0370 1.0561 0.7742 1.0755 1.0755 1.0370 0.9298 0.6541 0.7886  1.1359 0.9469 1.0755 0.9820 1.1359 1.1782 1.0561 1.0952 0.9643  
St Dev 0.0302 0.0233 0.0227 0.0227 0.0233 0.0342 0.0291 0.0204 0.0243 0.0315 0.0675 0.0468  0.0364 0.0348 0.0284 0.0261 0.0255 0.0279 0.0305 0.0247 0.0296  
t-test -0.2910 -0.3564 -0.3278 0.2400 0.7484 -2.9020 0.3455 0.2559 -0.4547 -0.8852 -3.8582 -1.5326  1.4245 -1.6245 -0.3634 0.5075 -1.4078 0.8247 -0.5772 -0.6749 -1.4147  
p-value 0.7713 0.7219 0.7434 0.8105 0.4550 0.0041 0.7300 0.7982 0.6497 0.3770 0.0002 0.1268  0.1557 0.1057 0.7167 0.6123 0.1606 0.4104 0.5644 0.5005 0.1586  
Panel C DNC                           
Count 337 337 337 337 337 337 337 337 337 337 337 337  337 337 337 337 337 337 337 337 337  
Min -0.0692 -0.0616 -0.1230 -0.0602 -0.2191 -0.0787 -0.0782 -0.0833 -0.1065 -0.0779 -0.2023 -0.1536  -0.1735 -0.0627 -0.1362 -0.0668 -0.0678 -0.1300 -0.0945 -0.1182 -0.1010  
Max 0.0590 0.0922 0.0699 0.0889 0.1250 0.0584 0.1565 0.1205 0.0942 0.1151 0.1787 0.2449  0.1494 0.0591 0.0535 0.0902 0.1641 0.2543 0.0893 0.0702 0.0876  
Mean -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0001 0.0010 -0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0017 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0032 -0.0027  -0.0022 -0.0012 -0.0017 0.0006 -0.0003 0.0006 0.0001 -0.0021 0.0015  
+ve/-ve 0.9040 0.9824 0.9480 1.0301 0.9480 0.8722 0.8415 0.8933 0.9040 0.9708 0.8415 0.8516  0.8516 0.9480 0.8118 0.9824 0.7737 0.8722 0.8516 0.8722 1.0301  
St Dev 0.0154 0.0162 0.0191 0.0167 0.0211 0.0159 0.0202 0.0191 0.0188 0.0193 0.0378 0.0315  0.0237 0.0165 0.0196 0.0174 0.0226 0.0240 0.0165 0.0202 0.0188  
t-test -0.3972 -0.4892 0.0780 1.1447 -0.0810 -0.9756 -0.4514 -1.6296 -0.0724 -0.1405 -1.5571 -1.5652  -1.6676 -1.3004 -1.6317 0.6071 -0.2317 0.4942 0.0564 -1.8919 1.5112  
p-value 0.6915 0.6250 0.9379 0.2532 0.9355 0.3300 0.6520 0.1041 0.9424  0.8884 0.1204 0.1185  0.0963 0.1943 0.1037 0.5442 0.8169 0.6215 0.9550 0.0594 0.1317  
Figure 5-2: Mean Values of Abnormal Returns over the Test Period - Dividend Increases, Dividend Decreases, Dividend No Change. 
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 Circled means are significantly different from zero at the 5% level of error. 
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However, when the data set was filtered to observe the market reaction to announcements in 
which dividends were left unchanged (irrespective of the earnings joint component), no 
significant ARs were found anywhere in the 21-day window spanning the announcement date. 
This pattern of insignificant results can be read across the bottom row of Panel C of Table 5-2. 
Again this pattern of results was similar to what Easton (1991) found on Australian data and 
Abeyratna (1994) found on his UK data. In this instance, the null hypothesis that DNC category 
ARs are indistinguishable from zero cannot be rejected. 
Next, the sample was partitioned by the nature of the announcements’ earnings components. 
With respect to the subsample containing all announcements of earnings increases and tabulated 
in Panel A of Table 5-3, there was a strongly significant one percent AR (t-value = 4.34, p < 
0.0000) on the day of the announcement. The previous day (t-1) furnished a much smaller 
positive AR that was weakly significant at the 7 percent level of error; but it was day t2 that 
produced the most interesting output. This was a negative AR significant at less than the one 
percent level of error. A further negative correction significant at the five percent level of error 
occurred on day t7. Further, in accordance with the premature fluctuation noted roughly a 
working week in advance of announcements of dividend increases and decreases (Table 5-2 and 
Figure 5-2), a small positive AR significant at the 5% level of error was detected on day t-4. 
We now turn to observations of earnings decreases only (irrespective of their dividend joint 
component). The subsample of all earnings decrease announcements generated a negative one 
percent AR with a negligible associated error on the announcement day, t0, while the following 
day (t1) furnished only a weakly significant negative AR. However, there was a further negative 
AR significant within a five percent level of error on day t3. It was interesting that from day t2 
onward, the largely insignificant ARs fluctuate in sign, whereas those for the week leading up to 
the announcement date are uniformly negative. Of these, the AR for day t-5 is significant within 
the five percent level of error. 
These earnings-related results show that (when dividend information is ignored), a significantly 
positive AR is generated on day t0 when announced earnings rise, which is replaced by a 
significantly negative AR when announced earnings fall. This enables us to reject the null 
hypothesis, H01 with respect to both EI and ED category ARs. 
The earnings results and the dividend results together behave in a similar but not identical 
manner to that detected by Easton and Sinclair (1989) on Australian data. They found that 
controlling for a dividend effect on joint announcement data allowed a significant earnings effect 
to be seen. When they controlled for earnings there was a much reduced dividend effect. 
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Table 5-3: Abnormal Returns over the Test Period - Earnings Change ignoring Dividend Change. 
Day -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2  -1 0 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
 Panel A EI     
Count 489 489 489 489 489 489 489 489 489 489 489 489  489 489 489 489 489 489 489 489 489  
Min -0.2024 -0.1340 -0.1392 -0.0536 -0.2191 -0.0719 -0.0782 -0.2420 -0.0693 -0.0715 -0.4674 -0.1486  -0.1576 -0.0905 -0.0594 -0.0731 -0.1486 -0.1507 -0.0876 -0.1182 -0.0911  
Max 0.1693 0.2339 0.1121 0.1303 0.1250 0.1206 0.2111 0.1205 0.1488 0.1238 0.3594 0.2449  0.2077 0.0998 0.1995 0.0954 0.1641 0.1248 0.1055 0.2189 0.0769  
Mean 0.0003 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0004 0.0000 0.0010 0.0020 0.0006 0.0009 0.0017 0.0101 0.0020  -0.0035 -0.0006 0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0018 -0.0004 0.0004 0.0011  
+ve/-ve 0.9718 0.8953 0.8808 1.0041 0.8808 1.0041 0.8736 0.9405 0.8664 1.0207 1.2227 0.9482  0.7098 0.8593 0.7978 0.8111 0.8315 0.7978 0.8736 0.9718 0.9878  
St Dev 0.0211 0.0250 0.0202 0.0176 0.0208 0.0194 0.0220 0.0218 0.0188 0.0204 0.0514 0.0326  0.0258 0.0192 0.0211 0.0188 0.0211 0.0200 0.0191 0.0230 0.0169  
t-test 0.3619 0.4336 -0.0801 0.4407 -0.0070 1.0948 2.0199 0.5766 1.0396 1.7951 4.3376 1.3756  -2.9743 -0.6494 0.0642 -1.0308 -0.4140 -2.0056 -0.4275 0.4287 1.4807  
p-value 0.7176 0.6648 0.9362 0.6596 0.9944 0.2741 0.0439 0.5645 0.2991 0.0733 0.0000 0.1696  0.0031 0.5164 0.9489 0.3031 0.6791 0.0454 0.6692 0.6684 0.1393  
 Panel B ED                           
Count 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459  459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459 459  
Min -0.1303 -0.1044 -0.1230 -0.0609 -0.0920 -0.3022 -0.1844 -0.0833 -0.1065 -0.1906 -0.4088 -0.2410  -0.1735 -0.2362 -0.1405 -0.1009 -0.1353 -0.1534 -0.2046 -0.1160 -0.2116  
Max 0.2861 0.0922 0.0786 0.1288 0.1184 0.0768 0.1179 0.1035 0.0942 0.1864 0.1547 0.2204  0.2761 0.1100 0.1296 0.1229 0.1572 0.2543 0.1555 0.1195 0.1724  
Mean -0.0007 -0.0003 -0.0008 0.0003 0.0004 -0.0029 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0012 -0.0002 -0.0102 -0.0034  0.0020 -0.0028 -0.0017 0.0006 -0.0014 0.0017 -0.0006 -0.0012 -0.0007  
+ve/-ve 0.8360 1.1651 0.9532 0.8967 1.0220 0.8889 0.8889 0.9532 0.9286 1.0220 0.8071 0.9367  1.0959 0.9367 0.9367 1.0132 0.9870 1.0310 0.9615 0.9870 0.9870  
St Dev 0.0239 0.0185 0.0204 0.0201 0.0189 0.0265 0.0210 0.0188 0.0209 0.0253 0.0537 0.0391  0.0296 0.0269 0.0252 0.0213 0.0236 0.0270 0.0233 0.0212 0.0241  
t-test -0.5868 -0.3022 -0.8156 0.3497 0.4656 -2.3574 -0.8147 -0.8807 -1.2031 -0.1689 -4.0504 -1.8851  1.4773 -2.2508 -1.4252 0.5994 -1.2327 1.3788 -0.5544 -1.2488 -0.6627  
p-value 0.5576 0.7627 0.4152 0.7267 0.6417 0.0188 0.4157 0.3789 0.2295  0.8660 0.0001 0.0601  0.1403 0.0249 0.1548 0.5492 0.2183 0.1686 0.5796 0.2124 0.5078  
Figure 5-3: Mean values of Abnormal returns over the Test period - Earnings Change ignoring Dividend Change. 
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 Circled means are significantly different from zero at the 5% level of error. 
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Table 5-4: Abnormal Returns for DI-EI Announcements over the Test Period and Event Window. 
Day -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2  -1 0 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
 Panel A Di-EI Announcements - Full Sample     
Count 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311  311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311 311  
Min -0.2024 -0.0679 -0.1392 -0.0536 -0.0593 -0.0719 -0.0594 -0.2420 -0.0693 -0.0528 -0.4674 -0.1486  -0.1430 -0.0905 -0.0594 -0.0593 -0.1486 -0.1507 -0.0876 -0.1144 -0.0657  
Max 0.1693 0.2339 0.1121 0.1303 0.0708 0.1206 0.0919 0.1141 0.1037 0.1238 0.3594 0.1632  0.2077 0.0998 0.1995 0.0954 0.1369 0.1248 0.0913 0.2189 0.0769  
Mean 0.0007 0.0014 -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0025 0.0022 0.0016 0.0000 0.0031 0.0164 0.0034  -0.0025 -0.0007 0.0003 -0.0016 -0.0010 -0.0018 -0.0004 0.0015 0.0007  
+ve/-ve 1.0195 0.9198 0.8081 0.8512 0.8294 1.1301 0.8735 0.9438 0.7874 1.0872 1.5492 1.0872  0.7278 0.8081 0.7977 0.7374 0.8512 0.7977 0.8963 1.0596 0.9438  
St Dev 0.0232 0.0276 0.0200 0.0190 0.0173 0.0207 0.0185 0.0231 0.0182 0.0203 0.0565 0.0331  0.0268 0.0195 0.0231 0.0178 0.0210 0.0213 0.0189 0.0232 0.0152  
t-test 0.5128 0.8668 -0.7362 -0.3037 -0.1799 2.1249 2.0929 1.1890 0.0162 2.6719 5.1096 1.8097  -1.6653 -0.6571 0.2118 -1.5794 -0.8523 -1.5197 -0.4022 1.1368 0.8051  
p-value 0.6084 0.3867 0.4621 0.7616 0.8573 0.0344 0.0372 0.2353 0.9871 0.0079 0.0000 0.0713  0.0969 0.5116 0.8324 0.1153 0.3947 0.1296 0.6878 0.2565 0.4214  
 Panel B Di-EI Announcements -Initiations and Resumptions Only                   
Count 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67  67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67  
Min -0.0724 -0.0459 -0.1392 -0.0536 -0.0528 -0.0515 -0.0430 -0.0581 -0.0693 -0.0253 -0.0597 -0.1486  -0.1430 -0.0583 -0.0553 -0.0593 -0.1486 -0.1507 -0.0876 -0.0613 -0.0321  
Max 0.1693 0.2252 0.1121 0.0565 0.0394 0.1206 0.0614 0.0638 0.0496 0.0665 0.2888 0.1632  0.0547 0.0998 0.1600 0.0954 0.0520 0.0571 0.0655 0.0763 0.0704  
Mean 0.0025 0.0037 -0.0036 0.0015 -0.0006 0.0045 0.0017 0.0013 -0.0010 0.0077 0.0212 0.0006  -0.0111 -0.0018 0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0093 -0.0051 -0.0012 0.0009 0.0023  
+ve/-ve 0.9143 0.6750 0.4255 1.0303 0.6341 0.8611 0.6750 0.8108 0.5952 1.3929 1.0938 0.9143  0.4889 0.5581 0.7179 0.5952 0.4255 0.6341 0.6750 0.9143 0.9706  
St Dev 0.0303 0.0390 0.0281 0.0213 0.0166 0.0289 0.0200 0.0218 0.0192 0.0184 0.0584 0.0476  0.0332 0.0250 0.0266 0.0252 0.0277 0.0268 0.0236 0.0201 0.0165  
t-test 0.6801 0.7685 -1.0419 0.5660 -0.3172 1.2819 0.7013 0.4801 -0.4189 3.4193 2.9638 0.0975  -2.7217 -0.5997 0.6559 -0.6776 -2.7594 -1.5645 -0.4217 0.3557 1.1314  
p-value 0.4988 0.4449 0.3012 0.5733 0.7521 0.2044 0.4856 0.6327 0.6767 0.0011 0.0042 0.9226  0.0083 0.5507 0.5141 0.5004 0.0075 0.1225 0.6746 0.7232 0.2620  
 Panel C Di-EI Announcements -Without Initiations and resumptions                   
Count 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244  244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244  
Min -0.2024 -0.0679 -0.0957 -0.0528 -0.0593 -0.0719 -0.0594 -0.2420 -0.0647 -0.0528 -0.4674 -0.0809  -0.0506 -0.0905 -0.0594 -0.0560 -0.0584 -0.0834 -0.0544 -0.1144 -0.0657  
Max 0.0789 0.2339 0.0851 0.1303 0.0708 0.0840 0.0919 0.1141 0.1037 0.1238 0.3594 0.1450  0.2077 0.0807 0.1995 0.0482 0.1369 0.1248 0.0913 0.2189 0.0769  
Mean 0.0002 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0008 0.0000 0.0019 0.0023 0.0016 0.0003 0.0018 0.0150 0.0042  -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0015 0.0013 -0.0009 -0.0002 0.0017 0.0003  
+ve/-ve 1.0504 1.0000 0.9520 0.8074 0.8915 1.2182 0.9365 0.9837 0.8485 1.0165 1.7111 1.1404  0.8074 0.8915 0.8209 0.7810 1.0165 0.8485 0.9677 1.1034 0.9365  
St Dev 0.0208 0.0236 0.0171 0.0183 0.0175 0.0179 0.0180 0.0234 0.0180 0.0207 0.0560 0.0280  0.0243 0.0177 0.0222 0.0153 0.0181 0.0195 0.0174 0.0240 0.0148  
t-test 0.1256 0.4792 -0.0741 -0.7007 -0.0429 1.6952 2.0089 1.0868 0.2525 1.3726 4.1988 2.3346  -0.1211 -0.3720 -0.1622 -1.4961 1.0987 -0.7487 -0.1927 1.0838 0.2692  
p-value 0.9002 0.6322 0.9410 0.4842 0.9658 0.0913 0.0457 0.2782 0.8008  0.1711 0.0000 0.0204  0.9037 0.7102 0.8713 0.1359 0.2730 0.4548 0.8474 0.2795 0.7880  
Figure 5-4: Mean Values of Abnormal Returns over the Test Period - DI-EI Full Sample (Panel A) Only. 
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-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  Circled means are significantly different from zero at the 5% level of error. 
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The pattern of dividend and earnings effects becomes even clearer when the interactions of joint 
earnings and dividend announcements are explicitly taken into account. Of these, the DI-EI and 
DD-ED combinations should produce the starkest impact on the behaviour of ARs, as they 
contain pairings that pull in the same as distinct from opposing directions. With respect to the 
two DNC combinations, one would expect the dividend to have little influence on investors, but 
for there to be some influence emanating from the rise or fall in earnings which would be 
somewhat muted down by the ‘DNC’ aspect. With respect to the DD-EI and DI-ED 
combinations, the component changes pull in opposite directions. In these cases, one would 
expect that the impact on ARs would be minimised by the canceling effect of the two 
countervailing influences. 
I will start with the DI-EI permutation in Table 5-4. All DI-EI announcements, including those 
announcing resumptions of dividends and initiations of dividends for the first time, are 
considered in Panel A. Two of the three days in the event window produce strongly significant 
ARs. The positive mean AR of 0.31 percent (t-value = 2.67, p = 0.0079) on day t-1, is followed 
on the announcement day, t0 by a positive 1.64 percent mean AR (t-value = 5.11, p < 0.0001). 
There is a further, but only weakly significant AR (at the 7 percent level of error) on day t1. It is 
to be noted that the apparently premature week-earlier phenomenon (noted in this discussion of 
Table 5-2 and Table 5-3) recurs here. On days t-5 and t-4, much smaller positive ARs are recorded 
within a five percent probability of error. The plot of means for all DI-EI observations from 
Panel A is shown in Figure 5-4. 
In Panel B of Table 5-4, the DI-EI data subsample is filtered so that it contains only dividend 
initiations and dividend resumptions, of which there are 67 observations. With the subsample 
thus restricted, the mean magnitude of the announcement day (t0) AR jumps to 2.12 percent 
t-value = 2.96, p = 0.0042), while the AR of day t-1, with a similar level of error (t-value = 3.42, 
p = 0.0011), doubles in size to 0.77 percent. However, there is no apparent leakage of 
information in advance in Panel B. Instead, there are statistically significant negative corrections 
on days t2 (t-value = -2.72, p = 0.0083) and t6. (t-value = -2.75, p = 0.0075).150 
Panel C of Table 5-4 contains the AR results on DI-EI announcements once all dividend 
initiations and resumptions have been excluded from the data set. The magnitude of the AR on 
the announcement day reduces to 1.50 percent (t-value = 4.20, p < 0.0001), which is still quite a 
                                                 
150 Panel B and Panel C information is similar in basic shape to that in Panel A and can be easily visualized. But it 
has not been plotted in Figure Four in order that the picture would remain clear and uncluttered. 
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strong positive result. This is backed up with a smaller AR of 0.42 percent (t-value = 2.33, 
p = 0.0204), the next day, t1. With respect to DI-EI announcements in which the DI component 
consists only of increases upon the dividend of the previous period, it is interesting that the 
negative correction phenomenon apparent in Panel B has disappeared. Also of interest is that the 
day preceding the announcement (i.e., day t-1) no longer furnishes a significant result. But the 
week-in-advance phenomenon recurs with a weakly significant AR on day t-4. 
The conclusion to be drawn from panels A, B and C of Table 5-4 is as follows. When earnings 
changes are kept constant at EI, both dividend initiations and resumptions, and mere increases 
upon existing dividends produce statistically significant positive ARs in the event window that 
stick up like a mountain peak from the test period plain. Clearly, H01 with respect to the DI-EI 
category of ARs can confidently be rejected. This result corroborates Emanuel (1984) who found 
a positive announcement AR for DI-EI announcements on 1970s New Zealand weekly share-
returns data. 
The initiation and resumption subset produces larger and more strongly significant ARs. This is 
unsurprising when one considers that a dividend initiation is an infinite percentage increase on 
the previous period’s dividend, which had a value of zero. Investors would seem to react more 
enthusiastically to the advent of a new or restored dividend than to an amendment to an existing 
tradition of dividends. 
In Table 5-5, the three equivalent permutations of the DD-ED data set are examined, and again, 
the result corroborates Emanuel (1984) who found a significant negative AR associated with 
DD-ED announcements on weekly New Zealand returns data in the period from 1967 to 1979. 
With respect to the current study, the extreme form of a dividend reduction is the total omission 
of the dividend, which is a 100 percent reduction from the previous period. In Panel A of Table 
5-5, which includes both forms of dividend reduction, the joint impact of a dividend reduction 
and an earnings reduction is a negative 1.95 percent AR (t-value = -3.67, p = 0.0003) on the 
announcement day, t0. There is nothing significant to report for either of the other two days in the 
three-day test period. However, there is a small negative AR significant within the one percent 
level of error on day t-5, and a positive correction on day t2 that is significant within the five 
percent level of error. The Panel A means are plotted in Figure 5-5. 
When, in Panel B of Table 5-5, the set of DD-ED announcements entailing a complete dividend 
omission is considered, the negative AR on the announcement day more than doubles in absolute 
magnitude to negative 4.88 percent (t-value = -4.11, p = 0.0001). This finding contrasts with 
Healy and Palepu (1988) who found significant negative returns on both t0 and t-1 associated with 
omissions in the context of dividend-announcement only data. 
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Table 5-5: Abnormal Returns for DD-ED Announcements over the Test Period and Event Window. 
Day -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2  -1 0 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10   
 All DD-ED       
Count 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182  182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182 182   
Min -0.1303 -0.1044 -0.0903 -0.0609 -0.0920 -0.3022 -0.1844 -0.0567 -0.0880 -0.1906 -0.4088 -0.2410  -0.1630 -0.2362 -0.1405 -0.0883 -0.1353 -0.1534 -0.2046 -0.1160 -0.2116   
Max 0.2861 0.0806 0.0786 0.1288 0.1184 0.0768 0.0924 0.1035 0.0903 0.1864 0.1547 0.2204  0.2761 0.1100 0.1296 0.1229 0.0863 0.1417 0.1555 0.1195 0.1724   
Mean -0.0009 -0.0015 -0.0011 0.0001 0.0016 -0.0073 -0.0005 0.0008 -0.0028 -0.0020 -0.0195 -0.0054  0.0062 -0.0041 -0.0011 0.0012 -0.0026 0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0019 -0.0038   
+ve/-ve 0.7170 1.1928 0.9362 0.9570 1.1667 0.7670 0.9783 1.1412 0.9158 0.9570 0.6106 0.7843  1.2750 0.9570 1.0682 1.0222 1.1928 1.1928 1.0449 1.0682 0.9783   
St Dev 0.0320 0.0220 0.0216 0.0235 0.0241 0.0355 0.0269 0.0210 0.0225 0.0335 0.0719 0.0496  0.0373 0.0366 0.0299 0.0258 0.0272 0.0299 0.0307 0.0249 0.0316   
t-test -0.3818 -0.9323 -0.7000 0.0317 0.8917 -2.7721 -0.2354 0.4961 -1.6751 -0.7891 -3.6679 -1.4744  2.2276 -1.5156 -0.4982 0.6368 -1.2706 0.8067 -0.7816 -1.0491 -1.6161  
p-value 0.7031 0.3524 0.4849 0.9748 0.3737 0.0062 0.8142 0.6204 0.0956 0.4311 0.0003 0.1421  0.0271 0.1314 0.6189 0.5251 0.2055 0.4209 0.4355 0.2956 0.1078  
 Omissions Only                          
Count 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66  66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66   
Min -0.0823 -0.0900 -0.0903 -0.0476 -0.0695 -0.3022 -0.1844 -0.0545 -0.0880 -0.1906 -0.4088 -0.2410  -0.1630 -0.2362 -0.0813 -0.0883 -0.1353 -0.1246 -0.2046 -0.0826 -0.2116   
Max 0.1048 0.0806 0.0786 0.1288 0.1184 0.0768 0.0924 0.0899 0.0903 0.1864 0.1547 0.1442  0.0883 0.1100 0.1296 0.1194 0.0863 0.0887 0.0842 0.1195 0.0477   
Mean -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0051 0.0022 0.0040 -0.0129 -0.0034 -0.0008 -0.0045 -0.0052 -0.0488 -0.0028  0.0064 -0.0080 0.0003 0.0038 -0.0039 0.0025 -0.0061 -0.0035 -0.0070   
+ve/-ve 0.6923 1.0625 0.8333 0.9412 1.3571 1.0625 0.6923 1.2000 1.2000 1.0000 0.3469 0.9412  1.2000 1.3571 1.2000 1.4444 1.2000 1.1290 0.8333 1.0000 0.8857   
St Dev 0.0294 0.0245 0.0281 0.0301 0.0275 0.0504 0.0337 0.0209 0.0242 0.0447 0.0965 0.0655  0.0375 0.0530 0.0316 0.0325 0.0363 0.0351 0.0396 0.0305 0.0347   
t-test -0.2075 -0.2459 -1.4655 0.5996 1.1881 -2.0761 -0.8151 -0.2931 -1.5031 -0.9399 -4.1103 -0.3521  1.3758 -1.2222 0.0684 0.9512 -0.8826 0.5843 -1.2600 -0.9279 -1.6466  
p-value 0.8363 0.8065 0.1476 0.5508 0.2391 0.0418 0.4180 0.7704 0.1377 0.3507 0.0001 0.7259 0.1736 0.2260 0.9456 0.3450 0.3807 0.5610 0.2122 0.3569 0.1045  
 Omisions Excluded                          
Count 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116  116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116   
Min -0.1303 -0.1044 -0.0739 -0.0609 -0.0920 -0.1413 -0.0782 -0.0567 -0.0747 -0.0780 -0.1814 -0.1588  -0.1026 -0.1332 -0.1405 -0.0694 -0.0622 -0.1534 -0.0921 -0.1160 -0.1073   
Max 0.2861 0.0677 0.0626 0.0577 0.0814 0.0554 0.0869 0.1035 0.0892 0.1187 0.1375 0.2204  0.2761 0.0745 0.0906 0.1229 0.0702 0.1417 0.1555 0.0524 0.1724   
Mean -0.0010 -0.0020 0.0011 -0.0012 0.0002 -0.0041 0.0012 0.0016 -0.0018 -0.0001 -0.0029 -0.0069  0.0061 -0.0019 -0.0019 -0.0002 -0.0018 0.0014 0.0007 -0.0011 -0.0019   
+ve/-ve 0.7313 1.2745 1.0000 0.9661 1.0714 0.6338 1.1887 1.1091 0.7846 0.9333 0.8125 0.7059  1.3200 0.7846 1.0000 0.8413 1.1887 1.2308 1.1887 1.1091 1.0351   
St Dev 0.0335 0.0205 0.0166 0.0188 0.0219 0.0229 0.0222 0.0211 0.0215 0.0252 0.0459 0.0381  0.0374 0.0227 0.0289 0.0212 0.0204 0.0267 0.0242 0.0211 0.0297   
t-test -0.3193 -1.0294 0.7286 -0.6737 0.1029 -1.9432 0.5764 0.8384 -0.9183 -0.0588 -0.6801 -1.9510  1.7447 -0.9144 -0.7010 -0.1270 -0.9359 0.5533 0.3123 -0.5367 -0.7041  
p-value 0.7501 0.3055 0.4677 0.5019 0.9182 0.0544 0.5655 0.4036 0.3604  0.9532 0.4978 0.0535  0.0837 0.3624 0.4847 0.8992 0.3513 0.5812 0.7554 0.5925 0.4828  
Figure 5-5: Mean Values of Abnormal Returns over the Test Period - DD-ED Full Sample (Panel A) Only. 
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Circled means are significantly different from zero at the 5% level of error. 
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The day t-5 negative AR in Panel B also almost doubles in absolute magnitude, but its associated 
error is greater, now within the five percent level. However, the day t2 correction has 
disappeared.151 
In Panel C of Table 5-5, dividend omissions have been excluded from the DD-ED subsample. 
This has a dramatic effect on the pattern of ARs. Now there are small negative ARs on days t-5 
and t1 which are only weakly significant at the six percent level of error. There are no ARs at all 
with acceptably low levels of a Type 1 error. The inference to be drawn from this result is that 
investors in the New Zealand market are not overly worried by a reduction in dividends; but a 
total dividend omission does bother them. It is useful to remember at this point that the measure 
of change in dividends currently being used in the study, is the percentage change from the 
previous year; and that most companies pay dividends which are only a few cents per share. This 
means that a fifty percent reduction may well entail a drop in payment of maybe two or three 
cents per share. Overall, with respect to the DD-ED category, hypothesis H01 can be confidently 
rejected on the full sample containing both omissions and reductions, and on the subsample 
containing only omissions. But the subsample of only reductions does not allow us to reject the 
null hypothesis. 
The four remaining relevant permutations of dividend and earnings announcements are ones in 
which the earnings change component conflicts with the dividend change component. Panel A of 
Table 5-6 contains the ARs associated with a decrease in dividend combined with an increase in 
earnings (DD-EI). The fact that there are only 38 observations indicates that company managers, 
in keeping with Lintner (1956) and Ghosh (1993), are generally reluctant to reduce dividends 
(thereby potentially annoying shareholders) unless a falling earnings trend makes this reduction 
necessary. The salient feature of Panel A is that it does not contain any ARs within the 
acceptable significance level of a five percent error. Nevertheless, the mean ARs reported in the 
test period are negative in sign. The negative AR in day t2 is weakly significant with just over a 
five percent probability of error; but the other weakly significant AR in the panel for day t-2 
(within a seven percent level of error), has a small positive mean. These results are indicative of 
the absence of any common response pattern among investors caught between enthusiasm for 
increased earnings and displeasure for a decreased dividend. The means are plotted in the more 
jagged line in Figure 5-6 that has no circles and hypothesis H01 cannot be rejected with respect to 
the DD-EI category of ARs. 
                                                 
151 In keeping with the DI-EI information in Figure 5-4, Figure 5-5 reports only the plotted means of the full set of 
DD-ED announcement ARs from Panel A. 
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Panel B of Table 5-6 contains the ARs associated with an increase in dividends in combination 
with a decrease in earnings (DI-ED). That there are more of these announcements than for the 
DD-EI combination in Panel A, again may be indicative of Lintner’s (1956) findings. In this 
instance it is a plausible explanation that the company dividend-setters may prefer not to cut 
dividends when earning decreases are predicted to be temporary, and that they have a target 
dividend payout ratio to which they are continuing to adjust current dividends. In Panel B, only 
one AR mean is significant. It occurs outside the event window on day t-5, in keeping with a 
similar quirk noted in Table 5-2 and Table 5-3. Again, hypothesis H01 cannot be rejected with 
respect to DI-ED category ARs. 
The record for earnings increases in association with no change in announced dividends (DNC-
EI) in Panel A of Table 5-7 has marginally less clarity. Again, no AR recorded in the three-day 
test period achieves acceptable statistical significance; but a small negative AR in day t2 is 
significant within the five percent level of error. This day t2 result is unexpected as it would be 
reasonable to predict that investors would be pleased with an earnings increase and indifferent 
about the maintenance of the dividend at last period’s level. However, with respect to the DNC-
EI category of ARs, H01 cannot be rejected. 
However, the combination of no change in dividend and a reduction in announced earnings 
(DNC-ED) is interpreted as relatively bad news by investors. In Panel B of Table 5-7 there are 
two small negative ARs significant at the five percent level of a Type 1 error, falling on the 
announcement day, t0, (t-value = -2.39 p = 0.0179) and on the following day t1, (t-value = -2.11, 
p = 0.0364). This AR output breaks the expected pattern of insignificant returns from mixed-
message announcements in the event window and forces us to reject H01 in this instance. There is 
a further small negative AR which is weakly significant (t-value = -1.91, p = 0.0582) on day t3. 
In summary, the results in this section point to several phenomena. First, the two variables, 
∆DPS and ∆EPS each have a discernible impact on event window ARs when considered without 
cognizance of the confounding effect of the other. Second, when this confounding effect is 
separated out into the individual permutations of the possible interaction between dividends 
announced and earnings announced, a systematic predictable pattern of ARs is recorded in the 
event window. DI-EI announcements produce positive ARs, DD-ED ones are associated with 
negative ARs, and mixed-message announcements produce insignificant ARs in the event 
window — with one exception, DNC-ED. Outside the event window, most ARs for all 
categories of announcement are insignificant. However, several significant ARs with respect to 
the DI-EI, DD-ED and DD-EI groups occur in the test period prior to the most widely-defined 
event window used in the study, which is days t-1, t0 and t1. There may be some indication of 
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information leakage here, because a signficant association is discovered between these and these 
particular dividend-and-earnings interaction variables in Appendix H. 
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Table 5-6: Abnormal Returns over the Test Period - DD-EI and DI-ED Announcements Only. 
Day -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2  -1 0 1   2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
 Panel A 
 DD-EI Announcements - Full Sample       
Count 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38   38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38  
Min -0.0482 -0.1340 -0.0525 -0.0337 -0.0313 -0.0704 -0.0461 -0.0488 -0.0296 -0.0307 -0.1608 -0.0830   -0.0826 -0.0533 -0.0343 -0.0731 -0.0507 -0.0399 -0.0605 -0.0507 -0.0346  
Max 0.0433 0.0626 0.0822 0.0511 0.0752 0.0615 0.2111 0.0367 0.1488 0.0619 0.0762 0.0689   0.0572 0.0730 0.0658 0.0815 0.0239 0.0252 0.1055 0.0946 0.0415  
Mean 0.0009 0.0040 0.0025 0.0019 -0.0008 -0.0037 0.0062 -0.0017 0.0091 -0.0015 -0.0080 -0.0020   -0.0093 -0.0023 0.0012 -0.0007 -0.0018 0.0004 0.0017 0.0028 0.0018  
+ve/-ve 0.9000 1.3750 1.3750 1.5333 0.6522 0.8095 1.7143 0.8095 1.9231 0.8095 0.9000 0.8095   0.6522 0.9000 1.1111 0.8095 0.9000 1.1111 1.1111 1.2353 0.9000  
St Dev 0.0196 0.0288 0.0273 0.0187 0.0198 0.0270 0.0380 0.0171 0.0298 0.0195 0.0395 0.0303   0.0283 0.0243 0.0205 0.0279 0.0155 0.0145 0.0294 0.0238 0.0168  
t-test 0.2850 0.8647 0.5568 0.6142 -0.2483 -0.8562 1.0018 -0.6010 1.8760 -0.4733 -1.2510 -0.4134  -2.0236 -0.5937 0.3760 -0.1464 -0.7022 0.1685 0.3496 0.7138 0.6513  
p-value 0.7773 0.3928 0.5810 0.5428 0.8053 0.3974 0.3230 0.5515 0.0686 0.6388 0.2188 0.6817  0.0503 0.5564 0.7091 0.8844 0.4870 0.8671 0.7286 0.4798 0.5189  
 Panel B 
 DI-ED Announcements - Full Sample with 16 Dividend Initiations Removed                   
Count 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64   64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64  
Min -0.0630 -0.0527 -0.0939 -0.0458 -0.0310 -0.0175 -0.0288 -0.0404 -0.0487 -0.0600 -0.0852 -0.0772   -0.0334 -0.0848 -0.0555 -0.1009 -0.0478 -0.0517 -0.0526 -0.0411 -0.0311  
Max 0.0438 0.0470 0.0500 0.0482 0.0319 0.0496 0.0315 0.0271 0.0531 0.0492 0.1184 0.1331   0.0796 0.0419 0.0549 0.0592 0.0323 0.0761 0.0457 0.0494 0.0474  
Mean -0.0038 0.0010 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0031 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0007 0.0037 0.0038 0.0027   0.0011 -0.0030 0.0004 -0.0009 0.0019 -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0013 0.0031  
+ve/-ve 0.8286 1.2069 1.0645 0.8824 1.2857 1.2069 0.6842 1.0000 0.8824 1.5600 1.2069 1.2069   1.0645 0.9394 0.7778 1.0645 1.3704 0.9394 1.1333 0.8824 1.3704  
St Dev 0.0182 0.0150 0.0184 0.0138 0.0115 0.0119 0.0106 0.0131 0.0171 0.0177 0.0315 0.0273   0.0176 0.0192 0.0188 0.0196 0.0131 0.0194 0.0162 0.0140 0.0132  
t-test -1.6855 0.5432 0.0724 -0.1077 0.1305 2.0578 -0.2380 0.1353 -0.3387 1.6678 0.9715 0.7872  0.5126 -1.2465 0.1534 -0.3752 1.1369 -0.1850 -0.1291 0.7464 1.8640  
p-value 0.0968 0.5889 0.9425 0.9146 0.8966 0.0438 0.8126 0.8928 0.7360  0.1003 0.3350 0.4341  0.6100 0.2172 0.8786 0.7087 0.2599 0.8539 0.8977 0.4582 0.0670  
Figure 5-6: Mean Values of Abnormal Returns over the Test Period - DD-EI and DI-ED Announcements. 
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Circled means are significantly different from zero at the 5% level of error. 
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Table 5-7: Abnormal Returns over the Test Period - DNC-EI and DNC-ED Announcements Only. 
Day -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2  -1 0 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
 DNC-EI     
Count 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140  140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140 140  
Min -0.0692 -0.0601 -0.0926 -0.0346 -0.2191 -0.0359 -0.0782 -0.0689 -0.0363 -0.0715 -0.0992 -0.1002  -0.1576 -0.0540 -0.0492 -0.0668 -0.0430 -0.1157 -0.0818 -0.1182 -0.0911  
Max 0.0579 0.0568 0.0699 0.0443 0.1250 0.0518 0.1565 0.1205 0.0670 0.1151 0.1787 0.2449  0.0625 0.0591 0.0477 0.0858 0.1641 0.0620 0.0559 0.0702 0.0650  
Mean -0.0005 -0.0024 0.0009 0.0014 0.0006 -0.0012 0.0005 -0.0010 0.0006 -0.0006 0.0011 0.0001  -0.0040 0.0003 -0.0007 0.0007 0.0013 -0.0023 -0.0008 -0.0025 0.0019  
+ve/-ve 0.8919 0.7500 0.9444 1.2951 1.0896 0.8182 0.7284 0.9718 0.8667 0.9444 0.7949 0.7284  0.6867 0.9718 0.7284 1.0000 0.7722 0.7284 0.7722 0.7500 1.1212  
St Dev 0.0161 0.0163 0.0186 0.0137 0.0272 0.0123 0.0233 0.0201 0.0157 0.0208 0.0389 0.0321  0.0226 0.0169 0.0159 0.0181 0.0228 0.0180 0.0160 0.0221 0.0203  
t-test -0.3963 -1.7455 0.5870 1.2511 0.2543 -1.1261 0.2380 -0.5989 0.4475 -0.3652 0.3315 0.0320  -2.0807 0.1978 -0.5530 0.4321 0.6998 -1.5398 -0.5814 -1.3477 1.1251  
p-value 0.6925 0.0831 0.5581 0.2130 0.7997 0.2620 0.8122 0.5502 0.6552 0.7156 0.7408 0.9746  0.0393 0.8435 0.5812 0.6663 0.4852 0.1259 0.5619 0.1800 0.2625  
 DNC-ED                            
Count 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197  197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197  
Min -0.0559 -0.0616 -0.1230 -0.0602 -0.0490 -0.0787 -0.0681 -0.0833 -0.1065 -0.0779 -0.2023 -0.1536  -0.1735 -0.0627 -0.1362 -0.0488 -0.0678 -0.1300 -0.0945 -0.1058 -0.1010  
Max 0.0590 0.0922 0.0693 0.0889 0.0523 0.0584 0.1179 0.0807 0.0942 0.0696 0.0810 0.0881  0.1494 0.0510 0.0535 0.0902 0.1572 0.2543 0.0893 0.0552 0.0876  
Mean -0.0002 0.0010 -0.0005 0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0012 -0.0022 -0.0005 0.0002 -0.0063 -0.0047  -0.0009 -0.0022 -0.0024 0.0005 -0.0014 0.0028 0.0006 -0.0018 0.0013  
+ve/-ve 0.9126 1.1889 0.9505 0.8762 0.8585 0.9126 0.9314 0.8411 0.9314 0.9899 0.8762 0.9505  0.9899 0.9314 0.8762 0.9700 0.7748 0.9899 0.9126 0.9700 0.9700  
St Dev 0.0149 0.0160 0.0194 0.0187 0.0155 0.0181 0.0176 0.0184 0.0208 0.0182 0.0368 0.0311  0.0244 0.0162 0.0218 0.0170 0.0224 0.0273 0.0169 0.0187 0.0177  
t-test -0.1756 0.8454 -0.3751 0.5708 -0.5221 -0.4760 -0.9414 -1.6609 -0.3707 0.1562 -2.3874 -2.1065  -0.4920 -1.9055 -1.5744 0.4267 -0.9058 1.4261 0.5347 -1.3242 1.0114  
p-value 0.8608 0.3989 0.7080 0.5688 0.6022 0.6346 0.3477 0.0983 0.7112  0.8760 0.0179 0.0364  0.6233 0.0582 0.1170 0.6701 0.3661 0.1554 0.5935 0.1870 0.3131  
Figure 5-7: Mean Values of Abnormal Returns over the Test Period - DNC-EI and DNC-ED Announcements. 
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 Circled means are significantly different from zero at the 5% level of error. 
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5.3 The Patterns Discernible in Three-day Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CARs) 
Table 5-8 contains three-day CARs associated with DI-EI calculated over the full test period 
with the event window CARs in the central column. In all three panels, the null hypothesis H02 
(reprinted here for convenience) must be rejected with respect to DI-EI category CARs spanning 
the announcement day. 
HA2: The mean three-day CAR generated over the days spanning the public release of 
the announcement (days t-1, t0 and t1) and grouped by direction of change of 
dividend and direction of change in earnings category, will be statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. 
Figure 5-8: Mean Values of Three-day CARs over the Test Period - DI-EI and DD-ED Announcements. 
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Table 5-8: DI-EI CARs for t-3 to t3. 
Panel A:  DI-EI Announcements - Full Sample
CAR-3 CAR-2 CAR-1 CAR0 CAR1 CAR2 CAR3
Count 311 311 311 311 311 311 311
Mean 0.0012 0.0020 0.0038 0.0228 -0.0030 -0.0044 0.0018
St Dev 0.0435 0.0338 0.0367 0.0713 0.0390 0.0358 0.0345
t-test 0.4855 1.0390 1.8088 5.6495 -1.3480 -2.1926 0.8994
p-value 0.6277 0.2996 0.0714 0.0000 0.1787 0.0291 0.3691
Panel B:  DI-EI Announcements - Initiations and Resumptions only
Count 67 67 67 67 67 67 67
Mean 0.0026 0.0054 0.0020 0.0294 -0.0108 -0.0166 0.0019
St Dev 0.0665 0.0341 0.0414 0.0842 0.0487 0.0480 0.0394
t-test 0.3205 1.2836 0.3977 2.8563 -1.8072 -2.8249 0.4043
p-value 0.7496 0.2038 0.6921 0.0057 0.0753 0.0062 0.6873
Panel C:  DI-EI Announcements - Without Initiations and Resumptions
Count 244 244 244 244 244 244 244
Mean 0.0008 0.0011 0.0042 0.0210 -0.0008 -0.0011 0.0017
St Dev 0.0348 0.0337 0.0354 0.0674 0.0356 0.0309 0.0331
t-test 0.3640 0.4947 1.8747 4.8765 -0.3685 -0.5679 0.8058
p-value 0.7161 0.6213 0.0620 0.0000 0.7128 0.5706 0.4212
 
130 
In Panel A, the cumulative mean over the event window was 2.28 percent (t-value = 5.65, 
p < 0.0000). One other DI-EI three-day CAR in the test period was significant within the five 
percent level of error. This was the CAR for days t5, t6 and t7. In addition, the CAR covering 
days t-4, t-3 and t-2 had weak significance (t-value = 1.81, p = 0.0715). However these other CARs 
do not create a meaningful pattern. The mean for initiations and resumptions only in Panel B is 
higher at 2.94% and the mean for DI-EI CARs without initiations and resumptions is slightly 
lower at 2.10%. This indicates that, as a group, initiations and resumptions have a stronger effect 
on investors than when the announced dividend is just one of an ongoing series. 
The pattern in Table 5-9 for DD-ED three-day CARs is of a similar nature. 
Table 5-9: DD-ED CARs for t-3 to t3. 
Panel A:  DD-ED Announcements - Full Sample
CAR-3 CAR-2 CAR-1 CAR0 CAR1 CAR2 CAR3
Count 182 182 182 182 182 182 182
Mean -0.0035 -0.0057 -0.0025 -0.0269 0.0009 0.0004 -0.0075
St Dev 0.0439 0.0452 0.0398 0.0898 0.0559 0.0469 0.0503
t-test -1.0911 -1.6858 -0.8436 -4.0440 0.2283 0.1288 -2.0134
p-value 0.2767 0.0936 0.4000 0.0001 0.8196 0.8977 0.0456
Panel B:  DD-ED Announcements - Omissions only
Count 66 66 66 66 66 66 66
Mean -0.0066 -0.0066 -0.0086 -0.0568 -0.0013 0.0024 -0.0167
St Dev 0.0493 0.0582 0.0478 0.1105 0.0661 0.0523 0.0607
t-test -1.0802 -0.9273 -1.4644 -4.1764 -0.1654 0.3692 -2.2276
p-value 0.2841 0.3572 0.1479 0.0001 0.8692 0.7132 0.0294
Panel C:  DD-ED Announcements - Without Omissions
Count 116 116 116 116 116 116 116
Mean -0.0018 -0.0051 0.0010 -0.0099 0.0022 -0.0006 -0.0023
St Dev 0.0406 0.0362 0.0342 0.0707 0.0494 0.0437 0.0426
t-test -0.4874 -1.5164 0.3135 -1.5130 0.4900 -0.1599 -0.5799
p-value 0.6269 0.1322 0.7545 0.1330 0.6251 0.8732 0.5631
 
 
In Panel A, the three-day window mean was negative 2.69% (t-value = -4.04, p = 0.0001); but 
the final three days of the test period also yielded a significant CAR with a mean of negative 
0.17 percent (t-value = -2.01, p = 0.0456). This echo response may be indicative of small 
shareholders having had time to receive the news by mail from the company (the mailout being 
concurrent with disclosure to the Stock Exchange) and act on it via a stockbroker. However, 
there is no hard evidence to suggest that this is necessarily so. The mean of the subset of 
responses to a dividend omission in Panel B is greater at –5.68% (t-value = -4.18, p = 0.0001), 
while in Panel C, dividend reductions net of omission observations remain insignificant. In 
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Panels A and B there is some evidence of a further negative AR significant at the five percent 
level of error with respect to the CAR covering days t8, t9 and t10. There is no immediate 
explanation for this. In keeping with what was found with respect to the one-day ARs in the DD-
ED category, hypothesis H02 can be rejected on the full sample and on the subsample of omission 
only, but not on the subsample of only mere reductions in dividend. 
Figure 5-9: Mean Values of Three-day CARs over the Test Period - DD-EI and DI-ED Announcements. 
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Table 5-10: DD-EI and DI-ED CARs for t-3 to t3. 
Panel A:  DD-EI Announcements - Full Sample  (Includes 9 Omissions)
CAR-3 CAR-2 CAR-1 CAR0 CAR1 CAR2 CAR3
Count 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
Mean 0.0074 -0.0027 0.0136 -0.0115 -0.0104 -0.0020 0.0062
St Dev 0.0444 0.0365 0.0431 0.0556 0.0353 0.0378 0.0435
t-test 1.0292 -0.4523 1.9411 -1.2797 -1.8155 -0.3302 0.8777
p-value 0.3100 0.6537 0.0599 0.2086 0.0776 0.7431 0.3858
Panel B:  DI-ED Announcements - Full Sample (Includes 16 Initiations or Resumptions)
Count 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
Mean -0.0023 0.0014 -0.0004 0.0085 -0.0028 0.0001 0.0019
St Dev 0.0264 0.0277 0.0243 0.0451 0.0371 0.0329 0.0255
t-test -0.7708 0.4641 -0.1623 1.6879 -0.6719 0.0191 0.6522
p-value 0.4431 0.6439 0.8715 0.0954 0.5036 0.9848 0.5162
 
 
In Table 5-10 there are no three-day CARs significant within the five percent level of error. This 
suggests that the impact of earnings change and dividend change cancel each other out in the 
mixed message announcements, DD-EI and DI-ED. Hence, the null hypothesis H02 cannot be 
rejected for either of these categories. There were actually 9 instances of dividend omissions in 
the DD-EI data set and 16 instances of dividend initiations or resumptions in the DI-ED set. 
These have not been reported in further panels as they separately did not furnish significant 
results. 
The DNC-EI observations tabled in Panel A of Table 5-11 are similarly insignificant. Hence the 
null hypothesis H02 cannot be rejected with respect to DNC-EI results. But this pattern is broken 
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in Panel B where the DNC-ED three-day CARs are strongly significant in both the event window 
where there was a mean of negative 1.07% (t-value = -2.79, p = 0.0059) and over the ensuing 
three days when a further CAR with a mean of negative 0.55% was generated (t-value = -2.23, 
p = 0.0271). Therefore, for the DNC-ED category, the null hypothesis, H02 is rejected. 
Table 5-11: DNC-EI and DNC-ED CARs for t-3 to t3. 
Panel A:  DNC-EI Announcements 
CAR-3 CAR-2 CAR-1 CAR0 CAR1 CAR2 CAR3
Count 140 140 140 140 140 140 140
Mean -0.002011 0.000857 0.000049 0.000535 -0.004435 -0.000337 -0.001375
St Dev 0.026846 0.033839 0.036772 0.049298 0.031882 0.029919 0.032462
t-test -0.886257 0.299748 0.015638 0.128324 -1.645924 -0.133278 -0.501129
p-value 0.377010 0.764817 0.987546 0.898078 0.102039 0.894166 0.617073
Panel B:  DNC-ED Announcements 
Count 197 197 197 197 197 197 197
Mean 0.000261 -0.000430 -0.003906 -0.010714 -0.005502 0.001840 0.000153
St Dev 0.029372 0.028123 0.030708 0.053997 0.034672 0.039926 0.032316
t-test 0.124701 -0.214366 -1.785416 -2.784981 -2.227152 0.647009 0.066495
p-value 0.900888 0.830484 0.075740 0.00587819 0.027075 0.518383 0.947052
 
Figure 5-10: Mean Values of Three-day CARs over the Test Period - DNC-EI and DNC-ED 
Announcements. 
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It is instructive to compare the magnitude of this phenomenon, which I have argued is related to 
investors’ reaction to an announced drop in earnings, with the magnitude of the negative CARs 
over the same six days in the DD-ED case in Panel B of Table 5-9. Over the six days (t-1 to t4) in 
Table 5-9 the mean DD-ED CAR is negative 2.6 percent, while in Table 5-11, the DNC-ED 
event window CAR plus the CAR immediately following amount to negative 1.62 percent. In 
other words, the severity of the reaction to the announced drop in earnings is muted to the tune of 
almost one percentage point by the fact that in Panel B of Table 5-11, the companies announced 
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dividends unchanged from the previous period.152 
Effectively, the three-day CARs of Table 5-8 to Table 5-11 corroborate the pattern already found 
with respect to ARs in Section 5.2; so it would be appropriate at this point to step back from the 
minutiae of the results and consider the implications in overview. So far it has been revealed that 
DI-EI three-day event-window CARs provide an average holding gain of 2.1 percent for an 
investor while the equivalent DD-ED holding loss is 2.69 percent. These figures imply that an 
astute investor could make money on short-term trading. On the face of it, this contradicts Watts 
(1973) who found that the information content of dividends was economically insignificant — 
albeit that Watts was observing the behaviour of returns based on stand-alone dividend 
announcements in the United States. But an important question has not been addressed. The 
mere existence of ARs and CARs is not enough. Can they be related back to the dividend 
information and earnings information furnished in an announcement? Can we show that the 
announcement content is actually responsible for the ARs and CARs that coincide with it? The 
nature of such a causal link may be examined via the circumstantial evidence furnished by RLS 
regression analysis.153 This occurs in the next section. 
 
5.4 Linked Regressions with Dummy Variables on the Three-day 
CARs of the Event Window 
In this section I will show the results obtained from using the three-day CARs of the event 
window (t-1, t0, t1) as the dependent variable (CAR3Day) in a series of regressions in which 
percentage change in announced earnings ( EPS∆ ) and percentage change in announced 
dividends ( DPS∆ ) are the two independent variables. Initially, I will show how each 
independent variable interacts with CAR3Day in isolation, then I will proceed on to a series of 
restricted least squares regressions utilising a set of dummy variables representing the interaction 
effects between the two independent variables. But first two small items of housekeeping need to 
be covered. 
                                                 
152 A period is defined as twelve months earlier with some latitude for variation, when the previous announcement of 
the same type (mid-year or year-end) was published. 
153 Regression output provides circumstantial evidence only. We may choose to imply causation from it; but the 
output provides evidence of a relationship (or lack of it) only; and ‘relationship’ is a broader, less definitive (or 
judgemental) term than ‘causation’. We may conclude causation from our inferences, but that conclusion must 
remain tentative. 
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5.4.1 Removal of Dividend Initiation Observations and Reporting of Early 
and Late Subsamples 
From this point, the data set is going to be temporarily reduced from 948 to 865 observations 
with the removal of all dividend initiations and resumptions (67 DI-EI data points and 16 DI-ED 
data points). This is because the DPS∆  configuration used here is: 
 ANNOUNCED LAST YEAR
LAST YEAR
DPS DPS
DPS
DPS
−
∆ =  (5.1) 
A zero dividend (i.e., no dividend) for last year in the denominator leaves the variable undefined. 
It is clear from Table 5-4 that initiations and resumptions produce ARs which are qualitatively 
similar to (although quantitatively more impressive than) those produced by increases in existing 
dividends. From this it is reasonable to assume if dividend increases produce weaker effects than 
dividend initiations (and resumptions), then a statistically significant regression result obtained 
from the data set of dividend increases should also be a reasonable predictor of the results 
obtainable if the initiations and resumptions had been left in the data set. Removal of these data 
points will not change the qualitative nature of the impact made by dividend announcement data 
— but this removal of the observations associated with the largest observed CARs may mute 
down any evidence that there is a dividend signal.154 
The corollary to the above discussion of dividend initiations and resumptions is a similar 
discussion of the treatment of dividend omission data points. However, in this instance, there is a 
qualitative difference as well as a quantitative difference between dividend reductions and 
omissions. As shown in Panel C of Table 5-9, dividend reductions (that are not omissions) 
appear to have no significant impact on the market in New Zealand. Therefore the inclusion of 
omissions does make an important difference. Further, as stated earlier the percentage level of a 
dividend omission is not an arbitrarily set value — it is an incontrovertible negative 100 percent. 
The second item concerns the finding in the last chapter that the variance of the EPS 
observations calculated within the study from announcement data was quite different from that 
of the EPS figures supplied in announcements from mid-May 1996. The latter EPS were fully 
                                                 
154 A possible alternative would have been to assign ∆DPS an arbitrary value. I looked into this, but found it 
unsatisfactory. Consider the size of dividends in New Zealand generally. They tend to be quite small. If last period’s 
announced dividend was two cents per share, an increase of one cent this period is a 50 percent increase. An 
increase by three cents to a five cent dividend would represent a 150 percent increase. This sort of increase in the 
data set is not out of the ordinary; and to restrict the sample to data points in which the maximum dividend increase 
could be 100 percent would distort the analysis. On the other hand, setting a value of more than 100 percent on a 
dividend initiation would be bizarre; while settling for an arbitrary value of 100 percent for initiations while 
allowing other data points to take on higher values would also be bizarre. I did consider setting the value at 1,000 
percent, but this was distortionary. Therefore dividend initiation and resumption data points are deleted, with respect 
to this formulation of the variable from the sample as of this point. 
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diluted while the former were simple in format (since insufficient data was available concerning 
unexercised options etc). The discovery of this difference forced a choice. Either all observations 
before May 13th 1996 should be deleted from the study, or the results should be reported on these 
as an early subsample separately from results reported with respect to observations from May 
13th 1996 onwards. Given that investors would probably have made similar calculations to those 
made by me to obtain EPS, it is likely that the ‘early subsample’ will remain a valid tool in the 
search for evidence of a dividend signal in the first part of the 1990s. 
On that basis, three sets of each regression are reported in the ensuing tables. In the first column, 
are the results for the entire sample of 865 observations. In the second column are the results on 
the subsample in which EPS∆  was calculated in the study for all announcement events prior to 
(and including) May 8th 1996. The third column will contain the results for the rest of the decade 
when the announcement disclosure itself was required to contain explicit EPS information. 
Where a result is significant within the five percent level of a Type 1 error, the cell is filled with 
a light grey background. 
 
5.4.2 Regression Results 
In this section, a three-day event window will be used; and the equivalent results for a one-day 
window will be furnished in Appendix E. 
Table 5-12 contains the results of two simple regressions in which EPS∆  and then DPS∆  is 
employed as the independent variable, and also a regression in which both independent variables 
feature. All of the regressions are reliable in terms of their F-statistics; but the adjusted R2 
figures are very low. When EPS∆  is the sole independent variable (Regression 1), the 
relationship between the recorded 1.18 percent change in three-day CARs per unit change in 
EPS∆  is strongly significant at the five percent level. But when both percentage change 
variables are introduced into the procedure (Regression 3), a unit rise in EPS∆  reduces to a 
mere 0.85% increase in CAR3Day. By contrast, a unit rise in DPS∆  is associated with a 3.38% 
increase in CAR3Day in the same set of results. 
It is interesting that when DPS∆  is the sole regressor in the late subsample in Table 5-12, it fails 
to furnish a statistically significant coefficient, while on the early subsample it most certainly 
did. This cannot be related to the influence of how EPS was calculated as EPS is not present in 
this estimation. Perhaps we are seeing here material evidence in New Zealand of the decline in 
importance of dividends in general that was observed elsewhere at the end of the twentieth 
century prior to the bursting of the Dot-Com Bubble.  
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Table 5-12: Stepwise Regressions on First-order Variables. 
Regressand
All Obs. Early
(to 8/5/96)
Late
(from 9/5/96)
(INTERCEPT) -0.0013 -0.0028 -0.0005
(0.4648) (0.2470) (0.8586)
∆EPS 0.0017 0.0063 0.0009
(0.0096) (0.0001) (0.2129)
(INTERCEPT) -0.0019 -0.0035 -0.0007
(0.2840) (0.1317) (0.7981)
∆DPS 0.0188 0.0281 0.0133
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003)
(INTERCEPT) -0.0019 -0.0039 -0.0007
(0.2759) (0.0914) (0.7971)
∆EPS 0.0006 0.0037 0.0002
(0.3793) (0.0227) (0.7846)
∆DPS 0.0182 0.0255 0.0130
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0006)
N 865 441 424
Adj R2EQUATION (i) 0.0066 0.0302 0.0013
Adj R2EQUATION (ii) 0.0511 0.0909 0.0284
Adj R2EQUATION (iii) 0.0508 0.0996 0.0263
FEQUATION (i) 6.7424 14.7160 1.5563
(0.0096) (0.0001) (0.2129)
FEQUATION (ii) 47.5130 45.0140 13.3830
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003)
FEQUATION (iii) 24.1370 25.3370 6.7141
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0013)
Regression with Change in Dividends Only EQUATION (ii)
Regression with Change in Earnings and Dividend  EQUATION (iii)
Observations, Adj R2 Statistics, F-Statistics, (p-Values)
ARt0
Regression with Change in Earnings Only EQUATION (i)
 
 
This decline was discussed by Fama and French (2001), who noted that the disbursement of 
dividends by US firms had been declining steadily since 1978. 
The procedure reported in Table 5-13 is the result of a three-part linked regression procedure 
involving the following set of equations, the first of which contains a single dummy variable 
relating to change in earnings: 
 
1 2 3 0
1 2
1 0
1. 3
2. 3
3. 3
EPS
EPS
CAR day EPS DPS Dummy
CAR day EPS DPS
CAR day Dummy
α β β β ε
α β β ε
α β ε
∆ >
∆ >
= + ∆ + ∆ + +
= + ∆ + ∆ +
= + +
 (5.2) 
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Equation 1 of the set is known as the unrestricted regression. The dummy variable here 
represents an announced rise in earnings (ignoring all changes in dividends); and its presence 
converts the intercept term into a measure of announced decreases in earnings (ignoring all 
changes in dividends). Equation 2 is restricted to the two primary independent variables, and is 
indeed the regression reported in Table 5-12. Equation 3 is restricted to an assessment of the rise-
in-earnings dummy only — and of the effect of a fall in earnings via the behaviour of the 
intercept term. 
Table 5-13: RLS Regression with Respect to Earnings Behaviour. 
Regressand
All Obs. Early
(to 8/5/96)
Late
(from 9/5/96)
Coefficients of Unrestricted Regression (p-Values)
Falling earnings (INTERCEPT) -0.0104 -0.0174 -0.0024
(0.0012) (0.0004) (0.5688)
∆EPS 0.0006 0.0067 -0.0001
(0.5132) (0.0053) (0.8736)
∆DPS 0.0200 0.0294 0.0143
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0018)
Rising earnings 0.0161 0.0166 0.0104
(0.0008) (0.0236) (0.1139)
N 865 441 424
Adj R2UNRESTRICTED 0.0661 0.1255 0.0335
Adj R2EQUATION (ii) 0.0550 0.1172 0.0301
Adj R2EQUATION (iii) 0.0346 0.0622 0.0147
FUNRESTRRICTED 21.3690 22.0510 5.8907
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0006)
FEQUATION (ii) 26.1390 30.2120 7.5538
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0006)
FEQUATION (iii) 31.9600 30.1690 7.3001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0072)
FFIRST ORDER 15.5447 16.9011 5.1195
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0064)
FINTERACTION 11.2210 5.1472 2.5215
(0.0008) (0.0238) (0.1131)
Observations, Adj R2 Statistics, F-Statistics, (p-Values)
CAR3Day
 
 
In Table 5-13 (and in all tables of linked regression results), the final two rows report two extra 
F-statistics. The first-order F-statistic is a measure of the strength and reliability of the 
relationship between the dependent variable and the two first-order independent variables, 
DPS∆  and EPS∆  jointly. The interaction F-statistic is a measure of the strength and reliability 
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of the relationship between the dependent variable and the interaction variables represented by 
the dummy and constant term in Equations 1 and 3.155 
In Table 5-13, the first point of interest is that, with respect to the early subsample, the unit fall 
in earnings (ignoring dividend changes) modelled by the intercept term corresponds with a 
strongly significant 1.74 percent drop in the dependent variable, CAR3Day (p = 0.0004). This 
information is provided in the results for the constant term for the unrestricted regression 
(Equation 1). Further, the significance of the dummy variable modeling earnings increases 
(ignoring dividend information) is similar (p = 0.0236). This indicates that a unit rise in 
‘earnings-change-upward’ relates to a 1.66 percent rise in CAR3Day. These two results are also 
in the full sample in column one; and both the full sample and the early sample furnish 
significant interaction F-statistics (the full sample at the one percent level of error and the early 
subsample at the five percent level). 
These interaction variable results enable us to reject the null of the hypothesis (shown in its 
alternative form here) on these two samples: 
HA3: The market reacts to interactions between dividend-change and earnings-change 
published in a joint announcement in a manner distinguishable from the separate 
impacts of percentage change in earnings announced and percentage change in 
dividend announced. 
Further in the early subsample, a unit increase in the first-order variable, DPS∆  corresponds 
with a 2.94 percent increase in CAR3Day (p < 0.0000); and a unit increase in EPS∆  
corresponds with a rather more spindly 0.67 percent increase in CAR3Day, which is still 
significant at the one percent level of error. These DPS∆  results also occur in the full sample; 
but EPS∆  in that sample lapses into insignificance. However, the first-order F-statistics for the 
early subsample and for the full sample are both strongly significant. This allows us to reject the 
null form of the hypothesis H4 (printed in alternative form): 
HA4: The first-order variables, ∆DPS and ∆EPS are jointly related to CARs generated, 
during the three-day event window, by investor activity following joint 
announcements. 
                                                 
155 A full explanation of the joint F-testing of restricted least squares regressions is provided in Gujarati, Damodar 
N., “Basic Econometrics” Third Edition, (1995). See Section 8.7 “Restricted Least Squares: Testing Linear Equality 
Restrictions”, pp 256 – 262. 
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This early subsample result is congruent with Easton and Sinclair (1989). When they controlled 
for a dividend effect by leaving dividend random in their data set, they found a significant 
earnings effect over quintile portfolios ranked by the magnitude of the variable, unexpected 
earnings. In other words, a rise or fall in earnings in the presence of a dividend announcement is 
not autonomously significant, but the individual permutations of rises or falls in earnings in 
conjunction with an associated dividend-change announcement are highly significant. 
The results for the late subsample data set reported in the third column are quite different. Only 
the first-order F-statistic is significant and the only regressor found to have a significant 
coefficient was DPS∆ . Here a unit increase in DPS∆  corresponded with a 1.43 percent increase 
in CAR3Day at the one percent level of error. This allows us to reject H04, but not H03. 
Table 5-14 repeats the exercise in Table 5-13 with one alteration — a new RLS equation set. In 
Equation (5.3) there are two dummy variables. The first represents a rise in announced dividend 
(ignoring earnings change); and the second stands for a situation of no change in the announced 
dividend (ignoring earnings change). The intercept term in the unrestricted equation proxies a 
fall in announced dividend (ignoring earnings change): 
 
1 2 3 0 4 0
1 2
1 0 2 0
1. 3
2. 3
3. 3
DPS DPS
DPS DPS
CAR day EPS DPS D D
CAR day EPS DPS
CAR day D D
α β β β β ε
α β β ε
α β β ε
∆ > ∆ =
∆ > ∆ =
= + ∆ + ∆ + + +
= + ∆ + ∆ +
= + + +
 (5.3) 
In the late subsample in Table 5-14, the coefficient for EPS∆  is so tiny it does not register at 
four decimal places and is not significant, and DPS∆  is also insignificant. Hence for this 
subsample, H04 cannot be rejected. However the interaction dummy for rising dividends is 
significant in this subsample at the one percent level of error. This significance is corroborated 
by an interaction F-statistic that is significant at the five percent error level, which allows us to 
reject the null hypotheses, H03. The dividend-no-change dummy remained insignificant along 
with falling dividends (modeled by the intercept). 
With respect to the simple EPS formulation in the early subsample, most of these results are 
reversed. In this subsample, the rising dividend dummy is insignificant; but the intercept term 
(falling dividends) is significant at the five percent level and has the expected negative sign. 
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Table 5-14: Restricted Least Squares Regression for Change in Dividends. 
Regressand
All Obs. Early
(to 8/5/96)
Late
(from 9/5/96)
Coefficients of Unrestricted Regression (p-Values)
Falling dividends (INTERCEPT) -0.0166 -0.0173 -0.0123
(0.0013) (0.0410) (0.0529)
∆EPS 0.0010 0.0080 0.0000
(0.2646) (0.0006) (0.9904)
∆DPS 0.0125 0.0234 0.0072
(0.0078) (0.0059) (0.1857)
Rising Dividends 0.0286 0.0203 0.0281
(0.0002) (0.1024) (0.0046)
DNC 0.0107 0.0026 0.0146
(0.0888) (0.7962) (0.0668)
N 865 441 424
Adj R2UNRESTRICTED 0.0693 0.1228 0.0440
Adj R2EQUATION (ii) 0.0550 0.1172 0.0301
Adj R2EQUATION (iii) 0.0609 0.0824 0.0444
FUNRESTRRICTED 17.0870 16.3950 5.8671
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
FEQUATION (ii) 26.1390 30.2120 7.5538
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0006)
FEQUATION (iii) 29.0100 20.7430 10.8150
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
FFIRST ORDER 4.8972 11.0955 0.9270
(0.0077) (0.0000) (0.3966)
FINTERACTION 7.6308 2.3879 4.0813
(0.0005) (0.0930) (0.0176)
Observations, Adj R2 Statistics, F-Statistics, (p-Values)
CAR3Day
 
But this is not supported by the interaction F-statistic, which is only tenuously significant at the 
ten percent level of error. Further, the insignificance of the DNC dummy confirms the diagnosis 
made in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 that announcements of unchanged dividends do not excite 
investors. These early subsample results individually and collectively fall short of allowing us to 
reject the null hypothesis, H03. 
With respect to the first-order variables in the early subsample, both are significant at the one 
percent level of error, and the DPS∆  coefficient shows that a unit increase in this variable is 
associated with a 2.34 percent rise in CAR3Day. A unit increase in EPS∆ , by contrast, relates to 
a rise in CAR3Day of 0.80 percent, which is approximately one third this size. This significance 
is corroborated by a strongly significant first-order F-statistic which causes us to reject the null 
hypothesis H04. These results indicate that the percentage change (from twelve months earlier) in 
an announced dividend is picked up and acted upon by investors. This is a much stronger finding 
in favour of a dividend effect than was found by Easton and Sinclair (1989) on Australian data, 
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when they organized unexpected dividend changes into quintile portfolios, leaving earnings data 
random. They found that the dividend effect was much weaker than the earnings effect. 
Some comment should also be made about the results in Table 5-14 for the full sample in column 
one — keeping in mind the underlying flaw in this sample. Here the rising dividend and falling 
dividend interaction effects are strongly significant while the DNC interaction dummy remains 
insignificant. These are corroborated by a strongly significant interaction F-statistic at the bottom 
of column one. This most certainly allows us to reject the null hypothesis H03. Further, DPS∆  in 
the unrestricted estimation is strongly significant (although EPS∆  remains quite insignificant); 
and the full sample’s first-order F-statistic is also strongly significant. The association between 
DPS∆  and CAR3Day is strongly confirmed and null hypothesis H04 is rejected. 
At this point we reach the RLS regression procedure modeling all six of the categories of 
direction of earnings-and-dividend change, which are tabulated in Table 5-15 and formulated in 
Equation (5.4): 
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 (5.4) 
The first salient feature here is that, while EPS∆  is insignificant in both restricted and 
unrestricted regressions, DPS∆  is strongly significant in both. The restricted regression has 
already been reported in Table 5-12, Table 5-13 and Table 5-14. The DPS∆  coefficient in the 
early subsample in Table 5-15 indicates that a unit change this variable relates to a 2.29 percent 
change in the dependent variable CAR3Day (p = 0.0075), while the EPS∆  coefficient, also 
strongly significant, shows a much smaller association — less than one third of this magnitude. 
These first-order results on the early subsample are corroborated by a strongly significant first-
order F-statistic (F = 7.95, p = 0.0004), which allows us to reject the null hypothesis H04 on this 
subsample. 
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Table 5-15: Restricted Least Squares Regression with Dummy Variables. 
Regressand
All Obs. Early
(to 8/5/96)
Late
(from 9/5/96)
Coefficients of Unrestricted Regression (p-Values)
DD-ED (INTERCEPT) -0.0190 -0.0248 -0.0108
(0.0006) (0.0082) (0.1109)
∆EPS 0.0007 0.0065 0.0000
(0.4523) (0.0069) (0.9766)
∆DPS 0.0125 0.0229 0.0076
(0.0074) (0.0075) (0.1634)
DI_EI 0.0329 0.0299 0.0270
(0.0001) (0.0301) (0.0106)
DD-EI 0.0133 0.0312 -0.0085
(0.2569) (0.0696) (0.5946)
DI-ED 0.0239 0.0250 0.0224
(0.0253) (0.1073) (0.1394)
DNC-EI 0.0195 0.0174 0.0181
(0.0136) (0.1535) (0.0869)
DNC-ED 0.0088 0.0036 0.0109
(0.2266) (0.7567) (0.2317)
N 865 441 424
Adj R2UNRESTRICTED 0.0703 0.1267 0.0385
Adj R2EQUATION (ii) 0.0550 0.1172 0.0301
Adj R2EQUATION (iii) 0.0629 0.0987 0.0384
FUNRESTRRICTED 10.3320 10.1170 3.4169
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0015)
FEQUATION (ii) 26.1390 30.2120 7.5538
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0006)
FEQUATION (iii) 12.6060 10.6380 4.3786
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0007)
FFIRST ORDER 4.4017 7.9541 1.0112
(0.0125) (0.0004) (0.3647)
FINTERACTION 3.8381 1.9456 1.7357
(0.0019) (0.0857) (0.1252)
Observations, Adj R2 Statistics, F-Statistics, (p-Values)
CAR3Day
 
However, the early subsample does not furnish a significant interaction F-statistic (F = 1.9456, 
p = 0.0857) in spite of the unrestricted model’s furnishing of a strongly significant DD-ED effect 
(measured by the intercept term) and a DI-EI effect that was significant at the five percent level 
of error. These are the two effects we would expect to have an impact on the regressand in 
accordance with Kane, Lee and Marcus (1984), Easton (1991) and Lonie, Abeyratna, Power and 
Sinclair (1996). However, with respect to the early subsample with its simple formulation of 
EPS, these effects are ruled out by the insignificant interaction F-statistic. On this basis, the null 
form of the hypothesis H5 (shown in alternative form here) cannot be rejected on the early 
subsample. 
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HA5: The six paired dividend-and-earnings combinations (DI-EI, DD-ED, DD-EI, 
DI-ED, DNC-EI and DNC-ED) modelled by five interaction dummy variables are 
jointly related to CARs generated during the three-day event window, by investor 
activity following joint announcements. 
The late subsample furnishes an even less responsive level of association. Although the 
unrestricted model produces a strongly significant DI-EI (good-news) interaction effect, this is 
not corroborated by a significant interaction F-statistic. Here again, H05 cannot be rejected. 
Further, the total absence of any first-order coefficients of any significance means that the 
hypothesis, H04 pertaining to the joint significance of first-order variables also cannot be 
rejected. There just does not appear to be any evidence of an investor reaction to a dividend 
signal (or any signal) present. 
However, when the two subsamples are merged in column one, the 865 observations of the full 
sample do produce both a significant first-order effect and also a significant interaction effect, 
which allows us to reject both H04 and H05. Here, the first-order DPS∆  effect, implying a 1.25 
percent rise in CAR3Day per unit change in itself, is much stronger than the statistically 
insignificant first-order EPS∆  effect; and the DD-ED (bad news) and DI-EI (good news) 
interaction effects have the correct signs and are both strongly significant — along with two of 
the mixed news interaction effects albeit at only the five percent level of error. 
The explanation for the statistically significant output generated by these mixed-message 
earnings-and-dividend direction variables is less intuitively obvious, but the background to it has 
already been laid in the discussion of ARs and three-day CARs in Sections 5.2 and 5.3. A unit 
change in the DNC-EI combination generated a positive 1.95 percent change in CAR3Day 
(p = 0.0136) because investors have reacted positively to the earnings-rise component in the 
sample’s mid-year announcements. It is to be noted, however, that the t-tests of DNC-EI event-
window CARs yielded test values that were insignificant, while those of the DNC-ED category 
were significant in the Sections 5.2 and 5.3 t-test results, but cease to be so here. 
With respect to other mixed message categories, a unit change in the DI-ED combination 
generated a positive 2.39 percent change in CAR3Day (p = 0.0253). No clear reasoning can be 
applied to this finding as yet; but an interesting pattern relating to it will be discussed in 
Appendix G with respect to differences in CAR and interaction variable output characteristics 
between mid-year and year-end announcements. 
These full-sample results indicate that the percentage change variables ( EPS∆  and DPS∆ ) 
jointly have a significant relationship with CAR3Day, and that the dividend-and-earnings 
direction combinations as a group enjoy an even stronger relationship with it. In other words, the 
144 
market is influenced by the interaction effects between dividends and earnings when announced 
jointly — as they generally are in New Zealand. 
The results reported in Table 5-15 are similar to, and in several respects, different from the 
results reported in earlier studies employing the same RLS technique, the significance levels of 
which are summarized in Table 5-16. The dividend and earnings interaction dummy variables in 
the full sample achieved levels of significance loosely similar to those observed by Kane, Lee 
and Marcus (1984) on their American data set of 352 observations. In that study, five of the 
combinations were significant at the one percent level of error. Their only combination failing to 
attain significance was I(+ -), which is called DD-EI in the current study. 
Table 5-16: Comparison of Significance Levels of RLS Output over Four Studies. 
 Kane et al 
(1984) 
Easton 
(1991) 
Lonie et 
al (1996) 
Current 
(Full 
Sample) 
Current 
(Early 
Subsample) 
Current 
(Late 
Subsample) 
∆EPS 1%# - 5% - 1% - 
∆DPS 1%# - - 1% 1% - 
DD-ED* 1% 5% - 1% 1%# - 
DI-EI 1% 5% 5% 1% 5%# 5%# 
DD-EI - - - - - - 
DI-ED - - 5% 5% - - 
DNC-EI 1% 5% 5% 5% - - 
DNC-ED 1% - 5% - - - 
First-order F - - 5% 5% 1% - 
Interaction F 5% 1% 5% 1% - - 
Adjusted R2 ** 0.144 0.052 0.077 0.070 0.127 0.039 
* DD-ED was modeled by the intercept in all studies 
** This is the adjusted R2 for the unrestricted equation. Easton (1991) reports only an R2, which is reproduced here. 
The stated percentages give the benchmark probability of a Type 1 error reported as not having been exceeded. 
# Statistic not validated by a significant first-order or interaction F-statistic 
  
With respect to the first-order variables containing quantitative dividend information and 
quantitative earnings information, Kane et al reported a strongly significant ‘dividend surprise’ 
effect (the equivalent of the current study’s DPS∆ ). However, Kane et al found their ‘earnings 
surprise’ variable to be strongly significant. This fails to correspond with any equivalent effect in 
the full sample or late subsample in the current study, but strongly coincides with the finding on 
the early subsample. On the other hand, the 1984 study produced an insignificant first-order 
F-statistic, while the current New Zealand results furnished a first-order F-statistic significant 
with a five percent level of error. These two differences, qualitatively speaking, would tend to 
cancel each other out. Both studies place emphasis on the importance of the role of the 
interaction effects in place of the stand-alone effects of the first-order variables. 
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It is not feasible to compare the percentage change in the dependent CAR variable across Kane 
et al’s and the current study as their definition of a joint announcement allowed for temporal 
proximity rather in addition to simultaneity, and their CAR was generated over a period of 21 
days. It is of note that Kane et al did not report the behaviour of CARs outside their test period, 
whereas the current study does furnish this context. 
Easton (1991), using 789 Australian industrial firm announcement observations which, unlike 
Kane et al’s, were simultaneously joint dividend and earnings disclosures, also produced broadly 
similar results with points of difference. Easton’s first-order variables, like Kane et al’s, lapsed 
into insignificance in the output of his unrestricted equation, while in the current study, DPS∆  
continued to be significant with less than a one percent error in the full sample and early 
subsample. Like, Kane et al, Easton produced a first-order F-statistic which was insignificant. 
This agrees with the current study’s finding with respect to the late subsample. However, the 
first-order F-statistic is significant at the five percent level in the full sample and at the one 
percent level in the early subsample. With respect to his dummy variables, Easton produced only 
three significant interaction effects — all within the five percent error benchmark. These were 
for I(+ +), I(- -) and I(+ 0), which correspond with DI-EI, DD-ED and DNC-EI in the current 
study. The current study found significant DI-EI interactions in all three sets of results 
(significant at the one percent level in the full sample at five percent in the two subsamples). The 
current study’s DD-ED significance levels were tighter at the one percent level than Easton’s in 
two out of three instances; but in the third (late subsample) this item lapsed into insignificance. 
The current study’s full sample furnished a DNC-EI interaction with a five percent level of 
significance like Easton’s. However, in the current study, the DI-ED interaction effect was also 
significant. Easton, like the current study’s full sample, produced an interaction F-statistic that 
was significant at the one percent level of error. 
The third study employing RLS regression was Lonie, Abeyratna, Power and Sinclair (1996) on 
617 British joint announcement observations, which were simultaneous as in Easton (1991) and 
in the current study. Lonie et al produced both first-order and interaction F-statistics significant 
at the five percent level. The finding that both RLS combinative F-statistics were significant was 
something that set Lonie et al and the current study’s full sample apart from Easton (1991) and 
Kane et al. However, while according with the current study’s full sample output, Lonie et al’s 
first-order F-statistic’s significance was based on the performance of their first-order variable, 
‘earnings change’ ( EPS∆  in the current study) which was significant at the five percent level in 
their unrestricted regression, while their ‘dividend change’ variable lapsed into insignificance. In 
the full sample current study, it was DPS∆  which was significant and EPS∆  which was 
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insignificant. However, the current study’s early subsample finds both first-order variables 
strongly significant while the late subsample finds neither significant at all. 
The most interesting aspect of the British findings was that the DD-ED interaction effect 
modeled in their unrestricted regression’s constant term was not significant while it was strongly 
significant in both the US study and in two of the three outputs of the current study. More 
generally, with respect to Table 5-16, the current study and its three predecessors produce only 
three results in common agreement. The first two are a significant DI-EI interaction effect and a 
significant interaction F-statistic (on the full sample). The third is a little more intriguing — a 
significant DNC-EI interaction effect (again apparent in the current study’s full sample) in 
conjunction with an absence of any significant DD-EI effect. In all studies the DNC-EI 
coefficient was positive, indicating the superior impact of a rise in announced earnings over a 
stasis in notified dividends, while news of a lowering of the dividend quite evidently cancelled 
this impact out in the DD-EI case. Nevertheless all studies still reported positive DD-EI 
coefficients. 
One further item is of interest with respect to the results tabled from Table 5-12 to Table 5-15 in 
this subsection. This is the behaviour of the adjusted R2 statistics. These are summarized in Table 
5-17. With respect to the full sample, the rise in the adjusted R2 is monotonic as the regressions 
become more all-encompassing. This trend is also evident with respect to the early subsample 
with one lapse from monotonicity; but the late subsample adjusted R2 statistics peak in the 
second-to-last row where dummies are provided (as reported in Table 5-14) for the direction of 
dividend changes only. 
Table 5-17: Summary of Adjusted R² statistics. 
Regression Procedure Full 
Sample 
Early 
subsample 
Late 
subsample 
∆EPS only 0.0091 0.0557 0.0005 
∆DPS only 0.0544 0.0917 0.0322 
∆DPS & ∆EPS 0.0550 0.1172 0.0301 
∆DPS & ∆EPS & One Earnings Dummy 0.0661 0.1255 0.0335 
∆DPS & ∆EPS & Two Dividend Dummies 0.0693 0.1228 0.0440 
∆DPS & ∆EPS & Five Dummies 0.0703 0.1267 0.0385 
 
The bottom row can be directly compared with that of Table 5-16 which has the adjusted R2 
figures for Kane et al, Easton, and Lonie et al. It shows that the New Zealand results have 
roughly the same explanatory power as the British and Australian R2s. Quite frankly they are all 
tiny. It would seem that none of the study RLS regressions can conclusively demonstrate a close 
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linkage between event window CARs and the first-order and dummy variables employed in 
terms of variance or, as measured by their coefficients, in terms of magnitudes. 
In summary, the record for the event window three-day cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR3Day) is as follows: The variable, percentage change in earnings per share ( EPS∆ ) is 
significant on the full sample and early subsample when employed alone as the independent 
variable in a simple regression and retains this significance in all of the restricted least squares 
regression procedures on the early subsample (all observations form the start of the decade 
through to May 8th “1996). By contrast, it is never significant with respect to reported 
estimations on the late subsample (all observations from May 13th 1996 to the end of the 
decade). 
The variable, percentage change in dividend per share ( DPS∆ ) is significant in all of the 
regression procedures recorded in this subsection with respect to the early subsample, but lapses 
into insignificance with respect to the five-dummy RLS regression on late subsample. With 
respect to the five-dummy procedures, the good news dummy variable (DI-EI) consistently 
furnished statistically significant relationships with the event window variable cumulative 
abnormal return variable, CAR3Day on both time-related subsamples — but this was not 
corroborated by the interaction F-statistic furnished in either the early or the late subsample. This 
also means that the strongly significant DD-ED effect in the early subsample’s unrestricted 
equation was also disqualified. 
However, with respect to the full sample, both first-order and interaction effects are found to be 
valid. In this set of results, EPS∆  remains insignificant, while DPS∆  is strongly significant, as 
are both the good-news and bad-news interaction effects. The fly in the ointment with respect to 
these results is that the EPS variable used in the creation of the EPS∆  variable changes its 
nature as of May 8th 1996, midway through the decade — thus rendering the result potentially 
dubious. However, in section 5.5, a test in the nature of a Chow test shows that the configuration 
of EPS did not unduly influence these results. 
5.5 An Experiment concerning the Role of EPS 
Throughout this chapter three sets of regression results have been reported and in these the early 
subsample results (based on a simple EPS formulation) differ substantially from the late 
subsample results (based on EPS information that was disclosed from May 13th 1996 onward). 
We might wonder why these results should be so dissimilar. Further we might wonder why the 
late subsample provides much less evidence of any significant association with the abnormal 
returns of the event window — especially given the fact that investors no longer needed to 
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generate their own EPS information. Could it possibly be that investors do not actually use the 
provided EPS information, but base their perception of company profitability on something else? 
In this section I do two things. First I perform an RLS regression procedure which performs the 
same function as a Chow test.156 Second, I re-estimate the RLS regression with five dummies on 
a data set which has had the EPS component recalculated for all observations of EPS∆  such that 
it is based on net profit after tax and before extraordinaries divided by the number of ordinary 
shares outstanding on day t-2.157 This means that a consistent formulation of EPS is being 
employed across both time-based subsamples. 
The equivalent to the Chow test is reported in Table 5-18. 
The absence of a significant interaction F-statistic indicates that the change in configuration of 
the EPS variable does not make an appreciable difference to the results. The procedure was 
estimated for both a three-day event window and a single day event window. In addition, since 
distinctions between mid-year and year-end announcements are examined in Appendix G, the 
test has been performed on these subsamples as well. But the interaction F-statistic remained 
insignificant. 
The results pertaining to re-estimated EPS inputs are reported in Table 5-19. (These are to be 
compared with those reported in Table 5-15 on page 142.) The first noteworthy item is that 
EPS∆  has become significant at the one percent level of error in the late subsample along with 
retaining its significance in the early subsample. (The full sample being a combination of the 
two, naturally furnishes a strongly significant EPS∆  also.) However, DPS∆  remains significant 
only in the early subsample and full sample cases. Nevertheless, all three cases furnish strongly 
significant corroborative first-order F-statistics. 
                                                 
156 The RLS procedure is recommended as superior to the Chow test by Gujurati, p. 265 at the end of his description 
of the Chow test. 
157 This formulation was not used in the rest of the study, as EPS data was calculated very early when information 
on daily shares outstanding was not available, and IRG annual summary data had to be used instead. However, the 
new results on the early data subsample should be very little different from the previously obtained results. 
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Table 5-18: RLS for Change in Way Announcements were made in the Early Part of the Decade 
compared with the Late. 
Regressand
All Obs. Mid Year
End of 
Year All Obs. Mid Year
End of 
Year
Coefficient (p-Values)
Intercept -0.006037 -0.013311 -0.000238 -0.002085 -0.00772 0.0026648
(0.0612) (0.0016) (0.9600) (0.4075) (0.0133) (0.4876)
∆EPS 0.0025813 0.0016459 0.0084169 0.0017367 0.00126 0.0047515
(0.0026) (0.0491) (0.0004) (0.0094) (0.0424) (0.0139)
Late dummy 0.0083063 0.0034736 0.012023 0.0015734 -0.001317 0.0034807
(0.0711) (0.5722) (0.0695) (0.6613) (0.7729) (0.5155)
N 865 397 468 865 397 468
Adj R2UNRESTRICTED 0.0117 0.0056 0.0270 0.0057 0.0056 0.0092
Adj R2EQUATION (ii) 0.0091 0.0073 0.0222 0.0066 0.0079 0.0104
Adj R2EQUATION (iii) 0.0023 -0.0017 0.0029 -0.0010 -0.0023 -0.0017
FUNRESTRRICTED 6.0943 2.1098 7.4805 3.4641 2.1137 3.1591
(0.0024) (0.1226) (0.0006) (0.0317) (0.1222) (0.0434)
FEQUATION (ii) 8.8993 3.9068 11.592 6.74E+00 4.15E+00 5.90E+00
(0.0029) (0.0488) (0.0007) (0.0096) (0.0422) (0.0155)
FEQUATION (iii) 3.0209 0.32223 2.3572 0.14764 0.080158 0.2129
(0.0826) (0.5706) (0.1254) (0.7009) (0.7772) (0.6447)
FFIRST ORDER 9.1355 3.8901 12.5521 6.7854 4.1478 6.1062
(0.0026) (0.0493) (0.0004) (0.0093) (0.0424) (0.0138)
FINTERACTION 3.2642 0.2951 3.3105 0.1795 0.0829 0.4211
(0.0712) (0.5873) (0.0695) (0.6719) (0.7736) (0.5167)
Observations, Adj R2 Statistics, F-Statistics, (p-Values)
CAR3Day ARt0
 
 
But, as before it is only the early subsample and not the late subsample which reports significant 
dividend-and-earnings interaction effects. However, with the improvement in the timeliness of 
share outstanding information used in computing the simple EPS, both the early subsample and 
the full sample now report significant interaction F-statistics. But the late subsample’s 
interaction F-statistic (p = 0.0689) quite narrowly misses out on being significant at the five 
percent level of error. The early and late subsamples now have a strong DI-EI effect in common 
while only the early subsample also finds a strong DD-ED effect with the appropriate negative 
sign. 
This revamped result quite strongly suggests that investors do react to earnings information, but 
not necessarily in terms of the EPS information actually provided in the announcement 
disclosures. Perhaps instead they may use some more general measure of profitability. But in 
addition the result hints at a time-based change in how investors react to the dividend component 
in New Zealand mid-year and year-end announcements. There appears to be a falling off of 
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reactivity to the putative dividend signal in these announcements in the second half of the 
decade. 
Table 5-19: RLS for CAR3Day with Alternative Formulation of EPS. 
Regressand
All Obs. Early
(to 8/5/96)
Late
(from 9/5/96)
Coefficients of Unrestricted Regression (p-Values)
DD-ED (INTERCEPT) -0.0188 -0.0277 -0.0107
(0.0006) (0.0029) (0.1116)
∆EPS 0.0013 0.0012 0.0015
(0.0000) (0.0057) (0.0006)
∆DPS 0.0126 0.0242 0.0070
(0.0056) (0.0045) (0.1825)
DI_EI 0.0321 0.0360 0.0260
(0.0001) (0.0079) (0.0125)
DD-EI 0.0090 0.0380 -0.0190
(0.4383) (0.0248) (0.2366)
DI-ED 0.0237 0.0261 0.0229
(0.0251) (0.0923) (0.1245)
DNC-EI 0.0175 0.0208 0.0169
(0.0249) (0.0824) (0.1058)
DNC-ED 0.0089 0.0047 0.0117
(0.2145) (0.6859) (0.1929)
N 865 441 424
Adj R2UNRESTRICTED 0.0883 0.1274 0.0651
Adj R2EQUATION (ii) 0.0743 0.1081 0.0532
Adj R2EQUATION (iii) 0.0629 0.0987 0.0384
FUNRESTRRICTED 12.9560 10.1760 5.2055
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
FEQUATION (ii) 35.6560 27.6510 12.8950
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
FEQUATION (iii) 12.6060 10.6380 4.3786
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0007)
FFIRST ORDER 12.9553 8.1393 6.9641
(0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0011)
FINTERACTION 3.6574 2.9386 2.0642
(0.0028) (0.0127) (0.0689)
Observations, Adj R2 Statistics, F-Statistics, (p-Values)
CAR3Day
 
 
Further, the result tabled in this section lends some support to the accuracy of the full sample 
results reported throughout the chapter. While they are based on a schizophrenic EPS 
formulation (i.e. pre- and post May 13th 1996), they agree with the Table 5-19 full sample result 
based on a consistent recalculated EPS for all observations. 
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Table 5-20: RLS for ARt0 with Alternative Formulation of EPS. 
Regressand
All Obs. Early
(to 8/5/96)
Late
(from 9/5/96)
Coefficients of Unrestricted Regression (p-Values)
DD-ED (INTERCEPT) -0.0124 -0.0068 -0.0141
(0.0040) (0.3003) (0.0152)
∆EPS 0.0011 0.0010 0.0012
(0.0000) (0.0009) (0.0010)
∆DPS 0.0112 0.0239 0.0053
(0.0017) (0.0001) (0.2400)
DI_EI 0.0204 0.0097 0.0238
(0.0014) (0.3140) (0.0083)
DD-EI 0.0061 0.0168 -0.0068
(0.5056) (0.1638) (0.6220)
DI-ED 0.0114 -0.0002 0.0196
(0.1665) (0.9866) (0.1303)
DNC-EI 0.0117 0.0020 0.0190
(0.0554) (0.8158) (0.0356)
DNC-ED 0.0069 -0.0055 0.0144
(0.2203) (0.5048) (0.0640)
N 865 441 424
Adj R2UNRESTRICTED 0.0813 0.1180 0.0594
Adj R2EQUATION (ii) 0.0743 0.1137 0.0490
Adj R2EQUATION (iii) 0.0499 0.0659 0.0356
FUNRESTRRICTED 11.9210 9.4071 4.8168
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
FEQUATION (ii) 35.6870 29.2290 11.9080
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
FEQUATION (iii) 10.0740 7.2065 4.1246
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0011)
FFIRST ORDER 15.6790 13.8542 6.2871
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0020)
FINTERACTION 2.3081 1.4221 1.9334
(0.0426) (0.2150) (0.0877)
Observations, Adj R2 Statistics, F-Statistics, (p-Values)
ARt0
 
 
I would now like to narrow the event window to one day and report how the experiment worked 
in that context. Table 5-20 is the one-day event window equivalent of Table 5-19. Its salient 
feature is that the first-order F-statistics are strongly significant for all three time-based cases, 
while the interaction F-statistic for the early subset lapses into insignificance — although the late 
subsample has an interaction F-statistic p-value which falls not far short of significance at the 
five percent level of error. However, given that the compilation of EPS information is consistent 
across both subsamples, the significant interaction F-statistic for the full sample can be accepted 
at face value. The two interaction effects that attain significance are the DD-ED and DI-EI 
interaction effects as posited by Kane, Lee and Marcus (1984), Easton (1991) and Lonie, 
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Abeyratna, Power and Sinclair (1996). This does appear to support the contention that a dividend 
signal is being acted upon by investors. 
5.5.1 The Shift to a 948-event Data Set 
The RLS regressions performed so far in this chapter were performed in a format that would be 
directly comparable to those of Lonie, Abeyratna, Power and Sinclair (1996). This entailed the 
configuration of the percentage change in dividend variable from the equivalent dividend 
announced the previous year. The formula employed for calculating percentage change in 
dividend was158: 
 1
1
t t
t
DPS DPSDPS
DPS
−
−
−∆ =  (5.5) 
There were several disadvantages in this measure. As a percentage measure it related only to 
dividends and nothing else, which made it somewhat esoteric relative to what investors might 
take into account when framing an investment decision. For instance it does not take into 
account the existing value of the underlying share. Consider, for instance, a one-cent increase 
from last year’s ten-cent dividend. This is a 10 percent increase. Now, let the current price of the 
underlying share be either $1 or $10. If it is $10, the “10 percent” increase afforded by one-cent 
change in dividend looks much less of a bonanza than if the share were currently to have been 
trading at $1. 
In addition, a dividend initiation or resumption following a year or more of no dividends at all 
could not be included in the sample unless it was assigned an arbitrary value — such as 1,000% 
increase.159 This was because if the announced dividend from the previous year (DPSt-1) was 
zero, then ∆DPS was undefined. Any chosen arbitrary value, if set high enough to be greater 
than actual recorded percentage changes in dividend would be so high that it would distort the 
regression results in the manner of an over-emphasised outlier. Any lesser assigned value would 
be indefensible on the ground that it was surpassed by mere changes as distinct from initiations. 
The solution chosen for this conundrum was the dropping of dividend initiations and 
resumptions from the sample, thereby reducing the dataset from 948 to 865 event-observations. 
                                                 
158 The t-subscripts in this formula relate to years. A change in midyear dividend was measured from this year’s and 
last year’s midyear figures; and a change in year-end dividend was produced from year-end figures. 
159 Given that most dividends in New Zealand in the 1990s were between 5 and 15 cents in magnitude, and increase 
of 10 cents from the former to the latter is a 300% increase. An increase of 13 cents from 2 cents to 15 cents is a 
750% increase. 
153 
An alternative configuration which gets around both the implausible framing disadvantage and 
the arbitrary value assignment disadvantage is: 
 
1
THIS YEAR LAST YEAR
t
DPS DPS
DPS
P
−
−
∆ =  (5.6) 
Here the denominator is the adjusted closing price on the day before the joint dividend and 
earnings announcement. If last year’s dividend is an investor’s expectation of this year’s 
dividend, the formulation can be easily interpreted as the unexpected change in dividend yield 
based on the most recent available price. And, given that Pt-1 is never zero, the formulation never 
produces undefined results. Hence the original dataset of 948 observations can be employed in 
the RLS procedure. Further, the new configuration is intuitively attractive because it computes a 
dividend change from the elements which are most immediately available for such a computation 
— and therefore likely to be used as a heuristic.  
When all 948 observations are used, the pattern of significant first-order variables and significant 
interaction dummies is consistent with the results reported on the 865-observation dataset in 
Table 5-15 on page 142 with the small exception that in the equation restricted to first-order 
variables only, EPS∆  becomes significant at the 5% level where before it was insignificant. This 
has the effect of making the first-order F-stat significant at the 1% level of a Type 1 error. This is 
reported in the first column of Table 5-24 on page 157 in the next section. The table is placed 
there because it specifically addresses the phenomenon of thin trading, which is now about to be 
discussed. 
5.6 Effect of thin Trading on Market Model Calculations and RLS 
Output 
5.6.1 Preliminary Comments 
The earlier studies, Kane, Lee and Marcus (1984), Easton (1991) and Lonie et al (1996) did not 
consider the effects of thinly-traded markets.  Therefore an immediate question one might ask is 
whether adjusting for thin trading might change our ability to detect a dividend signal.  In 
addition, there is a methodological question.  The methodology of Market Model estimation and 
the associated RLS regression rely on the assumption that the data is normally distributed.  
Furthermore, they require that the regression errors follow a normal distribution. 
Hence at this point, an initial focus of interest becomes whether or not any immediate connection 
can be drawn between the incidence of thin trading and the incidence of non-normality. A 
154 
second question is, what effect was discernible on dividend signalling when an RLS regression 
was applied to observations partitioned on the basis of trading thinness?  I consider the incidence 
of non-normality first in Subsections 5.6.2 and 5.6.3.  The effect of partitioning is then 
considered in Subsections 5.6.4 and 5.6.5.  Subsection 5.6.6 then considers the incidence and 
effect of inclusion in the study of announcement events where the company’s shares failed to 
trade at all in the event window. 
5.6.2 Cross-sectional Characteristics of ARs estimated on the Test Period 
In the second calculation of Market Model methodology, the expected return computed on each 
stock’s 100-day estimation period is subtracted from the actual log returns collected for each 
stock on each day of the 21-day test period to furnish a daily abnormal return (AR). Since there 
were 948 event observations, we now have 948 sets of test period ARs. 
But can we trust the ARs? Are they biased, given that the population of betas generated by the 
Market Model appear to be biased? Brown and Warner (1985) tested the properties of the Market 
Model with respect to 250 portfolios (each containing 50 randomly selected shares) from the 
CRSP database with an 11-day test period containing an artificial event window AR. Their 
dataset allowed for the inclusion of shares that had as few as 30 actual returns available in the 
preceding 239-day estimation period. Brown and Warner argued that the resulting set of ARs 
should not be biased as, by construction, the respective biases of the collected alphas and betas 
would cancel each other out in the expected returns calculation.160 
Table 5-21: Normality Tests on RLS Regression Dependent Variables CAR3Day and ARt0. 
 Jarque-Bera Test 
  H p-Value STAT CV5% 
CAR3Day 1 0 3259.7 5.9915 
 ARt0 1 0 11990 5.9915 
Lilliefors Test 
CAR3Day 1 NaN 0.1101 0.028776 
ARt0 1 NaN 0.1562 0.028776 
Kurtosis and Skewness 
 Kurtosis Skewness 
CAR3Day 12.065 -0.45149 
ARt0 20.329 -1.0885 
 
Normality tests on the day zero abnormal return, ARt0, and the three-day CAR, CAR3Day are 
presented in Table 5-21. It is clear that the biases of the alphas and betas did not cancel each 
                                                 
160 Brown and Warner (1985), p. 16. 
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other out. In addition, the test values furnished by CAR3Day are more extreme than are ARt0 test 
values, implying they diverge even further from normality. 
5.6.3 Characteristics of the Residuals from the RLS Regression on Event 
Window Data 
The RLS procedure entailed the three linked regressions, as used earlier in this chapter. Table 
5-22 shows that the distributions of the RLS residuals in all three estimations, with respect to a 
three-day event window and the model including the full five dummies, are far from normal. 
Table 5-22: Normality Tests on Residuals of RLS Regression (Regressand = CAR3Day). 
Jarque-Bera Unrestricted EQN (ii) EQN (iii) 
Non Normality (H) 1 1 1 
p-value 0 0 0 
CV5% 5.9915 5.9915 5.9915 
Test Stat 3215.8 3191.3 3293.5 
        
Lilliefors Unrestricted EQN (ii) EQN (iii) 
Non Normality (H) 1 1 1 
p-value NaN NaN NaN 
CV5% 0.028776 0.028776 0.028776 
Test Stat 0.090978 0.10514 0.095607 
        
  Unrestricted EQN (ii) EQN (iii) 
Kurtosis 11.9880 11.9360 12.1240 
Skewness -0.5205 -0.5904 -0.3860 
        
5.6.4 The Effect of Partitioning the Data Sets into Bands or Portfolios  
When the 100-day estimation sets were separated into bands by the number of days on which 
trading actually occurred, there was some change in the incidence of non-normality on the 
residuals — with respect to the Jarque-Bera and Lilliefors results. Table 5-23 shows that where 
estimation sets contained at least 80 days of actual trading, the incidence of normally distributed 
residuals did actually rise; but this rise certainly did not swamp out the preponderance of the 
non-normal ones. However, as the number of actual trading days approached the full 100, non-
normality did indeed trend downward. This is visible towards the bottom of the table where the 
top 20% band was split into two narrower bands, and then the 100% group recorded in isolation. 
The other noteworthy feature in Table 5-23 is that, as more and more of the 100 available days 
become days of actual trading, the mean kurtosis monotonically reduces from 38.88 to a 
minimum (for 100-day traders) of 5.56. While this is still far from the kurtosis value for a normal 
distribution, it is a big drop. There is no similar trend in the skewness figures. There are 16,924 
zero-value returns out of the 94,800 returns in the estimation sets, and these amount to 17.85% of 
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the total. This figure will decrease only slightly if estimation sets containing less than 40 days of 
actual trading are removed from the study. 
Table 5-23: Normality Tests on 100-Day Estimation Set Residuals sorted into Twenty-day Bands. 
Days Traded Normality Tests   
Band Count Jarque-Bera Lilliefors Kurtosis Skewness 
0-19 21  100% (21)  100% (21) 38.88 -1.0360 
20-39 61  100% (61)  100% (61) 20.57 0.2922 
40-59 80  100% (80)  100% (80) 14.32 -0.0975 
60-79 130  98% (127)  99% (129) 8.84 0.4129 
80-100 656  69% (452)  75% (494) 6.13 0.2423 
80-89 117  83% (97)  94% (110) 7.56 0.2218 
90-100 539  66% (355)  71% (384) 5.82 0.2467 
100 211  58% (122)  53% (111) 5.56 0.2644 
All 948  78% (741)  83% (785) 8.847026 0.2119138 
            
 
5.6.5 RLS Results and the characteristics of their Residuals 
Table 5-24 contains the RLS regression results for 948 sets of RLS regressions using CAR3Day 
as the dependent variable and with the two first-order variables reconfigured to measure the 
dollar change as a percentage of the most recent closing price (day t-1). None of the lower four 
bands return any significant evidence of an investor reaction to a dividend signal, or for that 
matter, any earnings signal either. However, the 648 observations in the top band utilising 
Market Model estimation sets where there were at least 81 days of actual trading did furnish 
evidence supporting a strongly significant interaction effect. Both the good-news and the bad-
news combinations were significant at the one percent level, and only one mixed-news 
combination (DI-ED) registered as significant at the five percent level of error. Given that DI-ED 
furnished a positive coefficient, this evidence indicates that a discrete dividend signal might be 
present here for this particular subset of observations. The first-order variables themselves 
remained insignificant — which does not damage the finding that reaction to a dividend signal 
has been detected on the subset. The final column in Table 5-24 contains results for the entire 
dataset left unpartitioned, which (as before) leave the presence of a discernible dividend signal 
open to question because of the fog-creating significance of mixed-message coefficients. These 
results, so far, suggest that very thin trading does not pick up spurious instances of a response in 
log returns to a dividend or earnings signal. 
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Table 5-24: RLS Results on Thin Trading Subsamples partitioned by 20-day Bands 
Regressand
Band
All Obs. 
To 20 Days 21 to 40 41 to 60 61 to 80
81 Days 
Upward
DD-ED (INTERCEPT) -0.0168 -0.0011 -0.0366 0.0003 -0.0192 -0.0211
(0.0032) (0.9808) (0.2086) (0.9881) (0.2495) (0.0020)
∆EPS 0.0003 -0.0036 0.0007 0.0052 0.0010 -0.0003
(0.4318) (0.6096) (0.8533) (0.0236) (0.1117) (0.4858)
∆DPS 0.0021 0.0041 0.0017 0.0017 -0.0007 0.0014
(0.0002) (0.0348) (0.3234) (0.4172) (0.7627) (0.1702)
DI-EI 0.0334 0.0207 0.0590 0.0419 0.0421 0.0349
(0.0000) (0.7436) (0.1794) (0.2283) (0.0612) (0.0001)
DD-EI 0.0118 [No Data] 0.1230 0.0205 -0.0017 0.0086
(0.3284) (0.2533) (0.6635) (0.9571) (0.5129)
DI-ED 0.0222 0.0051 0.0257 0.0103 0.0308 0.0271
(0.0201) (0.9463) (0.6687) (0.8010) (0.2522) (0.0146)
DNC-EI 0.0173 0.0299 0.0438 0.0132 0.0201 0.0167
(0.0310) (0.5850) (0.4252) (0.6616) (0.4092) (0.0701)
DNC-ED 0.0068 -0.0376 0.0338 0.0208 0.0247 0.0046
(0.3504) (0.5175) (0.4170) (0.5239) (0.2284) (0.5812)
N 948 25 60 77 138 648
Adj R2UNRESTRICTED 0.0874 0.4139 0.1245 0.1847 0.0924 0.0711
Adj R2EQUATION (ii) 0.0624 0.3494 0.0798 0.1633 0.0630 0.0353
Adj R2EQUATION (iii) 0.0721 0.2304 0.1077 0.1126 0.0741 0.0682
FUNRESTRRICTED 12.859 2.1186 1.0562 2.2336 1.8915 7.0028
(0.0000) (0.1015) (0.4047) (0.0416) (0.0759) (0.0000)
FEQUATION (ii) 31.4410 5.9068 2.4717 7.2212 4.5347 11.8040
(0.0000) (0.0088) (0.0934) (0.0014) (0.0124) (0.0000)
FEQUATION (iii) 14.6350 1.4970 1.3037 1.8020 2.1143 9.3919
(0.0000) (0.2408) (0.2762) (0.1235) (0.0676) (0.0000)
FFIRST ORDER 7.8772 2.6613 0.4979 3.0516 1.3100 1.0162
(0.0004) (0.0987) (0.6107) (0.0537) (0.2734) (0.3626)
FINTERACTION 5.1490 0.3742 0.5307 0.3627 0.8444 4.9334
(0.0001) (0.8594) (0.7520) (0.8723) (0.5207) (0.0002)
CAR3Day
Observations, Adj R2 Statistics, F-Statistics, (p-Values)
Coefficients of Unrestricted Regression (p-Values)
 
5.6.5.1 Results by Quartile 
In Table 5-25, the same datasets are repartitioned (as near as possible) into quartiles. It is of 
interest to see exactly how the quartiles fall in terms of days traded. The thinnest trader in the 
lower-mid quartile traded on 73 out 100 days, while the thinnest trader in the upper-mid quartile 
traded on 93 days out of 100 — or put the other way, failed to trade on only seven days. The top 
quartile consisted of only fully-traded stocks. This time around, none of the subsamples return 
significant results — not even the 211 observations furnished from fully-traded Market Model 
estimation sets. 
The results imply that the mere absence of trading during the Market Model estimation phase is 
not sufficient to explain untrustworthy results. It is to be noted that even the most heavily-traded 
companies in the study tended to furnish distributions of log returns that were not normally 
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distributed, and residuals that were likewise from some other distribution. (The incidence of non-
normality by the Jarque-Bera test in Table 5-23 was 58% of these 211 firm/events.) 
Table 5-25: RLS Results on Thin Trading Subsamples partitioned by (Rough) Quartiles. 
Regressand
Quartile All Obs. To 72 Days
73 to 92 
Days
93 to 99 
Days 100 Days
DD-ED (INTERCEPT) -0.0168 -0.0206 -0.0110 -0.0234 -0.0195
(0.0032) (0.1061) (0.3991) (0.0427) (0.0259)
∆EPS 0.0003 0.0007 0.0004 0.0000 0.0007
(0.4318) (0.4791) (0.4930) (0.9432) (0.4240)
∆DPS 0.0021 0.0019 0.0027 0.0010 -0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0255) (0.2212) (0.5089) (0.8455)
DI-EI 0.0334 0.0549 0.0340 0.0352 0.0169
(0.0000) (0.0035) (0.0480) (0.0187) (0.1536)
DD-EI 0.0118 0.0464 0.0071 0.0294 -0.0214
(0.3284) (0.1654) (0.7473) (0.2683) (0.1868)
DI-ED 0.0222 0.0221 0.0439 0.0146 0.0257
(0.0201) (0.3352) (0.0334) (0.4224) (0.0909)
DNC-EI 0.0173 0.0329 0.0214 0.0112 0.0141
(0.0310) (0.0724) (0.2573) (0.4753) (0.2153)
DNC-ED 0.0068 0.0189 0.0009 0.0009 0.0148
(0.3504) (0.2642) (0.9542) (0.9487) (0.1645)
N 948 241 236 260 211
Adj R2UNRESTRICTED 0.0874 0.1361 0.1158 0.0657 0.0533
Adj R2EQUATION (ii) 0.0624 0.0987 0.0764 0.0249 0.0180
Adj R2EQUATION (iii) 0.0721 0.1153 0.1047 0.0641 0.0503
FUNRESTRRICTED 12.859 5.2427 4.2669 2.5314 1.6328
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0156) (0.1279)
FEQUATION (ii) 31.4410 13.0310 9.6373 3.2754 1.9014
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0394) (0.1520)
FEQUATION (iii) 14.6350 6.1279 5.3767 3.4770 2.1719
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0047) (0.0586)
FFIRST ORDER 7.8772 2.7916 1.4419 0.2260 0.3214
(0.0004) (0.0634) (0.2386) (0.7978) (0.7255)
FINTERACTION 5.1490 2.0153 2.0335 2.2033 1.5156
(0.0001) (0.0773) (0.0749) (0.0545) (0.1864)
Observations, Adj R2 Statistics, F-Statistics, (p-Values)
Coefficients of Unrestricted Regression (p-Values)
CAR3Day
 
5.6.6 Trading on the Day of the “Event” 
Of the 948 event observations, 847 of them recorded trades on t0, the day of the joint dividend 
and earnings announcement. A failure to trade on day t0 should produce no evidence at all of a 
dividend signal with respect to that particular firm’s dividend and earnings announcement.  
However, the Market Model methodology used so far in the study would create a spurious and 
potentially large AR that, in the RLS regression step, would be quite likely to furnish evidence of 
a signalling effect. The simple problem with this is that the evidence is entirely spurious. 
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There were 101 instances in which no trade occurred on Day t0 and these amount to 10.65% of 
the entire sample. Interestingly, nine of these related to announcements of dividend initiations or 
resumptions. When the event window was re-expanded to include a day either side of t0, 
measured by CAR3Day, 910 of the original 948 event observations furnished related trades; and 
the 38 non-traders amounted to 4.01% of the sample. But there were still four dividend initiating 
or resuming firms whose shares even now did not trade in the event window.161 Obviously there 
was no dividend signal taken up by investors in those instances. 
5.7 Chapter Summary 
The chapter started with a perusal of the mean abnormal returns generated on a data set of 948 
company observations which included 83 instances of dividend initiations and resumptions. The 
initial analytical tool was the t-test. It was found that the set, as a whole did not furnish 
significant ARs, but dividend increases and decreases (ignoring changes in earnings) did produce 
ARs that were significant with less than a one percent likelihood of a Type 1 error. The set of all 
announcements containing news of no change in an existing level of dividend did not produce a 
statistically significant mean AR. When the data set was reassembled into observations 
containing an earnings increase (ignoring changes in dividend) and then an earnings decrease, 
the mean ARs were again significant at the one percent level of error. The signs of all means 
were positive for increases, and negative for decreases. 
With respect to three-day CARs spanning days t-1, t0 and t1, the DI-EI set, containing increases 
only, furnished a strongly significant positive mean, while the DD-ED set, with dividend 
omissions retained in it, furnished a strongly significant negative mean AR. Three of the 
remaining four dividend-and-earnings groupings did not produce significant ARs (DD-EI, DI-
ED and DNC-EI), but the final one, DNC-ED furnished a negative mean AR significant with less 
than a five percent level of error. This pattern was repeated, with one exception, when the ARs 
were coalesced into three-day CARs. The exception was that the DNC-ED mean CAR was more 
strongly significant at less than a one percent level of error. It would seem that the reduction in 
earnings was the influential factor here. 
At this point, the data set was reduced to 865 to avoid an arbitrary value assignment problem 
associated with dividend initiations and resumptions, and to make the ensuing results comparable 
to those of Lonie et al in the United Kingdom.  Then simple ordinary least squares regression 
and restricted least squares regressions procedures were employed in the data analysis. The 
                                                 
161 In an extreme instance, the Radio Otago announcement of November 1991 had no history of associated trading 
over almost a nine-week period. The last prior trade was on day t-42, and the next was on day t1. 
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variable percentage change in EPS ( EPS∆ ) was found to be significant when used as the sole 
independent variable in the full sample (covering the full 1990s decade) and in the early 
subsample of observations (covering from 1990 through till May 8th 1996). However this 
significance lapsed in the late subsample of observations from May 13th 1996 to the end of the 
decade. EPS∆  retained its significant status when DPS∆  was added as an independent variable 
only in the early subsample. With respect to the early subsample only, EPS∆  continued to be 
significant in the unrestricted estimations when dummy variables were introduced to model the 
direction of change in earnings leaving direction of dividend change unmodeled, and the 
direction of change in dividend leaving direction of earnings change unmodeled. EPS∆  also 
remained significant with respect to the early subsample only, when the full five-dummy RLS 
regression procedure was employed. However, with respect to the late subsample, EPS∆  never 
achieves significance. In terms of the full sample, EPS∆  remains insignificant whenever DPS∆  
is included in the same estimation. 
I now turn to the first-order variable, DPS∆ . With respect to the early subsample and also the 
full sample, DPS∆  remained significant in every procedure, and in every instance for these two 
sets of observations, the first-order F-statistics were also significant. Therefore the joint impact 
of the two announcement components can be said to have a significant impact on the event 
window CAR variable. But this hold true only in terms of the full decade estimations and the 
early subsample estimations. Significance eludes it with respect to all but one of the late 
subsample estimations. Further, the first-order F-statistic remains insignificant in the full five-
dummy RLS procedure for this subsample. Clearly, on the published data for the latter part of 
the decade there is no joint influence effect from announcements discernible in the behaviour of 
first-order coefficients on this dataset. 
When a dummy variable was employed to represent all announcements containing an earnings 
increase and increases (ignoring change in dividends) with respect to the full sample, earnings 
decreases were found to be strongly significant in the full decade sample and in the early 
subsample but earnings remained insignificant in the late subsample. 
With respect to the use of two dummy variables to represent direction of dividend change 
(ignoring earnings change), rising dividends and falling dividends furnished coefficients that 
were appropriately positive and negative. In the full sample the DI and DD interactions were 
significant and were validated by a significant interaction F-statistic. In the early subsample, DI 
lapsed into insignificance and so did the interaction F-statistic. In the late subsample, however, 
the DI effect was significant and the DD and dividend no-change category (DNC) remained 
insignificant, the DI interaction was validated by a significant F-statistic. 
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This schizophrenic behaviour remained apparent when the full restricted least squares procedure 
with five dummy variables representing the six dividend-and-earnings change permutations was 
employed. The full sample furnished strong support for the existence of a dividend signal that 
investors reacted to. In the full sample, the first-order variable, ∆DPS was strongly significant 
along with the coefficients for the DI-EI, DD-ED interactions. All of these were significant with 
less than a one percent level of error. However, two further interaction effects were significant 
(DI-ED and DNC-EI) at the five percent level of error. It was of interest that the DNC-EI 
category became significant, because it furnished no significant results in the t-testing phase 
covered in Sections 5.2 and 5.3. Furthermore, DNC-EI announcements produced significant 
event window CARs in all of the earlier American, Australian and British studies discussed in 
Section 5.4. Generally speaking, the results of all of the joint earnings and dividend signalling 
studies mentioned in Section 5.4 were broadly in agreement with the full sample result. All 
supported the contention that there is a joint dividend-and-earnings signal which systematically 
varies the message that investors apparently receive from it in accordance with the nature of the 
dividend-change and earnings-change mix. 
But the entire story changed when focus shifted from the full sample to the late subsample of 
observations dating from May 13th 1996 onward. Nothing could be deemed significant as neither 
the first-order nor the interaction F-statistic achieved significance. 
With respect to the early subsample, the main feature was that both of the first-order variables 
and the first-order F-statistic were significant, but the interaction effects were not. Hence, for the 
first half of the decade, given the configuration of the EPS variable, the dividend signal cannot 
actually be separated out from the earnings signal. 
However, when an experiment was performed on the data set in which a simple formulation of 
EPS was recalculated for all announcement observations (irrespective of whether the 
announcement actually provided an EPS figure or not), the late subsample did show more 
responsiveness in three-day CARs to the dividend and earnings content of announcement data. 
This suggested that investors might use information other than the EPS figures actually provided 
to assess the profitability of the firm. In addition, however, the experiment also showed that there 
was less responsiveness to specific elements of announcement information in the second half of 
the decade. 
In Subsection 5.6 it was shown that thin trading affects the computed results. Because there are a 
large number of zero daily company returns in the 100-day Market Model estimation period for 
many of the 948 company-events considered in this study, the observed share returns, itR  tend 
not to follow a normal distribution. This, in turn, undercuts the validity of OLS regression as the 
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proper tool for estimating expected returns. However, the question as to what to do about it in the 
context of a regression-based methodology remains an open question. The record of prior 
research suggests that a few good diagnostic tests are in place, but that OLS regression 
outperforms most, if not all, of the improvements that have been proposed over time.   
However, with respect to the thin trading phenomenon which will be one of ther most important 
themes of this thesis from this point onward, the sample will be divided into a subset containing 
company/event observations where the trading is ‘fat,’ and another subset in which the trading 
associated with the company/events is relatively thin. The thinly-traded subset is defined as 
containing all observations associated with firms whose shares failed to trade on at least one day 
in the 100-day estimation period for calculating expected returns. With respect to the fully-traded 
subset, firms’ shares traded on all 100 days. (The term ‘fully-traded’ will be used in place of 
‘fat.’) It will be observed that the fully-traded subset rarely furnishes significant results of an 
association between the independent variables ( DPS∆ , EPS∆  and the five interaction dummy 
variables) and the event-window measures of abnormal returns (CAR3Day and ARt0). 
In Chapter 6 the first of two radical solutions to the zero-return econometric problem associated 
with thin trading is tabled.  Chapter 6 is about friction models. 
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6 A Friction Model Solution to Diagnosis of Signalling in a 
Thin Market Environment 
6.1 Chapter Introduction 
In Chapter 2 Subsection 2.4, the concept of friction modelling was introduced and a background 
was provided. In this new chapter, the friction models used in the current study are developed 
and the results that have been obtained are tabled and explained.  The chapter is laid out as 
follows: 
In Section 6.2, the characteristics of the study’s daily returns and regression residuals are tabled 
to show why a friction model employing Maximum Likelihood Estimation is a methodologically 
attractive alternative to the Market Model. Section 6.3 covers the methodology in more depth 
than has been provided so far, while Section 6.4 tables results at two levels of operation. The 
first of these involves the use of a friction model to obtain expected returns which take the 
influence of zero-value returns (and therefore thin trading) into account. These expected returns 
are then employed in the generation of ARs, which are fed into the standard restricted least 
squares (RLS) regression procedure for determining the presence or non-presence of an investor 
reaction associated with a purported dividend signal in the joint dividend-and-earnings 
announcement context. This material is covered in Subsections 6.4.1 and 6.4.1.1. 
Then in Subsection 6.4.2, I move on to the second level, which concerns the use of friction 
modelling to account directly for what is observed in the event window of the event study. 
Initially a series of related models that replace regression procedures employing the first-order 
variables, DPS∆  and EPS∆  are explored. With respect to the most sophisticated of these 
friction models.. 
But so far, these models can be deemed to have only partially replaced the role of the standard 
RLS regression procedure used throughout this thesis. In Subsection 6.4.3 this issue is directly 
addressed with a friction model employing two interaction variables which have three levels 
apiece and which model the behaviour of four of the six dividend-and-earnings interaction 
effects. This is followed by the chapter’s conclusion in Section 6.4.4. 
6.2 Why a Regression-based Methodolgy should be replaced 
Because it employs OLS regression, the Market Model produces reliable results only if it is 
estimated on data that is linear in nature. In the context of 1990s New Zealand Stock Exchange 
data, it became clear that neither the input data nor the residuals associated with the final output 
follow a normal distribution. 
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6.2.1 Characteristics of Observed Daily Returns 
Expected returns have been estimated with respect to the 100 days of stock returns immediately 
preceding the 21-day test period in which the three-day event window (days t-1, t0 and t1) was 
embedded. The returns themselves were logarithmic on the ground that logarithmic returns were 
more likely to follow a normal distribution than would a simple ratio of closing price 
information. Indeed, if the Market Model is to be used with confidence, then the residuals of the 
OLS regression on the underlying estimation phase data should exhibit the properties of a normal 
distribution. 
But even where a firm’s shares were traded every day, neither the daily log returns nor the OLS-
generated residuals turned out to be normally distributed. Figure 6-1 contains the pattern of 
returns visible when all 100 observations from all 948 company/event estimation periods were 
put into a histogram with the horizontal axis is restricted to –0.1 and +0.1. It was necessary to 
truncate the vertical axis at 100. This is a very artificial view because the free-standing spike at 
zero actually goes up to a count of 41,655. 
Figure 6-1: Distribution of Log Returns with Both Axes and Zero-value Spike Truncated. 
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Effectively, the prevalence of zero-value returns drives the behaviour of the OLS regressions 
used in Market Model estimation in this study. Of interest is the absence of values that are close 
to zero — which causes the zero-return spike to rise from the bottom of a deep valley. This 
implies that the returns change in discrete steps relating to the price changes in dollars and cents 
on a share; and that there is a minimum step-size. 
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6.2.2 Characteristics of Residuals from the Market Model Estimation Sets 
In Table 6-1, the incidence of non-normality with respect to the residuals of the 948 Market 
Model estimation datasets is only slightly lower than what was found in the previous subsection 
on the distributions of log returns. Jacque Bera and Lilliefors tests for normality were employed. 
Table 6-1: Percentage (and Count) of Estimation Datasets with Non-normal Residuals 
  
Percentage (Count) 
Not Normal Residuals 
Sample Total Jarque Bera Lilliefors  Kurtosis Skewness 
DI-EI 311 77% (240) 81% (252) 8.7854 0.3253 
DD-ED 182 81% (148) 89% (162) 9.6081 0.039632 
DD-EI 38 84% (32) 82% (31) 7.8079 0.62034 
DI-ED 80 80% (64) 84% (67) 8.9246 0.12481 
DNC-EI 140 75% (105) 79% (111) 7.7693 0.20356 
DNC-ED 197 77% (152) 82% (162) 9.176 0.15461 
 
It is clear again here that non-normality is pervasive and independent of any ensuing 
announcement information. The average figures for the kurtosis and skewness of dividend and 
earnings-related subsets are included in the final two columns. 
That we are dealing with a distribution that is other than normal is made graphically clear in 
Figure 6-2. The residuals conform to a distribution resembling a witch’s hat with a very tall peak 
and a very wide brim. The horizontal axis has been trimmed to between –0.1 and +0.1, which has 
excluded a few extreme outliers; and a normal distribution curve has been superimposed. 
Figure 6-2: Histogram of 94,800 Residuals from 948 Estimations with Horizontal Axis Truncated. 
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It is clear that these residuals are not normally distributed. On the one hand, outliers are present 
which bring about the fatness of the tail of the repeatedly diagnosed leptokurtic distributions; and 
on the other, there is a huge presence of zero-value returns in the sample. 
With respect to the outliers alone, an OLS regression will accord these too much weight relative 
to their overall importance and thereby produce parameter estimates that are inefficient.162 This 
will be the case even in a well-traded market. 
What makes a friction modelling approach very attractive in the face of this evidence, is its 
employment of numerical estimation techniques with respect to maximum likelihood estimation. 
This circumvents the limitations imposed by the requirements of OLS regression. 
6.3 Friction Methodology 
The basic model used for estimating expected returns in the presence of friction is adapted from 
Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999). The observed daily return (for each company j on day t) 
is jtR . This variable may take on positive, zero or negative values, and — depending on the 
thinness of trading of the particular company share — there may be many zero values. It is 
assumed that a zero value will be associated with small values of returns on the market index. On 
average, jtR  will take on values that follow the three-part linear (zig-zag) path depicted in Figure 
6-3, which implies it will move in the same direction as changes in the market, MtR . 
Figure 6-3: Schematic Diagram of a Friction Model for Calculation of Expected Returns. 
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The line segment between Ljα  and Ujα  explicitly represents the region in which zero-value 
returns are expected — which means that this model sets out to model the effect of these 
                                                 
162 Dillen and Stolz (1999), p. 44. 
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(whether they be generated by prices that fail to shift or by the absence of trading in the share) 
and therefore impound them into the estimation of expected return parameters. 
A “true” daily return for company j, is denoted as *jtR . Unfortunately this remains unobserved; 
however it would theoretically furnish near-zero values commensurate with those small values of 
market index returns in keeping with the curve that sweeps through the origin in Figure 6-3. The 
model is set up as follows: 
 
*
* *
*
* *
if
0 if
if
jt j Mt jt
jt jt Lj jt Lj
jt Lj jt Uj
jt jt Uj jt Uj
R R
Where
R R R
R R
R R R
β ε
α α
α α
α α
= +
 = − < = ≤ ≤ = − >
 (6.1) 
However, the fact that *jtR  is unobservable and Ljα  and Ujα  are endogenous makes Equation 
(6.1) hard to work with. The specification of inputs into the model’s maximum likelihood 
estimation procedure requires some simplification of this. 
In the world at large, and in this study’s data set, it is quite possible for jtR  to be negative instead 
of positive in a rising market, or positive when the market is falling — hence we can expect a 
cloud of both positive and negative observations to be associated with increases in the 
independent variable, MtR . Hence, the assignment of observations to the upper region is not 
dependent on the sign of the unobservable *jtR  or the observed jtR , but on the requirement that 
MtR  is positive. (However the theoretical locus of *jtR  values in Figure 6-3 does ordain that *jtR  
is positive when MtR  is positive.) Likewise, whatever the sign of jtR , the lower region requires 
the matching MtR  observation to be negative. A practical implementation of the model is as 
follows163: 
                                                 
163This is developed from Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999), pp. 1120 – 1122. It will immediately be obvious 
that Equation (6.2) differs in its restrictions from those stated in their Equation (1); but Equation (6.2) has been 
altered to take into account Lesmond et al’s sentence (p.1122) in which they explain that in their likelihood function 
(Equation (2)) that “…R1 and R2 denote the regions where the measured return, jtR  is nonzero in negative and 
positive market return regions, respectively. R0 denotes the zero returns.” This interpretation was confirmed in an 
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*
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if 0 0
0 if 0
if 0 0
jt jt Lj jt Mt
jt jt
jt jt Uj jt Mt
R R R and R
R R
R R R and R
α
α
 = − ≠ < = = = − ≠ >
 (6.2) 
The final embedded assumption is that the non-zero observations of jtR  are normally distributed. 
This was found to be the case with 33.23% of the data sets in terms of a Lilliefors Test with a 
five percent error, while the returns distributions with zero-value returns included was 3.10 
percent. One advantage of assuming a normal distribution of non-zero observations is that the 
normal probability density function and the cumulative normal density function can be used in 
the maximum likelihood estimation procedure. Further, it allows for the computation of Z-values 
(from which confidence intervals can be calculated), and the testing of parameters for significant 
differences from zero can be performed and the associated p-values can be recorded. 
In keeping with Equations (6.1) and (6.2) the three-part likelihood function is shown in Equation 
(6.3): 
 ( )
0
1 3
1 1Pr no change
LOWER UPPER
t t
t R t R t Rj j
L ε εφ φσ σ σ σ∈ ∈ ∈
   =       ∏ ∏ ∏  (6.3) 
Here the symbols RLOWER, R0 and RUPPER stand for the three regions depicted in Figure 6-3 and t 
denotes an observation assigned to a given region. The lower region accounts for decreasing 
company returns (give or take the presence of some anomalous increasing observations), the zero 
region contains company returns that are zero in value, and the upper region accounts for 
increasing returns (allowing for the presence of anomalous decreasing company return 
observations). In Equation (6.3), tL εφ σ
     is the standard normal density function of the residuals 
of the negative returns in the lower region, and tU εφ σ
     the standard normal density function of 
the residuals of the positive returns in the upper region, where σ  is the standard deviation 
estimated from the sample of all observations of observed returns excluding the zero value 
observations assigned to the zero region. In accordance with Lesmond et al (1999) and Maddala 
(1983), the full likelihood function, complete with parameters to be estimated is presented in 
                                                                                                                                                             
email communication with Dr Lesmond, who also kindly made part of his thesis (pertaining to methodology) and his 
Fortran code available. 
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Equation (6.4), where ( )LΦ ⋅  and ( )UΦ ⋅  are the cumulative normal density functions of the 
standard normal distribution for lower and upper regions.164 
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 (6.4) 
In natural logarithmic terms, the likelihood function becomes: 
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 (6.5) 
The negative of this likelihood function is then minimised to produce solutions for the two 
bounds, Ljα  and Ujα , and for the two other parameters, jβ  and jσ . This minimisation process is 
achieved by a quasi-Newton non-linear numerical optimisation procedure called ‘optim’ in 
Scilab.165 The fact that the process is non-linear liberates friction model methodology from the 
linear assumption required by the Market Model. The computer code for the procedures used in 
this chapter are documented and explained in Appendix J. 
Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka (1999) was largely based on Lesmond (1995), which furnished 
two methods for computing the expected return, E(Rj) developed from Maddala (1983) — one 
for an unconditional expected return which includes the zero-return region, and the other for a 
conditional expected return, which excludes returns falling in the zero region. 
                                                 
164 A comment on the configuration of the equation is provided in Appendix J.1. 
165 The computer software which was ultimately used for estimating all friction model procedures was Scilab, which 
turned out to be far more user-friendly than Matlab for this purpose. 
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Lesmond’s unconditional expected return formulation is as follows166: 
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 (6.6) 
Equation (6.6) shows that the unconditional expected return builds in the influence of market 
(systematic) risk captured by the Market Model (and by all CAPM models), and in addition 
incorporates the influence of effective transactions costs — the estimation and nature of which 
were the primary focus of interest for Lesmond (1995) and Lesmond, Ogden and Trzcinka 
(1999). Also, the presence of σ  in the equation indicates that variance in a set of company 
returns is, in Lesmond’s words, “a priced element”.167 With respect to the formulation of 
conditional expected returns, the zero-returns argument is dropped out of Equation (6.6) and the 
specification becomes168: 
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 (6.7) 
Both formulations of expected return are useable, with respect to the current study, in the 
determination of ARs if these are to be employed as the dependent variable in a cross-sectional 
                                                 
166 Lesmond (1995), Chapter 3, Subsection 3.2.1, Equation 14. This chapter was provided electronically by the 
author. 
167 Ibid, final sentence of Subsection 3.2.2. 
168 Ibid, Chapter 3, Subsection 3.2.2, Equation 15. 
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restricted least squares regression. But only the conditional expected return is useful when an 
LDV friction model is developed in Subsection 6.4.2 (and onward) for analysis of what happens 
at the time of the dividend and earnings announcement event, employing DPS∆  and EPS∆  as 
independent variables. The methodological details of that friction model are provided in that 
later subsection along with its results. 
6.4 Friction Results 
6.4.1 Estimation of Expected Returns on the 100-day Period 
When the 948 company/event estimation period data sets were passed to the LDV friction model 
procedure, only 25 of them could not be processed on the ground of insufficient observations in 
any one region. This dropped the sample size to 923. Given that the company/event sets were 
scheduled in descending order in terms of the variable, ‘DAYSTRADED’ (the number of market 
days on which the company’s shares actually changed hands), it became clear that the 
dysfunctional sets were at the bottom end. Ten of these were the ten most poorly-traded stocks in 
the study, while the other 15 are all numbered within the poorest-traded 45. The best-transacted 
of these, event set No. 904, traded on only 28 of the 100 days, while the least, No. 948, traded on 
a total of 4 days. 
Table 6-2 summarises the characteristics of the 923 optimised sets of parameters. 
Table 6-2: Characteristics of the 923 Optimised Sets of Parameters. 
Parameter Mean Minimum Maximum Std Deviation 
Lα  -0.0304 -0.2499 -0.0012 0.0293 
Uα  0.0297 0.0007 0.2960 0.0291 
β  2.0346 0.4962 19.388 1.2279 
σ  0.0277 0.0069 0.2020 0.0185 
 
The dataset furnishing the highest beta was No. 544, which traded on 89 days, and which 
contained two large outliers — one negative and one positive. This certainly indicates that the 
LDV friction model estimates are sensitive to outliers. In the third panel of Figure 6-4, which 
contains histograms of the four parameters, it is clear that the betas are quite closely clustered 
about the mean of 2.03 with some skewing to the right. It is interesting that this mean is double 
the standard CAPM mean of 1.0 and much larger than the Market Model mean beta of 0.472 in 
Table 7-3 on page 194. It is also much more credible given that firms in the sample are not 
necessarily large firms at all — although the maintenance of a dividend payout policy does argue 
that the firms will tend to be relatively stable. Arguably this is a function of the exclusion of zero 
observations. With respect to the bounds Lα  and Uα , most observations have an absolute value 
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closer to zero than 0.05, while observations with values in excess of 0.1±  can be considered to 
be outliers. With respect to the standard deviations in the fourth panel, most appear to be less 
than 0.05. 
Figure 6-4: Histograms of the Four Parameters of the Friction model. 
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Perhaps more interesting than the estimated parameters themselves are the expected returns 
generated from them. The summary characteristics of all 923 distributions of unconditional and 
conditional expected returns (as measured over the 100-day estimation period) are shown in 
Table 6-3 along with the equivalent results underlying the OLS estimation procedures used in 
Chapter 5 and calculated here for convenience. 
In the first column of Panel A, it is clear that the LDV friction model furnishes expected return 
distributions that have means that have a higher absolute value, and that these distributions 
exhibit greater variation. However, with respect to size, the unconditional expected returns have 
the greatest positive value while the conditional ones are actually negative. The OLS expected 
returns, on average are positive and closer to zero. This implies that, for observed returns on day 
t0 that are relatively large and positive, the unconditional expected returns could be predicted to 
furnish smaller abnormal returns than the OLS model, while the conditional expected return 
would actually produce the largest AR. 
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Table 6-3: Comparison of Expected Returns. 
Expected Return 
Distributions1 
Mean Maximum Minimum Std Deviation 
Panel A: Expected Return Distribution Means (100-Day Estimation Period) 
Unconditional 0.0013 0.0290 - 0.0251 0.0044 
Conditional - 0.0062 0.0066 - 0.0436 0.0054 
OLS Exp. Return Distributions 0.0004 0.0093 -0.0083 0.0022 
Panel B: Expected Return Distribution Standard Deviations (100-Day Estimation Period) 
Unconditional 0.0165 0.0906 0.0046 0.0084 
Conditional 0.0154 0.1203 0.0025 0.0093 
OLS Exp. Return Distributions 0.0050 0.0361 3.19E-06 0.00485 
Panel C: Expected Return Distribution Means (21-Day Test Period) 
Unconditional Expected Returns 0.0002 0.0252 - 0.0463 0.0060 
Conditional Expected Returns - 0.0073 0.0112 - 0.0577 0.0068 
OLS Expected. Returns 9.76E-05 0.0118 -0.0150 0.0025 
Panel D: Expected Return Distribution Standard Deviations (21-Day Test Period) 
Unconditional Expected Returns 0.0158 0.1366 0.0025 0.0113 
Conditional Expected Returns 0.0150 0.1826 0 0.0124 
OLS Expected Returns 0.0044 0.0625 5.56E-06 0.0049 
 1 923 sets of Expected Returns data 
 
Also in the 4th column of Panel A, the distribution of unconditional means has a standard 
deviation that is double that of the OLS means distribution to the four decimal places reported. 
The conditional mean distribution has yet a larger standard deviation. However, there is no 
immediate explanation for why the mean of the conditional means distribution should be 
negative. 
When forecasted forward onto market return data available in the 21-day test period, the LDV 
friction model unconditional expected returns (reported in Panels C and D), again turned out to 
be larger than those produced by OLS, while the conditional expected returns continued to be 
smaller. The effect indeed was that the test period ARs based on unconditional expected returns 
were the smallest; and those based on the LDV friction model conditional returns were the 
largest. The AR distributions’ mean and standard deviation characteristics are reported in Table 
6-4: 
It is a very interesting question as to why the LDV friction model furnishes conditional expected 
returns that are smaller rather than larger than OLS estimates, and therefore ARs which are 
larger. When no trade took place on a particular day (or there was at least one trade but the 
closing price just did not change), the zero value of jtR  was assigned to the expected return and 
also to the AR for that day — and Equation (6.7) did not apply. 
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Table 6-4: Comparison of Characteristics of Abnormal Returns. 
Expected Return Distributions1 Mean Maximum Minimum Std Deviation 
Panel A: Abnormal Return Distribution Means (21-Day Test Period)  
Unconditional Abnormal Returns -0.0004 0.0013 -0.0016 0.0007 
Conditional Abnormal Returns 0.0071 0.0092 0.0062 0.0007 
OLS Abnormal Returns -0.0002 0.0009 -0.0015 0.0006 
Panel B: Abnormal Return Distribution Standard Deviations (21-Day Test Period) 
Unconditional Abnormal Returns 0.0287 0.0560 0.0235 0.0070 
Conditional Abnormal Returns 0.0285 0.0564 0.0218 0.0074 
OLS Abnormal Returns 0.0239 0.0540 0.0185 0.0078 
 1 923 sets of 21-day test period results 
 
This had the effect of bringing the treatment of ARs into line with Kallunki’s (1997) “lumped 
return” method mentioned in Section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2. One item which surfaced as a result of 
investigating this question was that there was one company/event data set which furnished 
nothing but zero values for jtR  over the entire test period (the 889th ranked by number of 
actively traded days, which recorded only 33 trades in the 100-day estimation period.) 
 
6.4.1.1 Cross-Sectional Regression Results 
Table 6-5 reports the results from a restricted least squares cross-sectional regression in which 
the dependent variable CAR3Day was cumulated from ARs obtained from the LDV friction 
model’s conditional expected returns.  (The results for the equivalent procedure employing ARs 
derived from LDV friction model unconditional expected returns are reported in Appendix J.) 
The conditional ARs give rise to relatively less evidence of investor awareness of dividend or 
earnings news than did the unconditional AR procedures. With respect to a one-day event 
window on the full sample, both first-order variables ( DPS∆  and EPS∆ ) are confirmed as 
significant by a strongly significant first-order F-statistic. By contrast, the fully-traded subset of 
211 company/events furnishes no significant results (the EPS∆  association that was significant 
in the same column in Table J-1 has dropped out). The more thinly-traded subsample of 712 
company/events furnishes a significant DI-EI interaction in the unrestricted equation along with 
a significant first-order DPS∆  effect; but there is no significant interaction F-statistic to give it 
authenticity. Only the first-order variable is confirmed in this way in the subsample. 
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Table 6-5: Restricted Least Squares Regressions with Conditional Abnormal Returns. 
Regressand
Sample by 
Days Traded All Obs. 100 Days
<100 
Days All  Obs. 100 Days
<100 
Days
Coefficient (p-Values)
DD-ED (INTERCEPT) 0.0098494 0.010114 0.0090628 0.0042545 0.0020016 0.0022151
(0.1342) (0.2814) (0.2622) (0.3713) (0.7546) (0.7061)
∆DPS 0.0009828 3.747E-05 0.000888 0.0022861 -0.001699 0.0025311
(0.1787) (0.9827) (0.2817) (0.0000) (0.1515) (0.0000)
∆EPS -8.23E-05 0.0006275 -0.000108 0.0006174 0.000429 0.0006385
(0.8396) (0.4924) (0.8150) (0.0362) (0.4919) (0.0570)
DI-EI 0.031963 0.0086206 0.038503 0.012149 0.01205 0.015448
(0.0003) (0.4991) (0.0003) (0.0551) (0.1673) (0.0467)
DD-EI 0.007565 -0.019265 0.016828 0.0009412 -0.020629 0.0095614
(0.5835) (0.2707) (0.3360) (0.9249) (0.0848) (0.4520)
DI-ED 0.018425 0.0088935 0.02234 0.0048003 0.0005854 0.0098122
(0.0946) (0.5874) (0.0950) (0.5472) (0.9583) (0.3127)
DNC-EI 0.012886 0.0066819 0.015864 0.0056456 0.0025034 0.0097996
(0.1646) (0.5858) (0.1717) (0.4001) (0.7649) (0.2454)
DNC-ED 0.0023312 0.005429 0.0024159 0.0002023 0.0022084 0.0022307
(0.7819) (0.6369) (0.8170) (0.9735) (0.7785) (0.7689)
Observations Count R2 Statistics, F-Statistics and p-Values
N 923 211 712 948 211 712
R2UNRESTRICTED 0.0403 0.0210 0.0469 0.0683 0.0415 0.0816
R2EQUATION (ii) 0.0184 0.0080 0.0192 0.0619 0.0015 0.0741
R2EQUATION (iii) 0.0384 0.0185 0.0454 0.0412 0.0311 0.0499
FUNRESTRRICTED 5.4943 0.62132 4.9541 9.5895 1.2544 8.9395
(0.0000) (0.7380) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2748) (0.0000)
FEQUATION (ii) 8.6361 0.84083 6.9279 30.374 0.15464 28.385
(0.0002) (0.4328) (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.8568) (0.0000)
FEQUATION (iii) 7.3313 0.77268 6.7103 7.8874 1.3179 7.4135
(0.0000) (0.5704) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2578) (0.0000)
FFIRST ORDER 0.9035 0.2561 0.5847 13.6713 1.0940 12.1565
(0.4055) (0.7743) (0.5575) (0.0000) (0.3368) (0.0000)
FINTERACTION 4.1753 0.5375 4.1050 1.2932 1.6927 1.1461
(0.0009) (0.7477) (0.0011) (0.2645) (0.1378) (0.3345)
CAR3Day ARt 0
 
 
Hence, the conditional ARs in Table 6-5 produce a simpler, starker picture than do the 
unconditional ARs in Table J-1. In Table 6-5, a three-day event window shows evidence of one 
dividend-and-earnings combination (good news) having an impact on share price, while in the 
one-day event window case, dividends appear to be more important than earnings — but with no 
particular combination standing out as being of note. 
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6.4.2 Friction Models of the Day Zero Event Window 
I now propose a friction model that removes the need to resort to any regression procedure in 
searching for evidence investor behaviour indicative of a response to a dividend signal. Initially, 
the 923 observations of day zero conditional abnormal returns derived from the friction model in 
Subsection 6.4.1 will be used as the dependent variable in a friction model procedure in which 
the independent variable is DPS∆ . Then, in a second sweep in Subsection 6.4.2.2, this 
independent variable will be replaced by EPS∆ . Following that in Subsection 6.4.2.3, both 
independent variables will be employed together. 
6.4.2.1 Conditional Abnormal Returns and ∆DPS 
While a more general model configuration for all of these day zero procedures is furnished in 
Appendix J, the LDV friction model in the first instance is: 
 
*
*
*
if 0 0
0 if 0
if 0 0
j j j j
j j Lj j j
j j
j j Uj j j
AR DPS
Where
AR AR AR and DPS
AR AR
AR AR AR and DPS
β ε
α
α
= ∆ +
 = − ≠ ∆ < = = = − ≠ ∆ ≥
 (6.8) 
The results obtained from this procedure are reported in Table 6-6. Below a 5.49 percent lower 
bound, a change in dividend is associated with an increasingly negative AR, while above a 1.53 
percent upper bound, the change in dividend is associated with a rising positive AR. The linear 
approximation of the rate of change ( DPSβ∆ ) is strongly significantly different from zero; but the 
rate of change is quite small (0.0018 per unit change in the dividend variable. The results are 
reported as point estimates in the table’s first column, and in terms of a 95 percent confidence 
interval in the second and third columns. It must be emphasised that this model is misspecified at 
least to the extent that it totally ignores the role of the simultaneous earnings announcement 
information. 
Table 6-6: Conditional Abnormal Returns on Day Zero and ∆DPS. 
Parameter MLE 95% Conf. Int 
Lower Bound 
95% Conf. Int 
Upper Bound 
p-Values 
αL -0.0549 -0.0603 -0.0495 0.0000 
αU 0.0153 0.0120 0.0186 0.0000 
β∆DPS 0.0018 0.0011 0.0024 0.0000 
σ 0.0385 0.0361 0.0408 0.0000 
923 observations 
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6.4.2.2 Conditional Abnormal Returns and ∆EPS 
When we replace the change-in-dividend variable with a change-in-earnings variable, the LDV 
friction model has one subtle change. Because, EPS∆  never exactly equals zero, the inequalities 
in the conditions become strict inequalities: 
 
*
*
*
if 0 0
0 if 0
if 0 0
j j j j
j j Lj j j
j j
j j Uj j j
AR EPS
Where
AR AR AR and EPS
AR AR
AR AR AR and EPS
β ε
α
α
= ∆ +
 = − ≠ ∆ < = = = − ≠ ∆ >
 (6.9) 
The results are very similar to those reported on DPS∆ . There is approximately a 6% range 
about zero defined by αL at –4.08% and αU at 2.15% outside which a change in announced 
earnings does impact on the size of abnormal earnings; but the rate of change of this impact is 
again small (0.0008 per unit change in the earnings variable). And again the model is 
misspecified in the absence of the dividend announcement variable. However, in keeping with 
what was reported in Table 5-12 on page 136 with respect to the Market Model-based 
methodology, the EPS∆  coefficient (0.0008) in Table 6-7 is under half the size of the 
DPS∆ coefficient (0.0018) reported above in Table 6-6. 
Table 6-7: Conditional Abnormal Returns on Day Zero and ∆EPS. 
Parameter MLE 95% Conf. Int 
Lower Bound 
95% Conf. Int 
Upper Bound 
p-Values 
αL -0.0408 -0.0449 -0.0366 0.0000 
αL 0.0215 0.0179 0.0252 0.0000 
β∆EPS 0.0008 0.0004 0.0012 0.0000 
σ 0.0383 0.0360 0.0406 0.0000 
923 observations 
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6.4.2.3 Conditional Abnormal Returns and both ∆EPS and ∆EPS 
There were two possible ways of defining the upper and lower regions. The first was to define 
the prerequisite for upper region membership as 0jAR ≠  and 
2
1
0i
i
X
=
≥∑  where 
2
1
ij j j
i
X DPS EPS
=
=∆ + ∆∑ ; and for lower region membership, 0jAR ≠  and 2
1
0i
i
X
=
<∑ . This 
configuration allowed all 923 observations to be used. The model is: 
 ( )
( )
*
1 2
*
*
if 0 0
0 if 0
if 0 0
j j j j j j
j j Lj j j j
j j
j j Uj j j j
AR DPS EPS
Where
AR AR AR and EPS DPS
AR AR
AR AR AR and EPS DPS
β β ε
α
α
= ∆ + ∆ +
 = − ≠ ∆ + ∆ < = = = − ≠ ∆ + ∆ ≥
 (6.10) 
In the result of the maximum likelihood procedure reported in Table 6-8, it is strongly clear that 
the beta of the change in dividend variable is insignificantly different from zero in the presence 
of an earnings announcement variable. This result contradicts the finding in Table 5-12 on page 
136, where the inclusion of DPS∆  in a Market Model-based procedure caused the coefficient of 
EPS∆  to drop into insignificance. 
Table 6-8: Conditional Abnormal Returns on Day Zero and both ∆DPS and ∆EPS (N = 923). 
Parameter MLE 95% Conf. Int 
Lower Bound 
95% Conf. Int 
Upper Bound 
p-Values 
αL -0.0403 -0.0443 -0.0362 0.0000 
αL 0.0206 0.0170 0.0243 0.0000 
β∆DPS -0.0001 -0.0007 0.0006 0.4120 
β∆EPS 0.0008 0.0004 0.0012 0.0000 
σ 0.0374 0.0351 0.0397 0.0000 
923 observations including the DD-EI and DI-ED announcement combinations 
 
It can also be seen that the size of the friction region between the two bounds in Table 6-8 
implies that a 6 percent change in the independent variables is necessary before any response is 
picked up in the AR variable. 
However, there is a hidden aspect to this result. Two of the dividend and earnings announcement 
combinations comprise mixed news in which the two components move in opposite directions 
(the DD-EI and DI-ED observations). This means that one had to dominate the other in size in 
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order for the assignment to either upper or lower region to happen. This effectively built in a 
hidden assumption to the effect that a change in earnings should have the same value as a change 
in dividend — and that a larger change in one should rightfully dominate the smaller change in 
the other (even if the difference in size was actually quite small). This assumption can be 
jettisoned by requiring that the independent variables must each be greater than or equal to zero 
for assignment to the upper region, and less than or equal to zero for the lower region. However, 
this altered specification comes at the cost of removing the DD-EI and DI-ED observations from 
the data set. Nevertheless, it does still allow analysis to occur with respect to observations in 
which earnings change while dividends do not (the DNC-EI and DNC-ED combinations). The 
re-specified model looks like this: 
 
*
1 2
*
*
if 0 0, 0
0 if 0
if 0 0, 0
j j j j j j
j j Lj j j j
j j
j j Uj j j j
AR DPS EPS
Where
AR AR AR and EPS DPS
AR AR
AR AR AR and EPS DPS
β β ε
α
α
= ∆ + ∆ +
 = − ≠ ∆ < ∆ ≤ = = = − ≠ ∆ > ∆ ≥
 (6.11) 
The result furnished in Table 6-9 is quite different from that in Table 6-8. Now, the beta of the 
change-in-dividend variable is more than four times larger than that of the change-in-earnings 
variable; and the p-values of all parameters indicate the probability of a Type 1 error of much 
less than one percent. This finding is more in keeping with the Market Model-based results in 
Table 5-12 on page 136; but this friction model result furnishes a strongly significant EPS∆  
coefficient where the Market Model based EPS∆  coefficient was insignificant. It also agrees 
with the result in Table 6-5 where, with respect to the procedure on ARt0 on the full sample, the 
change in dividends and the change in earnings were found to be influential. 
Table 6-9: Conditional Abnormal Returns on Day Zero and both ∆DPS and ∆EPS. 
Parameter MLE 95% Conf. Int 
Lower Bound 
95% Conf. Int 
Upper Bound 
p-Values 
αL -0.0533 -0.0603 -0.0463 0.0000 
αL 0.0257 0.0193 0.0320 0.0000 
β∆DPS 0.0055 0.0043 0.0068 0.0000 
β∆EPS 0.0017 0.0010 0.0024 0.0000 
σ 0.0680 0.0640 0.0719 0.0000 
807 observations that exclude the DI-ED and DD-EI announcement combinations 
Minimum Likelihood Estimate = -466.21223 
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The independent variables in Table 6-9 exert their effect on the dependent variable, AR above 
and below a friction region between the upper and lower alphas, which amounts to almost 0.08 
in width. This is one third larger than the six percent recorded in Table 6-8.  The results in Table 
6-9 suggest that, both the dividend component of an announcement and the earnings component 
play a significant role in price change on day zero. 
The behaviour of the bounds, Lα  and Uα  in Table 6-9 is also of interest. Lesmond, Ogden and 
Trzcinka (1999) argued, with respect to the relation between company returns and returns on the 
market index, that investors tend not to transact when the perceived gain from trading does not 
exceed what they call the round trip effective transaction cost. The fact that RMt has been 
replaced in Equation (6.11) by other independent variables does not change the bounds from 
being a measure of some form of effective transactions cost. However, we are no longer just 
dealing with a possible monetary cost, but also with a loss-aversion effect. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979), in their promulgation of prospect theory, documented loss aversion as one of the 
key behaviours identifiable in decision makers making choices under uncertainty; and this was 
observed, in terms of a ‘disposition effect’ by Odean (1998) in a study of a brokerage firm’s 
transactions records showing client reluctance to realise losses but greater eagerness to realise 
gains. More recently, Norsworthy, Gorener, Morgan, Schuler and Li (2004) have confirmed the 
presence of loss aversion in share market trading behaviour, which they were able to identify in 
the results generated by their four-state asset-pricing model. Here, in Table 6-9 we can see 
evidence of the disposition effect in the fact that the lower bound is approximately twice the 
distance from zero measured by the upper bound. It appears that investors will trade more readily 
on the basis of good news, where the seller is able to realise a small profit, than on the basis of 
bad news where the seller would realise a small loss. The bad news has to be of a greater 
magnitude before sellers decide to divest. This asymmetry in the values of the bounds has also 
been apparent in Table 6-8, Table 6-7, Table 6-6 and in Table 6-2. 
More importantly, the friction region between Lα  and Uα  can also be interpreted in a more 
direct manner with respect to dividend and earnings signalling. Between these two bounds the 
change in the announcement variables is too small for a signal to be sent — of at least too small 
to be acted upon. 
A number of further explorations of the nature of friction modelling with conditional ARs, ∆EPS 
and ∆EPS are made in Appendix J. 
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6.4.3 Day Zero Friction Model with First-order and Interaction Variables 
So far in this chapter, friction models have been employed to consider only the performance of 
the two first-order variables, DPS∆  and .EPS∆  A logical progression from this point would be 
to incorporate into a friction model some version of the RLS regressions’ dummy variables. 
In the cross-sectional regression procedure, five dummy variables were employed to ascertain 
the presence (or not) of a significant interaction effect. It was not possible to carry all these 
dummies over into the maximum likelihood estimation environment. There were several reasons 
for this. For a start, in a friction model context, we have two alpha values where the restricted 
least squares regression model furnished only one — which could take on the job of proxying the 
announcement combination for which no dummy variable was specified. One might ask, which 
of the MLE alphas would take up this role? More importantly, a dummy variable is binary, 
taking on the value ‘1’ if an observation belongs to the chosen category, or ‘0’ if it does not; and 
a binary variable is incapable of furnishing a set of values which fit into all three of the friction 
model’s three regions. The problem arises, that if there are no values present in a given region, 
then the maximum likelihood estimation procedure furnishes a hessian matrix with negatives 
present on the leading diagonal, which gives rise to standard errors which are the square roots of 
negative numbers — and are therefore imaginary. This means that the numerical search 
mechanism in the maximum likelihood procedure has failed to achieve convergence on an 
optimal value. 
Nevertheless, it is an interesting question as to whether the actual combination of dividend and 
earnings changes present in an announcement are significantly different from each other. 
Therefore the friction model was reconfigured to include an additional two variables in an 
attempt to answer this. 
1. ‘GOOD+BADNEWS’ this variable takes on the value ‘1’ if the dividend and earnings 
announcement notified rises in both dividends and earnings, and ‘-1’ if both items are 
reduced, and finally, ‘0’ if the announcement data falls outside the good and bad-news 
categories. 
2. ‘MIXEDNEWSDNC’ handles announcement combinations in which there is no change in 
dividend, but either a rise or fall in announced earnings. It is configured in a similar 
manner. If earnings go up, then MIXEDNEWS takes on the value, ‘1’, while a drop in 
earnings caused it to take on the value ‘-1’, and if the announcement actually is of neither 
sort, MIXEDNEWSDNC takes on the value, ‘0’. 
The above variables left two dividend-and-earnings combinations unaccounted for. These were 
DI-ED (dividend increased with earnings decreased) and DD-EI.. These had to be left out, as all 
attempts to configure summations of variables to circumvent the same-sign restriction (explained 
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in Subsection 6.4.2) merely ended up producing results with non-invertible hessian matrices. The 
implementation of the friction model was as follows.169 
*
1 2 3 4
*
*
if 0 0, 0, 0, 0
0 if 0
if 0 0, 0, 0, 0
j j j j j j G B j MIX j
j j Lj j j j G B MIX
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β β β β ε
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= ∆ + ∆ + + +
 = − ≠ ∆ < ∆ ≤ ≤ ≤ = = = − ≠ ∆ > ∆ ≥ > >
 (6.12) 
When the DI-ED and DD-EI observations were excluded, the data set was now reduced to 807 
observations. The results for the expanded model incorporating GOOD+BADNEWS and 
MIXEDNEWSDNC are in Table 6-10. In common with the unexpanded friction model, DPSβ∆  is 
about three time the size of EPSβ∆ , and both are significant. However, both GOOD BAD NEWSβ +  and 
DNCMIXED NEWSβ are much larger than either of the first-order coefficients; and both are supported by 
p-values with less than a one percent level of error. This strongly supports the contention that 
investors are indeed reacting to a perception of an earnings signal at the very least. In addition, 
the fact that βGOOD+BADNEWS has a slightly higher value than βMIXEDNEWSDNC does suggest that the 
change in the announced dividend does amplify the effect of a change in announced earnings — 
which does not occur with respect to MIXEDNEWSDNC. 
Table 6-10: Day Zero Parameters furnished by the Expanded Friction Model with Interaction Variables. 
Parameter MLE 95% Conf. Int 
Lower Bound 
95% Conf. Int 
Upper Bound 
p-Values 
αL -0.1241 -0.1645 -0.0838 0.0000 
αU 0.1030 0.0627 0.1433 0.0000 
β∆DPS 0.0027 0.0013 0.0041 0.0001 
β∆EPS 0.0007 0.0000 0.0015 0.0232 
βGOOD+BADNEWS 0.1039 0.0634 0.1443 0.0000 
βMIXEDNEWS 0.1001 0.0598 0.1404 0.0000 
σ 0.0672 0.0633 0.0711 0.0000 
This MLE procedure was run on 807 observations 
Minimum Likelihood Estimate = -605.26487 
                                                 
169 Specification of the restrictions in terms of the dummy variables was actually redundant as these were dependent 
on the restrictions associated with the two first-order variables. For instance, GOOD BAD NEWSD + could only be 
positive if DPS∆  and DPS∆  were both positive.  
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But does the expanded model in Table 6-10 incorporating GOOD+BADNEWS and 
MIXEDNEWSDNC deliver an improvement in explanatory power over the unexpanded model? A 
likelihood ratio test was employed to answer this question. 
Unrestricted Model (Table 6-10) MLE = LUNRESTRICTED -605.26487 
Restricted Model (Table 6-9) MLE = LRESTRICTED -466.21223 
Likelihood Ratio = 2(LUNRESTRICTED - LRESTRICTED) -278.10528 
Number of restrictions 2 
p-value for a 22χ  distribution170  4.07573E-61 
 
The two MLE figures are minimum likelihood estimates which need to be multiplied by -1 to be 
viewed as maximum likelihood estimates. The absolute value of the difference between the 
unrestricted model with the two interaction dummies and the restricted model without dummies 
is 278.1053 which is somewhat larger than 9.21, the 22χ  critical value with a one percent Type 1 
error probability. The p-value is 0.0000 to four decimal places, and the expanded model 
incorporating interaction variables is clearly superior in its explanatory power. 
6.4.4 Chapter Conclusion and Discussion 
This chapter set out to do two things. The first was to provide a method for estimating expected 
returns which did not rely on all of the assumptions that are associated with the Market Model. 
For instance, the Market Model, by employing OLS regression requires linearity while the 
friction model’s employment of a quasi-Newton optimisation procedure liberates us from the 
linearity requirement. However, the procedure — as presented — did still make the assumption 
that the data was normally distributed. But the normality assumption too may be dropped if the 
normal cumulative density function and the normal probability density functions are replaced by 
their equivalents furnished by some other distribution such as the asymmetric power distribution 
(APD). Achieving this would be a logical next step in future employment of friction modelling 
with respect to event studies. 
The second goal of the chapter was to provide a method for estimating expected returns which 
did not rely on sleight of hand or sheer blinkeredness in dealing with the thinness of trading of 
many of the stocks in the dataset. Far from sweeping non-trading days and zero-value company 
returns under the carpet, the friction model methodology explicitly sets out to model their impact 
on the parameters employed in constructing expected returns. 
                                                 
170 Excel’s CHIDIST function was used for this computation. 
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The third goal of this chapter was to employ the ARs generated with respect to the expected 
return output of a friction model procedure on every feasible company/event estimation period 
dataset, to determine if any evidence of an investor reacting to a dividend signal could be found.  
When the ARs were constructed from conditional expected returns, evidence of dividend 
signalling was not clear. When a three-day window was employed, only the DI-EI interaction 
effect was significant and it was corroborated by a significant interaction F-statistic. This is 
insufficient to separate out the effect of an earnings signal from that of the dividend signal — 
since both pull in the same direction in a DI-EI interaction.  With respect to the one-day event 
window, the two first-order variables were significant together — which is not enough to 
separate out their signalling effects from one another. The best that could be done was to report 
that the DPS∆  coefficient was larger than the EPS∆  coefficient. 
The fourth goal of this chapter was to develop friction models which could be used directly to 
investigate the behaviour in the event window. For brevity (a rare commodity in this thesis) they 
were restricted to either a one-day event window, or a one-day window in the context of the rest 
of the test period. These models certainly showed both DPS∆  and EPS∆ to be significant and 
that DPS∆  was exerted a greater magnitude impact on the associated ARs. In the final model, 
which incorporated two interaction variables modelling the effect of four of the six dividend and 
earnings interaction effects, some evidence was furnished that indicated that the dividend signal 
could be separated from the earnings signal — but the degree of separation was very subtle. 
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7 State Models 
7.1 Chapter Introduction 
In an event study employing the Market Model, the function of the Model is to generate expected 
returns, which when forecasted into the test period, can be subtracted from observed returns to 
capture the measure of surprise (an AR or CAR) provoked by the news content of the event. But 
the accuracy of the measure of surprise is cast into doubt by the relatively low explanatory power 
of expected returns which we record in the form of the r2 statistic reported in the simple OLS 
procedure which is the Market Model. State asset pricing models, which are sophistications of 
the Market Model offer a strong improvement in explanatory power — and are worth 
investigating for that reason. 
A four-state asset pricing model separates company returns and their matched market returns into 
four subsets by their paired signs and specifies a multiple regression with coefficients for each of 
the four subsets of market returns. This new expanded-form Market Model is called the four-
state asset pricing model — and it is most definitely associated with a much higher R2 statistic 
than the simple Market Model can achieve. 
However, there is a second reason for investigating state models. The four-state model comes in 
two versions. The first is an unrotated form in which the partitioning is based on the sign of the 
return. The second is a rotated form in which the axes are transformed so that, according to 
Norsworthy et al, they more accurately capture a-priori investor expectations. This was 
developed by Norsworthy, Gorener, Morgan, Schuler and Li (2004).171 Norsworthy et al found 
that their rotated four-state model was superior in its performance to their unrotated verson. This 
chapter shows that this may not be attributable to a better capture of investor’s expectations.  
The current study replicates the unrotated and rotated four-state models and then goes on to 
specify unrotated and rotated versions of a five-state model, where the fifth state is the state of a 
zero company return being recorded. Some evidence is furnished that indicates that the 
differences among versions of four-state models and five-state models are strongly dependent on 
the treatment of zero-value company returns.  
The chapter also furnishes a five-state-two-step model. One of the reasons for the low 
explanatory power of the Market Model is the presence of large numbers of zero-returns in the 
estimation period data sets. Zero returns are the consequence of either a failure of share prices to 
change with trading (which may be simply liquidity trading), or an absence of trading altogether. 
                                                 
171 Norsworthy, Gorener, Morgan, Schuler and Li (2004), Op. Cit. 132 (Chapter 2, Subsection 2.5). 
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The function of the second step is to remove the effect of extreme outliers and also liquidity 
trading so that the calculated expected returns become a better fit of the data as a whole, and 
therefore a more accurate mechanism for compiling abnormal returns. It is found that inclusion 
of the second step in the five-state two-step model increases the R2. 
But then the chapter goes on to study a simple three-state model, and a two-step three-state 
model. This last model is promoted as this researcher’s choice of model to be used in an event 
study investigating dividend signalling. It gains this status on the ground that it is fairly simple, 
can be estimated on most of the available datasets without problems of lack of observations in 
particular states or narrow ranges, and has high explanatory power. 
The chapter is laid out as follows. Section 7.2 explains the underlying methodology of the 
unrotated and rotated four state models and then goes on to specify the unrotated and rotated 
five-state models which are innovations furnished by this study. Following this exposition of 
specifications, the results of this study’s estimations of four- and five-state models are tabled in 
Section 7.3. In Sections 7.4 and 7.5, the models with a second step are introduced and evaluated. 
Section 7.6 contains the chapter conclusions. 
7.2 Methodology for Four- and Five-state Models 
7.2.1 Four-state Unrotated Model 
Following Norsworthy et al, the data set for each company/event in the current study is 
partitioned into four quadrants by the sign of the company return and the sign of the matched 
market return, where RiAt is the daily return on company ‘A’ at time t, which in the tth instance, 
falls into quadrant i. The four quadrants are labelled in Figure 7-1.  
Figure 7-1: Classification of Quadrants used by the Four-state Model. 
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R M t   
R A t   ≥ 0  
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R A t   < 0  
R Mt   ≥  0  
R A t   ≥  0  
R Mt  <  0  
R A t   < 0  
R Mt  <  0  
1 
2 3 
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Investors do not know in advance to which quadrant an observation (RiAt, RM) is going to belong; 
but they actually will have a perception of what kind of behaviour is likely in each quadrant. 
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Jokung and Meyfredi (2003) note that this partitioning can be seen as defining bull and bear 
asset conditions.172 This expectation is based on past performance. 
A regression is run to separate out the behaviours in the four quadrants. The equation for this is 
an expansion of the traditional Market Model which contains a series of dummy variables ( iα ), 
and MtR  takes on the value of the actual market return if and only if iAtR  belongs to the ith 
quadrant, and otherwise takes on the value zero. 
 
4 4
1 1
iAt i i Mt i
i i
R Rα β ε
= =
= + +∑ ∑  (7.1) 
Given that the dummies (Q1 to Q4) take on the value ‘1’ or zero, and replacing iα  with i iQβ , the 
equation expands to173: 
 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4
5 1 6 2 7 3 8 4
iAt
Mt Mt Mt Mt t
R Q Q Q Q
Q R Q R Q R Q R
β β β β
β β β β ε
= + + +
+ + + + +
 (7.2) 
In this equation, the first term is the intercept term — the Q1 being redundant as distinct from 
incorrect. An alternative way of looking at Equation (7.2) is that it combines four separate 
regressions (one for each quadrant) into one regression. 
7.2.2 Four-state Rotated Model 
If, on a daily basis, today’s expected return is deemed to be the mean of past returns, it is 
possible to rotate the axes so that a company return becomes a zero company return (i.e., be 
seated on the horizontal axis) in the case where the share is performing only as well as 
anticipated — and not better or worse. In other words, if a 0.02% return is anticipated, on the 
basis that it happens to be the mean historical return, then a return of this magnitude will fall on 
the rotated horizontal axis, while a return seated at any point above the axis would denote a 
better-than-expected performance by the company share, while any point below the rotated axis 
(whether or not it was actually below the original unrotated axis) would indicate worse-than-
expected performance. The rotated vertical axis should be interpreted in a similar way. If a 
                                                 
172 Jokung and Meyfredi (2003), p. 3. 
173 Note that the subscript ‘i’ is not carried through for the independent variable, RMt in either this or the immediately 
preceding equation. This is because the observation has already been assigned with respect to the company share 
return in conjunction with it per the decision table embedded in Figure 7-1. 
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market return for a particular day was seated on the rotated vertical axis, then the market’s 
performance that day was exactly as anticipated on past mean rises or falls. 
Figure 7-2: Diagram showing the Rotation Effect for Classification into Quadrants used by the Rotated 
Four-state Model. 
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The rotation of the axes is computed as K radians by a calculation based on both the mean 
performance of a stock and the mean performance of the market index irrespective of quadrant. 
The angle of rotation (counterclockwise) is: 
 ( ) ( )arctan A M
E RK E R
 =     (7.3) 
This means that the transformed axes lie at, relative to the original axes, at an extra K radians, 
(K+pi/2), (K+pi), and (K+3pi/2) radians. 
However, the method for determining membership of a quadrant is actually worked out on an 
observation-by-observation basis, where the observation is transformed relative to the original 
axes as shown in Figure 7-3. Given Equation (7.3), the equivalent transformation of ( ),A MR R  to 
( ),A Mρ ρ is: 
 ( ) ( )( )sin cosA M AR K R Kρ = − +  (7.4) 
 ( ) ( )( )cos sinM M AR K R Kρ = +  (7.5) 
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Figure 7-3: Classification into Quadrants as used by the Rotated Four-state Model. 
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Nevertheless, once membership of a quadrant has been assigned via the decision table embedded 
in Figure 7-3, the actual computation of expected returns on the 100-day estimation period data 
set is actually performed using original values of the ( ),A MR R  observations. Norsworthy et al 
noted that if the rotated model did not explain investor behaviour any better than the original 
axes, then the R2 of the procedure will be no higher than that of the unrotated model.174 
Figure 7-4: Example of Classification Change with Rotation (110th Company/event Data Set). 
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Figure 7-4 provides an actual rotation from the current study’s sample. In this instance it is the 
110th company/event data set in the series ranked by trading frequency, which was the Cavalier 
Corporation Ltd (CAV) year-end announcement made on August 26th 1993. This one was chosen 
as it displays archetypal properties. In particular, the rotated observations are much more 
strongly present in the first and third quadrants; and the zero value company returns have been 
                                                 
174 Norsworthy et al, p. 19. 
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relocated into quadrants two and four — discernible as a line segment through the origin with a 
steep negative slope. 
7.2.3 Five-state Conditions 
One of the major points of focus of the current study is the disruptive presence of large numbers 
of zero-value company returns. Norsworthy et al’s four-state unrotated model is easily adapted to 
allow for a fifth state in which company returns are either zero because there was no change in 
closing trading price or because trading failed to take place. In this instance the model remains a 
four-state model, but the quadrant membership conditions are amended to remove all zero-value 
company returns (and their matched market returns) from the OLS regression procedure. A zero-
value company return, in terms of the friction modelling in Chapter 6.2, is its own expected 
return; and if there is no change in share price in the dividend-and-earnings announcement event 
window (or an absence of trading), the associated abnormal return is set at zero too. 
The five-state model was estimated by OLS regression, and also was configured as a friction 
model (explicitly catering for a zero-value company return region) and its parameters estimated 
by maximum likelihood estimation. 
 
*
1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 1
6 2 7 3 8 4
* *
*
* *
if
0 if
if
jit j j j j j M
j M j M j M jt
jit jit Lj jit Lj
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α α
α α
α α
= + + + +
+ + + +
 = − < = ≤ ≤ = − <
 (7.6) 
In practical terms, the implementation conditions in Equation (7.6) becomes, for all three 
regions, dependent upon the sign of the dependent variable. 
 
*
*
if 0
0 if 0
if 0
jit jit Lj jit
jit jit
jit jit Lj jit
R R R
R R
R R R
α
α
 = − < = = = − >
 (7.7) 
This is actually less complex than the implementation conditions required for the friction models 
employed in Chapter 6.2 where the upper and lower regions required as a membership decision 
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criterion, the correct sign of the independent variable. However, the log likelihood function 
becomes rather messy unless vector notation is employed. Therefore let X  be a list of all the 
explanatory variables and Ω  be their associated coefficients, where , , ,Lj Uj j jα α σ Ω   is the 
vector of parameters. The log likelihood function becomes: 
 
( )
0
, , , , ,
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1
Lj Uj j j j j
jt Lj j j
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Uj j j Lj j j
U L
j j
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 (7.8) 
The code for estimating this procedure is in Appendix J. 
Following consideration of the five-state unrotated model, a five-state rotated model is 
considered. This is essentially the rotated four-state model with zero-value company return 
observations excluded. 
7.3 Results for Four- and Five-state Models 
7.3.1 Unrotated Four-state Model 
In these results, it was specified that each quadrant must have at least six observations. This cut 
the available number of company/event data sets down from 948 to 801. Further, as elsewhere in 
this study, the estimation period contained exactly 100 daily observations (while Norsworthy et 
al’s sample contained almost 15 years of daily observations).175 As a consequence, while 
Norsworthy et al obtained coefficient estimates with satisfyingly tiny probabilities of a Type 1 
error, this was not the case on the New Zealand data here.176 
Table 7-1 shows the summary of results for the unrotated four-state model on 100-day data sets. 
On average, none of the beta coefficients for the four quadrants furnish acceptable p-values, and 
                                                 
175 Norsworthy et al, p. 54, Table 5 
176 The results reported in Table 7-1 are recalculated on data sets with an estimation period of 500 days (which 
includes multiple prior dividend-and-earnings announcement events) and with the requirement that each quadrant 
must have at least ten observations. The result gained from this recalculation are in Appendix L. Interestingly, the F-
statistic (38.41) is much higher, but the adjusted R2 statistic (0.4534) is inferior to their equivalents in the first panel 
of Table 7-1. 
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only one of the four dummy variables modelling an intercept term for each quadrant managed to 
be significant at the five percent level of error. The actual number of data sets furnishing results 
supported at the five percent level of error is shown in Table 7-2.  The difference in significance 
of first and third quadrant p-values between those in Table 7-1 may be caused by the relatively 
tiny estimation period used in the current study; but another possibility is that there are more 
close-to-zero returns in New Zealand, where trades are usually measured in steps of a cent.  For 
the bulk of the NYSE, the standard step has been 12.5 cents. 
However, the regression in Table 7-1 furnishes F-statistics which have a mean significance level 
of 0.0003, which is much less than a one percent probability of a Type 1 error, which suggests 
that it is still a valid vehicle for the compilation of expected returns. 
It is clear that, if we depended upon individual regressors furnishing significant results, the 100-
day estimation period would be too small for such a model — and data sets approaching the size 
of those of Norsworthy et al, or of Jokung and Meyfredi (2003) would need to be used. 
Returning to Table 7-1, a mean Durbin-Watson statistic of 1.9752 is reported. Given that there 
are seven explanatory variables (including quadrant dummies, but excluding the one that would 
be considered to be the intercept term), this falls between dU (1.826) and 4-dU (2.174) which 
indicates a null hypothesis of no auto-correlation present, on average, cannot be rejected. But this 
is also true of the results obtained from the unimproved Market Model, which are furnished in 
Table 7-3. However, Norsworthy et al make the point that Durbin-Watson statistics are not 
meaningful for models estimated on partitions.177 
However, we are not primarily concerned as to whether any particular explanatory variable is — 
or is not — significantly different from zero; and the existence of serial correlation in a time 
series of returns based on adjusted closing share prices is not surprising news. What is important 
is the explanatory power of the expected returns computable from the procedure; hence the 
relevant output is the collective explanatory power of all of the independent variables, which is 
best captured by the adjusted R2 statistic. In Table 7-1 the mean adjusted R2 statistic is 0.507, 
which is more than a five-fold improvement on the unimproved Market Model result (0.0875) in 
Table 7-3. This compares with the rise in mean adjusted R2 in Jokung and Meyfredi’s (2003) 
results from 0.2747 for the Market Model to 0.6174 obtained by with respect to the four-state 
model — which is a two-fold increase. In the United States, Norsworthy et al recorded a three-
fold rise from their Market Model output of 0.1646 to 0.5513 for the unrotated four-state model. 
The French and American figures are higher; but both of those studies used much longer data 
                                                 
177 Norsworthy et al, p.23. 
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sets and made an adjustment for heteroskedasticity not made in the current study with its 
relatively miniscule 100-day estimation period. 
 
Table 7-1: Summary Results for the Four-state Unrotated Model. 
Mean Min Max St Dev
F 17.4150 1.6666 99.9218 9.1651
Sig. F 0.0003 0.0000 0.1270 0.0049
R2 0.5419 0.1125 0.8838 0.1057
Adj R2 0.5070 0.0450 0.8749 0.1138
Variance 0.0003 0.0000 0.0240 0.0011
Durbin-Watson 1.9752 1.1106 2.8961 0.2345
βQ1 0.0077 -0.0053 0.0457 0.0054
t-Stat   2.2425 -2.2158 6.5781 1.2673
p-Value 0.1309 0.0000 1.0000 0.2134
βQ2 -0.0188 -0.1907 0.0644 0.0143
t-Stat   -2.8572 -8.1719 1.3762 1.2535
p-Value 0.0623 0.0000 0.9759 0.1376
βQ3 -0.0180 -0.1483 0.0316 0.0127
t-Stat   -3.2390 -9.7088 0.8619 1.3934
p-Value 0.0431 0.0000 0.9664 0.1177
βQ4 0.0081 -0.0154 0.0609 0.0056
t-Stat   1.9219 -1.8510 5.5047 0.9394
p-Value 0.1481 0.0000 0.9473 0.1989
βQ1RMt 0.4112 -3.1507 3.2349 0.6045
t-Stat   1.4331 -2.2886 11.5881 2.0204
p-Value 0.3311 0.0000 1.0000 0.3228
βQ2RMt 0.0015 -25.0188 22.5279 1.6209
t-Stat   -0.0153 -4.7419 5.0626 0.9873
p-Value 0.5525 0.0000 0.9986 0.2898
βQ3RMt 0.3723 -6.3126 11.9686 1.2274
t-Stat   1.0769 -3.2854 14.6847 2.1964
p-Value 0.4051 0.0000 0.9959 0.3299
βQ4RMt 0.1455 -5.9558 4.8784 0.6480
t-Stat   0.2416 -3.7899 3.1998 0.8825
p-Value 0.5381 0.0003 0.9992 0.2772
N 801
 
Norsworthy et al argued that the added explanatory power apparent in their American results 
could be sourced in the fact that the relationship between risk and return is not continuous, but 
discontinuous in its nature, and is reference-frame dependent. The quadrants depicted in Figure 
7-1 effectively are those reference frames, which take account of not only bull and bear market 
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movements, but bull and bear asset movements as well. Hence the four-state model allows for 
four reference frames where the Market Model allows for only one. 
Table 7-2: Count of Coefficients with Better than Benchmark p-Values. 
Coefficient Nα<0.05 %
βQ1 464 57.93%
βQ2 609 76.03%
βQ3 659 82.27%
βQ4 368 45.94%
βQ1RMt 244 30.46%
βQ2RMt 40 4.99%
βQ3RMt 184 22.97%
βQ4RMt 24 3.00%
 
Table 7-3: Unmodified Market Model Results. 
Mean Min Max St Dev
F 15.1694 0.0000 490.8003 34.0293
Sig. F 0.2109 0.0000 0.9983 0.2837
R2 0.0968 0.0000 0.8336 0.1385
Adj R2 0.0875 -0.0102 0.8319 0.1400
Variance 0.0005 0.0000 0.0252 0.0011
Durbin-Watson 1.9900 0.8880 2.9990 0.2530
α (Intercept) 0.0001 -0.0101 0.0095 0.0020
t-Stat   0.1008 -3.0969 3.3023 1.0121
p-Value 0.4944 0.0013 0.9991 0.2919
β(Slope) 0.4720 -0.8982 2.7031 0.4441
t-Stat   2.6507 -2.7792 22.1540 2.8552
p-Value 0.2109 0.0000 0.9983 0.2837
N 948
 
7.3.2 Rotated Four-state Model 
When rotation is applied to the four-state model, the number of eligible company/event data sets 
rises from 801 to 871. This is because some observations have been relocated into another 
quadrant, which has allowed a further 70 data sets to pass the six-observations-per-quadrant 
entry requirement. The results are shown in Table 7-4. 
The improvement that the rotated model makes on the unrotated model is its enhancement of 
explanatory power. In Table 7-4 the mean adjusted R2 of the 871 procedures rises to 66.91%, 
which is very similar to the 63.70% obtained by Jokung and Meyfredi (2003) and to the 0.6508 
recorded by Norsworthy et al (2004). These findings imply that in New Zealand in the 1990s (for 
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the firms in the sample, anyway), the level of undiversifiable risk was only 33.09 percent of total 
risk, while in the two northern hemisphere countries it was only slightly higher at 36.30 percent 
and 34.92 percent. 
Table 7-4: Rotated Four-state Model 
Mean Min Max St Dev
F 34.9590 1.4631 172.7841 18.5193
Sig. F 0.0003 0.0000 0.1903 0.0065
R2 0.6925 0.1002 0.9293 0.1040
Adj R2 0.6691 0.0317 0.9239 0.1119
Variance 0.0002 0.0000 0.0243 0.0010
Durbin-Watson 2.0330 1.3532 2.8915 0.2242
βQ1 0.0168 -0.0148 0.1444 0.0169
t-Stat   6.0566 -3.7773 20.2973 4.8962
p-Value 0.1813 0.0000 1.0000 0.3207
βQ2 -0.0073 -0.1600 0.0347 0.0139
t-Stat   -2.6560 -20.2323 4.9730 4.3551
p-Value 0.3953 0.0000 1.0000 0.3715
βQ3 -0.0151 -0.1755 0.0302 0.0160
t-Stat   -5.4031 -20.6226 3.1922 4.5976
p-Value 0.1978 0.0000 1.0000 0.3369
βQ4 0.0074 -0.0319 0.1322 0.0142
t-Stat   2.4485 -3.6705 20.1584 4.1789
p-Value 0.4293 0.0000 1.0000 0.3826
βQ1RMt 0.5315 -14.6208 13.9985 1.2477
t-Stat   1.4684 -7.7069 13.8035 2.3716
p-Value 0.2919 0.0000 1.0000 0.3290
βQ2RMt 0.3009 -4.7648 3.5455 0.7723
t-Stat   1.2301 -6.7313 12.5343 2.3301
p-Value 0.3332 0.0000 1.0000 0.3384
βQ3RMt 0.3571 -4.0804 13.5506 1.0173
t-Stat   1.0084 -10.6583 16.3956 2.2504
p-Value 0.3480 0.0000 1.0000 0.3323
βQ4RMt 0.3560 -9.4844 4.7017 0.8524
t-Stat   1.3550 -6.9350 14.8079 2.4070
p-Value 0.3698 0.0000 1.0000 0.3524
N 871
 
In addition, the mean F-statistic has doubled in size from, 17.4150 in Table 7-1 to 34.959, which 
is still strongly significant (p = 0.0003). However, on samples of only 100 days of observations, 
none of the mean (individual) coefficients are statistically significant. The count of estimation 
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sets furnishing p-values within the five percent benchmark level of error is given in Table 7-5. 
Although the mean p-values reported in Table 7-4 are worse (in significance rating) than those of 
Table 7-1, the counts of data sets furnishing p-values with less than a five-percent error are much 
higher with respect to the rotated model in Table 7-5 than with respect to the unrotated model in 
Table 7-4. Norsworthy et al concluded of the rotated four-state model, that it gained its 
explanatory power from taking the psychology of decision-making into account. This was 
achieved by the translation of observations into ‘expectations space’ by the rotation procedure. 
Table 7-5: Number of significant Coefficients in the Rotated Four-state Model. 
Coefficient Nα<0.05 %
βQ1 612 70.26%
βQ2 305 35.02%
βQ3 604 69.35%
βQ4 292 33.52%
βQ1RMt 346 39.72%
βQ2RMt 298 34.21%
βQ3RMt 250 28.70%
βQ4RMt 262 30.08%
 
7.3.3 Unrotated Five-state Model 
The five-state model does not add a fifth quadrant (which would be a logical impossibility); but 
it does specifically allow for the existence of zero-value company returns (whether they be for 
profitless liquidity trading or for the absence of trading) as a separate item in the estimation 
process. The zero-value returns are, in fact, ignored and sidelined in the estimation of model 
parameters because they are equated with a parameter value of zero — which does not need to be 
calculated in the five-state model’s OLS procedure. Again it is the results from data sets with 
standard 100-day estimation periods that are reported here in Table 7-6; and there is no separate 
section in it for the fifth state on the ground that no coefficient for zero-value returns needed to 
be calculated. The minimum number of observations per quadrant was again set at six. 
In Table 7-6 the mean adjusted R2 has risen to 0.7038 while the mean F-statistic has risen to 
41.1681 (p = 0.0001). Also, all of the alpha coefficients ( 1Qβ  to 4Qβ ) are now significant, 
although, in keeping with the output of previous tables, the coefficients of the last four regressor 
variables yield very high mean p-values. 
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Table 7-6: Unrotated Five-state Model 
Mean Min Max St Dev
F 41.1681 2.0995 259.3885 25.3281
Sig. F 0.0001 0.0000 0.0512 0.0020
R2 0.7248 0.1377 0.9518 0.0913
Adj R2 0.7038 0.0721 0.9481 0.0982
Variance 0.0002 0.0000 0.0233 0.0010
Durbin-Watson 0.7038 0.0721 0.9481 0.0982
βQ1 0.0191 -0.0027 0.0858 0.0111
t-Stat   5.0497 -1.1385 14.7262 2.2317
p-Value 0.0168 0.0000 0.8336 0.0755
βQ2 -0.0180 -0.1907 0.0644 0.0129
t-Stat   -3.8043 -12.6067 1.6573 1.8823
p-Value 0.0404 0.0000 0.9698 0.1174
βQ3 -0.0174 -0.1046 0.0054 0.0110
t-Stat   -4.2656 -13.1718 0.4598 1.9779
p-Value 0.0233 0.0000 0.8617 0.0883
βQ4 0.0193 -0.0398 0.1444 0.0125
t-Stat   3.7861 -2.6683 14.1754 1.8704
p-Value 0.0376 0.0000 0.8847 0.1091
βQ1RMt 0.3399 -4.9684 10.3119 1.0392
t-Stat   1.2948 -4.9821 18.1636 2.4797
p-Value 0.3006 0.0000 0.9992 0.3116
βQ2RMt -0.0176 -25.0188 22.5279 1.5840
t-Stat   -0.0329 -6.9352 4.4421 1.2581
p-Value 0.4794 0.0000 0.9964 0.3044
βQ3RMt 0.3401 -6.3126 9.7080 1.0327
t-Stat   1.3802 -3.6012 21.3650 2.8233
p-Value 0.3382 0.0000 0.9940 0.3265
βQ4RMt 0.1286 -18.4549 10.8864 1.5231
t-Stat   0.1648 -8.1499 5.1878 1.2999
p-Value 0.4454 0.0000 0.9991 0.2997
N 733
 
The actual OLS output for the first company/event data set is reported along with the matching 
friction model output in Table 7-8. In this table, the final four betas produced by the OLS 
regression procedure and by the friction model maximum likelihood estimation procedure are 
identical. However, the first four are not identical until they are reconciled by adjusting each of 
the friction model beta estimates by subtraction of the relevant alpha estimate. 
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Table 7-7: Number of Significant Coefficients in the Unrotated Five-state Model. 
Coefficient Nα<0.05 %
βQ1 690 94.13%
βQ2 626 85.40%
βQ3 665 90.72%
βQ4 624 85.13%
βQ1RMt 257 35.06%
βQ2RMt 79 10.78%
βQ3RMt 225 30.70%
βQ4RMt 87 11.87%
 
Table 7-8: Reconciliation of the Five-state model and the Five-state Friction Model. 
 OLS  MLE  Reconciliation 
     (MLE) (MLE) 
σ   0.01296    
aL   -0.1116    
αU   0.12191    
βQ1 0.03043  0.15234  0.030429 βQ1-αU 
βQ2 -0.0366  -0.1483  -0.03661 βQ2-αL 
βQ3 -0.0271  -0.1388  -0.02713 βQ3-αL 
βQ4 0.04679  0.1687  0.046786 βQ1-αU 
       
βQ1RMt -0.1639  -0.1639    
βQ2RMt 0.2112  0.2112    
βQ3RMt 0.03762  0.03762    
βQ4RMt 1.81173  1.81173    
       
 
The presence of the zero-value region between the upper and lower alphas is made explicit in the 
friction model output. 
Further evidence of the fact that the two estimation procedures produce identical results can be 
seen in Figure 7-5 in which the friction model result is plotted against the distribution of 
observed company returns against market index returns in the first panel, the OLS regression 
result is plotted in the second, and the two are superimposed in the third. 
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Figure 7-5: Comparison of Estimation Methods for Five state Models: Friction and OLS. 
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The five-state unrotated model appears to be an improvement on the four-state rotated and 
unrotated models. Because of that it is of interest to explore the nature of the ARs generated by 
it. In Figure 7-6, day zero ARs are plotted by dividend-and-earnings classification. 
In Table 7-9, the summary statistics for the expected returns of four models are provided in 
tabular format. These comprise the unrotated and rotated versions of the four-state model, the 
unrotated five-state model, and the three-state model. Beneath them is a graphical illustration 
provided by the Cavalier Corporation’s combined estimation period and test period data set with 
respect to its end-of-year announcement dated 26th August 1993. The upper graphical panel 
shows market returns on the horizontal axis versus company returns on the vertical axis. The 
hollow circles represent the fitted lines for the various states with respect to this single 
representative company/event data set. The bottom pair of time series panels consists of returns 
and expected returns in the upper panel, and a plot of abnormal returns in the lower panel. This 
company/event did not furnish a significant abnormal return on the day of the announcement in 
spite of raising its dividend by one cent from 12 to 13 cents, and increasing its EPS (as calculated 
from earnings after tax and before extraordinaries divided by the number of ordinary shares 
outstanding) from 32.3 cents a share to 33.6 cents per share. 
Of particular interest in the top panel are the comparative figures titled ‘% Norm’. 
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Table 7-9: State Model Expected Returns with Mean summary Statistics and Graphical Illustration provided by Cavalier Corporation, 26th August 1993  
4 State Model 3 State 
Unrotated Rotated (graphed) 
Unrotated 5 State 
States Rj<0; Rj=0; Rj>0 RM≥0,and Rj≥0; RM≥0 and Rj<0; 
RM<0 and Rj<0; RM<0and Rj≥0 
Rj=0; RM≥0 and Rj>0; RM≥0 and Rj<0; 
RM<0 and Rj<0; RM<0 and Rj>0 
N 900 801 871 733 
F 88.0833 17.4150 34.9590 41.1681 
Sig. F 0.0000 0.0003 0.0003 0.0001 
Adj R² 0.6908 0.5070 0.6691 0.7038 
% Norm 51.56% 17.48% 21.15% 58.00% 
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This percentage records the incidence of datasets (out of the total number of datasets employed) 
which furnished residuals in the procedure that were normally distributed according to the 
Lilliefors test with a five percent error.  The three-state model actually furnishes residuals that 
perform better, with respect to a normal distribution, than either of the four-state models.  Of the 
three-state model’s datasets, 51.56 percent furnish normally-distibuted residuals, while only 
about one third of that percentage (17.48 percent) of the unrotated four-state model’s datasets do 
likewise.  The rotated four-state model fares not quite so badly with 21.15 percent; but the 
unrotated five-state model furishes better record with 58.0 percent.  The basic Market Model, on 
the other hand, managed 20.57 percent, which is reported in Table 7-10. 
Table 7-10: Market Model Mean Statistics and Cavalier Corporation, 26th August 1993. 
Model Market Model 
States -∞<RM<∞ and -∞<Rj<∞ 
N 948 
F 15.1694 
Sig. F 0.2109 
Adj R² 0.0875 
% Norm 20.57% 
Mean α 0.0001 
Mean β 0.4720 
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In both Table 7-9 and Table 7-10, it is of interest how closely the solid line of the expected 
return series approximates the dotted line of the observed returns in the upper time-series panels. 
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It is not possible to spot significant differences in the quality of these fits from model to model, 
by eye. All of them are much closer fits than that provided by the basic Market Model. 
With respect to the expected returns in the upper time series panel, it is clear that the fitted line 
does a much poorer job of approximating the path of the observed returns depicted as the dotted 
series. In the lower time series panel, there is some evidence of a positive abnormal return on day 
t0, but it is dwarfed by both positive and negative abnormal returns in the preceding thirty days. 
I now turn to the record provided by the abnormal returns furnished by the unrotated five-state 
model. 
Figure 7-6: Day Zero Abnormal Returns outside a 90% Confidence Interval. 
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For each 100-day company/event estimation period, the ARs used in Figure 7-6 were collected 
and a two-tailed 90 percent confidence interval was calculated. If the day zero AR fell outside 
these limits, it was plotted in the figure, while the rest (being generally closer to zero — allowing 
for some distributions to have larger variances than others) were suppressed. One would expect 
to see a dispersion of ARs above and below zero for each of the mixed news announcement 
combinations; but this occurs with respect to the good news and bad news combinations as well.  
Table 7-11: Count and Percentage of Day Zero Abnormal Returns (ARt0). 
DPS-EPS Class Negative Zero Positive Total 
DI-EI 77 (32%) 52 (22%) 110 (46%) 239 
DD-ED 58 (41%) 31 (22%) 51 (36%) 140 
DD-EI 11 (34%) 8 (25%) 13 (41%) 32 
DI-ED 26 (42%) 14 (23%) 22 (35%) 62 
DNC-EI 44 (42%) 24 (23%) 38 (36%) 106 
DNC-ED 67 (44%) 36 (23%) 51 (33%) 154 
Total 283 (39%) 165 (23%) 285 (39%) 733 
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In Table 7-11 all ARs (ignoring the confidence interval) are classified by announcement type and 
the percentage by sign of each is computed for each row. For instance, in the DI-EI row, 32 
percent are positive, 22 percent are zero (in accordance with an observed return on the day being 
zero), and 46 percent are negative. 
It is interesting, in terms of the five-state unrotated model, that 32 percent of the ARs in the DI-
EI category are negative while only 46 percent are positive. One would predict from this that this 
interaction effect will lapse into insignificance when the restricted least squares regression 
procedure standard to this study is performed on this model’s output data. Further, the zero 
column is fairly consistent over the categories, ranging from a minimum of 22% to a maximum 
of 25%; and for all mixed news categories, the percentage of positive ARs is greater (smaller) 
than the percentage of negative ARs whenever earnings increase (decrease). 
Table 7-12: Three-day Event Window CARs (CAR3Day). 
DPS-EPS Class Negative Zero Positive Total
DI-EI 98 (41%) 6 (3%) 135 (56%) 239
DD-ED 78 (56%) 6 (4%) 56 (40%) 140
DD-EI 13 (41%) 2 (6%) 17 (53%) 32
DI-ED 25 (40%) 3 (5%) 34 (55%) 62
DNC-EI 57 (54%) 5 (5%) 44 (42%) 106
DNC-ED 95 (62%) 7 (5%) 52 (34%) 154
Total 366 (50%) 29 (4%) 338 (46%) 733
 
When the event window is expanded to three days, the three-day CARs follow the pattern shown 
in Table 7-12. The zero-value observations drop to an average of four percent; and the positive 
CARs for the good news announcements outweigh the negative CARs by 56% to 41%, while the 
ratio is almost exactly reversed with respect to the bad news category (56% negative to 40% 
positive). However, the mixed-news categories furnish a more complex relationship between 
positive and negative ARs. For both DNC categories, the negatives outweigh the positives. This 
implies that no change in dividend certainly dampens any signal sent by an associated rise in 
earnings, but it certainly appears not to dampen down the negative signal sent by an associated 
fall in announced earnings. In the case of the DI-ED category, the rise in announced dividend 
would appear to garner more positive ARs than the drop in earnings gathers negatives. However, 
in the case of the DD-EI category, the positives outweigh the negatives, suggesting that changes 
in earnings might just be more important in investors’ trading decisions than changes in 
announced dividend. 
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7.3.4 Rotated Five-state Model 
In Table 7-13 the results of the rotated five-state model are furnished. Again the requirement was 
imposed that each quadrant (with rotated axes) must contain at least six observations. The results 
are not as good as the five-state unrotated model. The mean F-statistic has dropped to 21.7974 (p 
= 0.0006). Further, the mean adjusted R2 statistic has dropped to 0.6559. 
Table 7-13: Rotated Five-state Model. 
Mean Min Max St Dev
F 21.7974 1.5961 107.3135 10.1210
Sig. F 0.0006 0.0000 0.1512 0.0084
R2 0.6929 0.1394 0.9567 0.0917
Adj R2 0.6559 0.0520 0.9478 0.1022
Variance 0.0003 0.0000 0.0250 0.0016
Durbin-Watson 2.0663 1.2583 2.8851 0.2829
βQ1 0.0145 -0.0967 0.1789 0.0198
t-Stat   4.6501 -4.8495 13.6350 4.3093
p-Value 0.0713 0.0000 0.9344 0.1700
βQ2 -0.0025 -0.1625 0.0634 0.0185
t-Stat   -1.3927 -11.6375 5.8011 3.7807
p-Value 0.2357 0.0000 0.9977 0.3065
βQ3 -0.0131 -0.1704 0.0928 0.0190
t-Stat   -3.9918 -13.7438 3.9853 3.7239
p-Value 0.0932 0.0000 0.9965 0.2156
βQ4 0.0030 -0.0529 0.1523 0.0189
t-Stat   1.4260 -6.1434 12.2117 3.7754
p-Value 0.2457 0.0000 0.9985 0.3009
βQ1RMt 0.1715 -10.0202 7.5897 1.0323
t-Stat   0.4069 -5.1202 4.6464 1.4750
p-Value 0.4139 0.0000 0.9987 0.3267
βQ2RMt 0.0747 -5.6376 4.5934 0.9943
t-Stat   0.0211 -4.0223 8.3696 1.3371
p-Value 0.4544 0.0000 0.9989 0.3124
βQ3RMt 0.0923 -5.6592 11.6250 1.1012
t-Stat   0.1579 -8.0975 4.5621 1.3606
p-Value 0.4484 0.0000 0.9980 0.3017
βQ4RMt 0.0856 -4.3345 4.7797 0.8784
t-Stat   0.0549 -4.2238 6.6607 1.1633
p-Value 0.5088 0.0000 0.9993 0.3172
N 442
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The question is begged — why does the five-state rotated model not offer an improvement over 
the five-state unrotated model when the rotated four-state model definitely appears to be an 
improvement over the unrotated four-state model? The answer appears to lie in the fact that in 
the five-state models, the zero-value company return observations have been separated out, 
whereas they remain embedded in the four-state models. In the unrotated four-state model, the 
specification of membership of a given quadrant was stated in Figure 7-1. But it turns out that 
the explanatory power of this model depends on where the zero-value company returns are 
shunted. 
When the 0AtR ≥  for the first quadrant was changed to 0AtR > , and the 0AtR <  for the second 
quadrant was changed to 0AtR ≤  with everything else left as in Figure 7-1, the rotated four-state 
model’s mean adjusted R2 statistic rose from 0.5070 to 0.5510. This change was effectively 
brought about by shifting the zero-value company returns from the first quadrant to the second. 
Rather than improve further when this change was left in place and a similar switch was made to 
shift zero-value company returns from the fourth quadrant into the third, the mean adjusted R2 
dropped slightly to 0.5351. 
7.3.5 RLS Regressions employing Abnormal Returns with Respect to 
Event Window Dividend and Earnings Data 
Abnormal returns were then created from the expected returns of the rotated four-state model 
and used in the RLS regression procedures reported in this subsection. The ARs obtained from 
the rotated four-state model showed very little significant connection with changes in dividend 
per share or with changes in earnings per share at all. This result is reported in Table 7-14. The 
only significant relationship is furnished by the first-order variable, ∆EPS on the full sample in 
the fourth column where the dependent variable is ARt0. This relationship is only weakly 
significant, since the p-value fails to come within the five percent benchmark probability of 
error; but the first-order F-statistic at the foot of this column does confirm it within the five 
percent error level. However, this result is very tenuous as the unrestricted equation itself has an 
F-statistic whose supporting p-value is only significant within the ten percent level of error. The 
number of days a firm trades does not appear to make any difference in the light of this model. 
It is of interest that nowhere in the table does the first-order variable, ∆DPS achieve any degree 
of importance at all. Its p-values are, everywhere, utterly inconsequential. The rotated four-state 
model furnishes no evidence of the existence of a dividend signal. 
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Table 7-14: RLS Regression Results employing ARs from the Rotated Four-state Model 
Regressand
Sample by 
Days Traded All Obs. 100 Days
<100 
Days All  Obs. 100 Days
<100 
Days
Coefficient (p-Values)
DD-ED (INTERCEPT) 0.0024638 -0.005749 0.005274 -0.000563 -0.002928 0.0003207
(0.2379) (0.1097) (0.0356) (0.6133) (0.1706) (0.8077)
∆DPS -0.000388 0.0001972 -0.000396 -0.00018 7.68E-05 -0.000194
(0.1241) (0.7672) (0.1568) (0.1819) (0.8464) (0.1855)
∆EPS -3.95E-06 -0.000668 7.929E-05 -0.000122 -0.000207 -0.000108
(0.9737) (0.0567) (0.5467) (0.0569) (0.3186) (0.1191)
DI-EI -0.001126 0.0063497 -0.003885 0.0010718 0.0029082 0.0002614
(0.6839) (0.1920) (0.2391) (0.4681) (0.3148) (0.8802)
DD-EI -0.001324 0.0058967 -0.001674 -0.001643 0.0043177 -0.00396
(0.7604) (0.3624) (0.7617) (0.4786) (0.2627) (0.1728)
DI-ED 0.0024163 0.0007407 0.0013174 0.0029342 0.0071505 0.0015994
(0.4938) (0.9122) (0.7495) (0.1200) (0.0750) (0.4609)
DNC-EI -0.001324 0.0049815 -0.003248 0.000773 0.0029035 -3.66E-06
(0.6513) (0.2886) (0.3659) (0.6213) (0.2985) (0.9985)
DNC-ED -0.005227 0.0035196 -0.008633 -0.00086 0.0024422 -0.002152
(0.0491) (0.4185) (0.0076) (0.5439) (0.3456) (0.2049)
Observations Count R2 Statistics, F-Statistics and p-Values
N 808 190 618 808 190 618
R2UNRESTRICTED 0.0149 0.0276 0.0258 0.0153 0.0276 0.0203
R2EQUATION (ii) 0.0055 0.0142 0.0087 0.0075 0.0070 0.0100
R2EQUATION (iii) 0.0119 0.0076 0.0224 0.0072 0.0222 0.0122
FUNRESTRRICTED 1.7297 0.73863 2.3078 1.7755 0.73761 1.8065
(0.0988) (0.6395) (0.0250) (0.0890) (0.6403) (0.0834)
FEQUATION (ii) 2.2069 1.3462 2.6882 3.0342 0.65933 3.0921
(0.1107) (0.2627) (0.0688) (0.0487) (0.5184) (0.0461)
FEQUATION (iii) 1.926 0.28292 2.8005 1.1643 0.83541 1.517
(0.0877) (0.9220) (0.0164) (0.3250) (0.5261) (0.1824)
FFIRST ORDER 1.2371 1.8706 1.0736 3.2706 0.5067 2.5127
(0.2908) (0.1570) (0.3424) (0.0385) (0.6033) (0.0819)
FINTERACTION 1.5390 0.5024 2.1434 1.2641 0.7713 1.2897
(0.1752) (0.7742) (0.0588) (0.2774) (0.5716) (0.2666)
AR3Day ARt 0
 
7.3.5.1 Results from the Five-state Unrotated Model 
The results from the unrotated five-state model, however, do show a slightly greater degree of 
association between the ARs furnished from this model’s expected returns and day zero 
announcement phenomena. Observe the interaction dummy effects first. Although the good-
news and bad-news announcement combinations managed to achieve significance in the 
unrestricted equation in the first and third columns of Table 7-15 with respect to a three-day 
event window, this significance was left unconfirmed since the interaction F-statistics steadfastly 
remained insignificant. However, with respect to a one-day window, the interaction F-statistics 
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did endorse the DI-EI and DD-ED effects within a ten percent level of error. Indeed, in the result 
reported for the unrestricted procedure, the DI-EI interaction effect was significant at the one-
percent level of error. 
Table 7-15: RLS Regression Results employing ARs from the Unrotated Five-state Model 
Regressand
Sample by 
Days Traded All Obs. 100 Days
<100 
Days All  Obs. 100 Days
<100 
Days
Coefficient (p-Values)
DD-ED (INTERCEPT) -0.016471 -0.010092 -0.01991 -0.009744 -0.005328 -0.012224
(0.0099) (0.1282) (0.0193) (0.0122) (0.2577) (0.0163)
∆DPS 0.001132 -0.000476 0.0014469 0.0004019 -0.000692 0.0006853
(0.2658) (0.6950) (0.2631) (0.5163) (0.4235) (0.3750)
∆EPS 0.0005994 0.0005587 0.0005627 0.0007405 0.0002144 0.000754
(0.0935) (0.3864) (0.1836) (0.0007) (0.6397) (0.0030)
DI-EI 0.022512 0.0075617 0.028658 0.015933 0.010809 0.018736
(0.0082) (0.4003) (0.0110) (0.0021) (0.0915) (0.0055)
DD-EI 0.020244 -0.011011 0.035736 0.0059541 -0.016117 0.018163
(0.0953) (0.3693) (0.0307) (0.4199) (0.0653) (0.0660)
DI-ED 0.017855 0.012926 0.021331 0.0083733 0.0015556 0.011618
(0.0890) (0.2823) (0.1148) (0.1901) (0.8553) (0.1506)
DNC-EI 0.016161 0.0082175 0.0204 0.0099998 0.0040806 0.01334
(0.0631) (0.3488) (0.0818) (0.0589) (0.5123) (0.0570)
DNC-ED 0.014906 0.011564 0.017021 0.006491 0.0028665 0.0082179
(0.0615) (0.1615) (0.1081) (0.1808) (0.6244) (0.1941)
Observations Count R2 Statistics, F-Statistics and p-Values
N 733 198 535 733 198 535
R2UNRESTRICTED 0.0438 0.0280 0.0551 0.0681 0.0562 0.0839
R2EQUATION (ii) 0.0334 0.0061 0.0391 0.0540 0.0032 0.0661
R2EQUATION (iii) 0.0363 0.0240 0.0474 0.0493 0.0527 0.0623
FUNRESTRRICTED 4.7432 0.78282 4.3924 7.5655 1.6176 6.8921
(0.0000) (0.6025) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.1325) (0.0000)
FEQUATION (ii) 12.614 0.59398 10.825 20.851 0.31293 18.842
(0.0000) (0.5531) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.7317) (0.0000)
FEQUATION (iii) 5.4792 0.94529 5.2643 7.5335 2.1358 7.0298
(0.0001) (0.4529) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0629) (0.0000)
FFIRST ORDER 2.8229 0.3923 2.1576 7.3353 0.3533 6.2026
(0.0601) (0.6761) (0.1166) (0.0007) (0.7029) (0.0022)
FINTERACTION 1.5732 0.8595 1.7874 2.1843 2.1372 2.0395
(0.1653) (0.5095) (0.1136) (0.0542) (0.0628) (0.0717)
AR3Day ARt 0
 
As in Table 7-14, the Table 7-15 results furnish no evidence of any meaningful degree of 
association between the regressand and the first-order variable, ∆DPS. On the other hand, ∆EPS 
becomes more strongly significant in the unrotated five-state model results — when the event 
window is restricted to a single day. In the unrestricted procedure results on the one-day window, 
and in the associated first-order F-statistic, ∆EPS in columns four and six has p-values that 
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indicate less than a one percent level of error. But this significance disappears when the sample 
is cut down to include only shares that trade every day during the 100-day expected return 
estimation period. The unrotated five-state model does not furnish results that support the 
existence of a dividend signal. 
7.4 Five State-two Step Model 
The five state-two step model attempts to overcome the problems of spikes in the data and low-
return liquidity trades by performing a second regression on those data-points that fall within an 
80% confidence interval of the estimated fit calculated in a first regression. However, if the 
estimation period is kept at 100 days and the minimum membership requirement for each state is 
six points, this drops the dataset down to 196 usable announcement events. This is just too few. 
However, the method has potential for future studies and so is included. Table 7-16 reports the 
results. 
The most noteworthy item in the table is the F-statistic of 281.29 which is over ten times larger 
than the 17.42 furnished by the unrotated four-state model in Table 7-1. Also the average 
adjusted R2 is very high at 87.96%, but this is for those points included in the second regression. 
But while the four quadrant dummy coefficients ( 1Qβ  to 4Qβ ) are all significant, the coefficients 
of the four market return variables by quadrant remain insignificant. Nevertheless, in terms of 
potentially furnishing expected returns with a high explanatory power with respect to the set of 
observed returns they were calculated upon, this model appears to perform well. 
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Table 7-16: Five-state Two Step Model 
Mean Min Max St Dev
F 281.2937 29.1768 22190.9404 1620.4579
Sig. F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R2 0.8796 0.7194 0.9994 0.0562
Adj R2 0.8689 0.6971 0.9994 0.0609
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
Durbin-Watson 0.8689 0.6971 0.9994 0.0609
βQ1 0.0157 0.0026 0.0682 0.0086
t-Stat   9.3389 1.5916 155.6824 11.9216
p-Value 0.0016 0.0000 0.1125 0.0100
βQ2 -0.0143 -0.0655 0.0005 0.0089
t-Stat   -7.3238 -109.8934 0.1042 9.703
p-Value 0.0105 0.0000 0.3957 0.0451
βQ3 -0.0136 -0.0399 -0.0017 0.0073
t-Stat   -7.855 -115.5873 -0.9866 10.2569
p-Value 0.0056 0.0000 0.2439 0.0264
βQ4 0.0159 -0.0006 0.0691 0.0094
t-Stat   7.3413 -0.197 90.6174 8.2635
p-Value 0.0072 0.0000 0.3901 0.0393
βQ1RMt 0.4205 -2.7074 9.0822 1.1646
t-Stat   2.1581 -9.6728 27.2392 4.5728
p-Value 0.1057 0.0000 0.3976 0.1341
βQ2RMt -0.0124 -3.1619 2.9407 0.8333
t-Stat   -0.1603 -14.0238 6.189 2.3501
p-Value 0.2070 0.0000 0.3978 0.1531
βQ3RMt 0.3674 -1.6456 4.7334 0.7884
t-Stat   2.4016 -11.3507 39.7859 5.8324
p-Value 0.1424 0.0000 0.3978 0.1537
βQ4RMt 0.115 -3.8245 3.6846 0.9681
t-Stat   0.3231 -8.3161 6.2714 2.0928
p-Value 0.1847 0.0000 0.3977 0.1450
N 196
 
7.5 Three-state Asset Pricing Models 
7.5.1 Three-state Methodology 
It may at first appear that spending time looking at a three-state model is a retrograde step — but 
it is not. It is interesting in that it has a mean explanatory power (on the study’s New Zealand 
datasets) of 69.08 percent which is almost as good as the 70.38 percent furnished by the 
unrotated five-state model. This does suggest that it might be more useful as a compiler of 
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expected returns than either of the four-state models. More important, it is the precursor for a 
more important model, which is the three-state two-step model. The three states of the simple 
three-step model are 0jtR > , 0jtR = , and 0jtR < ; and it makes use of two dummy variables. 
These are 1Q , which takes on the value ‘1’ when MtR  is positive, and zero otherwise, and 2Q , 
which takes on the value ‘1’ only when MtR  is negative. 1 1Qβ  is simply the intercept term. 
 1 1 2 2 3 1 4 2jt Mt Mt jtR Q Q Q R Q Rβ β β β ε= + + + +  (7.9) 
The results for the simple three-state model are furnished in Table 7-17 and were summarised in 
Table 7-9 for comparison with the quadrant-based models. 
Table 7-17: Three-state Model. 
Mean Min Max St Dev
F 88.0833 3.2410 547.2592 49.4516
Sig. F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0254 0.0009
R2 0.7001 0.0920 0.9448 0.0992
Adj R2 0.6908 0.0636 0.9430 0.1023
Variance 0.0002 0.0000 0.0235 0.0010
Durbin-Watson 2.0536 1.3239 2.9193 0.2313
βQ1 0.0221 0.004 0.1322 0.0131
t-Stat   9.8019 1.5455 24.8586 3.0816
p-Value 0.0003 0.0000 0.1255 0.0048
βQ2 -0.0207 -0.1209 -0.0032 0.0119
t-Stat   -9.5527 -25.5416 -1.5552 3.0023
p-Value 0.0004 0.0000 0.1232 0.0058
βQ1RMt 0.2655 -7.813 13.3441 0.8105
t-Stat   1.3837 -7.0841 12.7892 2.3042
p-Value 0.2625 0.0000 1.0000 0.2990
βQ2RMt 0.1964 -4.7648 7.7104 0.7138
t-Stat   1.2105 -7.0163 17.7741 2.6451
p-Value 0.3136 0.0000 0.9964 0.3175
N 900
 
Given that there had to be at least six observations in the positive region and six in the negative 
region, the number of estimation data sets dropped from 948 to 900. But 900 is actually quite a 
large number of datasets — and much larger than the 733 eligible sets employed in the unrotated 
five-state model estimation. Effectively the three-step model can run on more thinly-traded 
firms’ datasets. However, the explanatory power of the individual beta coefficients, 1Q RMtβ  and 
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2Q RMtβ  is low, with neither typically achieving significance within any acceptable benchmark 
level for a Type 1 error. However, the same can be found on the coefficients furnished by the 
basic Market Model in Table 7-3 on page 194. 
7.5.2 Three-state Two Step Model 
What I now propose is a three-state two-step model.  This is a definite improvement on all of the 
models discussed and estimated so far in this chapter.  In the manner of the five-state two-step 
model already mentioned, the first step is just the estimation of the state model (here the three-
state model).  The second step entailed screening out observations that fell outside an 80 percent 
confidence interval associated with fitted lines for each of the states and then re-estimating the 
three-state model regression. 
The employment of an 80 percent confidence interval was decided upon after looking at a 
number of graphs using different confidence intervals — but is basically arbitrary.  The decision 
criterion in the confidence interval decision was to retain suffcicient data points while screening 
out two sorts of distorting observations.  The first sort consisted of near-zero company returns 
(from liquidity trading) associated with moderate to large positive and negative values of return 
on the market (RMt).  The second sort were high-value (in absolute terms) outliers.  (Zero-value 
return observations have already been filtered out by being assigned the ‘third’ state.) In 
common with other state model specifications, each state had to have at least six observations for 
a dataset to be eligible for inclusion in the procedure. 
7.5.3 Three-state Two Step Model Results 
The first thing of note in in Table 7-18 is that the mean F-statistic is extremely high (451.71) and 
strongly signficant (p = 0.0000), and the mean adjusted R2 statistic is the highest we have seen so 
far.  This indicates that the variance of the independent variables account for 82.54 percent of the 
variance of the dependent variable — which is very high explanatory power indeed.  Further, this 
procedure was able to be performed on 849 of the 948 datasets in the study — which is a 
reduction of only 51 from what was feasible on the ordinary three-state model.  The two regional 
dummies ( 1Qβ  and 2Qβ ) are strongly significant, but the two market return coefficients do 
remain insignificant — on average.  Nevertheless, as shown in Table 7-19, either half of the 
datasets (or nearly half) furnish market return coefficients which are significant at the five 
percent level. 
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Table 7-18: Three-state Two Step Model 
Mean Min Max St Dev
F 451.7089 45.2826 49718.5761 2758.5721
Sig. F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R2 0.8311 0.5936 0.9994 0.0705
Adj R2 0.8254 0.5805 0.9994 0.0728
Variance 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0000
DW Test 2.0503 1.3843 2.7513 0.2268
βQ1 0.0176 0.0037 0.1129 0.0094
t-Stat   16.0252 3.7095 269.9934 18.2104
p-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000
βQ2 -0.017 -0.1092 -0.0041 0.0088
t-Stat   -16.183 -262.1751 -3.9237 19.061
p-Value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000
βQ1RMt 0.2238 -6.0557 4.5814 0.5466
t-Stat   1.9459 -13.1709 43.8459 3.8271
p-Value 0.2014 0.0000 0.9947 0.2770
βQ2RMt 0.1867 -3.466 4.7541 0.4868
t-Stat   1.6398 -12.0102 27.4763 3.6808
p-Value 0.2518 0.0000 0.9985 0.3023
N 849
 
However, the percentage of datasets which furnished normal residuals in the procedure’s second 
step has risen close to 70 percent, which is shown in Table 7-19.  This is the best mean set of 
residuals furnished in the study.  
Table 7-19: Number of Signifcant Coefficients in the Three-state Two Step Model 
Coefficient Na<0.05 %
βQ1 849 100.00%
βQ2 849 100.00%
βQ1RMt 436 51.35%
βQ2RMt 366 43.11%
% Normal Residuals 69.85%
 
7.5.4 RLS Regressions with Three-state Two Step Model-based Abnormal 
Returns 
I will start with the column of results in Table 7-20 for the full sample in the context of a one-
day event window (where ARt0 is the regressand). 
213 
Table 7-20: RLS Regression Results employing ARs from the Three-state Two Step Model 
Regressand
All Obs. 100 Days <100 Days All Obs. 100 Days <100 Days
DD-ED (INTERCEPT) -0.0153 -0.0155 -0.0163 -0.0072 -0.0051 -0.0088
(0.0006) (0.0129) (0.0034) (0.0374) (0.2812) (0.0408)
∆EPS 0.0008 -0.0013 0.0010 0.0007 -0.0009 0.0009
(0.2092) (0.2496) (0.1620) (0.1727) (0.2779) (0.1206)
∆DPS 0.0003 0.0005 0.0003 0.0008 0.0005 0.0008
(0.2001) (0.3895) (0.2806) (0.0000) (0.2781) (0.0002)
DI-EI 0.0248 0.0163 0.0283 0.0139 0.0114 0.0159
(0.0000) (0.0550) (0.0001) (0.0026) (0.0763) (0.0057)
DD-EI 0.0115 -0.0120 0.0208 0.0015 -0.0166 0.0095
(0.1842) (0.2997) (0.0606) (0.8210) (0.0600) (0.2706)
DI-ED 0.0193 0.0213 0.0204 0.0076 0.0017 0.0106
(0.0086) (0.0500) (0.0235) (0.1820) (0.8397) (0.1301)
DNC-EI 0.0164 0.0137 0.0187 0.0085 0.0029 0.0118
(0.0075) (0.0913) (0.0171) (0.0745) (0.6386) (0.0527)
DNC-ED 0.0061 0.0123 0.0049 0.0034 0.0014 0.0048
(0.2732) (0.1056) (0.4816) (0.4305) (0.8097) (0.3768)
N 849 211 638 849 211 638
Adj R2UNRESTRICTED 0.0661 0.0477 0.0800 0.0781 0.0616 0.0907
Adj R2EQUATION (ii) 0.0398 0.0062 0.0467 0.0646 0.0065 0.0764
Adj R2EQUATION (iii) 0.0615 0.0398 0.0743 0.0532 0.0529 0.0627
FUNRESTRRICTED 8.5063 1.4525 7.8309 10.1790 1.9049 8.9790
(0.0000) (0.1862) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0704) (0.0000)
FEQUATION (ii) 17.5410 0.6521 15.5700 29.1900 0.6830 26.2580
(0.0000) (0.5220) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5062) (0.0000)
FEQUATION (iii) 11.0530 1.6999 10.1440 9.4793 2.2904 8.4572
(0.0000) (0.1361) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0471) (0.0000)
FFIRST ORDER 2.0724 0.8386 1.9700 11.3441 0.9384 9.7012
(0.1265) (0.4338) (0.1403) (0.0000) (0.3929) (0.0001)
FINTERACTION 4.7344 1.7684 4.5625 2.4681 2.3852 1.9852
(0.0003) (0.1208) (0.0004) (0.0312) (0.0395) (0.0789)
Coefficients of Unrestricted Regression (p-Values)
CAR3Day ARt0
Observations, Adj R2 Statistics, F-Statistics, (p-Values)
 
Here, only three individual coefficients in the unrestricted estimation procedure achieve 
significance.  These are the first-order DPS∆  coefficient (albeit tiny in being associated with a 
0.08 percent change in ARt0 per unit change in itself), and the good-news (DI-EI) and bad-news 
(DD-ED) interaction effects only.  The DI-EI effect was significant at the one percent level of 
error and its positive coefficient indicates that a unit upward change in this variable is associated 
with a 1.39 percent upward shift in ARt0.  The DD-ED coefficient is negative and smaller in that 
a unit rise in it is associated with a downward shift of 0.72 percent in ARt0.  No other interaction 
effects are significant; and both the first-order and interaction F-statistics are significant (the 
former, strongly).  One could argue that this combination of significant coefficients (in 
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conjunction with those that remain insignificant) furnishes strong proof of an investor reaction to 
a dividend signal in that the conflicting signals in the mixed news categories have cancelled each 
other out.  This may be correct.  However, the fact that we are left only with significant 
interaction effects in which the dividend change and the earnings change both pull in the same 
direction means that we cannot distinguish them from each other.  The presence of the small but 
highly significant DPS∆  first-order coefficient may rescue us from that conundrum. 
This result is echoed weakly with respect to the relatively thinly-traded subsample in the final 
column, where the interaction F-statistic has lapsed into insignificance excepting at the ten 
percent level of error (p = 0.0789); and, as ever, the fully-traded subsample furnishes no 
meaningfully significant results. (This time it furnished a promising interaction F-statistic which 
had nothing to corroborate.) 
The results on the three-day window offer a clearer view.  They are very similar to the results 
furnished in Table J-1 (page 316) with respect to friction model unconditional returns in 
9Appendix J.5.  In particular, the DI-EI and DD-ED interaction effects (for both full sample and 
thinly-traded subsample) are still strongly significant in the unrestricted regression and are 
corroborated by strongly significant interaction F-statistics.  In addition, two mixed-message 
interaction effects (DI-ED and DNC-EI), have positive and significant coefficients. These results 
furnish evidence of an investor reaction to a clear dividend signal. 
Meanwhile the fully-traded subset yet again failed to furnish any corroborated significant results.  
Nevertheless, the three-state two step model, which furnished expected returns with the greatest 
degree of explanatory power of all expected returns in this study, has furnished evidence on a 
one-day window that investors do react to a dividend signal — which therefore must exist. 
7.6 Chapter Conclusions 
A number of models relating to the four-state model of Norsworthy, Gorener, Morgan, Schuler 
and Li (2004) were examined in this chapter. Both the unrotated and rotated versions of the four-
state model show huge increases explanatory power over the explanatory power of the basic 
Market Model. So too did a simple three-state model, which was compiled in this study and then 
developed as a three-state two step model. 
What was much more important than the four-state models in the chapter was that two new five-
state models were furnished. These improved upon Norsworthy et al’s four-state model by 
explicitly allowing for an extra state, which was the state of zero-value returns. One of these was 
an unrotated five-state model and the other was a rotated five-state model. The unrotated five-
state model was calculated in two separate ways. In the first instance, it was computed as an OLS 
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regression with a number of dummy variables. In the second instance, it was computed as a 
friction model. The results for both formulations of the unrotated five-state model were 
congruent. 
It was then found that the rotated five-state model was not an improvement upon the unrotated 
five-state model. The reason for this was the removal of zero-value returns into a separate ‘state’. 
Given that the removal of zero-value returns was the salient difference between Norsworthy et 
al’s two four state models and this study’s two five-state models, it is clear that it was the 
presence of these zero-value returns that was creating the difference in performance between the 
North American authors’ unrotated and rotated four-state models. Once these zero-value returns 
were handled separately, the distinction disappeared. 
The chapter went on to investigate a five-state two step model and the three-state and three-state 
two step models.  These last two models had the highest adjusted R2 statistics of all models 
looked at in this study.  In addition, almost 70 percent of the 849 datasets employed by the three-
state two step model furnished distributions of residuals that the Lilliefors Test determined to be 
nromal with a five percent probability of a Type 1 error.  In addition, when CAR3Day and ARt0 
were compiled from ARs derived from the three-state two-step model, the effect on ARt0 of an 
unconfounded dividend signal was clearly detected. 
216 
8 Conclusions  
8.1 Proof of an Investor Reaction to Dividend Signalling? 
This thesis set out to examine the record of dividend signalling in the joint dividend-and-
earnings announcement context of company disclosures to the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
(NZX) in the 1990s. Was there any shift in share prices in association with the release of 
announcement information that could be imputed as evidence of investors acting in accordance 
with a dividend signal separable from the simultaneously transmitted earnings signal?  That was 
the research question. 
Three methodologies were used in checking this research question out. Initially a two-step 
methodology entailing restricted least squares (RLS) regression on abnormal returns data 
obtained via the Market Model was employed.  This appeared to be a sound technique, having 
been re-used by researchers in different countries over a span of twelve years without revision.  
However, it did not address the econometric issue of distortion induced by absences of trading in 
a thinly-traded market.  This shortcoming meant that the expected returns generated by the 
Market Model would be biased downward in size, and that the abnormal returns calculated from 
them would be overstated.  Hence, a second methodolgy (friction modelling) and a third 
methodology entailing the employment of state models were investigated as replacements to the 
simple OLS procedure that is the Market Model.  In addition, friction models were also 
developed to replace the RLS regression procedure in the second step, thereby potentially doing 
away with the methodology pioneered by Kane, Lee and Marus (1984) entirely. 
The answer to the research question about the detection of a dividend signal turned out to be a 
qualified yes. Some, but not all of the models furnished evidence of it. If a dividend signal could 
be viewed as an elusive wild beast, then the following models uncovered its spoor: 
1. The full five-dummy RLS procedure employed in conjunction with the Market Model in 
Chapter 5 on data up till May 13th 1996 based on EPS figures calculated in the study 
(since announcements did not provide them explicitly). 
2. All but one of the friction models in Chapter 6 incorporating both event window changes 
in dividend and changes in earnings. (The exception was the one which entered the two 
variables additively in the friction model specification, which was methodologically not 
as sound as the rest of these models — indeed made so by that additivity.) 
3. The full five-dummy RLS procedure on measures of abnormal return compiled from the 
three-state two-step model in Chapter 7. 
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The following models failed to find it: 
1. The full five-dummy RLS procedure in Chapter 5 from May 13th 1996 onward. 
2. The full five-dummy RLS procedures in Chapter 7 where the measures of abnormal 
return were compiled from expected returns generated by the rotated four-state model. 
3. The full five-dummy RLS procedures in Chapter 7 where the measures of abnormal 
return were compiled from expected returns generated by the unrotated five-state model. 
4. Wherever the sample was split into a fully-traded subset and a more thinly-traded subset, 
the fully-traded subsample did not furnish significant results.  
Therefore the conclusion indeed must be a qualified ‘yes’. Dividend signalling can be detected in 
the behaviour of company abnormal returns in the context of the New Zealand market in the 
1990s, but only when a number of limiting factors have been taken into account. These limiting 
factors are the degree of trading that occurs in a share during the estimation period for expected 
returns, and the exact nature of the model employed.  I will now deal with each of these items in 
turn. 
8.2 Market Model with RLS Regression 
Because the Market Model and RLS methodology is well understood, and in this study furnished 
results that were commensurate with prior studies in the US, Australia and the UK in which the 
effect of thinly-traded markets were not modelled, there is no great need for a finely-detailed 
debriefing of its nuts and bolts here.  While the methodology, as stated in the previous section, 
did come up with evidence of dividend signalling, two items of interest did spring forth, that are 
worth considering separately.  These were the thin trading effect canvassed immediately below 
in the next section, and a possible mid-decade shift in investor behaviour, which is discussed in 
Section 8.6. I will move on to the first of these now. 
8.3 Thin Trading 
The phenomenon of thin trading was initially ignored in the study in till late in Chapter 5.  
However, when it was investigated in conjunction with the initial Market Model and RLS 
methodology, the subsample of companies which had an unbroken record of share trading every 
day throughout their designated estimation periods showed no evidence of dividend signalling — 
or at least no evidence of investors acting in response to one.  This is similar to the finding more 
generally in the literature that large companies tend to produce smaller CARS in event studies 
than those of relatively smaller companies.  This tendancy has generally been interpreted as 
having been a downstream effect of the ongoing supply of information pumped into the market 
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by the analysts who study particular large firms, or by the firms themselves.  The steadiness of 
this supply stands in contrast with a relative absence of information concerning the financial 
health of smaller listed firms.  Hence, when smaller firms make an announcement, the substance 
of it is less likely to have been predicted from a stream of previous communications. 
Perhaps the large firm effect and the absence of thin trading are closely linked phenomena.  
Large firms with huge market capitalisations are much more likely to have their shares traded 
every day that the share market is open than would small firms with more modest market 
capitalisations.   
I speculate that the thin-trading effect may be at least a partial explanation as to why smaller 
companies have traditionally furnished larger CARs in event studies.  The effect works in two 
ways.  First, there is the influence of the absence of any steady, ongoing information stream.  
Second, there is the econometric effect mentioned above that causes expected returns to be 
understated and ARs and CARs to be exaggerated in size.   
However, even when friction models were employed in Chapter 6, the distinction remained.  
Firms whose shares traded every day furnished no evidence of a dividend signal when RLS 
regression was employed in the second step. 
Nevertheless it should be remembered with respect to the thinly-traded subsample, that it 
included every degree of thinness of trading from 99 out 100 days downward to less than 10 out 
of 100. Indeed, the shares of most firms in this subsample traded most of the time. Hence this 
subsample does not represent extreme thinness. 
It was my concern about the econometric difficulties associated with applying the Market Model 
and RLS methodology to New Zealand’s thinly-traded share market that impelled me to 
investigate friction modelling and state models.  The drive to work appropriately with thin 
market data was a drive to work with it in econometrically sound ways.   
8.4 Friction Models 
In the face of the OLS (including RLS) regression requirement that the error term be 
independently and identically distributed (iid), and the fact that company returns data from thin 
markets does not furnish iid residuals, friction modelling’s avoidance of regression’s iid error 
restriction was an attractive attribute.  Given the preponderance of zero-value company returns in 
company returns series calculated on NZX data, a friction model presented itself as an ideal tool 
for calculating expected returns since it took zero-value company returns explicitly into account. 
Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) replaced OLS regression as the computational 
workhorse in a friction model context, and found, via a quasi-Newton numerical search 
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procedure, the optimal set of parameters to fit the observations from each 100-day estimation 
period for each company/event. 
Two sets of expected returns were calculated from friction model output — unconditional 
expected returns (reported in Appendix J) and conditional expected returns. The conditional 
expected returns forecasted into the 21-day test period produced larger ARs than did either the 
unconditional expected returns or the expected returns of the Market Model. This was a 
surprising result.  
However, the RLS regression results on the full sample obtained when ARt0 was derived from 
conditional expected returns furnished both a statistically significant first-order DPS∆  
coefficient and EPS∆  coefficient that were corroborated by the related first-order F-statistic; but 
no noteworthy dividend-and-earnings interaction effects. With respect to CAR3Day derived 
from conditional expected returns, only the good-news effect (DI-EI) was significant and 
corroborated. This was some, but not overwhelming evidence of an investor reaction to a 
dividend signal on the three-day window. 
The unconditional returns furnished results that were more closely aligned with those furnished 
from the original basic Market Model methodology in tandem with the RLS procedure, and 
furnished evidence of a clear dividend signal in spite of the presence of earnings signal effects. 
Then Chapter 6 went on to examine a number of friction models directly modelling the 
association between ARt0 and the variables derived from announcement news components. 
Initially DPS∆  alone was modelled with ARt0; and then EPS∆  was modelled alone with it. 
Both furnished significant results, but the coefficient of DPS∆  was much larger. When they 
were employed simultaneously, they both continued to be significant — and DPS∆  continued to 
have a bigger beta. But the significance of the DPS∆  was dependent on the fine details of the 
configuration of the friction model. (With one configuration, where the first-order variables were 
treated additively, it was insignificant; but with a simpler, more restrictive and more 
conceptually satisfying configuration it became strongly positive.) 
In addition, the coefficients of both variables were found to be much greater (and more 
significant) on day t0 than on any other day in the 21-day test period. This does suggest a strong 
reaction to the advent of both earnings news and dividend news. 
I turn now to the friction region where the dependent variable, ARt0 did not move in association 
with the first-order news variables. The size of this region was of interest. For the model 
employing both news variables on the 923 observations of the full sample, this had a value of six 
percent, which implied that the rise in dividend or in earnings had to be greater than two percent 
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before any impact was observable on the abnormal return variable, and a fall in dividend or in 
earnings had to be greater in absolute magnitude than four percent. This provided some evidence 
of the unwillingness of investors to act as fast on bad news as they were prepared to act on good 
news. This phenomenon is predicted by prospect theory — which covers a large territory that is 
largely beyond the purview of this study. 
The last major area covered by Chapter 6 was the employment of a friction model modelling 
event window phenomena, incorporating dividend-and-earnings interaction effects. This model 
was found (by a likelihood ratio test) to be superior to the model employing first-order variables 
only. Indeed, both dummy variables were strongly significant. This indicated the presence of 
both earnings signalling and dividend signalling. 
Chapter 6 also utilised the study’s data in a manner that was different in one further aspect. In 
order to incorporate dividend initiations and resumptions into the available data set, the two 
variables, DPS∆  and EPS∆  were reconfigured as simple differences deflated by the previous 
day’s closing price. This turned them into measures of change-in-yield; but it was established 
that these variables performed in a manner closely aligned to the performance of the percentage 
change variables used in Chapter 5 (where the formulations were identical with those used by 
Kane, Lee and Marcus (1984), Easton (1991), Abeyratna (1994) and Lonie, Abeyratna, Power 
and Sinclair (1996) for the purpose of direct comparison.) The new configuration allowed 948 
company/events to be used in the analysis. 
8.5 State Asset Pricing Models 
State models and friction models handle the problem of thin trading in a similar way.  Both can 
employ zero-trading as a designated ‘state’.  But where friction models employ MLE, state 
models fall back upon reliance on the properties of OLS regression.  However, these state 
models do provide a much better fit between company returns and market returns data than either 
the Market Model or the various friction models. 
Chapter 7 enquired into a number of state asset pricing models. The first was the four-state asset 
pricing model promulgated by Norsworthy, Gorener, Morgan, Schuler and Li (2004) and also 
used by Jokung and Meyfredi (2003). This model was best understood in terms of partitioning 
observed company returns by their sign and also by the sign of the accompanying observed 
market returns in a manner that ostensibly captured the perceptions of investors when they 
committed themselves to making a trade. 
The four-state model came in two versions that were of interest — unrotated and rotated. The 
unrotated model furnished a view of investor trades in which company returns were measured 
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against the benchmark measure of a zero-value company return under the same market 
conditions, which was anywhere along the horizontal axis of a quadrant so long as the vertical 
axis value was zero. The rotated model’s shift of the position of the axes changed the 
classification to one in which company returns were measured, according to Norsworthy et al’s 
application of prospect theory, against investor expectations of company returns based on past 
share movements under given market conditions. 
Norsworthy et al found that their unrotated four-state model had much greater explanatory power 
than did the Market Model on the same data. The current study found a similar improvement 
when applying an unrotated four-state model to New Zealand data. This was hardly surprising 
given that more information about company returns was included in the formulation of expected 
returns. When rotation was applied, both the American study and the current study recorded 
further improvements in explanatory power. 
Then the current study moved onto new ground. Zero-value returns were explicitly designated as 
the fifth state and the four-state model became a five-state model, leaving all else unchanged. 
The unrotated five-state model showed a small increase in explanatory power over the rotated 
four-state model on the same New Zealand data. However, the rotated five-state model’s 
explanatory power diminished. Effectively, the increase in explanatory power brought about by 
rotating the four-state model can be ascribed to the handling of zero-value returns. With rotation, 
they are no longer aligned at zero (with respect to the vertical axis) along the horizontal axis — 
and this causes them to play a role in determining expected returns that perhaps they should not 
play. 
Chapter 7 then moved on to a five-state two step model. This was essentially the unrotated five-
state model with a second tier of estimations added into the procedure to remove the influence of 
outliers. The explanatory power of this model was reported by a mean adjusted R2 statistic of 87 
percent for the data points in the second regression. This procedure’s second tier of estimations 
involved re-estimating regressions on all observations found to be within an 80 percent 
confidence interval of the fitted lines from the first tier of regressions. Unfortunately this was 
very expensive on data sets as every quadrant required the presence of a minimum of six 
observations — and only 196 of the 948 original data sets met this criterion once the outliers 
were excluded. This model hints at the efficacy of jump-diffusion modelling. 
Chapter 7 then moved on to two three-state models — one of which was also a two step model. 
The three-state models were of particular interest. They outperformed the Market Model on the 
same data — and also outperformed both versions of the four-state models in explanatory power 
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and were almost as good as the five-state two step model while not sharing its Achilles heel (data 
attrition). 
The three-state two step model was set up in a manner similar to the five-state two-step model. 
Its second step entailed re-estimating the three-state OLS regression with data that fell within an 
80 percent confidence interval of the fitted lines of the first estimation. The residuals from this 
second step were normally distributed (according to the Lilliefors test with a five percent error) 
for almost 70 percent of all data sets employed. And in addition to that, a greater proportion of 
all estimated coefficients became significant at the five percent level of error than for any other 
state model estimated. This finding reinforces the study’s finding of the pivotal role played by 
zero-value returns in Market Model output and in the output of ‘state’ asset pricing models. The 
three-state two step model was arguably the best model found in Chapter 7. 
Next, RLS regressions were estimated on measures of CAR3Day and ARt0 compiled from the 
best of the four- and five-state asset pricing models. With respect to measures compiled from the 
rotated four-state model, no interaction effects were corroborated at all. This furnished strong 
evidence that there was no investor reaction to any dividend signal. With respect to the unrotated 
five-state model developed in the current study, there was, again, no corroborated evidence of a 
dividend signalling effect — although some evidence was discernible if the accepted benchmark 
for a Type 1 error was expanded to the ten percent level. But the result on ARt0 most certainly 
did point to the existence of an investor reaction to an earnings signal. 
Finally, a restricted least squares regression was estimated on abnormal returns furnished by the 
three-state two step asset pricing model. This provided evidence of the existence of a dividend 
signal. 
8.6 A Final Point of Interest 
An interesting general finding worth mentioning at this end-point was the discovery, in Chapter 
5, of a fall-off in association between the dividend-and-earnings news events and the behaviour 
of ARs and CARs in the second half of the decade.  
There were a number of possible reasons for this. The first was that the failure to find a 
significant association following the change in NZX disclosure regulations that took effect in 
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May 1996178 might have indicated that investors actually might not have used the figures as 
disclosed, but, instead, used some other measure of company profitability. 
The second was that investors, in the latter half of the decade, could have become less concerned 
about dividend streams as a component of their share-holding strategies, and more concerned 
about capital gains. There was certainly some comment, internationally that the importance of 
dividends might have been waning. The Economist November 18th 1999, for instance ran an 
article titled “Shares without the other bit” with the opening line, “In Corporate America paying 
dividends has gone out of fashion.”  
The third possibility was that investors no longer reacted to the final top-up dividend that had 
ceased to be reported, but were reacting to news of change in the cumulated total dividend for 
the year in end-of year announcements. This is an interesting avenue for future exploration. 
This possible change of investor behaviour was explored only in terms of the Market Model and 
RLS methodology of Chapter 5. This is one of the limitations of this study — as it would have 
been interesting to see if the other methodologies confirmed the phenomenon. 
                                                 
178 These changes included two vital matters with respect to this study.  First, EPS figures were required as of May 
1996 and not before.  Second, the dividend figure required as of May 1996 was the cumulative dividend for the year 
and not the final dividend which had been required beforehand.  
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Appendix A The NZX and the NZ Economy in the 1980s 
A brief tour of 1980s New Zealand history provides good reason for not employing 1980s 
sharemarket data — even if it were readily available. An excellent commentary on the decade is 
provided by Grant (1997), which provided much of the information sumarised here. In the 
decade, the country underwent economic upheaval starting in July 1984 with the election of the 
Lange/Douglas Labour Government and its embarkation upon a series of major economic 
reforms. There was a frenzy of speculation as people attempted to adapt, and to optimise their 
prospects in a new and unfamiliar market environment; and then there was the 1987 crash, which 
was locally much more severe in its impact than any share market or other economic reversal 
experienced in the 1990s. 
Prior to the election of the Lange/Douglas government, New Zealand had been heavily regulated, 
had (by current standards) over-employment in government services, and even had a nationwide 
price-wage freeze in place.179 The new government had two aims: to reduce public debt and to 
increase the country’s competitiveness. Within his first four months, the new Minister of 
Finance, Roger Douglas removed interest rate controls, abolished restrictions on in-coming and 
outgoing foreign investment and ended the wage freeze. Four months later (March 1985), he 
floated the New Zealand exchange rate. This was followed up in 1987 with deregulation of the 
banking industry. In tandem with these changes, was a huge reduction in tariffs and the abolition 
of import controls (importers had previously been required to hold import licenses). 
Given that New Zealand interest rates were high by world standards, foreign capital flooded 
inward and the New Zealand dollar appreciated significantly against the currencies of its trading 
partners. New Zealanders, also, for the first time in their lives, had the unrestricted right to 
deploy their wealth where and as they saw fit. The above factors stimulated a largely locally-
fuelled share market bull run which lasted through till the October 1987 crash; but the market 
leaders were primarily property development firms and companies that were speculative 
investors in their own right — as distinct from companies with an established record of 
producing goods and services. The manoeuvrings of these companies captured much of the 
popular imagination; and these tumultuous events gave plenty of scope for the occurrence of 
confounding factors that would potentially obscure the dividend signalling picture. 
Concurrent with these financial reforms, the Lange/Douglas Labour Government, also set about 
down-sizing the State Sector with a series of restructurings and privatisations which entailed 
making large numbers of employees redundant. The surge in unemployment was increased by 
Private Sector redundancies when manufacturing firms either went out of business or relocated 
their factories to where labour was cheaper, offshore. Further, the high exchange rate punished 
the agricultural sector, which was the main source of exports. Hence underneath the gung-ho 
effervescence of the 1984-1987 share market, the economy was not necessarily doing very well. 
By contrast, in the 1990s, most of the deregulatory reforms were in place and the speculative 
noise associated with them on the stock market had subsided. The economy was settling into 
                                                 
179 This government was a Labour Party government; and the Prime Minister was David Lange. Traditionally, in the 
two-party system in place for most of the Twentieth Century, Labour was the left-wing party, while the National 
Party was the right-wing one. Both tended to be fairly centrist; but the 1984 Labour Government was much more 
right-wing than the preceding National Government. Currently New Zealand has a multi-party system; and it is 
interesting that a number of the leading politicians of the 1984 Labour Government later became founding members 
of the ACT Party, which is, economically speaking, at the far right of the political spectrum. One such politician was 
Roger Douglas, Minister of Finance in the 1984 and 1987 governments. (Elections are held every three years unless 
called earlier.) 
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recovery mode. The only major reform of the decade was the deregulation of the labour market 
in May 1991.180 
When the October 1987 crash did occur, the New Zealand Stock Exchange fell further than those 
of New Zealand’s trading partners; and the recovery from the bottom end of the business cycle 
lingered into the early 1990s.181 The share market was severely downsized by the delisting of 
companies foundering as a result of the crash. In terms of the number of companies listed on the 
Exchange, the 361 of October 1987 had plummeted to 140 by April 1989. Similarly, from a 
high-point of $50.02 billion dollars on the eve of the crash, the NZX’s total market capitalisation 
was reduced to a mere $14.5 billion dollars in January 1991 before beginning to grow again.182 
The market had been reduced to less than half its former size. 
                                                 
180 The Employment Contracts Act of 1991 had the effect of reducing the power of trade unions in the work place. 
The Act had a settling effect as distinct from a disruptive effect on the New Zealand economy in the 1990s. 
181 Grant (1997), p. 329. Consider first the rises, and then the falls. Between 1982 and October 1987, the NZX rose 
600 percent, which was almost double the equivalent rise in the United Kingdom over the same period (350 
percent), and over double the rise in U.S. share markets (250 percent). In Australia, the share market rose 400 
percent. In the ten months following the crash, the New Zealand market fell 50 percent where the others’ falls 
tended to be in the 25 – 30 percent range. Grant (p. 329) ascribes partial responsibility for this difference to the 
relative lack of foreign institutional investment in the New Zealand share market. Such investment might have acted 
as a brake. Further, “…the New Zealand market was small and narrowly based compared with New York, London 
and Australia, with the top twenty companies representing more than two-thirds of the market capitalisation. By 
October 1987 most of the twenty were unstable entrepreneurial and investment companies.” 
182 Ibid, p. 308. 
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Appendix B Nature Company/events in the Study.  
The company/events are described in this appendix by company code (coy), company name, industry code, the date 
of the announcement, and a short description of the company’s business activity. There is a separate table for each 
year from 1990 to 1999. The coding for the industry is, by necessity, quite loose, as many firms are active in more 
than one industry; and some of them change the nature of their business over time. 
 
The industry codes are: 
 
Code Description 
  
AGS Agriculture and associated services 
AUT Automotive 
BLD Building and construction 
CHM Chemical and fertilizer 
ELE Electrical 
ENE Energy and fuel 
ENG Engineering 
FIN Finance, banks and insurance 
FOD Food 
FOR Forestry and forest products 
INV Investments 
LIQ Liquor and tobacco 
MET Meat and by-products 
MCM Media and communications 
MED Medical supplies 
MIN Mining 
MIS Miscellaneous services 
PRO Property 
RET Retail merchants 
TEX Textile and apparel 
TRN Transport and tourism 
 
1990     
        
No COY INT/FI
N 
Name Code Date  Description 
        
1 BNZ 1 BNZ Finance FIN 15-Oct-90  Financial services 
2 BRY 2 Brierley Investments Ltd INV 27-Sep-90  Investment 
3 CAV 2 Cavalier Corporation Ltd TEX 29-Aug-90  Manufacturing - wool scouring and carpet 
4 CEM 1 Ceramco Corporation Ltd INV 11-Dec-90  Manufacturing - industrial and consumer products 
5 DBG 2 Magnum Corporation Ltd LIQ 29-Aug-90  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
hospitality 
        
6 DON 2 Donaghys Ltd TEX 7-Sep-90  Manufacturing - cordage, plastics, electronics 
7 FAP 1 Fisher & Paykel Industries Ltd ELE 2-Nov-90  Manufacturing - domestic appliances 
8 FER 2 Fernz Corporation Ltd CHM 26-Jul-90  Manufacturing - fertiliser and chemicals (agri-) 
9 GMF 2 Goodman Fielder Ltd FOD 25-Sep-90  Manufacturing - food processing 
10 HLG 2 Hallenstein Glasson Holdings Ltd RET 2-Oct-90  Retailing - clothing 
        
11 MAI 2 Mair Astley Holdings Ltd MET 13-Sep-90  Manufacturing and retailing - food, wool, leather 
12 MBN 1 Milburn New Zealand Ltd BLD 3-Sep-90  Manufacturing sand refining - cement, lime 
13 MHI 2 Michael Hill International Ltd RET 23-Aug-90  Manufacturing and retailing - jewellery 
14 MON 2 Corporate Investments Ltd INV 14-Sep-90  Investment, liquor industry 
15 NPX 2 Nuplex Industries Ltd CHM 24-Aug-90  Manufacturing - resins, chemicals 
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16 NZR 1 The New Zealand Refining 
Company Ltd 
ENE 30-Aug-90  Manufacturing and Refining - petrol 
17 OTR 2 Mineral Resources (NZ) Ltd MIN 3-Oct-90  Mineral Resources - gold 
18 OWN 1 Owens Group Ltd TRN 7-Dec-90  Investment, transport 
19 ROT 1 Radio Otago Ltd MCM 13-Nov-90  Radio station 
20 SEU 1 Amuri Corporation Ltd PRO 2-Nov-90  Manufacturing and Retailing - motor vehicles 
        
21 SSB 1 Salmond Smith Biolab Ltd MED 12-Dec-90  Manufacturing & retailing - food, plastic, 
brushware, angora goat industry 
22 WAM 1 Waste Management NZ Ltd MIS 21-Aug-90  Service Utility - waste disposal 
23 WHC 2 Rank Group Ltd MIS 3-Sep-90  Retail - books, Printing 
24 WHO 1 Wilson and Horton Ltd MCM 26-Oct-90  Newspaper and Publishing 
        
 
1991     
        
No COY INT/FI
N 
Name Code Date  Description 
        
1 AIRVA 2 Air New Zealand Ltd TRN 1-Oct-91  Transport - air 
2 APF 2 Apple Fields Ltd AGS 19-Nov-91  Horticulture and agriculture (later property 
development) 
3 BNZ 1 BNZ Finance Ltd FIN 15-Oct-91  Financial services 
4 BNZ 2 BNZ Finance Ltd FIN 16-Apr-91  Financial services 
5 BRY 2 Brierley Investments Ltd INV 26-Sep-91  Investment 
        
6 BWY 2 Broadway Industries Ltd MIS 13-Sep-91  Manufacturing and retailing - business machines, 
sewing equipment 
7 CAV 1 Cavalier Corporation Ltd TEX 25-Feb-91  Manufacturing - wool scouring and carpet 
8 CAV 2 Cavalier Corporation Ltd TEX 29-Aug-91  Manufacturing - wool scouring and carpet 
9 CEM 1 Ceramco Corporation Ltd INV 21-Nov-91  Manufacturing - industrial and consumer products 
10 CEM 2 Ceramco Corporation Ltd INV 14-Jun-91  Manufacturing - industrial and consumer products 
        
11 DBG 1 Magnum Corporation Ltd LIQ 28-Feb-91  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
hospitality 
12 DBG 2 Magnum Corporation Ltd LIQ 30-Aug-91  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
hospitality 
13 DMB 2 Damba Holdings Ltd MIS 18-Jun-91  Manufacturing - furniture (also distributing) 
14 DON 1 Donaghys Ltd TEX 4-Mar-91  Manufacturing - cordage, plastics, electronics 
15 DON 2 Donaghys Ltd TEX 6-Sep-91  Manufacturing - cordage, plastics, electronics 
        
16 EEQ 2 Eastern Equities Corporation Ltd AGS 30-Oct-91  Horticulture and Agriculture 
17 ERN 1 Ernest Adams Ltd FOD 11-Nov-91  Food processing - cakes pastries 
18 FAP 2 Fisher & Paykel Industries Ltd ELE 7-Jun-91  Manufacturing - domestic appliances 
19 FER 1 Fernz Corporation Ltd CHM 15-Feb-91  Manufacturing - fertiliser ad chemicals (agri-) 
20 FLC 1 Fletcher Challenge Ltd FOR 14-Feb-91  Manufacturing, construction, Forestry, Agricultural 
        
21 FRW 1 Fay Richwhite & Company Ltd FIN 28-Feb-91  Investment, Financial services 
22 FRW 2 Fay Richwhite & Company Ltd FIN 18-Sep-91  Investment, Financial services 
23 GMF 2 Goodman Fielder Ltd FOD 20-Sep-91  Manufacturing - food processing 
24 HLG 1 Hallenstein Glasson Holdings Ltd RET 28-Mar-91  Retailing - clothing 
25 HLG 2 Hallenstein Glasson Holdings Ltd RET 20-Sep-91  Retailing - clothing 
        
26 INL 1 Independent Newspapers Ltd MCM 8-Feb-91  Newspaper publishers 
27 LNN 1 Lion Nathan Ltd LIQ 16-May-91  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
hospitality 
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28 MAI 2 Mair Astley Holdings Ltd MET 26-Sep-91  Manufacturing and retailing - food, wool, leather 
29 MBN 1 Milburn New Zealand Ltd BLD 23-Aug-91  Manufacturing sand refining - cement, lime 
30 MBN 2 Milburn New Zealand Ltd BLD 8-Mar-91  Manufacturing sand refining - cement, lime 
        
31 MHI 2 Michael Hill International Ltd RET 21-Aug-91  Manufacturing and retailing - jewellery 
32 MON 2 Corporate Investments Ltd INV 16-Sep-91  Investment, liquor industry 
33 MTG 1 Lasercorp Holdings Ltd ELE 29-Nov-91  Distribution - electrical goods 
34 NPX 2 Nuplex Industries Ltd CHM 22-Aug-91  Manufacturing - resins, chemicals 
35 NZR 1 The New Zealand Refining 
Company Ltd 
ENE 29-Aug-91  Manufacturing and Refining - petrol 
        
36 NZR 2 The New Zealand Refining 
Company Ltd 
ENE 1-Mar-91  Manufacturing and Refining - petrol 
37 OTR 2 Mineral Resources (NZ) Ltd MIN 30-Sep-91  Mineral Resources - gold 
38 OWN 1 Owens Group Ltd TRN 18-Nov-91  Investment, transport 
39 PYN 1 Paynter Corporation Ltd PRO 4-Nov-91  Manufacturing and distribution - timber 
40 RIL 2 Canterbury Roller Flour Mills Co 
Ltd 
FOD 28-Jun-91  Food processing - flour milling 
        
41 ROT 1 Radio Otago Ltd MCM 20-Nov-91  Radio station 
42 SAN 1 Sanford Ltd FOD 2-May-91  Fisheries and aquaculture 
43 SEU 2 Amuri Corporation Ltd PRO 4-Jun-91  Manufacturing nd Retailing - motor vehicles 
44 SHP 1 Shortland Properties Ltd PRO 13-Sep-91  Property development, Investment 
45 SHP 2 Shortland Properties Ltd PRO 19-Mar-91  Property development, Investment 
        
46 SSB 1 Salmond Smith Biolab Ltd MED 12-Dec-91  Manufacturing and retailing - food, plastic, 
brushware, also anfora goat industry 
47 STU 2 Steel & Tube Holdings Ltd ENG 5-Jun-91  Manufacturing and retailing - vehicles, large items 
48 TRK 2 Transmark Corporation Ltd MIS 15-May-91  Manufactruing and Investment - electronics 
49 WAM 1 Waste Management NZ Ltd MIS 23-Aug-91  Service Utility - waste disposal 
50 WAM 2 Waste Management NZ Ltd MIS 5-Feb-91  Service Utility - waste disposal 
        
51 WHC 1 Rank Group Ltd MIS 25-Feb-91  Retail - books, Printing 
52 WHC 2 Rank Group Ltd MIS 5-Aug-91  Manufacturing and Retailing - motor vehicles 
53 WHO 1 Wilson and Horton Ltd MCM 4-Nov-91  Manufacturing and Retailing - motor vehicles 
 
1992     
        
No COY INTFI
N 
Name  Code Date  Description 
        
1 AIRVA 2 Air New Zealand Ltd TRN 21-Sep-92  Transport - air 
2 APF 2 Apple Fields Ltd AGS 27-Nov-92  Horticulture and agriculture (later property 
development) 
3 AQL 2 Regal salmon Ltd AGS 19-Jun-92  Fisheries 
4 BNZ 1 BNZ Finance Ltd FIN 16-Oct-92  Financial services 
5 BNZ 2 BNZ Finance Ltd FIN 21-Apr-92  Financial services 
        
6 BWY 2 Broadway Industries Ltd MIS 16-Sep-92  Manufacturing and retailing - business machines, 
sewing equipment 
7 CAH 2 Carter Holt Harvey Ltd FOR 12-Jun-92  Manufacturing, distribution, fisheries - pulp, timber 
8 CAV 2 Cavalier Corporation Ltd TEX 20-Aug-92  Manufacturing - wool scouring and carpet 
9 CEM 2 Ceramco Corporation Ltd INV 29-May-92  Manufacturing - industrial and consumer products 
10 CMO 1 The Colonial Motor Company Ltd AUT 1-Apr-92  Retailing and Distribution - motor vehicles 
        
11 CMO 2 The Colonial Motor Company Ltd AUT 28-Sep-92  Retailing and Distribution - motor vehicles 
12 DBG 1 DB Group Ltd LIQ 4-Mar-92  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
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hospitality 
13 DBG 2 DB Group Ltd LIQ 23-Sep-92  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
hospitality 
14 DMB 1 Damba Holdings Ltd MIS 4-Dec-92  Manufacturing - furniture (also distributing) 
15 DMB 2 Damba Holdings Ltd MIS 25-Jun-92  Manufacturing - furniture (also distributing) 
        
16 DON 1 Donaghys Ltd TEX 9-Mar-92  Manufacturing - cordage, plastics, electronics 
17 DON 2 Donaghys Ltd TEX 4-Sep-92  Manufacturing - cordage, plastics, electronics 
18 EBO 2 Ebos Group Ltd MED 1-Oct-92  Retailing and Distribution - hospital and surgical 
supplies 
19 EEQ 1 Eastern Equities Corporation Ltd AGS 6-May-92  Horticulture and Agriculture 
20 ERN 2 Ernest Adams Ltd FOD 29-May-92  Food processing - cakes pastries 
        
21 FAP 2 Fisher & Paykel Industries Ltd ELE 12-Jun-92  Manufacturing - domestic appliances 
22 FER 1 Fernz Corporation Ltd CHM 17-Feb-92  Manufacturing - fertiliser ad chemicals (agri-) 
23 FLC 1 Fletcher Challenge Ltd FOR 18-Feb-92  Manufacturing, construction, Forestry, Agricultural 
24 FRW 2 Fay Richwhite & Company Ltd FIN 17-Sep-92  Investment, Financial services 
25 GMF 1 Goodman Fielder Ltd FOD 6-Mar-92  Manufacturing - food processing 
        
26 GMF 2 Goodman Fielder Ltd FOD 11-Sep-92  Manufacturing - food processing 
27 HLG 1 Hallenstein Glasson Holdings Ltd RET 10-Apr-92  Retailing - clothing 
28 HLG 2 Hallenstein Glasson Holdings Ltd RET 25-Sep-92  Retailing - clothing 
29 INL 1 Independent Newspapers Ltd MCM 21-Feb-92  Newspaper publishers 
30 INL 2 Independent Newspapers Ltd MCM 21-Aug-92  Newspaper publishers 
        
31 LNN 1 Lion Nathan Ltd LIQ 4-May-92  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
hospitality 
32 LNN 2 Lion Nathan Ltd LIQ 4-Nov-92  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
hospitality 
33 MAI 2 Mair Astley Holdings Ltd MET 27-Aug-92  Manufacturing and retailing - food, wool, leather 
34 MBN 1 Milburn New Zealand Ltd BLD 21-Aug-92  Manufacturing sand refining - cement, lime 
35 MBN 2 Milburn New Zealand Ltd BLD 13-Mar-92  Manufacturing sand refining - cement, lime 
        
36 MON 2 Corporate Investments Ltd INV 1-Oct-92  Investment, liquor industry 
37 MTG 1 Lasercorp Holdings Ltd ELE 20-Nov-92  Distribution - electrical goods 
38 NLL 1 New Zealand Light Leathers Ltd MET 6-Mar-92  Manufacturing - Tanning industry 
39 NLL 2 New Zealand Light Leathers Ltd MET 11-Sep-92  Manufacturing - Tanning industry 
40 NPX 2 Nuplex Industries Ltd CHM 21-Aug-92  Manufacturing - resins, chemicals 
        
41 NZR 1 The New Zealand Refining 
Company Ltd 
ENE 27-Aug-92  Manufacturing and Refining - petrol 
42 NZR 2 The New Zealand Refining 
Company Ltd 
ENE 28-Feb-92  Manufacturing and Refining - petrol 
43 OTR 2 Mineral Resources (NZ) Ltd MIN 1-Oct-92  Mineral Resources - gold 
44 OWN 1 Owens Group Ltd TRN 20-Nov-92  Investment, transport 
45 OWN 2 Owens Group Ltd TRN 2-Jun-92  Investment, transport 
        
46 PYN 1 Paynter Corporation Ltd FOR 30-Nov-92  Manufacturing and distribution - timber 
47 RCH 2 Mainzeal Group Ltd INV 18-Sep-92  Property development, investment, construction 
48 RIL 2 Canterbury Roller Flour Mills Co 
Ltd 
FOD 25-Jun-92  Food processing - flour milling 
49 ROT 2 Radio Otago Ltd MCM 20-May-92  Radio station 
50 RPA 2 Radio Pacific Ltd MCM 19-Jun-92  Radio station 
        
51 SAN 1 Sanford Ltd FOD 4-May-92  Fisheries and aquaculture 
52 SEU 1 Amuri Corporation Ltd PRO 4-Nov-92  Manufacturing and Retailing - motor vehicles 
53 SEU 2 Amuri Corporation Ltd PRO 25-May-92  Manufacturing and Retailing - motor vehicles 
54 SHP 2 Shortland Properties Ltd PRO 30-Mar-92  Property development, Investment 
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55 SSB 1 Salmond Smith Biolab Ltd MED 10-Dec-92  Manufacturing and retailing - food, plastic, 
brushware, also anfora goat industry 
        
56 SSB 2 Salmond Smith Biolab Ltd MED 5-Jun-92  Manufacturing and retailing - food, plastic, 
brushware, also anfora goat industry 
57 TEL 1 Telecom Corporation of New 
Zealand Ltd 
MCM 17-Nov-92  Service Utility - telecommunications 
58 THL 1 The Helicopter Line Ltd TRN 17-Nov-92  Services - tourism 
59 THL 2 The Helicopter Line Ltd TRN 8-Jun-92  Services - tourism 
60 TRK 1 Transmark Corporation Ltd MIS 19-Nov-92  Manufacturing and Investment - electronics 
        
61 TRK 2 Transmark Corporation Ltd MIS 25-May-92  Manufacturing and Investment - electronics 
62 UBM 1 U-Bix Business Machines Ltd MIS 21-Feb-92  Distribution - business equipment 
63 WAM 1 Waste Management NZ Ltd MIS 20-Aug-92  Service Utility - waste disposal 
64 WAM 2 Waste Management NZ Ltd MIS 21-Feb-92  Service Utility - waste disposal 
65 WHC 1 Rank Group Ltd MIS 3-Mar-92  Retail - books, printing 
        
66 WHC 2 Rank Group Ltd MIS 28-Sep-92  Retail - books, printing 
67 WNE 1 Wilson Neill Ltd INV 27-Mar-92  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
Property development 
68 ZNZ 1 Stevens KMS Corporation Ltd MED 20-Nov-92  Manufacturing and Distribution - medical, dental, 
pharmaceutical supplies 
 
1993     
        
No COY INTFI
N 
Name Code Date  Description 
        
1 AIRVA 1 Air New Zealand Ltd TRN 4-Mar-93  Transport - air 
2 AIRVA 2 Air New Zealand Ltd TRN 8-Sep-93  Transport - air 
3 APF 2 Apple Fields Ltd AGS 1-Dec-93  Horticulture and agriculture (later property 
development) 
4 AQL 2 Regal salmon Ltd AGS 24-Jun-93  Fisheries 
5 ASN 1 Asian Properties Ltd PRO 22-Dec-93  Investment, Property Development - in Asia 
        
6 BNZ 1 BNZ Finance Ltd FIN 22-Apr-93  Financial services 
7 BNZ 2 BNZ Finance Ltd FIN 22-Oct-93  Financial services 
8 BWY 1 Broadway Industries Ltd MIS 25-Feb-93  Manufacturing and retailing - business machines, 
sewing equipment 
9 BWY 2 Broadway Industries Ltd MIS 15-Sep-93  Manufacturing and retailing - business machines, 
sewing equipment 
10 CAH 1 Carter Holt Harvey Ltd FOR 10-Nov-93  Manufacturing, distribution, fisheries - pulp, timber 
        
11 CAH 2 Carter Holt Harvey Ltd FOR 28-May-93  Manufacturing, distribution, fisheries - pulp, timber 
12 CAV 1 Cavalier Corporation Ltd TEX 11-Feb-93  Manufacturing - wool scouring and carpet 
13 CAV 2 Cavalier Corporation Ltd TEX 26-Aug-93  Manufacturing - wool scouring and carpet 
14 CEM 1 Ceramco Corporation Ltd INV 11-Nov-93  Manufacturing - industrial and consumer products 
15 CEM 2 Ceramco Corporation Ltd INV 21-May-93  Manufacturing - industrial and consumer products 
        
16 CMO 1 The Colonial Motor Company Ltd AUT 30-Mar-93  Retailing and Distribution - motor vehicles 
17 CMO 2 The Colonial Motor Company Ltd AUT 24-Sep-93  Retailing and Distribution - motor vehicles 
18 DMB 1 Damba Holdings Ltd MIS 22-Dec-93  Manufacturing - furniture (also distributing) 
19 DMB 2 Damba Holdings Ltd MIS 19-May-93  Manufacturing - furniture (also distributing) 
20 DON 1 Donaghys Ltd TEX 5-Mar-93  Manufacturing - cordage, plastics, electronics 
        
21 DON 2 Donaghys Ltd TEX 3-Sep-93  Manufacturing - cordage, plastics, electronics 
22 EBO 1 Ebos Group Ltd MED 12-Mar-93  Retailing and Distribution - hospital and surgical 
supplies 
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23 EBO 2 Ebos Group Ltd MED 1-Sep-93  Retailing and Distribution - hospital and surgical 
supplies 
24 EEQ 1 Eastern Equities Corporation Ltd AGS 26-Apr-93  Horticulture and Agriculture 
25 EEQ 2 Eastern Equities Corporation Ltd AGS 29-Oct-93  Horticulture and Agriculture 
        
26 ERN 1 Ernest Adams Ltd FOD 12-Nov-93  Food processing - cakes pastries 
27 ERN 2 Ernest Adams Ltd FOD 31-May-93  Food processing - cakes pastries 
28 FAP 2 Fisher & Paykel Industries Ltd ELE 4-Jun-93  Manufacturing - domestic appliances 
29 FER 1 Fernz Corporation Ltd CHM 12-Feb-93  Manufacturing - fertiliser ad chemicals (agri-) 
30 FER 2 Fernz Corporation Ltd CHM 22-Jul-93  Manufacturing - fertiliser ad chemicals (agri-) 
31 FIR 1 Firestone NZ Ltd AUT 16-Sep-93  Manufacturing - rubber tyres 
        
32 FIR 2 Firestone NZ Ltd AUT 1-Apr-93  Manufacturing - rubber tyres 
33 FLC 1 Fletcher Challenge Ltd FOR 17-Feb-93  Manufacturing, construction, Forestry, Agricultural 
34 FLC 2 Fletcher Challenge Ltd FOR 18-Aug-93  Manufacturing, construction, Forestry, Agricultural 
35 FRW 1 Fay Richwhite & Company Ltd FIN 4-Mar-93  Investment, Financial services 
        
36 FRW 2 Fay Richwhite & Company Ltd FIN 16-Sep-93  Investment, Financial services 
37 FSL 1 Fruitfed Supplies Ltd AGS 25-Nov-93  Horticulture and Distribution - of horticulteral 
products 
38 GMF 2 Goodman Fielder Ltd FOD 14-Sep-93  Manufacturing - food processing 
39 HLG 1 Hallenstein Glasson Holdings Ltd RET 26-Mar-93  Retailing - clothing 
40 HLG 2 Hallenstein Glasson Holdings Ltd RET 1-Oct-93  Retailing - clothing 
        
41 LNN 1 Lion Nathan Ltd LIQ 5-May-93  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
hospitality 
42 LNN 2 Lion Nathan Ltd LIQ 3-Nov-93  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
hospitality 
43 MAI 2 Mair Astley Holdings Ltd MET 16-Sep-93  Manufacturing and retailing - food, wool, leather 
44 MBN 1 Milburn New Zealand Ltd BLD 23-Aug-93  Manufacturing sand refining - cement, lime 
45 MBN 2 Milburn New Zealand Ltd BLD 15-Mar-93  Manufacturing sand refining - cement, lime 
        
46 MHI 1 Michael Hill International Ltd RET 18-Feb-93  Manufacturing and retailing - jewellery 
47 MHI 2 Michael Hill International Ltd RET 25-Aug-93  Manufacturing and retailing - jewellery 
48 MMC 2 Macraes Mining Company Ltd MIN 1-Mar-93  Construction, Property Development, Distribution 
- construction industry 
49 MTG 1 Mastertrade Group Ltd ELE 22-Nov-93  Distribution - electrical goods 
50 NPX 1 Nuplex Industries Ltd CHM 19-Feb-93  Manufacturing - resins, chemicals 
        
51 NPX 2 Nuplex Industries Ltd CHM 20-Aug-93  Manufacturing - resins, chemicals 
52 NZR 1 The New Zealand Refining 
Company Ltd 
ENE 26-Aug-93  Manufacturing and Retailing - motor vehicles 
53 NZR 2 The New Zealand Refining 
Company Ltd 
ENE 25-Feb-93  Manufacturing and Retailing - motor vehicles 
54 OTR 1 Mineral Resources (NZ) Ltd MIN 15-Mar-93  Mineral Resources - gold 
55 OWN 1 Owens Group Ltd TRN 3-Dec-93  Investment, transport 
        
56 OWN 2 Owens Group Ltd TRN 11-Jun-93  Investment, transport 
57 PBF 2 Huttons Kiwi Ltd MET 13-Aug-93  Food processing - beef 
58 PDL 1 PDL Holdings Ltd ELE 22-Nov-93  Manufacturing - plastics, electrical goods 
59 POT 1 Port of Tauranga Ltd TRN 5-May-93  Port management 
60 POT 2 Port of Tauranga Ltd TRN 29-Nov-93  Manufacturing and Investment - electronics 
        
61 RCH 1 Mainzeal Group Ltd INV 18-Mar-93  Manufacturing and Investment - electronics 
62 RCH 2 Mainzeal Group Ltd INV 20-Sep-93  Property development, investment, construction 
63 REI 2 Reid Farmers Ltd AGS 23-Aug-93  Agricultural services - stock and station agency 
64 RIL 1 Canterbury Roller Flour Mills Co 
Ltd 
FOD 10-Dec-93  Food processing - flour milling 
247 
65 RIL 2 Canterbury Roller Flour Mills Co 
Ltd 
FOD 25-Jun-93  Retail - books, printing 
        
66 ROT 1 Radio Otago Ltd MCM 11-Nov-93  Retail - books, printing 
67 ROT 2 Radio Otago Ltd MCM 18-May-93  Radio station 
68 RPA 1 Radio Pacific Ltd MCM 30-Nov-93  Radio station 
69 RPA 2 Radio Pacific Ltd MCM 25-Jun-93  Radio station 
70 SAN 1 Sanford Ltd FOD 5-May-93  Fisheries and aquaculture 
        
71 SAN 2 Sanford Ltd FOD 5-Nov-93  Fisheries and aquaculture 
72 SEU 2 Amuri Corporation Ltd PRO 28-May-93  Manufacturing nd Retailing - motor vehicles 
73 SHP 2 Shortland Properties Ltd PRO 26-Mar-93  Property development, Investment 
74 SOU 1 Southern Petroleum NL Ltd MIN 17-Feb-93  Mineral Resources - Oil Exploration 
75 SOU 2 Southern Petroleum NL Ltd MIN 18-Aug-93  Mineral Resources - Oil Exploration 
        
76 STU 1 Steel & Tube Holdings Ltd ENG 3-Dec-93  Manufacturing and retailing - vehicles, large items 
77 TAS 2 Tasman Agriculture Ltd AGS 26-Aug-93  Agriculture - dairying 
78 TEL 1 Telecom Corporation of New 
Zealand Ltd 
MCM 2-Nov-93  Service Utility - telecommunications 
79 TEL 2 Telecom Corporation of New 
Zealand Ltd 
MCM 18-May-93  Service Utility - telecommunications 
80 THL 2 The Helicopter Line Ltd TRN 27-May-93  Services - tourism 
        
81 TRK 1 Transmark Corporation Ltd MIS 5-Nov-93  Manufactruing and Investment - electronics 
82 TRK 2 Transmark Corporation Ltd MIS 1-Jun-93  Manufactruing and Investment - electronics 
83 UBM 1 U-Bix Business Machines Ltd MIS 19-Feb-93  Distribution - business equipment 
84 UBM 2 U-Bix Business Machines Ltd MIS 20-Aug-93  Distribution - business equipment 
85 WAM 1 Waste Management NZ Ltd MIS 16-Aug-93  Service Utility - waste disposal 
        
86 WAM 2 Waste Management NZ Ltd MIS 1-Mar-93  Service Utility - waste disposal 
87 WHC 2 Whitcoulls Group Ltd MIS 30-Aug-93  Retail - books, Printing 
88 WHO 2 Wilson and Horton Ltd MCM 31-May-93  Newspaper and Publishing 
89 ZNZ 1 Zuellig New Zealand Ltd MED 29-Nov-93  Manufacturing and Distribution - medical, dental, 
pharmaceutical supplies 
90 ZNZ 2 Zuellig New Zealand Ltd MED 11-Jun-93  Manufacturing and Distribution - medical, dental, 
pharmaceutical supplies 
 
1994     
        
No COY INTFI
N 
Name Code Date  Description 
        
1 AIRVA 2 Air New Zealand Ltd TRN 7-Sep-94  Transport - air 
2 APF 2 Apple Fields Ltd AGS 5-Dec-94  Horticulture and agriculture (later property 
development) 
3 ASN 2 Asian Properties Ltd PRO 11-Jul-94  Investment, Property Development - in Asia 
4 BNZ 1 BNZ Finance Ltd FIN 20-Apr-94  Financial services 
5 BNZ 2 BNZ Finance Ltd FIN 19-Oct-94  Financial services 
        
6 BRY 1 Brierley Investments Ltd INV 3-Mar-94  Investment 
7 BRY 2 Brierley Investments Ltd INV 8-Sep-94  Investment 
8 BWY 1 Broadway Industries Ltd INV 2-Mar-94  Manufacturing and retailing - business machines, 
sewing equipment 
9 CAH 2 Carter Holt Harvey Ltd FOR 25-May-94  Manufacturing, distribution, fisheries - pulp, timber 
10 CAV 2 Cavalier Corporation Ltd TEX 25-Aug-94  Manufacturing - wool scouring and carpet 
        
11 CEM 1 Ceramco Corporation Ltd TEX 11-Nov-94  Manufacturing - industrial and consumer products 
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12 CEM 2 Ceramco Corporation Ltd TEX 25-May-94  Manufacturing - industrial and consumer products 
13 CMO 1 The Colonial Motor Company Ltd AUT 30-Mar-94  Retailing and Distribution - motor vehicles 
14 CMO 2 The Colonial Motor Company Ltd AUT 23-Sep-94  Retailing and Distribution - motor vehicles 
15 DMB 2 Damba Holdings Ltd MIS 29-Jun-94  Manufacturing - furniture (also distributing) 
        
16 DON 1 Donaghys Ltd TEX 4-Mar-94  Manufacturing - cordage, plastics, electronics 
17 DON 2 Donaghys Ltd TEX 2-Sep-94  Manufacturing - cordage, plastics, electronics 
18 EBO 1 Ebos Group Ltd MED 16-Mar-94  Retailing and Distribution - hospital and surgical 
supplies 
19 EEQ 1 Eastern Equities Corporation Ltd AGS 6-May-94  Horticulture and Agriculture 
20 EEQ 2 Eastern Equities Corporation Ltd AGS 2-Nov-94  Horticulture and Agriculture 
        
21 ENC 1 Enerco New Zealand Ltd ENE 8-Nov-94  Distributing - natural gas 
22 ENC 2 Enerco New Zealand Ltd ENE 17-May-94  Distributing - natural gas 
23 ERN 2 Ernest Adams Ltd FOD 16-Jun-94  Food processing - cakes pastries 
24 FAP 2 Fisher & Paykel Industries Ltd ELE 2-Jun-94  Manufacturing - domestic appliances 
25 FER 2 Fernz Corporation Ltd CHM 22-Jul-94  Manufacturing - fertiliser ad chemicals (agri-) 
        
26 FLC 1 Fletcher Challenge Ltd FOR 23-Feb-94  Manufacturing, construction, Forestry, Agricultural 
27 FLC 2 Fletcher Challenge Ltd FOR 31-Aug-94  Manufacturing, construction, Forestry, Agricultural 
28 FRW 1 Fay Richwhite & Company Ltd FIN 8-Mar-94  Investment, Financial services 
29 FRW 2 Fay Richwhite & Company Ltd FIN 25-Aug-94  Investment, Financial services 
30 FSL 1 Fruitfed Supplies Ltd AGS 29-Nov-94  Horticulture and Distribution - of horticulteral 
products 
        
31 FSL 2 Fruitfed Supplies Ltd AGS 25-May-94  Horticulture and Distribution - of horticulteral 
products 
32 GMF 2 Goodman Fielder Ltd FOD 2-Sep-94  Manufacturing - food processing 
33 GRC 2 Grocorp Pacific Ltd AGS 22-Nov-94  Horticulture and Distribution - of horticultural 
products 
34 HLG 1 Hallenstein Glasson Holdings Ltd RET 31-Mar-94  Retailing - clothing 
35 HLG 2 Hallenstein Glasson Holdings Ltd RET 30-Sep-94  Retailing - clothing 
        
36 LNN 1 Lion Nathan Ltd LIQ 28-Apr-94  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
hospitality 
37 LNN 2 Lion Nathan Ltd LIQ 26-Oct-94  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
hospitality 
38 MAI 1 Mair Astley Holdings Ltd MET 16-Mar-94  Manufacturing and retailing - food, wool, leather 
39 MBN 1 Milburn New Zealand Ltd BLD 22-Aug-94  Manufacturing sand refining - cement, lime 
40 MBN 2 Milburn New Zealand Ltd BLD 14-Mar-94  Manufacturing sand refining - cement, lime 
        
41 MCH 1 Mr Chips Holdings Ltd FOD 25-Nov-94  Food Processing 
42 MHI 1 Michael Hill International Ltd RET 18-Feb-94  Manufacturing and retailing - jewellery 
43 MHI 2 Michael Hill International Ltd RET 18-Aug-94  Manufacturing and retailing - jewellery 
44 MMC 2 Macraes Mining Company Ltd MIN 4-Mar-94  Construction, Property Development, Distribution 
- construction industry 
45 MTG 1 Mastertrade Group Ltd ELE 18-Nov-94  Distribution - electrical goods 
        
46 MTG 2 Mastertrade Group Ltd ELE 10-Jun-94  Distribution - electrical goods 
47 NCH 2 Natural Gas Corporation Holdings 
Ltd 
ENE 25-Aug-94  Mineral resources - Natural Gas 
48 NPR 2 New Zealand Rural Properties Ltd AGS 7-Sep-94  Agriculture 
49 NPX 1 Nuplex Industries Ltd CHM 18-Feb-94  Manufacturing - resins, chemicals 
50 NPX 2 Nuplex Industries Ltd CHM 19-Aug-94  Manufacturing - resins, chemicals 
        
51 NTH 1 Northland Port Corporation (NZ) 
Ltd 
TRN 13-May-94  Port management 
52 NTH 2 Northland Port Corporation (NZ) 
Ltd 
TRN 24-Nov-94  Manufacturing and Retailing - motor vehicles 
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53 NZR 1 The New Zealand Refining 
Company Ltd 
ENE 25-Aug-94  Manufacturing and Retailing - motor vehicles 
54 OTR 1 Mineral Resources (NZ) Ltd MIN 10-Mar-94  Mineral Resources - gold 
55 OWN 1 Owens Group Ltd TRN 30-Nov-94  Investment, transport 
        
56 OWN 2 Owens Group Ltd TRN 9-Jun-94  Investment, transport 
57 PBF 1 Huttons Kiwi Ltd MET 11-Feb-94  Food processing - beef 
58 PBF 2 Huttons Kiwi Ltd MET 12-Aug-94  Food processing - beef 
59 PDL 1 PDL Holdings Ltd ELE 18-Nov-94  Manufacturing - plastics, electrical goods 
60 PDL 2 PDL Holdings Ltd ELE 10-Jun-94  Manufacturing and Investment - electronics 
        
61 POT 2 Port of Tauranga Ltd TRN 21-Nov-94  Manufacturing and Investment - electronics 
62 PRO 1 Progressive Enterprises Ltd FOD 31-Mar-94  Retailing - food (supermarkets) and restaurant 
operator 
63 PYN 1 Paynter Timber Group Ltd FOR 15-Nov-94  Manufacturing and distribution - timber 
64 RIL 2 Canterbury Roller Flour Mills Co 
Ltd 
INV 29-Jun-94  Food processing - flour milling 
65 ROT 1 Radio Otago Ltd MCM 15-Nov-94  Retail - books, printing 
        
66 ROT 2 Radio Otago Ltd MCM 25-May-94  Retail - books, printing 
67 RPA 1 Radio Pacific Ltd MCM 25-Nov-94  Radio station 
68 RPA 2 Radio Pacific Ltd MCM 3-Jun-94  Radio station 
69 SAN 1 Sanford Ltd FOD 9-May-94  Fisheries and aquaculture 
70 SAN 2 Sanford Ltd FOD 9-Nov-94  Fisheries and aquaculture 
        
71 SEU 2 Amuri Corporation Ltd PRO 1-Jun-94  Manufacturing nd Retailing - motor vehicles 
72 SHP 2 Shortland Properties Ltd PRO 31-Mar-94  Property development, Investment 
73 SJL 1 Shotover Jet Ltd TRN 11-Nov-94  Services - tourism 
74 SKL 2 Skellerup Group Ltd MIS 11-Aug-94  Manufacturing and distribution - rubber  
75 SOU 2 Southern Petroleum NL Ltd MIN 18-Aug-94  Mineral Resources - Oil Exploration 
        
76 STU 2 Steel & Tube Holdings Ltd ENG 19-Aug-94  Manufacturing and retailing - vehicles, large items 
77 TAS 1 Tasman Agriculture Ltd AGS 25-Feb-94  Agriculture - dairying 
78 TEL 1 Telecom Corporation of New 
Zealand Ltd 
MCM 3-Nov-94  Service Utility - telecommunications 
79 THL 1 The Helicopter Line Ltd TRN 24-Feb-94  Services - tourism 
80 THL 2 The Helicopter Line Ltd TRN 15-Sep-94  Services - tourism 
        
81 TRK 1 Transmark Corporation Ltd ELE 17-Nov-94  Manufactruing and Investment - electronics 
82 TRK 2 Transmark Corporation Ltd ELE 16-May-94  Manufactruing and Investment - electronics 
83 UBM 1 U-Bix Business Machines Ltd MIS 22-Feb-94  Distribution - business equipment 
84 UBM 2 U-Bix Business Machines Ltd MIS 18-Aug-94  Distribution - business equipment 
85 WAM 1 Waste Management NZ Ltd MIS 22-Aug-94  Service Utility - waste disposal 
        
86 WAM 2 Waste Management NZ Ltd MIS 28-Feb-94  Service Utility - waste disposal 
87 WHC 1 Whitcoulls Group Ltd RET 7-Mar-94  Retail - books, Printing 
88 WHC 2 Whitcoulls Group Ltd RET 19-Sep-94  Retail - books, Printing 
89 WHO 2 Wilson and Horton Ltd MCM 30-May-94  Newspaper and Publishing 
90 WKL 2 Williams and Kettle Ltd AGS 30-Sep-94  Services - Agricultual, financial, stock and station 
agency 
        
91 ZNZ 1 Zuellig New Zealand Ltd MED 24-Nov-94  Manufacturing and Distribution - medical, dental, 
pharmaceutical supplies 
92 ZNZ 2 Zuellig New Zealand Ltd MED 10-Jun-94  Manufacturing and Distribution - medical, dental, 
pharmaceutical supplies 
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1995     
        
No COY INTFI
N 
Name Code Date  Description 
        
1 ADV 2 Advantage Group Ltd MIS 31-Aug-95  Distribution - electronic equipment 
2 AIRVA 1 Air New Zealand Ltd TRN 17-Feb-95  Transport - air 
3 AIRVA 2 Air New Zealand Ltd TRN 5-Sep-95  Transport - air 
4 ARB 2 Arthur Barnett Ltd RET 29-Sep-95  Retailing 
5 ASN 1 Asian Properties Ltd PRO 11-Dec-95  Investment, Property Development - in Asia 
        
6 ASN 2 Asian Properties Ltd PRO 12-Jun-95  Investment, Property Development - in Asia 
7 BCH 1 Baycorp Holdings Ltd MIS 22-Feb-95  Financial Sevices - Debt collection, credit rating 
8 BCH 2 Baycorp Holdings Ltd MIS 9-Aug-95  Financial Sevices - Debt collection, credit rating 
9 BNZ 1 BNZ Finance Ltd FIN 19-Apr-95  Financial services 
10 BNZ 2 BNZ Finance Ltd FIN 18-Oct-95  Financial services 
        
11 BRY 1 Brierley Investments Ltd INV 2-Mar-95  Investment 
12 BRY 2 Brierley Investments Ltd INV 8-Sep-95  Investment 
13 BWY 1 Broadway Industries Ltd INV 28-Feb-95  Manufacturing and retailing - business machines, 
sewing equipment 
14 BWY 2 Broadway Industries Ltd INV 14-Sep-95  Manufacturing and retailing - business machines, 
sewing equipment 
15 CAV 1 Cavalier Corporation Ltd TEX 16-Feb-95  Manufacturing - wool scouring and carpet 
        
16 CAV 2 Cavalier Corporation Ltd TEX 1-Sep-95  Manufacturing - wool scouring and carpet 
17 CED 2 Cedenco Foods Ltd FOD 13-Dec-95  Horticulture -growing and processing 
18 CEM 1 Ceramco Corporation Ltd TEX 9-Nov-95  Manufacturing - industrial and consumer products 
19 CEM 2 Ceramco Corporation Ltd TEX 1-Jun-95  Manufacturing - industrial and consumer products 
20 CMO 1 The Colonial Motor Company Ltd AUT 16-Mar-95  Retailing and Distribution - motor vehicles 
        
21 DBG 2 DB Group Ltd LIQ 14-Dec-95  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
hospitality 
22 DMB 2 Damba Holdings Ltd MIS 15-Mar-95  Manufacturing - furniture (also distributing) 
23 DON 1 Donaghys Ltd TEX 3-Mar-95  Manufacturing - cordage, plastics, electronics 
24 DON 2 Donaghys Ltd TEX 1-Sep-95  Manufacturing - cordage, plastics, electronics 
25 DTL 1 Designer Textiles NZ Ltd TEX 21-Nov-95  Manufacturing - textiles 
        
26 EBO 1 Ebos Group Ltd MED 22-Feb-95  Retailing and Distribution - hospital and surgical 
supplies 
27 EBO 2 Ebos Group Ltd MED 23-Aug-95  Retailing and Distribution - hospital and surgical 
supplies 
28 EEQ 1 Eastern Equities Corporation Ltd AGS 3-May-95  Horticulture and Agriculture 
29 EEQ 2 Eastern Equities Corporation Ltd AGS 1-Nov-95  Horticulture and Agriculture 
30 ENC 1 Enerco New Zealand Ltd ENE 15-Nov-95  Distributing - natural gas 
        
31 ENC 2 Enerco New Zealand Ltd ENE 9-May-95  Distributing - natural gas 
32 ERN 1 Ernest Adams Ltd FOD 10-Nov-95  Food processing - cakes pastries 
33 ERN 2 Ernest Adams Ltd FOD 30-May-95  Food processing - cakes pastries 
34 FAP 1 Fisher & Paykel Industries Ltd ELE 3-Nov-95  Manufacturing - domestic appliances 
35 FAP 2 Fisher & Paykel Industries Ltd ELE 29-May-95  Manufacturing - domestic appliances 
        
36 FER 1 Fernz Corporation Ltd CHM 16-Feb-95  Manufacturing - fertiliser ad chemicals (agri-) 
37 FER 2 Fernz Corporation Ltd CHM 28-Jul-95  Manufacturing - fertiliser ad chemicals (agri-) 
38 FIR 1 Firestone NZ Ltd AUT 13-Sep-95  Manufacturing - rubber tyres 
39 FLC 1 Fletcher Challenge Ltd MIS 22-Feb-95  Manufacturing, construction, Forestry, Agricultural 
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40 FLC 2 Fletcher Challenge Ltd MIS 30-Aug-95  Manufacturing, construction, Forestry, Agricultural 
        
41 FLCF 2 Fletcher Challenge Ltd Forest 
Division 
FOR 30-Aug-95  Horticulture - Forestry and Logging 
42 FSL 1 Fruitfed Supplies Ltd AGS 23-Nov-95  Horticulture and Distribution - of horticulteral 
products 
43 FSL 2 Fruitfed Supplies Ltd AGS 31-May-95  Horticulture and Distribution - of horticulteral 
products 
44 GMF 1 Goodman Fielder Ltd FOD 3-Mar-95  Manufacturing - food processing 
45 GMF 2 Goodman Fielder Ltd FOD 11-Sep-95  Manufacturing - food processing 
        
46 GRC 2 Grocorp Pacific Ltd AGS 30-Nov-95  Horticulture and Distribution - of horticultural 
products 
47 HLG 1 Hallenstein Glasson Holdings Ltd RET 4-Apr-95  Retailing - clothing 
48 HLG 2 Hallenstein Glasson Holdings Ltd RET 2-Oct-95  Retailing - clothing 
49 INL 1 Independent Newspapers Ltd MCM 17-Feb-95  Newspaper publishers 
50 INL 2 Independent Newspapers Ltd MCM 18-Aug-95  Newspaper publishers 
        
51 LNN 2 Lion Nathan Ltd LIQ 26-Oct-95  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
hospitality 
52 LWR 1 LWR Industries Ltd TEX 22-Feb-95  Manufacturing and Retailing - motor vehicles 
53 LWR 2 LWR Industries Ltd TEX 11-Aug-95  Manufacturing and Retailing - motor vehicles 
54 MAI 2 Mair Astley Holdings Ltd MET 12-Sep-95  Manufacturing and retailing - food, wool, leather 
55 MBN 2 Milburn New Zealand Ltd BLD 13-Mar-95  Manufacturing sand refining - cement, lime 
        
56 MCH 2 Mr Chips Holdings Ltd FOD 23-May-95  Food Processing 
57 MHI 1 Michael Hill International Ltd RET 15-Feb-95  Manufacturing and retailing - jewellery 
58 MHI 2 Michael Hill International Ltd RET 17-Aug-95  Manufacturing and retailing - jewellery 
59 MMC 2 Macraes Mining Company Ltd MIN 2-Mar-95   
60 MPL 1 McCollam Printers Ltd MIS 4-Dec-95  Manufacturing and Investment - electronics 
        
61 MTG 2 Mastertrade Group Ltd ELE 9-Jun-95  Manufacturing and Investment - electronics 
62 NCH 1 Natural Gas Corporation Holdings 
Ltd 
ENE 16-Feb-95  Mineral resources - Natural Gas 
63 NCH 2 Natural Gas Corporation Holdings 
Ltd 
ENE 24-Aug-95  Mineral resources - Natural Gas 
64 NPR 2 New Zealand Rural Properties Ltd AGS 7-Sep-95  Agriculture 
65 NPX 1 Nuplex Industries Ltd CHM 17-Feb-95  Retail - books, printing 
        
66 NPX 2 Nuplex Industries Ltd CHM 18-Aug-95  Retail - books, printing 
67 NTH 1 Northland Port Corporation (NZ) 
Ltd 
TRN 19-May-95  Port management 
68 NTH 2 Northland Port Corporation (NZ) 
Ltd 
TRN 23-Nov-95  Port management 
69 NZR 1 The New Zealand Refining 
Company Ltd 
ENE 1-Sep-95  Manufacturing and Refining - petrol 
70 NZR 2 The New Zealand Refining 
Company Ltd 
ENE 23-Feb-95  Manufacturing and Refining - petrol 
        
71 OWN 1 Owens Group Ltd TRN 20-Nov-95  Investment, transport 
72 OWN 2 Owens Group Ltd TRN 31-May-95  Investment, transport 
73 PBF 1 Pacific Beef Ltd MET 20-Feb-95  Food processing - beef 
74 PBF 2 Pacific Beef Ltd MET 15-Aug-95  Food processing - beef 
75 PDL 2 PDL Holdings Ltd ELE 12-Jun-95  Manufacturing - plastics, electrical goods 
        
76 POA 2 Ports of Auckland Ltd TRN 15-Aug-95  Port management 
77 POT 1 Port of Tauranga Ltd TRN 8-May-95  Port management 
78 PRG 1 Noel Leeming Ltd RET 14-Nov-95  Retailing - home appliances 
79 PRG 2 Noel Leeming Ltd RET 29-May-95  Retailing - home appliances 
80 PRO 1 Progressive Enterprises Ltd FOD 23-Mar-95  Retailing - food (supermarkets) and restaurant 
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operator 
        
81 PRO 2 Progressive Enterprises Ltd FOD 28-Sep-95  Retailing - food (supermarkets) and restaurant 
operator 
82 PYN 1 Paynter Timber Group Ltd FOR 15-Nov-95  Manufacturing and distribution - timber 
83 REI 2 Reid Farmers Ltd AGS 28-Aug-95  Agricultural services - stock and station agency 
84 RNS 2 Triumph Industries Ltd ENG 12-Jun-95  Distribution - computers 
85 ROT 1 Radio Otago Ltd MCM 22-Nov-95  Radio station 
        
86 ROT 2 Radio Otago Ltd MCM 16-May-95  Radio station 
87 RPA 1 Radio Pacific Ltd MCM 17-Nov-95  Radio station 
88 RPA 2 Radio Pacific Ltd MCM 19-May-95  Radio station 
89 SAN 1 Sanford Ltd FOD 3-May-95  Fisheries and aquaculture 
90 SEU 1 Amuri Corporation Ltd ENE 10-May-95  Investments - in Utilities such as electricity 
        
91 SHP 2 Shortland Properties Ltd PRO 8-Mar-95  Property development, Investment 
92 SJL 1 Shotover Jet Ltd TRN 4-Dec-95  Services - tourism 
93 SJL 2 Shotover Jet Ltd TRN 11-May-95  Services - tourism 
94 SKL 1 Skellerup Group Ltd MIS 9-Feb-95  Manufacturing and distribution - rubber  
95 SOU 1 Southern Petroleum NL Ltd MIN 20-Feb-95  Mineral Resources - Oil Exploration 
        
96 SPN 2 Southport New Zealand Ltd TRN 11-Sep-95  Port management 
97 SSB 1 Salmond Smith Biolab Ltd MIS 9-Mar-95  Manufacturing and retailing - food, plastic, 
brushware, also anfora goat industry 
98 STU 1 Steel & Tube Holdings Ltd ENG 10-Feb-95  Manufacturing and retailing - vehicles, large items 
99 STU 2 Steel & Tube Holdings Ltd ENG 23-Aug-95  Manufacturing and retailing - vehicles, large items 
100 TAS 1 Tasman Agriculture Ltd AGS 21-Feb-95  Agriculture - dairying 
        
101 TAS 2 Tasman Agriculture Ltd AGS 4-Aug-95  Agriculture - dairying 
102 TAY 2 Taylors Group Ltd MIS 29-Aug-95  Services - drycleaning and Property investment 
103 TBK 1 Trust Bank New Zealand Ltd FIN 29-Nov-95  Financial Services - banking 
104 TEL 2 Telecom Corporation of New 
Zealand Ltd 
MCM 12-May-95  Service Utility - telecommunications 
105 THL 2 The Helicopter Line Ltd TRN 13-Sep-95  Services - tourism 
        
106 TPW 1 Trustpower Ltd ENE 15-Nov-95  Service Utility - electricity 
107 TRK 1 Transmark Corporation Ltd ELE 13-Nov-95  Manufactruing and Investment - electronics 
108 TRK 2 Transmark Corporation Ltd ELE 18-May-95  Manufactruing and Investment - electronics 
109 UBM 1 U-Bix Business Machines Ltd MIS 22-Feb-95  Distribution - business equipment 
110 UBM 2 U-Bix Business Machines Ltd MIS 10-Aug-95  Distribution - business equipment 
        
111 UGF 2 Underground Fashions Ltd RET 5-Oct-95  Manufacturing and Retailing - clothing 
112 WAM 1 Waste Management NZ Ltd MIS 18-Aug-95  Service Utility - waste disposal 
113 WAM 2 Waste Management NZ Ltd MIS 23-Feb-95  Service Utility - waste disposal 
114 WHC 1 Whitcoulls Group Ltd RET 6-Mar-95  Retail - books, Printing 
115 WHC 2 Whitcoulls Group Ltd RET 7-Sep-95  Retail - books, Printing 
        
116 WHO 2 Wilson and Horton Ltd MCM 31-May-95  Newspaper and Publishing 
117 WKL 1 Williams and Kettle Ltd AGS 27-Mar-95  Services - Agricultual, financial, stock and station 
agency 
118 WKL 2 Williams and Kettle Ltd AGS 2-Oct-95  Services - Agricultual, financial, stock and station 
agency 
119 WNG 1 Wang New Zealand Ltd MIS 7-Feb-95  Distribution - computers 
120 WNG 2 Wang New Zealand Ltd MIS 8-Aug-95  Distribution - computers 
        
121 WRI 1 Wrightson Ltd AGS 23-Feb-95  Services - Agricultual, financial, stock and station 
agency 
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122 ZNZ 1 Zuellig New Zealand Ltd MED 24-Nov-95  Manufacturing and Distribution - medical, dental, 
pharmaceutical supplies 
123 ZNZ 2 Zuellig New Zealand Ltd MED 12-Jun-95  Manufacturing and Distribution - medical, dental, 
pharmaceutical supplies 
 
1996     
        
No COY INTFI
N 
Name Code Date  Description 
        
1 ADV 1 Advantage Group Ltd MIS 4-Mar-96  Distribution - electronic equipment 
2 ADV 2 Advantage Group Ltd MIS 30-Aug-96  Distribution - electronic equipment 
3 AFF 1 AFFCO Holdings Ltd MET 31-May-96  Food processing - meat 
4 AFF 2 AFFCO Holdings Ltd MET 14-Nov-96  Food processing - meat 
5 AIRVA 1 Air New Zealand Ltd TRN 23-Feb-96  Transport - air 
        
6 AIRVA 2 Air New Zealand Ltd TRN 2-Sep-96  Transport - air 
7 ARB 1 Arthur Barnett Ltd RET 25-Mar-96  Retailing 
8 ARB 2 Arthur Barnett Ltd RET 7-Oct-96  Retailing 
9 ASN 2 Asian Properties Ltd PRO 5-Jun-96  Investment, Property Development - in Asia 
10 BCH 1 Baycorp Holdings Ltd MIS 20-Feb-96  Financial Sevices - Debt collection, credit rating 
        
11 BRY 1 Brierley Investments Ltd INV 7-Mar-96  Investment 
12 BRY 2 Brierley Investments Ltd INV 5-Sep-96  Investment 
13 BWY 1 Broadway Industries Ltd INV 1-Mar-96  Manufacturing and retailing - business machines, 
sewing equipment 
14 BWY 2 Broadway Industries Ltd INV 3-Sep-96  Manufacturing and retailing - business machines, 
sewing equipment 
15 CAH 1 Carter Holt Harvey Ltd FOR 6-Nov-96  Manufacturing, distribution, fisheries - pulp, timber 
        
16 CAH 2 Carter Holt Harvey Ltd FOR 8-May-96  Manufacturing, distribution, fisheries - pulp, timber 
17 CAV 1 Cavalier Corporation Ltd TEX 16-Feb-96  Manufacturing - wool scouring and carpet 
18 CAV 2 Cavalier Corporation Ltd TEX 30-Aug-96  Manufacturing - wool scouring and carpet 
19 CED 1 Cedenco Foods Ltd FOD 17-Jun-96  Horticulture -growing and processing 
20 CED 2 Cedenco Foods Ltd FOD 16-Dec-96  Horticulture -growing and processing 
        
21 CEM 1 Ceramco Corporation Ltd TEX 20-Nov-96  Manufacturing - industrial and consumer products 
22 CEM 2 Ceramco Corporation Ltd TEX 30-May-96  Manufacturing - industrial and consumer products 
23 CMO 1 The Colonial Motor Company Ltd AUT 29-Feb-96  Retailing and Distribution - motor vehicles 
24 CMO 2 The Colonial Motor Company Ltd AUT 13-Sep-96  Retailing and Distribution - motor vehicles 
25 DBG 2 DB Group Ltd LIQ 11-Dec-96  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
hospitality 
        
26 DCP 2 Direct Capital Partners Ltd INV 13-Sep-96  Investment - unlistec companies 
27 DMB 2 Damba Holdings Ltd MIS 4-Mar-96  Manufacturing - furniture (also distributing) 
28 DON 1 Donaghys Ltd TEX 8-Mar-96  Manufacturing - cordage, plastics, electronics 
29 DTL 2 Designer Textiles NZ Ltd TEX 17-May-96  Manufacturing - textiles 
30 EBO 1 Ebos Group Ltd MED 21-Feb-96  Retailing and Distribution - hospital and surgical 
supplies 
        
31 EBO 2 Ebos Group Ltd MED 20-Aug-96  Retailing and Distribution - hospital and surgical 
supplies 
32 EEQ 1 Eastern Equities Corporation Ltd AGS 13-May-96  Horticulture and Agriculture 
33 EEQ 2 Eastern Equities Corporation Ltd AGS 25-Oct-96  Horticulture and Agriculture 
34 ENC 1 Enerco New Zealand Ltd ENE 13-Nov-96  Distributing - natural gas 
35 ENC 2 Enerco New Zealand Ltd ENE 8-May-96  Distributing - natural gas 
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36 ERN 1 Ernest Adams Ltd FOD 13-Dec-96  Food processing - cakes pastries 
37 ERN 2 Ernest Adams Ltd FOD 12-Jun-96  Food processing - cakes pastries 
38 FAP 2 Fisher & Paykel Industries Ltd ELE 7-Jun-96  Manufacturing - domestic appliances 
39 FER 2 Fernz Corporation Ltd CHM 29-Jul-96  Manufacturing - fertiliser ad chemicals (agri-) 
40 FIR 1 Firestone NZ Ltd AUT 5-Sep-96  Manufacturing - rubber tyres 
        
41 FLC 1 Fletcher Challenge Ltd MIS 28-Feb-96  Manufacturing, construction, Forestry, Agricultural 
42 FLCF 1 Fletcher Challenge Ltd Forest 
Division 
FOR 28-Feb-96  Horticulture - Forestry and Logging 
43 FLCF 2 Fletcher Challenge Ltd Forest 
Division 
FOR 28-Aug-96  Horticulture - Forestry and Logging 
44 FOR 1 Force Corporation Ltd MIS 22-Feb-96  Property Development, Services - cinema 
45 FOR 2 Force Corporation Ltd MIS 15-Aug-96  Property Development, Services - cinema 
        
46 FSL 1 Fruitfed Supplies Ltd AGS 26-Nov-96  Horticulture and Distribution - of horticulteral 
products 
47 FSL 2 Fruitfed Supplies Ltd AGS 29-May-96  Horticulture and Distribution - of horticulteral 
products 
48 GMF 1 Goodman Fielder Ltd FOD 7-Mar-96  Manufacturing - food processing 
49 GMF 2 Goodman Fielder Ltd FOD 5-Sep-96  Manufacturing - food processing 
50 HBY 2 Hellaby Holdings Ltd INV 3-Sep-96  Investment - in manufacturing and retail 
companies 
        
51 HLG 1 Hallenstein Glasson Holdings Ltd RET 29-Mar-96  Retailing - clothing 
52 HLG 2 Hallenstein Glasson Holdings Ltd RET 4-Oct-96  Manufacturing and Retailing - motor vehicles 
53 IFT 1 Infrastructure & Utilites NZ Ltd INV 23-Oct-96  Manufacturing and Retailing - motor vehicles 
54 IFT 2 Infrastructure & Utilites NZ Ltd INV 8-May-96  Investment 
55 INL 1 Independent Newspapers Ltd MCM 16-Feb-96  Newspaper publishers 
        
56 INL 2 Independent Newspapers Ltd MCM 16-Aug-96  Newspaper publishers 
57 LNN 1 Lion Nathan Ltd LIQ 18-Apr-96  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
hospitality 
58 LNN 2 Lion Nathan Ltd LIQ 31-Oct-96  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
hospitality 
59 LWR 1 LWR Industries Ltd TEX 23-Feb-96  Manufacturing - textiles 
60 LWR 2 LWR Industries Ltd TEX 9-Aug-96  Manufacturing and Investment - electronics 
        
61 MBN 1 Milburn New Zealand Ltd BLD 26-Aug-96  Manufacturing and Investment - electronics 
62 MBN 2 Milburn New Zealand Ltd BLD 11-Mar-96  Manufacturing sand refining - cement, lime 
63 MCH 1 Mr Chips Holdings Ltd FOD 6-Nov-96  Food Processing 
64 MCH 2 Mr Chips Holdings Ltd FOD 22-May-96  Food Processing 
65 MET 1 Metropolitan Lifecare Group Ltd MIS 2-Sep-96  Retail - books, printing 
        
66 MET 2 Metropolitan Lifecare Group Ltd MIS 14-Mar-96  Retail - books, printing 
67 MHI 1 Michael Hill International Ltd RET 16-Feb-96  Manufacturing and retailing - jewellery 
68 MHI 2 Michael Hill International Ltd RET 15-Aug-96  Manufacturing and retailing - jewellery 
69 MPL 1 McCollam Printers Ltd MIS 22-Nov-96  Printing 
70 MPL 2 McCollam Printers Ltd MIS 23-May-96  Printing 
        
71 NCH 2 Natural Gas Corporation Holdings 
Ltd 
ENE 21-Aug-96  Mineral resources - Natural Gas 
72 NPR 2 New Zealand Rural Properties Ltd AGS 26-Aug-96  Agriculture 
73 NPX 1 Nuplex Industries Ltd CHM 23-Feb-96  Manufacturing - resins, chemicals 
74 NPX 2 Nuplex Industries Ltd CHM 23-Aug-96  Manufacturing - resins, chemicals 
75 NTH 1 Northland Port Corporation (NZ) 
Ltd 
TRN 17-May-96  Port management 
        
76 NTH 2 Northland Port Corporation (NZ) 
Ltd 
TRN 21-Nov-96  Port management 
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77 NZR 1 The New Zealand Refining 
Company Ltd 
ENE 29-Aug-96  Manufacturing and Refining - petrol 
78 NZR 2 The New Zealand Refining 
Company Ltd 
ENE 22-Feb-96  Manufacturing and Refining - petrol 
79 OWN 1 Owens Group Ltd TRN 27-Nov-96  Investment, transport 
80 PBF 1 Pacific Beef Ltd MET 19-Feb-96  Food processing - beef 
        
81 PDL 1 PDL Holdings Ltd ELE 12-Nov-96  Manufacturing - plastics, electrical goods 
82 PDL 2 PDL Holdings Ltd ELE 7-Jun-96  Manufacturing - plastics, electrical goods 
83 POA 1 Ports of Auckland Ltd TRN 13-Feb-96  Port management 
84 POA 2 Ports of Auckland Ltd TRN 13-Aug-96  Port management 
85 POT 1 Port of Tauranga Ltd TRN 16-Feb-96  Port management 
        
86 POT 2 Port of Tauranga Ltd TRN 26-Aug-96  Port management 
87 PRG 1 Pacific Retail Group Ltd RET 2-Dec-96  Retailing - home appliances 
88 PRG 2 Pacific Retail Group Ltd RET 29-May-96  Retailing - home appliances 
89 PRO 1 Progressive Enterprises Ltd FOD 1-Apr-96  Retailing - food (supermarkets) and restaurant 
operator 
90 PRO 2 Progressive Enterprises Ltd FOD 30-Sep-96  Retailing - food (supermarkets) and restaurant 
operator 
        
91 PYN 2 Paynter Timber Group Ltd FOR 13-May-96  Manufacturing and distribution - timber 
92 REI 2 Reid Farmers Ltd AGS 26-Aug-96  Agricultural services - stock and station agency 
93 RNS 1 Triumph Industries Ltd ENG 6-Aug-96  Distribution - computers 
94 ROT 1 Radio Otago Ltd MCM 26-Nov-96  Radio station 
95 ROT 2 Radio Otago Ltd MCM 20-May-96  Radio station 
        
96 RPA 1 Radio Pacific Ltd MCM 29-Nov-96  Radio station 
97 RPA 2 Radio Pacific Ltd MCM 31-May-96  Radio station 
98 SAN 1 Sanford Ltd FOD 3-May-96  Fisheries and aquaculture 
99 SEU 1 South Eastern Utilities Ltd INV 2-Feb-96  Investments - in Utilities such as electricity 
100 SEU 2 South Eastern Utilities Ltd INV 15-Aug-96  Investments - in Utilities such as electricity 
        
101 SFH 1 Seafresh New Zealand Ltd FOD 21-Jun-96  Fisheries 
102 SHP 2 Shortland Properties Ltd PRO 12-Mar-96  Property development, Investment 
103 SJL 1 Shotover Jet Ltd TRN 10-Dec-96  Services - tourism 
104 SJL 2 Shotover Jet Ltd TRN 17-Jun-96  Services - tourism 
105 SPN 1 Southport New Zealand Ltd TRN 26-Feb-96  Port management 
        
106 SPN 2 Southport New Zealand Ltd TRN 6-Sep-96  Port management 
107 STL 1 St Lukes Group Ltd PRO 16-Feb-96  Retailing - supermarkets 
108 STL 2 St Lukes Group Ltd PRO 16-Aug-96  Retailing - supermarkets 
109 STU 1 Steel & Tube Holdings Ltd ENG 21-Feb-96  Manufacturing and retailing - vehicles, large items 
110 STU 2 Steel & Tube Holdings Ltd ENG 21-Aug-96  Manufacturing and retailing - vehicles, large items 
        
111 TAS 1 Tasman Agriculture Ltd AGS 14-Feb-96  Agriculture - dairying 
112 TAS 2 Tasman Agriculture Ltd AGS 14-Aug-96  Agriculture - dairying 
113 TAY 1 Taylors Group Ltd MIS 13-Mar-96  Services - drycleaning and Property investment 
114 TAY 2 Taylors Group Ltd MIS 4-Sep-96  Services - drycleaning and Property investment 
115 TBK 2 Trust Bank New Zealand Ltd FIN 31-May-96  Financial Services - banking 
        
116 THL 1 Tourism Holdings Ltd TRN 18-Mar-96  Services - tourism 
117 THL 2 Tourism Holdings Ltd TRN 12-Sep-96  Services - tourism 
118 TPW 1 Trustpower Ltd ENE 12-Nov-96  Service Utility - electricity 
119 TPW 2 Trustpower Ltd ENE 28-May-96  Service Utility - electricity 
120 TRK 1 Transmark Corporation Ltd ELE 19-Aug-96  Manufactruing and Investment - electronics 
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121 TTP 1 Trans Tasman Properties Ltd PRO 23-Aug-96  Property Investment 
122 UGF 1 Underground Fashions Ltd RET 4-Apr-96  Manufacturing and Retailing - clothing 
123 UGF 2 Underground Fashions Ltd RET 16-Oct-96  Manufacturing and Retailing - clothing 
124 UNL 2 Power New Zealand Ltd ENE 27-May-96   Service Utility - electricity 
125 WEL 2 Wairarapa Electricity Ltd ENE 22-May-96   Service Utility - electricity 
        
126 WHO 1 Wilson and Horton Ltd MCM 23-Aug-96  Newspaper and Publishing 
127 WKL 1 Williams and Kettle Ltd AGS 1-Apr-96  Services - Agricultual, financial, stock and station 
agency 
128 WKL 2 Williams and Kettle Ltd AGS 30-Sep-96  Services - Agricultual, financial, stock and station 
agency 
129 WNG 1 Wang New Zealand Ltd MIS 13-Feb-96  Distribution - computers 
130 WRI 1 Wrightson Ltd AGS 7-Mar-96  Services - Agricultual, financial, stock and station 
agency 
        
131 WRI 2 Wrightson Ltd AGS 6-Sep-96  Services - Agricultual, financial, stock and station 
agency 
132 ZNZ 1 Zuellig New Zealand Ltd MED 29-Nov-96  Manufacturing and Distribution - medical, dental, 
pharmaceutical supplies 
 
1997     
        
No COY INTFI
N 
Name Code Date  Description 
        
1 ADV 1 Advantage Group Ltd MIS 14-Feb-97  Distribution - electronic equipment 
2 ADV 2 Advantage Group Ltd MIS 15-Sep-97  Distribution - electronic equipment 
3 AFF 1 AFFCO Holdings Ltd MET 29-May-97  Food processing - meat 
4 AFF 2 AFFCO Holdings Ltd MET 14-Nov-97  Food processing - meat 
5 AIRVA 1 Air New Zealand Ltd TRN 19-Feb-97  Transport - air 
        
6 AIRVA 2 Air New Zealand Ltd TRN 2-Sep-97  Transport - air 
7 ARB 1 Arthur Barnett Ltd RET 20-Mar-97  Retailing 
8 ARB 2 Arthur Barnett Ltd RET 8-Oct-97  Retailing 
9 ASN 2 Asian Properties Ltd PRO 5-Jun-97  Investment, Property Development - in Asia 
10 BCH 1 Baycorp Holdings Ltd MIS 20-Feb-97  Financial Sevices - Debt collection, credit rating 
        
11 BCH 2 Baycorp Holdings Ltd MIS 12-Aug-97  Financial Sevices - Debt collection, credit rating 
12 BOA 1 J. Boag and Son Ltd LIQ 7-Mar-97  Liquor Industry 
13 BOA 2 J. Boag and Son Ltd LIQ 17-Sep-97  Liquor Industry 
14 BRY 1 Brierley Investments Ltd INV 6-Mar-97  Investment 
15 BRY 2 Brierley Investments Ltd INV 4-Sep-97  Investment 
        
16 BWY 2 Broadway Industries Ltd INV 12-Sep-97  Manufacturing and retailing - business machines, 
sewing equipment 
17 CAH 1 Carter Holt Harvey Ltd FOR 6-Nov-97  Manufacturing, distribution, fisheries - pulp, timber 
18 CAH 2 Carter Holt Harvey Ltd FOR 13-May-97  Manufacturing, distribution, fisheries - pulp, timber 
19 CAV 1 Cavalier Corporation Ltd TEX 14-Feb-97  Manufacturing - wool scouring and carpet 
20 CAV 2 Cavalier Corporation Ltd TEX 29-Aug-97  Manufacturing - wool scouring and carpet 
        
21 CDI 2 CDL Investments New Zealand Ltd PRO 3-Mar-97  Property developer 
22 CDL 2 CDL Hotels New Zealand Ltd INV 3-Mar-97  Investment - hotel industry 
23 CEM 1 Ceramco Corporation Ltd TEX 20-Nov-97  Manufacturing - industrial and consumer products 
24 CEM 2 Ceramco Corporation Ltd TEX 29-May-97  Manufacturing - industrial and consumer products 
25 DBG 1 DB Group Ltd LIQ 11-Jun-97  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
hospitality 
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26 DBG 2 DB Group Ltd LIQ 10-Dec-97  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
hospitality 
27 DCP 2 Direct Capital Partners Ltd INV 26-Aug-97  Investment - unlistec companies 
28 DON 1 Donaghys Ltd TEX 7-Mar-97  Manufacturing - cordage, plastics, electronics 
29 DON 2 Donaghys Ltd TEX 29-Aug-97  Manufacturing - cordage, plastics, electronics 
30 DTL 1 Designer Textiles NZ Ltd TEX 25-Feb-97  Manufacturing - textiles 
        
31 DTL 2 Designer Textiles NZ Ltd TEX 26-Aug-97  Manufacturing - textiles 
32 EBO 1 Ebos Group Ltd MED 24-Feb-97  Retailing and Distribution - hospital and surgical 
supplies 
33 EBO 2 Ebos Group Ltd MED 12-Sep-97  Retailing and Distribution - hospital and surgical 
supplies 
34 EEQ 1 Eastern Equities Corporation Ltd AGS 23-Apr-97  Horticulture and Agriculture 
35 EEQ 2 Eastern Equities Corporation Ltd AGS 23-Oct-97  Horticulture and Agriculture 
        
36 ENC 1 Enerco New Zealand Ltd ENE 4-Nov-97  Distributing - natural gas 
37 ENC 2 Enerco New Zealand Ltd ENE 16-May-97  Distributing - natural gas 
38 ERN 1 Ernest Adams Ltd FOD 12-Dec-97  Food processing - cakes pastries 
39 ERN 2 Ernest Adams Ltd FOD 5-Jun-97  Food processing - cakes pastries 
40 FAP 2 Fisher & Paykel Industries Ltd ELE 6-Jun-97  Manufacturing - domestic appliances 
        
41 FER 1 Fernz Corporation Ltd CHM 5-Feb-97  Manufacturing - fertiliser ad chemicals (agri-) 
42 FER 2 Fernz Corporation Ltd CHM 30-Jul-97  Manufacturing - fertiliser ad chemicals (agri-) 
43 FLCF 1 Fletcher Challenge Ltd Forest 
Division 
FOR 26-Feb-97  Horticulture - Forestry and Logging 
44 FLCF 2 Fletcher Challenge Ltd Forest 
Division 
FOR 20-Aug-97  Horticulture - Forestry and Logging 
45 FOR 2 Force Corporation Ltd MIS 21-Aug-97  Property Development, Services - cinema 
        
46 FSL 1 Fruitfed Supplies Ltd AGS 27-Nov-97  Horticulture and Distribution - of horticulteral 
products 
47 FSL 2 Fruitfed Supplies Ltd AGS 28-May-97  Horticulture and Distribution - of horticulteral 
products 
48 GMF 2 Goodman Fielder Ltd FOD 5-Sep-97  Manufacturing - food processing 
49 HBY 1 Hellaby Holdings Ltd INV 24-Feb-97  Investment - in manufacturing and retail 
companies 
50 HBY 2 Hellaby Holdings Ltd INV 8-Sep-97  Investment - in manufacturing and retail 
companies 
        
51 HED 1 Bay of Plenty Electricity Ltd ENE 10-Nov-97  Service Utility - electricity 
52 HED 2 Bay of Plenty Electricity Ltd ENE 21-May-97  Manufacturing and Retailing - motor vehicles 
53 HLG 1 Hallenstein Glasson Holdings Ltd RET 24-Mar-97  Manufacturing and Retailing - motor vehicles 
54 HLG 2 Hallenstein Glasson Holdings Ltd RET 30-Sep-97  Retailing - clothing 
55 IFT 2 Infrastructure & Utilites NZ Ltd INV 7-May-97  Investment 
        
56 INL 1 Independent Newspapers Ltd MCM 24-Feb-97  Newspaper publishers 
57 INL 2 Independent Newspapers Ltd MCM 15-Aug-97  Newspaper publishers 
58 JFA 2 Jardine Fleming Asia Pacific Ltd INV 22-Aug-97  Investment - Asia 
59 LNN 1 Lion Nathan Ltd LIQ 28-Apr-97  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
hospitality 
60 LNN 2 Lion Nathan Ltd LIQ 30-Oct-97  Manufacturing and Investment - electronics 
        
61 LWR 1 LWR Industries Ltd TEX 26-Feb-97  Manufacturing and Investment - electronics 
62 LWR 2 LWR Industries Ltd TEX 13-Aug-97  Manufacturing - textiles 
63 MBN 1 Milburn New Zealand Ltd BLD 25-Aug-97  Manufacturing sand refining - cement, lime 
64 MBN 2 Milburn New Zealand Ltd BLD 10-Mar-97  Manufacturing sand refining - cement, lime 
65 MCH 1 Mr Chips Holdings Ltd FOD 20-Nov-97  Retail - books, printing 
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66 MCH 2 Mr Chips Holdings Ltd FOD 15-May-97  Retail - books, printing 
67 MDL 2 McConnell Dowell Corporation Ltd BLD 15-Sep-97  Construction 
68 MET 1 Metropolitan Lifecare Group Ltd MIS 13-Aug-97  Services - retirement villages 
69 MET 2 Metropolitan Lifecare Group Ltd MIS 5-Mar-97  Services - retirement villages 
70 MFT 1 Mainfreight Ltd TRN 10-Nov-97  Transport 
        
71 MHI 1 Michael Hill International Ltd RET 25-Feb-97  Manufacturing and retailing - jewellery 
72 MHI 2 Michael Hill International Ltd RET 12-Aug-97  Manufacturing and retailing - jewellery 
73 NCH 1 Natural Gas Corporation Holdings 
Ltd 
ENE 19-Feb-97  Mineral resources - Natural Gas 
74 NLL 2 New Zealand Light Leathers Ltd MET 14-Feb-97  Manufacturing - Tanning industry 
75 NPX 1 Nuplex Industries Ltd CHM 21-Feb-97  Manufacturing - resins, chemicals 
        
76 NPX 2 Nuplex Industries Ltd CHM 22-Aug-97  Manufacturing - resins, chemicals 
77 NTH 1 Northland Port Corporation (NZ) 
Ltd 
TRN 16-May-97  Port management 
78 NTH 2 Northland Port Corporation (NZ) 
Ltd 
TRN 20-Nov-97  Port management 
79 NZR 1 The New Zealand Refining 
Company Ltd 
ENE 28-Aug-97  Manufacturing and Refining - petrol 
80 NZR 2 The New Zealand Refining 
Company Ltd 
ENE 27-Feb-97  Manufacturing and Refining - petrol 
        
81 PDL 1 PDL Holdings Ltd ELE 11-Nov-97  Manufacturing - plastics, electrical goods 
82 PDL 2 PDL Holdings Ltd ELE 4-Jun-97  Manufacturing - plastics, electrical goods 
83 PFI 2 Property for Industry Ltd PRO 20-Feb-97  Investment - property 
84 POA 1 Ports of Auckland Ltd TRN 18-Feb-97  Port management 
85 POT 1 Port of Tauranga Ltd TRN 3-Mar-97  Port management 
        
86 POT 2 Port of Tauranga Ltd TRN 25-Aug-97  Port management 
87 PRO 1 Progressive Enterprises Ltd FOD 27-Mar-97  Retailing - food (supermarkets) and restaurant 
operator 
88 PRO 2 Progressive Enterprises Ltd FOD 1-Oct-97  Retailing - food (supermarkets) and restaurant 
operator 
89 RCH 2 Richina Pacific Ltd PRO 10-Mar-97  Property development, investment, construction 
90 REI 2 Reid Farmers Ltd AGS 26-Aug-97  Agricultural services - stock and station agency 
        
91 RNS 1 Renaissance Ltd MIS 21-Aug-97  Distribution - computers 
92 ROT 2 Radio Otago Ltd MCM 11-Jun-97  Radio station 
93 RPA 1 Radio Pacific Ltd MCM 10-Nov-97  Radio station 
94 RPA 2 Radio Pacific Ltd MCM 30-May-97  Radio station 
95 SAN 1 Sanford Ltd FOD 7-May-97  Fisheries and aquaculture 
        
96 SAN 2 Sanford Ltd FOD 7-Nov-97  Fisheries and aquaculture 
97 SEU 1 South Eastern Utilities Ltd INV 31-Jan-97  Investments - in Utilities such as electricity 
98 SEU 2 South Eastern Utilities Ltd INV 30-Jul-97  Investments - in Utilities such as electricity 
99 SFH 1 Seafresh New Zealand Ltd FOD 5-Jun-97  Fisheries 
100 SFH 2 Seafresh New Zealand Ltd FOD 15-Dec-97  Fisheries 
        
101 SHP 2 Shortland Properties Ltd PRO 12-Mar-97  Property development, Investment 
102 SJL 1 Shotover Jet Ltd TRN 16-Jun-97  Services - tourism 
103 SPN 1 Southport New Zealand Ltd TRN 24-Feb-97  Port management 
104 SPN 2 Southport New Zealand Ltd TRN 8-Sep-97  Port management 
105 STL 1 St Lukes Group Ltd PRO 14-Feb-97  Retailing - supermarkets 
        
106 TAS 1 Tasman Agriculture Ltd AGS 14-Feb-97  Agriculture - dairying 
107 TAS 2 Tasman Agriculture Ltd AGS 13-Aug-97  Agriculture - dairying 
108 TAY 1 Taylors Group Ltd MIS 3-Mar-97  Services - drycleaning and Property investment 
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109 TAY 2 Taylors Group Ltd MIS 10-Sep-97  Services - drycleaning and Property investment 
110 THL 1 Tourism Holdings Ltd TRN 12-Mar-97  Services - tourism 
        
111 THL 2 Tourism Holdings Ltd TRN 12-Sep-97  Services - tourism 
112 TPW 1 Trustpower Ltd ENE 28-Nov-97  Service Utility - electricity 
113 TTP 1 Trans Tasman Properties Ltd PRO 4-Sep-97  Property Investment 
114 TTP 2 Trans Tasman Properties Ltd PRO 17-Mar-97  Property Investment 
115 UNL 1 Power New Zealand Ltd ENE 27-Nov-97   Service Utility - electricity 
        
116 WAM 1 Waste Management NZ Ltd MIS 21-Aug-97  Service Utility - waste disposal 
117 WAM 2 Waste Management NZ Ltd MIS 20-Feb-97  Service Utility - waste disposal 
118 WHO 1 Wilson and Horton Ltd MCM 19-Aug-97  Newspaper and Publishing 
119 WHO 2 Wilson and Horton Ltd MCM 28-Feb-97  Newspaper and Publishing 
120 WKL 1 Williams and Kettle Ltd AGS 19-Mar-97  Services - Agricultual, financial, stock and station 
agency 
        
121 WKL 2 Williams and Kettle Ltd AGS 29-Sep-97  Services - Agricultual, financial, stock and station 
agency 
122 WRI 1 Wrightson Ltd AGS 6-Mar-97  Services - Agricultual, financial, stock and station 
agency 
123 WRI 2 Wrightson Ltd AGS 11-Sep-97  Services - Agricultual, financial, stock and station 
agency 
124 ZNZ 1 Zuellig New Zealand Ltd MED 27-Nov-97  Manufacturing and Distribution - medical, dental, 
pharmaceutical supplies 
125 ZNZ 2 Zuellig New Zealand Ltd MED 9-Jun-97  Manufacturing and Distribution - medical, dental, 
pharmaceutical supplies 
 
1998     
        
No COY INTFI
N 
Name Code Date  Description 
        
1 ADV 1 Advantage Group Ltd MIS 9-Mar-98  Distribution - electronic equipment 
2 AFF 1 AFFCO Holdings Ltd MET 5-Jun-98  Food processing - meat 
3 AFF 2 AFFCO Holdings Ltd MET 10-Nov-98  Food processing - meat 
4 AIRVA 1 Air New Zealand Ltd TRN 17-Feb-98  Transport - air 
5 AIRVA 2 Air New Zealand Ltd TRN 3-Sep-98  Transport - air 
        
6 ARB 1 Arthur Barnett Ltd RET 6-Apr-98  Retailing 
7 ARB 2 Arthur Barnett Ltd RET 1-Oct-98  Retailing 
8 BCH 1 Baycorp Holdings Ltd MIS 10-Feb-98  Financial Sevices - Debt collection, credit rating 
9 BCH 2 Baycorp Holdings Ltd MIS 13-Aug-98  Financial Sevices - Debt collection, credit rating 
10 BOA 2 J. Boag and Son Ltd LIQ 4-Sep-98  Liquor Industry 
        
11 BRY 1 Brierley Investments Ltd INV 5-Mar-98  Investment 
12 BRY 2 Brierley Investments Ltd INV 11-Sep-98  Investment 
13 CAH 1 Carter Holt Harvey Ltd FOR 5-Nov-98  Manufacturing, distribution, fisheries - pulp, timber 
14 CAH 2 Carter Holt Harvey Ltd FOR 8-May-98  Manufacturing, distribution, fisheries - pulp, timber 
15 CAV 1 Cavalier Corporation Ltd TEX 20-Feb-98  Manufacturing - wool scouring and carpet 
        
16 CAV 2 Cavalier Corporation Ltd TEX 31-Aug-98  Manufacturing - wool scouring and carpet 
17 CDI 2 CDL Investments New Zealand Ltd PRO 13-Mar-98  Property developer 
18 CDL 2 CDL Hotels New Zealand Ltd INV 17-Mar-98  Investment - hotel industry 
19 CEM 1 Ceramco Corporation Ltd TEX 19-Nov-98  Manufacturing - industrial and consumer products 
20 CEM 2 Ceramco Corporation Ltd TEX 28-May-98  Manufacturing - industrial and consumer products 
        
21 CMO 1 The Colonial Motor Company Ltd AUT 4-Mar-98  Retailing and Distribution - motor vehicles 
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22 CMO 2 The Colonial Motor Company Ltd AUT 11-Sep-98  Retailing and Distribution - motor vehicles 
23 DBG 1 DB Group Ltd LIQ 9-Jun-98  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
hospitality 
24 DBG 2 DB Group Ltd LIQ 9-Dec-98  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
hospitality 
25 DON 1 Donaghys Ltd TEX 9-Mar-98  Manufacturing - cordage, plastics, electronics 
        
26 DON 2 Donaghys Ltd TEX 28-Aug-98  Manufacturing - cordage, plastics, electronics 
27 DPC 1 Dorchester Pacific Ltd FIN 27-Nov-98  Financial Services 
28 DPC 2 Dorchester Pacific Ltd FIN 11-Jun-98  Financial Services 
29 DTL 1 Designer Textiles NZ Ltd TEX 24-Feb-98  Manufacturing - textiles 
30 DTL 2 Designer Textiles NZ Ltd TEX 7-Sep-98  Manufacturing - textiles 
        
31 EBO 1 Ebos Group Ltd MED 27-Feb-98  Retailing and Distribution - hospital and surgical 
supplies 
32 EBO 2 Ebos Group Ltd MED 3-Sep-98  Retailing and Distribution - hospital and surgical 
supplies 
33 EEQ 1 Eastern Equities Corporation Ltd AGS 8-May-98  Horticulture and Agriculture 
34 EEQ 2 Eastern Equities Corporation Ltd AGS 27-Oct-98  Horticulture and Agriculture 
35 ERN 1 Ernest Adams Ltd FOD 15-Dec-98  Food processing - cakes pastries 
        
36 FAP 2 Fisher & Paykel Industries Ltd ELE 8-Jun-98  Manufacturing - domestic appliances 
37 FER 1 Fernz Corporation Ltd CHM 4-Feb-98  Manufacturing - fertiliser ad chemicals (agri-) 
38 FER 2 Fernz Corporation Ltd CHM 29-Jul-98  Manufacturing - fertiliser ad chemicals (agri-) 
39 FLCB 1 Fletcher Challenge Ltd Building 
Division 
BLD 18-Feb-98  Construction 
40 FLCB 2 Fletcher Challenge Ltd Building 
Division 
BLD 12-Aug-98  Construction 
        
41 FLCE 1 Fletcher Challenge Ltd Energy 
Division 
ENE 18-Feb-98  Mineral Resources 
42 FLCE 2 Fletcher Challenge Ltd Energy 
Division 
ENE 12-Aug-98  Mineral Resources 
43 FLCF 1 Fletcher Challenge Ltd Forest 
Division 
FOR 18-Feb-98  Horticulture - Forestry and Logging 
44 FLCF 2 Fletcher Challenge Ltd Forest 
Division 
FOR 12-Aug-98  Horticulture - Forestry and Logging 
45 FLCP 1 Fletcher Challenge Ltd Paper 
Division 
FOR 18-Feb-98  Manufacturing - Paper  
        
46 FOR 1 Force Corporation Ltd MIS 11-Feb-98  Property Development, Services - cinema 
47 FOR 2 Force Corporation Ltd MIS 24-Aug-98  Property Development, Services - cinema 
48 FSL 1 Fruitfed Supplies Ltd AGS 3-Dec-98  Horticulture and Distribution - of horticulteral 
products 
49 FSL 2 Fruitfed Supplies Ltd AGS 4-Jun-98  Horticulture and Distribution - of horticulteral 
products 
50 GMF 1 Goodman Fielder Ltd FOD 6-Mar-98  Manufacturing - food processing 
51 GMF 2 Goodman Fielder Ltd FOD 4-Sep-98  Manufacturing - food processing 
        
52 GPG 2 Guinness Peat Group Plc INV 12-Mar-98  Manufacturing and Retailing - motor vehicles 
53 GPG 2 Guinness Peat Group Plc INV 12-Mar-98  Manufacturing and Retailing - motor vehicles 
54 HBY 1 Hellaby Holdings Ltd INV 23-Feb-98  Investment - in manufacturing and retail 
companies 
55 HBY 2 Hellaby Holdings Ltd INV 4-Sep-98  Investment - in manufacturing and retail 
companies 
        
56 HED 1 Bay of Plenty Electricity Ltd ENE 10-Nov-98  Service Utility - electricity 
57 HED 2 Bay of Plenty Electricity Ltd ENE 8-May-98  Service Utility - electricity 
58 HLG 1 Hallenstein Glasson Holdings Ltd RET 24-Mar-98  Retailing - clothing 
59 HLG 2 Hallenstein Glasson Holdings Ltd RET 29-Sep-98  Retailing - clothing 
60 IFT 1 Infrastructure & Utilites NZ Ltd INV 20-Oct-98  Manufacturing and Investment - electronics 
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61 IFT 2 Infrastructure & Utilites NZ Ltd INV 22-Apr-98  Manufacturing and Investment - electronics 
62 INL 1 Independent Newspapers Ltd MCM 20-Feb-98  Newspaper publishers 
63 INL 2 Independent Newspapers Ltd MCM 21-Aug-98  Newspaper publishers 
64 LNN 2 Lion Nathan Ltd LIQ 28-Oct-98  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
hospitality 
65 LPC 2 Lyttelton Port Company TRN 10-Aug-98  Retail - books, printing 
        
66 LWR 1 LWR Industries Ltd TEX 25-Feb-98  Retail - books, printing 
67 MBN 2 Milburn New Zealand Ltd BLD 16-Mar-98  Manufacturing sand refining - cement, lime 
68 MCH 1 Mr Chips Holdings Ltd FOD 23-Nov-98  Food Processing 
69 MCH 2 Mr Chips Holdings Ltd FOD 5-Jun-98  Food Processing 
70 MDL 2 McConnell Dowell Corporation Ltd BLD 14-Sep-98  Construction 
        
71 MET 2 MetLifecare Group Ltd MIS 3-Mar-98  Services - retirement villages 
72 MFT 2 Mainfreight Ltd TRN 11-Jun-98  Transport 
73 MHI 1 Michael Hill International Ltd RET 20-Feb-98  Manufacturing and retailing - jewellery 
74 MHI 2 Michael Hill International Ltd RET 18-Aug-98  Manufacturing and retailing - jewellery 
75 MMC 2 Macraes Mining Company Ltd MIN 11-Mar-98   
        
76 MON 1 Corporate Investments Ltd INV 18-Feb-98  Investment, liquor industry 
77 MON 2 Corporate Investments Ltd INV 26-Aug-98  Investment, liquor industry 
78 NCH 1 Natural Gas Corporation Holdings 
Ltd 
ENE 18-Feb-98  Mineral resources - Natural Gas 
79 NCH 2 Natural Gas Corporation Holdings 
Ltd 
ENE 19-Aug-98  Mineral resources - Natural Gas 
80 NLL 1 New Zealand Light Leathers Ltd MET 20-Aug-98  Manufacturing - Tanning industry 
        
81 NLL 2 New Zealand Light Leathers Ltd MET 25-Feb-98  Manufacturing - Tanning industry 
82 NMH 1 National Mutual Holdings Ltd FIN 26-May-98  Financial Serivices - Insurance 
83 NOG 2 New Zealand Oil and Gas Ltd MIN 10-Sep-98  Mineral Resources - Oil and gas exploration 
84 NPX 1 Nuplex Industries Ltd CHM 20-Feb-98  Manufacturing - resins, chemicals 
85 NPX 2 Nuplex Industries Ltd CHM 28-Aug-98  Manufacturing - resins, chemicals 
        
86 NTH 1 Northland Port Corporation (NZ) 
Ltd 
TRN 22-May-98  Port management 
87 NTH 2 Northland Port Corporation (NZ) 
Ltd 
TRN 18-Nov-98  Port management 
88 NZR 1 The New Zealand Refining 
Company Ltd 
ENE 27-Aug-98  Manufacturing and Refining - petrol 
89 NZR 2 The New Zealand Refining 
Company Ltd 
ENE 26-Feb-98  Manufacturing and Refining - petrol 
90 OWN 1 Owens Group Ltd TRN 11-Dec-98  Investment, transport 
        
91 OWN 2 Owens Group Ltd TRN 29-May-98  Investment, transport 
92 PDL 1 PDL Holdings Ltd ELE 19-Nov-98  Manufacturing - plastics, electrical goods 
93 PDL 2 PDL Holdings Ltd ELE 15-Jun-98  Manufacturing - plastics, electrical goods 
94 PFI 2 Property for Industry Ltd PRO 18-Feb-98  Investment - property 
95 POA 1 Ports of Auckland Ltd TRN 17-Feb-98  Port management 
        
96 POT 1 Port of Tauranga Ltd TRN 2-Mar-98  Port management 
97 POT 2 Port of Tauranga Ltd TRN 1-Sep-98  Port management 
98 PRG 1 Pacific Retail Group Ltd RET 11-Nov-98  Retailing - home appliances 
99 PRG 2 Pacific Retail Group Ltd RET 3-Jun-98  Retailing - home appliances 
100 PRO 1 Progressive Enterprises Ltd FOD 2-Apr-98  Retailing - food (supermarkets) and restaurant 
operator 
        
101 PRO 2 Progressive Enterprises Ltd FOD 15-Sep-98  Retailing - food (supermarkets) and restaurant 
operator 
102 RCH 2 Richina Pacific Ltd PRO 4-Mar-98  Property development, investment, construction 
262 
103 REI 2 Reid Farmers Ltd AGS 31-Aug-98  Agricultural services - stock and station agency 
104 RNS 1 Renaissance Ltd MIS 24-Jul-98  Distribution - computers 
105 ROT 2 Radio Otago Ltd MCM 12-Jun-98  Radio station 
        
106 RPA 2 Radio Pacific Ltd MCM 8-Jun-98  Radio station 
107 SAN 1 Sanford Ltd FOD 6-May-98  Fisheries and aquaculture 
108 SAN 2 Sanford Ltd FOD 28-Oct-98  Fisheries and aquaculture 
109 SCT 2 Scott Technology Ltd ELE 8-Oct-98  Manufacturing - appliances 
110 SEU 1 South Eastern Utilities Ltd INV 2-Feb-98  Investments - in Utilities such as electricity 
        
111 SEU 2 South Eastern Utilities Ltd INV 31-Jul-98  Investments - in Utilities such as electricity 
112 SHP 2 Shortland Properties Ltd PRO 5-Mar-98  Property development, Investment 
113 SKC 1 Sky City Ltd TRN 20-Feb-98  Services - tourism, gambling 
114 SPN 1 Southport New Zealand Ltd TRN 27-Feb-98  Port management 
115 SPN 2 Southport New Zealand Ltd TRN 7-Sep-98  Port management 
        
116 STL 2 St Lukes Group Ltd PRO 20-Aug-98  Retailing - supermarkets 
117 STU 2 Steel & Tube Holdings Ltd ENG 30-Jul-98  Manufacturing and retailing - vehicles, large items 
118 TAS 2 Tasman Agriculture Ltd AGS 10-Aug-98  Agriculture - dairying 
119 TAY 1 Taylors Group Ltd MIS 25-Feb-98  Services - drycleaning and Property investment 
120 TAY 2 Taylors Group Ltd MIS 3-Sep-98  Services - drycleaning and Property investment 
        
121 THL 1 Tourism Holdings Ltd TRN 5-Mar-98  Services - tourism 
122 TLT 1 Transalta New Zealand Ltd ENE 12-Nov-98  Service Utility - electricity 
123 TLT 2 Transalta New Zealand Ltd ENE 28-May-98  Service Utility - electricity 
124 TPW 1 TrustPower Ltd ENE 27-Nov-98  Service Utility - electricity 
125 TPW 2 TrustPower Ltd ENE 29-May-98  Service Utility - electricity 
        
126 TRH 1 Tranz Rail Holdings Ltd TRN 30-Jan-98  Transport - railways 
127 UNL 1 Power New Zealand Ltd ENE 12-Nov-98   Service Utility - electricity 
128 WAM 1 Waste Management NZ Ltd MIS 20-Aug-98  Service Utility - waste disposal 
129 WAM 2 Waste Management NZ Ltd MIS 26-Feb-98  Service Utility - waste disposal 
130 WHS 1 The Warehouse Group Ltd RET 31-Mar-98  Retailing  
        
131 WHS 2 The Warehouse Group Ltd RET 25-Sep-98  Retailing  
132 WKL 1 Williams and Kettle Ltd AGS 30-Mar-98  Services - Agricultual, financial, stock and station 
agency 
133 WKL 2 Williams and Kettle Ltd AGS 29-Sep-98  Services - Agricultual, financial, stock and station 
agency 
134 WRI 1 Wrightson Ltd AGS 5-Mar-98  Services - Agricultual, financial, stock and station 
agency 
135 WRI 2 Wrightson Ltd AGS 3-Sep-98  Services - Agricultual, financial, stock and station 
agency 
        
136 ZNZ 1 Zuellig New Zealand Ltd MED 12-Nov-98  Manufacturing and Distribution - medical, dental, 
pharmaceutical supplies 
137 ZNZ 2 Zuellig New Zealand Ltd MED 4-Jun-98  Manufacturing and Distribution - medical, dental, 
pharmaceutical supplies 
 
1999     
        
No COY INTFI
N 
Name Code Date  Description 
        
1 AIRVA 2 Air New Zealand Ltd TRN 7-Sep-99  Transport - air 
2 ARB 1 Arthur Barnett Ltd RET 26-Mar-99  Retailing 
3 ARB 2 Arthur Barnett Ltd RET 12-Oct-99  Retailing 
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4 BCH 1 Baycorp Holdings Ltd MIS 17-Feb-99  Financial Sevices - Debt collection, credit rating 
5 BCH 2 Baycorp Holdings Ltd MIS 18-Aug-99  Financial Sevices - Debt collection, credit rating 
        
6 CAH 1 Carter Holt Harvey Ltd FOR 4-Nov-99  Manufacturing, distribution, fisheries - pulp, timber 
7 CAH 2 Carter Holt Harvey Ltd FOR 7-May-99  Manufacturing, distribution, fisheries - pulp, timber 
8 CAV 1 Cavalier Corporation Ltd TEX 22-Feb-99  Manufacturing - wool scouring and carpet 
9 CAV 2 Cavalier Corporation Ltd TEX 30-Aug-99  Manufacturing - wool scouring and carpet 
10 CDI 2 CDL Investments New Zealand Ltd PRO 26-Feb-99  Property developer 
        
11 CDL 2 CDL Hotels New Zealand Ltd INV 26-Feb-99  Investment - hotel industry 
12 CEM 1 Ceramco Corporation Ltd TEX 7-Dec-99  Manufacturing - industrial and consumer products 
13 CEM 2 Ceramco Corporation Ltd TEX 27-May-99  Manufacturing - industrial and consumer products 
14 CGH 2 Colonial Ltd FIN 3-Mar-99  Financial sevices - Insurance 
15 CMO 1 The Colonial Motor Company Ltd AUT 15-Mar-99  Retailing and Distribution - motor vehicles 
        
16 CMO 2 The Colonial Motor Company Ltd AUT 13-Sep-99  Retailing and Distribution - motor vehicles 
17 DBG 1 DB Group Ltd LIQ 4-Jun-99  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
hospitality 
18 DBG 2 DB Group Ltd LIQ 1-Dec-99  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
hospitality 
19 DMB 1 Damba Holdings Ltd MIS 8-Sep-99  Manufacturing - furniture (also distributing) 
20 DON 1 Donaghys Ltd TEX 5-Mar-99  Manufacturing - cordage, plastics, electronics 
        
21 DPC 2 Dorchester Pacific Ltd FIN 15-Jun-99  Financial Services 
22 DTL 1 Designer Textiles NZ Ltd TEX 23-Feb-99  Manufacturing - textiles 
23 DTL 2 Designer Textiles NZ Ltd TEX 26-Aug-99  Manufacturing - textiles 
24 EBO 1 Ebos Group Ltd MED 24-Feb-99  Retailing and Distribution - hospital and surgical 
supplies 
25 FAP 2 Fisher & Paykel Industries Ltd ELE 9-Jun-99  Manufacturing - domestic appliances 
        
26 FER 1 Fernz Corporation Ltd CHM 3-Feb-99  Manufacturing - fertiliser ad chemicals (agri-) 
27 FER 2 Fernz Corporation Ltd CHM 28-Jul-99  Manufacturing - fertiliser ad chemicals (agri-) 
28 FLCB 1 Fletcher Challenge Ltd Building 
Division 
BLD 17-Feb-99  Construction 
29 FLCB 2 Fletcher Challenge Ltd Building 
Division 
BLD 18-Aug-99  Construction 
30 FLCE 1 Fletcher Challenge Ltd Energy 
Division 
ENE 17-Feb-99  Mineral Resources 
        
31 FLCE 2 Fletcher Challenge Ltd Energy 
Division 
ENE 18-Aug-99  Mineral Resources 
32 FLCF 1 Fletcher Challenge Ltd Forest 
Division 
FOR 17-Feb-99  Horticulture - Forestry and Logging 
33 FLCF 2 Fletcher Challenge Ltd Forest 
Division 
FOR 18-Aug-99  Horticulture - Forestry and Logging 
34 FLCP 1 Fletcher Challenge Ltd Paper 
Division 
FOR 17-Feb-99  Manufacturing - Paper  
35 FOR 1 Force Corporation Ltd MIS 23-Feb-99  Property Development, Services - cinema 
        
36 FOR 2 Force Corporation Ltd MIS 31-Aug-99  Property Development, Services - cinema 
37 FSL 2 Fruitfed Supplies Ltd AGS 26-May-99  Horticulture and Distribution - of horticulteral 
products 
38 GMF 2 Goodman Fielder Ltd FOD 3-Sep-99  Manufacturing - food processing 
39 HBY 1 Hellaby Holdings Ltd INV 19-Feb-99  Investment - in manufacturing and retail 
companies 
40 HBY 2 Hellaby Holdings Ltd INV 8-Sep-99  Investment - in manufacturing and retail 
companies 
        
41 HED 2 Horizon Energy Distribution Ltd ENE 11-Jun-99  Service Utility - electricity 
42 HLG 1 Hallenstein Glasson Holdings Ltd RET 30-Mar-99  Retailing - clothing 
43 HLG 2 Hallenstein Glasson Holdings Ltd RET 1-Oct-99  Retailing - clothing 
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44 IFA 2 Infratil australia Ltd INV 30-Aug-99  Investment in Ports, Airports, Electricity Utilities 
45 INL 1 Independent Newspapers Ltd MCM 19-Feb-99  Newspaper publishers 
        
46 INL 2 Independent Newspapers Ltd MCM 3-Sep-99  Newspaper publishers 
47 LNN 1 Lion Nathan Ltd LIQ 30-Apr-99  Liquor industry production and distribution, 
hospitality 
48 LPC 1 Lyttelton Port Company TRN 8-Feb-99  Port Management 
49 LPC 2 Lyttelton Port Company TRN 9-Aug-99  Port Management 
50 LWR 1 LWR Industries Ltd TEX 3-Mar-99  Manufacturing - textiles 
        
51 MCH 2 Mr Chips Holdings Ltd FOD 11-Jun-99  Food Processing 
52 MDL 2 McConnell Dowell Corporation Ltd BLD 13-Sep-99  Manufacturing and Retailing - motor vehicles 
53 MET 1 MetLifecare Group Ltd MIS 13-Sep-99  Manufacturing and Retailing - motor vehicles 
54 MET 2 MetLifecare Group Ltd MIS 4-Mar-99  Services - retirement villages 
55 MFT 1 Mainfreight Ltd TRN 17-Nov-99  Transport 
        
56 MFT 2 Mainfreight Ltd TRN 10-Jun-99  Transport 
57 MHI 1 Michael Hill International Ltd RET 17-Feb-99  Manufacturing and retailing - jewellery 
58 MHI 2 Michael Hill International Ltd RET 20-Aug-99  Manufacturing and retailing - jewellery 
59 MON 2 Montana Group (NZ) Ltd LIQ 17-Aug-99  Investment, liquor industry 
60 NCH 1 Natural Gas Corporation Holdings 
Ltd 
ENE 18-Feb-99  Manufacturing and Investment - electronics 
        
61 NOG 2 New Zealand Oil and Gas Ltd MIN 14-Sep-99  Manufacturing and Investment - electronics 
62 NPX 1 Nuplex Industries Ltd CHM 26-Feb-99  Manufacturing - resins, chemicals 
63 NPX 2 Nuplex Industries Ltd CHM 20-Aug-99  Manufacturing - resins, chemicals 
64 NTH 1 Northland Port Corporation (NZ) 
Ltd 
TRN 14-May-99  Port management 
65 NZR 1 The New Zealand Refining 
Company Ltd 
ENE 26-Aug-99  Retail - books, printing 
        
66 NZR 2 The New Zealand Refining 
Company Ltd 
ENE 25-Feb-99  Retail - books, printing 
67 OWN 1 Owens Group Ltd TRN 26-Nov-99  Investment, transport 
68 PDL 1 PDL Holdings Ltd ELE 26-Nov-99  Manufacturing - plastics, electrical goods 
69 PDL 2 PDL Holdings Ltd ELE 14-Jun-99  Manufacturing - plastics, electrical goods 
70 PFI 2 Property for Industry Ltd PRO 23-Feb-99  Investment - property 
        
71 POA 1 Ports of Auckland Ltd TRN 16-Feb-99  Port management 
72 POA 2 Ports of Auckland Ltd TRN 17-Aug-99  Port management 
73 POT 2 Port of Tauranga Ltd TRN 27-Aug-99  Port management 
74 PRG 1 Pacific Retail Group Ltd RET 2-Dec-99  Retailing - home appliances 
75 PRG 2 Pacific Retail Group Ltd RET 15-Jun-99  Retailing - home appliances 
        
76 RBD 1 Restaurant Brands New Zealand 
Ltd 
FOD 9-Jul-99  Retailing - food, restaurants 
77 RCH 2 Richina Pacific Ltd PRO 16-Mar-99  Property development, investment, construction 
78 REI 2 Reid Farmers Ltd AGS 30-Aug-99  Agricultural services - stock and station agency 
79 RPA 1 Radio Pacific Ltd MCM 19-Nov-99  Radio station 
80 RPA 2 Radio Pacific Ltd MCM 31-May-99  Radio station 
        
81 SAN 1 Sanford Ltd FOD 6-May-99  Fisheries and aquaculture 
82 SCT 1 Scott Technology Ltd ELE 9-Apr-99  Manufacturing - appliances 
83 SCT 2 Scott Technology Ltd ELE 27-Oct-99  Manufacturing - appliances 
84 SEU 1 South Eastern Utilities Ltd INV 12-Feb-99  Investments - in Utilities such as electricity 
85 SHP 2 Shortland Properties Ltd PRO 10-Mar-99  Property development, Investment 
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86 SJL 2 Shotover Jet Ltd TRN 17-Aug-99  Services - tourism 
87 SKC 1 Sky City Ltd TRN 22-Feb-99  Services - tourism, gambling 
88 SKC 2 Sky City Ltd TRN 12-Aug-99  Services - tourism, gambling 
89 SPN 1 Southport New Zealand Ltd TRN 22-Feb-99  Port management 
90 SPN 2 Southport New Zealand Ltd TRN 9-Sep-99  Port management 
        
91 STU 2 Steel & Tube Holdings Ltd ENG 28-Jul-99  Manufacturing and retailing - vehicles, large items 
92 TAS 2 Tasman Agriculture Ltd AGS 5-Aug-99  Agriculture - dairying 
93 TAY 1 Taylors Group Ltd MIS 15-Feb-99  Services - drycleaning and Property investment 
94 TAY 2 Taylors Group Ltd MIS 1-Sep-99  Services - drycleaning and Property investment 
95 TLS 1 Telstra Corporation Ltd MCM 11-Mar-99  Service Utility - telecommunications 
        
96 TLT 2 Transalta New Zealand Ltd ENE 27-May-99  Service Utility - electricity 
97 TPW 1 TrustPower Ltd ENE 26-Nov-99  Service Utility - electricity 
98 TPW 2 TrustPower Ltd ENE 14-Jun-99  Service Utility - electricity 
99 TRH 1 Tranz Rail Holdings Ltd TRN 5-Feb-99  Transport - railways 
100 TTP 2 Trans Tasman Properties Ltd PRO 24-Feb-99  Property Investment 
        
101 UNL 2 UnitedNetworks Ltd ENE 14-Jun-99   Service Utility - electricity 
102 WAM 2 Waste Management NZ Ltd MIS 25-Feb-99  Service Utility - waste disposal 
103 WKL 1 Williams and Kettle Ltd AGS 30-Mar-99  Services - Agricultual, financial, stock and station 
agency 
104 WKL 2 Williams and Kettle Ltd AGS 17-Sep-99  Services - Agricultual, financial, stock and station 
agency 
105 WRI 2 Wrightson Ltd AGS 31-Aug-99  Services - Agricultual, financial, stock and station 
agency 
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NO. COY INT/FIN Date DPSt EPSt DPSt-1 EPSt-1 ∆DPS ∆EPS DPSEPS Days Traded 
1 ADV End 31-Aug-95 4.6 0.1530 3.8 0.1067 0.2105 0.4335 DI-EI 97 
2 ADV Mid 4-Mar-96 3 0.0663 3 0.0656 0.0000 0.0107 DNC-EI 94 
3 ADV End 30-Aug-96 3 11.8600 4.6 15.3000 -0.3478 -0.2248 DD-ED 91 
4 ADV Mid 14-Feb-97 3.5 6.4600 3 6.0500 0.1667 0.0678 DI-EI 85 
5 ADV End 15-Sep-97 0 5.6700 3 11.8600 -1.0000 -0.5219 DD-ED 88 
6 ADV Mid 9-Mar-98 0 -16.8900 3.5 6.4600 -1.0000 -3.6146 DD-ED 69 
7 AFF Mid 31-May-96 2.5 5.4800 0 4.9100 ∞ 0.1161 DI-EI 95 
8 AFF End 14-Nov-96 2.5 15.7700 2.5 17.2100 0.0000 -0.0837 DNC-ED 96 
9 AFF Mid 29-May-97 2.5 2.7600 2.5 5.4800 0.0000 -0.4964 DNC-ED 96 
10 AFF End 14-Nov-97 1.25 4.5600 2.5 15.7700 -0.5000 -0.7108 DD-ED 99 
11 AFF Mid 5-Jun-98 0 -1.2700 2.5 2.7600 -1.0000 -1.4601 DD-ED 99 
12 AFF End 10-Nov-98 0 -1.2200 1.25 4.5600 -1.0000 -1.2675 DD-ED 99 
13 AIRVA End 1-Oct-91 0 0.1926 6.5 0.3606 -1.0000 -0.4659 DD-ED 100 
14 AIRVA End 21-Sep-92 6 0.2741 0 0.0567 ∞ 3.8332 DI-EI 100 
15 AIRVA Mid 4-Mar-93 4 0.1451 4 0.2003 0.0000 -0.2755 DNC-ED 100 
16 AIRVA End 8-Sep-93 6 0.3209 6 0.2741 0.0000 0.1710 DNC-EI 99 
17 AIRVA End 7-Sep-94 8 0.4299 6 0.3209 0.3333 0.3396 DI-EI 100 
18 AIRVA Mid 17-Feb-95 8 0.3167 6 0.2026 0.3333 0.5630 DI-EI 100 
19 AIRVA End 5-Sep-95 12 0.5866 8 0.4299 0.5000 0.3645 DI-EI 99 
20 AIRVA Mid 23-Feb-96 8 0.3047 8 0.3167 0.0000 -0.0379 DNC-ED 100 
21 AIRVA End 2-Sep-96 12 50.7900 12 58.6600 0.0000 -0.1342 DNC-ED 100 
22 AIRVA Mid 19-Feb-97 8 13.5400 8 30.4700 0.0000 -0.5556 DNC-ED 100 
23 AIRVA End 2-Sep-97 12 26.5000 12 50.7900 0.0000 -0.4782 DNC-ED 100 
24 AIRVA Mid 17-Feb-98 8 14.4700 8 13.5400 0.0000 0.0687 DNC-EI 100 
25 AIRVA End 3-Sep-98 8 25.5500 12 26.5000 -0.3333 -0.0358 DD-ED 100 
26 AIRVA End 7-Sep-99 9 37.8200 8 24.8600 0.1250 0.5213 DI-EI 100 
27 APF End 19-Nov-91 4 0.1551 3 0.1089 0.3333 0.4241 DI-EI 41 
28 APF End 27-Nov-92 5 0.1403 4 0.0066 0.2500 20.1555 DI-EI 99 
29 APF End 1-Dec-93 5 0.1920 5 0.1403 0.0000 0.3685 DNC-EI 98 
30 APF End 5-Dec-94 0 -0.0167 5 -0.1423 -1.0000 0.8825 DD-EI 79 
31 AQL End 19-Jun-92 2 0.0801 2 0.0475 0.0000 0.6845 DNC-EI 99 
32 AQL End 24-Jun-93 0 -0.1175 2 0.0801 -1.0000 -2.4673 DD-ED 97 
33 ARB End 29-Sep-95 7 0.3460 0 0.3445 ∞ 0.0042 DI-EI 41 
34 ARB Mid 25-Mar-96 3 0.1484 0 0.1693 ∞ -0.1235 DI-ED 46 
35 ARB End 7-Oct-96 6 16.3500 7 22.0000 -0.1429 -0.2568 DD-ED 34 
36 ARB Mid 20-Mar-97 3 2.2800 3 9.4300 0.0000 -0.7582 DNC-ED 50 
37 ARB End 8-Oct-97 6 5.6100 6 16.3500 0.0000 -0.6569 DNC-ED 40 
38 ARB Mid 6-Apr-98 3 0.6600 3 2.2800 0.0000 -0.7105 DNC-ED 45 
39 ARB End 1-Oct-98 0 -14.3200 6 5.6100 -1.0000 -3.5526 DD-ED 42 
40 ARB Mid 26-Mar-99 5 2.1400 3 0.6600 0.6667 2.2424 DI-EI 22 
41 ARB End 12-Oct-99 3 2.8700 0 -14.3200 ∞ 1.2004 DI-EI 38 
42 ASN Mid 22-Dec-93 2 -0.0059 0 -0.0290 ∞ 0.7958 DI-EI 49 
43 ASN End 11-Jul-94 2 0.0304 0 0.1448 ∞ -0.7901 DI-ED 23 
44 ASN End 12-Jun-95 4 0.0584 2 0.0304 1.0000 0.9195 DI-EI 17 
45 ASN Mid 11-Dec-95 3 0.0283 0 0.0281 ∞ 0.0067 DI-EI 33 
46 ASN End 5-Jun-96 4 3.1000 4 5.8400 0.0000 -0.4692 DNC-ED 28 
47 ASN End 5-Jun-97 0 5.1700 4 3.1000 -1.0000 0.6677 DD-EI 29 
48 BCH Mid 22-Feb-95 4 0.0470 0 -0.1813 ∞ 1.2594 DI-EI 87 
49 BCH End 9-Aug-95 7.5 0.1202 0 -0.1807 ∞ 1.6653 DI-EI 87 
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50 BCH Mid 20-Feb-96 7 0.0789 4 0.0470 0.7500 0.6770 DI-EI 96 
51 BCH Mid 20-Feb-97 10 10.4700 7 7.8900 0.4286 0.3270 DI-EI 98 
52 BCH End 12-Aug-97 12 23.5300 10 18.3500 0.2000 0.2823 DI-EI 99 
53 BCH Mid 10-Feb-98 12 12.2800 10 10.4700 0.2000 0.1729 DI-EI 100 
54 BCH End 13-Aug-98 15 29.0000 12 23.5300 0.2500 0.2325 DI-EI 98 
55 BCH Mid 17-Feb-99 14 14.7400 12 12.2800 0.1667 0.2003 DI-EI 99 
56 BCH End 18-Aug-99 9 33.5500 15 29.0000 -0.4000 0.1569 DD-EI 100 
57 BNZ Mid 15-Oct-90 3.38 0.0764 4.13 0.0851 -0.1816 -0.1024 DD-ED 58 
58 BNZ End 16-Apr-91 4.13 0.1471 4.13 0.1625 0.0000 -0.0947 DNC-ED 41 
59 BNZ Mid 15-Oct-91 3.38 0.0605 3.38 0.0764 0.0000 -0.2082 DNC-ED 72 
60 BNZ End 21-Apr-92 4.13 0.1288 4.13 0.1471 0.0000 -0.1241 DNC-ED 93 
61 BNZ Mid 16-Oct-92 3.38 0.0504 3.38 0.0605 0.0000 -0.1675 DNC-ED 95 
62 BNZ Mid 22-Apr-93 4.13 0.1012 4.13 0.1288 0.0000 -0.2145 DNC-ED 97 
63 BNZ End 22-Oct-93 3.75 0.1153 4.13 0.1288 -0.0920 -0.1046 DD-ED 96 
64 BNZ Mid 20-Apr-94 3.38 0.0534 4.12 0.0243 -0.1796 1.1977 DD-EI 99 
65 BNZ End 19-Oct-94 4.75 0.1085 3.75 0.0666 0.2667 0.6290 DI-EI 90 
66 BNZ Mid 19-Apr-95 4.75 0.0632 3.75 0.0534 0.2667 0.1829 DI-EI 78 
67 BNZ End 18-Oct-95 6.25 0.1442 4.75 0.1085 0.3158 0.3289 DI-EI 82 
68 BOA Mid 7-Mar-97 1 4.4100 0 -0.4000 ∞ 12.0250 DI-EI 74 
69 BOA End 17-Sep-97 2.6 6.2900 0 -0.0600 ∞ 105.8333 DI-EI 79 
70 BOA End 4-Sep-98 0.5 -0.7700 2.6 6.2900 -0.8077 -1.1224 DD-ED 69 
71 BRY End 27-Sep-90 6 20.3950 5.5 21.1506 0.0909 -0.0357 DI-ED 100 
72 BRY End 26-Sep-91 4 0.0835 6 0.2040 -0.3333 -0.5906 DD-ED 100 
73 BRY Mid 3-Mar-94 4 0.0554 4 0.0444 0.0000 0.2459 DNC-EI 100 
74 BRY End 8-Sep-94 5 0.1642 5 0.1070 0.0000 0.5349 DNC-EI 100 
75 BRY Mid 2-Mar-95 4 0.0539 4 0.0554 0.0000 -0.0267 DNC-ED 100 
76 BRY End 8-Sep-95 5 0.1617 5 0.1642 0.0000 -0.0155 DNC-ED 99 
77 BRY Mid 7-Mar-96 4 0.0637 4 0.0539 0.0000 0.1814 DNC-EI 100 
78 BRY End 5-Sep-96 5 10.3800 5 14.5800 0.0000 -0.2881 DNC-ED 100 
79 BRY Mid 6-Mar-97 4 3.8800 4 5.6900 0.0000 -0.3181 DNC-ED 100 
80 BRY End 4-Sep-97 5 10.4000 5 10.3800 0.0000 0.0019 DNC-EI 100 
81 BRY Mid 5-Mar-98 4 4.0300 4 3.8800 0.0000 0.0387 DNC-EI 100 
82 BRY End 11-Sep-98 0 9.6000 5 10.4000 -1.0000 -0.0769 DD-ED 100 
83 BWY End 13-Sep-91 4 0.0896 3 0.2185 0.3333 -0.5901 DI-ED 43 
84 BWY End 16-Sep-92 5 0.1425 4 0.0896 0.2500 0.5913 DI-EI 84 
85 BWY Mid 25-Feb-93 2 0.0742 2 0.0801 0.0000 -0.0731 DNC-ED 85 
86 BWY End 15-Sep-93 6 0.1528 5 0.1425 0.2000 0.0722 DI-EI 91 
87 BWY Mid 2-Mar-94 3 0.1020 2 0.0790 0.5000 0.2919 DI-EI 88 
88 BWY Mid 28-Feb-95 3 0.0738 3 0.1020 0.0000 -0.2770 DNC-ED 62 
89 BWY End 14-Sep-95 4 0.0827 6 0.1773 -0.3333 -0.5333 DD-ED 76 
90 BWY Mid 1-Mar-96 0 -0.0312 3 0.0738 -1.0000 -1.4228 DD-ED 70 
91 BWY End 3-Sep-96 3 5.8800 4 8.2700 -0.2500 -0.2890 DD-ED 77 
92 BWY End 12-Sep-97 0 0.0200 3 5.8800 -1.0000 -0.9966 DD-ED 74 
93 CAH End 12-Jun-92 6 0.1428 6 0.1766 0.0000 -0.1912 DNC-ED 100 
94 CAH End 28-May-93 4 0.1526 6 0.1428 -0.3333 0.0686 DD-EI 100 
95 CAH Mid 10-Nov-93 4 0.1036 4 0.0829 0.0000 0.2497 DNC-EI 100 
96 CAH End 25-May-94 4 0.1923 4 0.1523 0.0000 0.2622 DNC-EI 100 
97 CAH End 8-May-96 5 0.2623 5 0.2579 0.0000 0.0171 DNC-EI 100 
98 CAH Mid 6-Nov-96 5 6.7700 5 15.6900 0.0000 -0.5685 DNC-ED 100 
99 CAH End 13-May-97 5 13.6500 5 26.2900 0.0000 -0.4808 DNC-ED 100 
100 CAH Mid 6-Nov-97 5 6.0700 5 6.7700 0.0000 -0.1034 DNC-ED 100 
101 CAH End 8-May-98 5 8.2100 5 13.6500 0.0000 -0.3985 DNC-ED 100 
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102 CAH Mid 5-Nov-98 3 1.4500 5 6.0700 -0.4000 -0.7611 DD-ED 100 
103 CAH End 7-May-99 3 3.7000 5 8.2100 -0.4000 -0.5493 DD-ED 100 
104 CAH Mid 4-Nov-99 3 3.6300 3 1.4500 0.0000 1.5034 DNC-EI 100 
105 CAV End 29-Aug-90 7 0.2561 7 0.2766 0.0000 -0.0740 DNC-ED 81 
106 CAV Mid 25-Feb-91 5.5 0.1309 5.5 0.1314 0.0000 -0.0040 DNC-ED 58 
107 CAV End 29-Aug-91 7.5 0.2511 7 0.2561 0.0714 -0.0198 DI-ED 89 
108 CAV End 20-Aug-92 12 0.3227 7.5 0.2511 0.6000 0.2852 DI-EI 99 
109 CAV Mid 11-Feb-93 7 0.1357 7 0.1280 0.0000 0.0607 DNC-EI 99 
110 CAV End 26-Aug-93 13 0.3363 12 0.3227 0.0833 0.0424 DI-EI 98 
111 CAV End 25-Aug-94 12 0.3075 13 0.3363 -0.0769 -0.0856 DD-ED 99 
112 CAV Mid 16-Feb-95 8 0.1819 8 0.1792 0.0000 0.0150 DNC-EI 95 
113 CAV End 1-Sep-95 12 0.3446 12 0.3075 0.0000 0.1204 DNC-EI 99 
114 CAV Mid 16-Feb-96 8 0.1346 8 0.1819 0.0000 -0.2599 DNC-ED 100 
115 CAV End 30-Aug-96 12 28.5300 12 34.4600 0.0000 -0.1721 DNC-ED 99 
116 CAV Mid 14-Feb-97 6 11.1200 8 13.4600 -0.2500 -0.1738 DD-ED 99 
117 CAV End 29-Aug-97 8 22.4200 12 28.5300 -0.3333 -0.2142 DD-ED 100 
118 CAV Mid 20-Feb-98 7 13.4800 6 11.1200 0.1667 0.2122 DI-EI 97 
119 CAV End 31-Aug-98 12 27.9300 8 22.4200 0.5000 0.2458 DI-EI 100 
120 CAV Mid 22-Feb-99 8 14.4600 7 13.4800 0.1429 0.0727 DI-EI 100 
121 CAV End 30-Aug-99 12 29.4300 12 27.9300 0.0000 0.0537 DNC-EI 100 
122 CDI End 3-Mar-97 3 5.7900 0 4.2400 ∞ 0.3656 DI-EI 97 
123 CDI End 13-Mar-98 2 5.0600 3 5.7900 -0.3333 -0.1261 DD-ED 93 
124 CDI End 26-Feb-99 2 2.2600 2 5.0600 0.0000 -0.5534 DNC-ED 89 
125 CDL End 3-Mar-97 1 3.7000 0 6.0100 ∞ -0.3844 DI-ED 92 
126 CDL End 17-Mar-98 0.75 3.2100 1 3.7000 -0.2500 -0.1324 DD-ED 90 
127 CDL End 26-Feb-99 0.75 1.9900 0.75 3.2100 0.0000 -0.3801 DNC-ED 94 
128 CED End 13-Dec-95 9 0.2303 7 0.1199 0.2857 0.9213 DI-EI 69 
129 CED Mid 17-Jun-96 0 -9.0700 5 6.6900 -1.0000 -2.3558 DD-ED 94 
130 CED End 16-Dec-96 0 -10.5400 9 23.4100 -1.0000 -1.4502 DD-ED 86 
131 CEM Mid 11-Dec-90 4 0.0478 4 0.1037 0.0000 -0.5396 DNC-ED 89 
132 CEM End 14-Jun-91 4 0.1488 4 0.1080 0.0000 0.3781 DNC-EI 94 
133 CEM Mid 21-Nov-91 5.5 0.0740 4 0.0478 0.3750 0.5504 DI-EI 100 
134 CEM End 29-May-92 7.5 0.1728 4 0.1488 0.8750 0.1607 DI-EI 100 
135 CEM End 21-May-93 28 0.3988 7.5 0.1728 2.7333 1.3081 DI-EI 100 
136 CEM Mid 11-Nov-93 12 0.1651 12 0.0783 0.0000 1.1097 DNC-EI 100 
137 CEM End 25-May-94 28 0.3154 28 0.3988 0.0000 -0.2090 DNC-ED 100 
138 CEM Mid 11-Nov-94 6 0.0857 12 0.1651 -0.5000 -0.4810 DD-ED 99 
139 CEM End 1-Jun-95 7.5 0.1802 28 0.3154 -0.7321 -0.4286 DD-ED 98 
140 CEM Mid 9-Nov-95 10 0.0081 6 0.0857 0.6667 -0.9059 DI-ED 100 
141 CEM End 30-May-96 7.5 0.0000 7.5 18.0200 0.0000 -1.0000 DNC-ED 98 
142 CEM Mid 20-Nov-96 0 -1.6100 10 1.0700 -1.0000 -2.5047 DD-ED 99 
143 CEM End 29-May-97 0 6.3300 7.5 9.9500 -1.0000 -0.3638 DD-ED 97 
144 CEM Mid 20-Nov-97 2.5 4.8000 0 -1.6100 ∞ 3.9814 DI-EI 100 
145 CEM End 28-May-98 2.5 9.7700 0 6.3300 ∞ 0.5434 DI-EI 96 
146 CEM Mid 19-Nov-98 0 1.2000 2.5 4.8000 -1.0000 -0.7500 DD-ED 87 
147 CEM End 27-May-99 5 7.1900 2.5 9.7700 1.0000 -0.2641 DI-ED 97 
148 CEM Mid 7-Dec-99 5 4.5400 0 1.2000 ∞ 2.7833 DI-EI 94 
149 CGH End 3-Mar-99 8 37.6700 7 39.0300 0.1429 -0.0348 DI-ED 100 
150 CMO Mid 1-Apr-92 3.25 0.0383 3.25 0.0229 0.0000 0.6757 DNC-EI 29 
151 CMO End 28-Sep-92 4.25 0.1188 4.25 0.0594 0.0000 1.0000 DNC-EI 46 
152 CMO Mid 30-Mar-93 3.25 0.0778 3.25 0.0383 0.0000 1.0306 DNC-EI 46 
153 CMO End 24-Sep-93 5.75 0.1866 4.25 0.1188 0.3529 0.5698 DI-EI 80 
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154 CMO Mid 30-Mar-94 4 0.1189 3.25 0.0778 0.2308 0.5272 DI-EI 90 
155 CMO End 23-Sep-94 6 0.2494 5.75 0.1866 0.0435 0.3368 DI-EI 69 
156 CMO Mid 16-Mar-95 4.25 0.1114 4 0.1189 0.0625 -0.0627 DI-ED 50 
157 CMO Mid 29-Feb-96 15 0.1704 4.25 0.1114 2.5294 0.5290 DI-EI 65 
158 CMO End 13-Sep-96 15 31.6700 8.75 24.5900 0.7143 0.2879 DI-EI 39 
159 CMO Mid 4-Mar-98 8 8.1700 8.5 11.5700 -0.0588 -0.2939 DD-ED 36 
160 CMO End 11-Sep-98 5.5 15.2300 7.5 21.1500 -0.2667 -0.2799 DD-ED 35 
161 CMO Mid 15-Mar-99 8 6.4100 8 8.1700 0.0000 -0.2154 DNC-ED 66 
162 CMO End 13-Sep-99 7.5 18.5500 5.5 15.2300 0.3636 0.2180 DI-EI 73 
163 DBG End 29-Aug-90 6 0.1819 9 0.3014 -0.3333 -0.3965 DD-ED 99 
164 DBG Mid 28-Feb-91 5 0.1051 5 0.1130 0.0000 -0.0698 DNC-ED 96 
165 DBG End 30-Aug-91 6 0.1082 6 0.1819 0.0000 -0.4053 DNC-ED 99 
166 DBG Mid 4-Mar-92 0 0.0360 5 0.1051 -1.0000 -0.6571 DD-ED 100 
167 DBG End 23-Sep-92 0 0.1011 6 0.1082 -1.0000 -0.0657 DD-ED 100 
168 DBG End 14-Dec-95 2 0.0564 0 -0.3030 ∞ 1.1860 DI-EI 100 
169 DBG End 11-Dec-96 2 7.9500 2 5.7000 0.0000 0.3947 DNC-EI 100 
170 DBG Mid 11-Jun-97 8 0.0422 2 0.0519 3.0000 -0.1865 DI-ED 100 
171 DBG End 10-Dec-97 2 27.1800 2 7.9500 0.0000 2.4189 DNC-EI 99 
172 DBG Mid 9-Jun-98 8 14.4800 8 4.5000 0.0000 2.2178 DNC-EI 99 
173 DBG End 9-Dec-98 8 24.4200 2 27.1800 3.0000 -0.1015 DI-ED 98 
174 DBG Mid 4-Jun-99 8 13.6700 8 14.4800 0.0000 -0.0559 DNC-ED 100 
175 DBG End 1-Dec-99 8 29.2300 8 24.4200 0.0000 0.1970 DNC-EI 100 
176 DCP End 13-Sep-96 1 7.1100 0 -3.2100 ∞ 3.2150 DI-EI 100 
177 DCP End 26-Aug-97 1.5 6.6000 1 7.1100 0.5000 -0.0717 DI-ED 99 
178 DMB End 18-Jun-91 2 0.0441 5 0.1171 -0.6000 -0.6232 DD-ED 7 
179 DMB End 25-Jun-92 0 0.0062 2 0.0441 -1.0000 -0.8605 DD-ED 10 
180 DMB Mid 4-Dec-92 2 0.0614 2 0.0333 0.0000 0.8423 DNC-EI 6 
181 DMB End 19-May-93 3 0.0632 0 0.0062 ∞ 9.2708 DI-EI 14 
182 DMB Mid 22-Dec-93 0 0.0421 2 0.0676 -1.0000 -0.3776 DD-ED 38 
183 DMB End 29-Jun-94 0 -0.0213 3 0.0633 -1.0000 -1.3360 DD-ED 21 
184 DMB End 15-Mar-95 2 0.0574 0 -0.0213 ∞ 3.6988 DI-EI 16 
185 DMB End 4-Mar-96 4 0.0862 2 0.0574 1.0000 0.5000 DI-EI 10 
186 DMB Mid 8-Sep-99 2.5 -0.4100 0 2.1600 ∞ -1.1898 DI-ED 35 
187 DON End 7-Sep-90 7 0.1712 7 0.1370 0.0000 0.2494 DNC-EI 62 
188 DON Mid 4-Mar-91 4.5 0.0789 4.5 0.0703 0.0000 0.1224 DNC-EI 59 
189 DON End 6-Sep-91 7 0.1650 7 0.1712 0.0000 -0.0363 DNC-ED 87 
190 DON Mid 9-Mar-92 4.5 0.0755 4.5 0.0789 0.0000 -0.0436 DNC-ED 93 
191 DON End 4-Sep-92 7 0.1741 7 0.1650 0.0000 0.0549 DNC-EI 98 
192 DON Mid 5-Mar-93 4.5 0.0916 4.5 0.0755 0.0000 0.2140 DNC-EI 99 
193 DON End 3-Sep-93 7 0.1861 7 0.1741 0.0000 0.0692 DNC-EI 95 
194 DON Mid 4-Mar-94 6 0.1101 4.5 0.0916 0.3333 0.2019 DI-EI 97 
195 DON End 2-Sep-94 7 0.2393 7 0.1861 0.0000 0.2860 DNC-EI 95 
196 DON Mid 3-Mar-95 6 0.1423 6 0.1101 0.0000 0.2928 DNC-EI 90 
197 DON End 1-Sep-95 7 0.6934 7 0.2393 0.0000 1.8971 DNC-EI 93 
198 DON Mid 8-Mar-96 7 0.1104 6 0.1423 0.1667 -0.2247 DI-ED 98 
199 DON Mid 7-Mar-97 7 9.8800 7 15.4500 0.0000 -0.3605 DNC-ED 92 
200 DON End 29-Aug-97 8 13.6000 8 22.0500 0.0000 -0.3832 DNC-ED 93 
201 DON Mid 9-Mar-98 4 5.6800 7 9.8800 -0.4286 -0.4251 DD-ED 97 
202 DON End 28-Aug-98 3 1.0000 8 13.6000 -0.6250 -0.9265 DD-ED 99 
203 DON Mid 5-Mar-99 5 9.9200 4 5.6800 0.2500 0.7465 DI-EI 94 
204 DPC End 11-Jun-98 0.4 1.3900 0 0.1800 ∞ 6.7222 DI-EI 67 
205 DPC Mid 27-Nov-98 2 4.5700 0.4 0.5900 4.0000 6.7458 DI-EI 85 
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206 DPC End 15-Jun-99 2.5 11.5100 0.8 1.3900 2.1250 7.2806 DI-EI 71 
207 DTL Mid 21-Nov-95 3 0.0517 3.75 0.1062 -0.2000 -0.5137 DD-ED 86 
208 DTL End 17-May-96 5 13.1600 5 21.5000 0.0000 -0.3879 DNC-ED 75 
209 DTL Mid 25-Feb-97 2 7.2400 3 5.1500 -0.3333 0.4058 DD-EI 69 
210 DTL End 26-Aug-97 3 12.2800 5 13.1600 -0.4000 -0.0669 DD-ED 83 
211 DTL Mid 24-Feb-98 2 4.4800 2 7.2400 0.0000 -0.3812 DNC-ED 66 
212 DTL End 7-Sep-98 1 4.0100 3 12.2800 -0.6667 -0.6735 DD-ED 64 
213 DTL Mid 23-Feb-99 1 2.8200 2 4.4800 -0.5000 -0.3705 DD-ED 58 
214 DTL End 26-Aug-99 2 5.2400 1 4.0100 1.0000 0.3067 DI-EI 86 
215 EBO End 1-Oct-92 5 0.1414 0 0.0989 ∞ 0.4292 DI-EI 27 
216 EBO Mid 12-Mar-93 3 0.1170 0 0.0506 ∞ 1.3125 DI-EI 48 
217 EBO End 1-Sep-93 10 0.2900 5 0.1414 1.0000 1.0511 DI-EI 43 
218 EBO Mid 16-Mar-94 15 0.2936 3 0.1170 4.0000 1.5097 DI-EI 37 
219 EBO Mid 22-Feb-95 6 0.3993 15 0.2936 -0.6000 0.3600 DD-EI 44 
220 EBO End 23-Aug-95 14 0.3020 30 0.6978 -0.5333 -0.5672 DD-ED 68 
221 EBO Mid 21-Feb-96 8.5 0.1807 6 0.3993 0.4167 -0.5475 DI-ED 45 
222 EBO End 20-Aug-96 18 38.5800 14 30.2000 0.2857 0.2775 DI-EI 53 
223 EBO Mid 24-Feb-97 9 18.3500 8.5 18.0700 0.0588 0.0155 DI-EI 81 
224 EBO End 12-Sep-97 18 40.0700 18 38.5800 0.0000 0.0386 DNC-EI 76 
225 EBO Mid 27-Feb-98 9 19.3900 9 18.3500 0.0000 0.0567 DNC-EI 59 
226 EBO End 3-Sep-98 18 37.9100 18 40.0700 0.0000 -0.0539 DNC-ED 70 
227 EBO Mid 24-Feb-99 9 19.5500 9 19.3900 0.0000 0.0083 DNC-EI 63 
228 EEQ End 30-Oct-91 3 0.1008 0 0.0280 ∞ 2.5974 DI-EI 46 
229 EEQ Mid 6-May-92 3 0.0205 2 0.0154 0.5000 0.3307 DI-EI 90 
230 EEQ Mid 26-Apr-93 0 -0.0148 3 0.0205 -1.0000 -1.7230 DD-ED 99 
231 EEQ End 29-Oct-93 4 0.0705 5 0.1684 -0.2000 -0.5816 DD-ED 98 
232 EEQ Mid 6-May-94 2.5 0.0069 0 -0.0148 ∞ 1.4640 DI-EI 100 
233 EEQ End 2-Nov-94 4 0.1215 4 0.0705 0.0000 0.7247 DNC-EI 89 
234 EEQ Mid 3-May-95 2.5 0.0077 2.5 0.0069 0.0000 0.1169 DNC-EI 86 
235 EEQ End 1-Nov-95 5 0.1085 4 0.1215 0.2500 -0.1068 DI-ED 90 
236 EEQ Mid 13-May-96 2.5 -1.8900 2.5 0.7700 0.0000 -3.4545 DNC-ED 93 
237 EEQ End 25-Oct-96 4 9.2300 5 10.8500 -0.2000 -0.1493 DD-ED 83 
238 EEQ Mid 23-Apr-97 2.5 -0.1200 2.5 -1.8900 0.0000 0.9365 DNC-EI 95 
239 EEQ End 23-Oct-97 4 8.6800 4 9.2300 0.0000 -0.0596 DNC-ED 87 
240 EEQ Mid 8-May-98 1.5 -3.0600 2.5 -0.1200 -0.4000 -24.5000 DD-ED 68 
241 EEQ End 27-Oct-98 1.5 -1.8400 4 8.6800 -0.6250 -1.2120 DD-ED 71 
242 ENC End 17-May-94 2.13 0.0784 6.3 0.1860 -0.6619 -0.5786 DD-ED 100 
243 ENC Mid 8-Nov-94 6 0.1439 5.6 0.1026 0.0714 0.4021 DI-EI 94 
244 ENC End 9-May-95 5.5 0.2234 2.13 0.0784 1.5822 1.8495 DI-EI 94 
245 ENC Mid 15-Nov-95 7 0.1195 6 0.1439 0.1667 -0.1696 DI-ED 96 
246 ENC End 8-May-96 7.5 0.1914 5.5 0.2234 0.3636 -0.1429 DI-ED 98 
247 ENC Mid 13-Nov-96 10.5 14.8700 7 11.8200 0.5000 0.2580 DI-EI 98 
248 ENC End 16-May-97 6 21.8300 7.5 19.1600 -0.2000 0.1394 DD-EI 93 
249 ENC Mid 4-Nov-97 11 15.8800 10.5 14.8700 0.0476 0.0679 DI-EI 97 
250 ERN Mid 11-Nov-91 3 0.0801 3 0.1006 0.0000 -0.2034 DNC-ED 74 
251 ERN End 29-May-92 4 0.1549 3.5 0.1529 0.1429 0.0126 DI-EI 74 
252 ERN End 31-May-93 5 0.1505 4 0.1549 0.2500 -0.0279 DI-ED 75 
253 ERN Mid 12-Nov-93 5 0.0984 4 0.0872 0.2500 0.1285 DI-EI 90 
254 ERN End 16-Jun-94 5 0.1672 5 0.1505 0.0000 0.1107 DNC-EI 96 
255 ERN End 30-May-95 5 0.1216 5 0.1672 0.0000 -0.2724 DNC-ED 67 
256 ERN Mid 10-Nov-95 5 0.0564 5 0.0654 0.0000 -0.1380 DNC-ED 75 
257 ERN End 12-Jun-96 5 9.5000 5 12.1600 0.0000 -0.2188 DNC-ED 74 
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258 ERN Mid 13-Dec-96 2 4.6500 5 6.8100 -0.6000 -0.3172 DD-ED 74 
259 ERN End 5-Jun-97 0 6.4700 5 9.5000 -1.0000 -0.3189 DD-ED 70 
260 ERN Mid 12-Dec-97 5 4.8300 2 4.6500 1.5000 0.0387 DI-EI 84 
261 ERN Mid 15-Dec-98 0 1.0600 5 4.8300 -1.0000 -0.7805 DD-ED 38 
262 FAP Mid 2-Nov-90 8 0.0570 8 0.1187 0.0000 -0.5199 DNC-ED 97 
263 FAP End 7-Jun-91 2 0.0439 8 0.2397 -0.7500 -0.8168 DD-ED 96 
264 FAP End 12-Jun-92 6 0.0813 2 0.0439 2.0000 0.8514 DI-EI 100 
265 FAP End 4-Jun-93 10 0.1879 6 0.0813 0.6667 1.3114 DI-EI 99 
266 FAP End 2-Jun-94 8 0.2572 10 0.1879 -0.2000 0.3691 DD-EI 99 
267 FAP End 29-May-95 9 0.3903 8 0.2572 0.1250 0.5174 DI-EI 100 
268 FAP Mid 3-Nov-95 9 0.1786 9 0.1837 0.0000 -0.0277 DNC-ED 99 
269 FAP End 7-Jun-96 9 0.0000 9 39.7200 0.0000 -1.0000 DNC-ED 100 
270 FAP End 6-Jun-97 9 32.8500 9 35.6400 0.0000 -0.0783 DNC-ED 100 
271 FAP End 8-Jun-98 9 31.0100 9 32.8500 0.0000 -0.0560 DNC-ED 99 
272 FAP End 9-Jun-99 9 29.8600 9 31.0100 0.0000 -0.0371 DNC-ED 100 
273 FER End 26-Jul-90 12 0.4941 14 0.3934 -0.1429 0.2559 DD-EI 85 
274 FER Mid 15-Feb-91 10 0.1959 10 0.2745 0.0000 -0.2864 DNC-ED 61 
275 FER Mid 17-Feb-92 10 0.2289 10 0.1959 0.0000 0.1690 DNC-EI 86 
276 FER Mid 12-Feb-93 11 0.2909 10 0.2289 0.1000 0.2707 DI-EI 97 
277 FER End 22-Jul-93 14 0.5263 13 0.4836 0.0769 0.0883 DI-EI 97 
278 FER End 22-Jul-94 8 0.2717 14 0.5263 -0.4286 -0.4838 DD-ED 100 
279 FER Mid 16-Feb-95 7 0.1383 6 0.3333 0.1667 -0.5849 DI-ED 99 
280 FER End 28-Jul-95 8 0.2852 8 0.2717 0.0000 0.0495 DNC-EI 98 
281 FER End 29-Jul-96 8 30.5200 8 28.5200 0.0000 0.0701 DNC-EI 99 
282 FER Mid 5-Feb-97 7 11.1600 7 10.9500 0.0000 0.0192 DNC-EI 100 
283 FER End 30-Jul-97 9 32.3400 8 30.5200 0.1250 0.0596 DI-EI 100 
284 FER Mid 4-Feb-98 8 6.9300 7 11.1600 0.1429 -0.3790 DI-ED 100 
285 FER End 29-Jul-98 10 34.1900 9 32.3400 0.1111 0.0572 DI-EI 100 
286 FER Mid 3-Feb-99 8 7.6800 8 6.9300 0.0000 0.1082 DNC-EI 100 
287 FER End 28-Jul-99 10 40.6800 10 34.1900 0.0000 0.1898 DNC-EI 100 
288 FIR End 1-Apr-93 5 0.1696 0 -0.0643 ∞ 3.6396 DI-EI 39 
289 FIR Mid 16-Sep-93 6 0.1970 0 -0.0121 ∞ 17.2520 DI-EI 76 
290 FIR Mid 13-Sep-95 6 0.2410 6 0.2609 0.0000 -0.0763 DNC-ED 31 
291 FIR Mid 5-Sep-96 10 21.4800 6 24.1000 0.6667 -0.1087 DI-ED 31 
292 FLC Mid 14-Feb-91 11.5 0.2099 11.5 0.2298 0.0000 -0.0866 DNC-ED 100 
293 FLC Mid 18-Feb-92 7 0.1203 11.5 0.2099 -0.3913 -0.4269 DD-ED 100 
294 FLC Mid 17-Feb-93 7 0.1010 7 0.0794 0.0000 0.2720 DNC-EI 100 
295 FLC End 18-Aug-93 7 0.2521 7 -0.1036 0.0000 3.4324 DNC-EI 99 
296 FLC Mid 23-Feb-94 6.25 0.3249 7 0.1010 -0.1071 2.2168 DD-EI 100 
297 FLC End 31-Aug-94 6.25 0.3547 7 0.2521 -0.1071 0.4069 DD-EI 100 
298 FLC Mid 22-Feb-95 6.25 0.0739 6.25 0.2961 0.0000 -0.7505 DNC-ED 100 
299 FLC End 30-Aug-95 6.25 0.2167 6.25 0.3108 0.0000 -0.3028 DNC-ED 99 
300 FLC Mid 28-Feb-96 8.5 0.1322 6.25 0.0739 0.3600 0.7890 DI-EI 100 
301 FLCB Mid 18-Feb-98 8 20.1100 6.5 16.2000 0.2308 0.2414 DI-EI 100 
302 FLCB End 12-Aug-98 6 34.5000 6.5 40.1200 -0.0769 -0.1401 DD-ED 100 
303 FLCB Mid 17-Feb-99 6 4.3600 8 20.1100 -0.2500 -0.7832 DD-ED 100 
304 FLCB End 18-Aug-99 6 22.2700 6 40.3700 0.0000 -0.4484 DNC-ED 100 
305 FLCE Mid 18-Feb-98 8.5 30.5200 8.5 25.3800 0.0000 0.2025 DNC-EI 100 
306 FLCE End 12-Aug-98 7.5 38.1900 8.5 69.5700 -0.1176 -0.4511 DD-ED 100 
307 FLCE Mid 17-Feb-99 7 10.1900 8.5 30.5200 -0.1765 -0.6661 DD-ED 100 
308 FLCE End 18-Aug-99 7 8.0200 7.5 46.4300 -0.0667 -0.8273 DD-ED 100 
309 FLCF End 30-Aug-95 3 0.1134 3 0.1622 0.0000 -0.3009 DNC-ED 99 
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310 FLCF Mid 28-Feb-96 3 0.0800 3 0.0568 0.0000 0.4079 DNC-EI 100 
311 FLCF End 28-Aug-96 3 7.9800 3 13.8700 0.0000 -0.4247 DNC-ED 100 
312 FLCF Mid 26-Feb-97 3 4.5900 3 5.9800 0.0000 -0.2324 DNC-ED 100 
313 FLCF End 20-Aug-97 3 8.2800 3 7.9800 0.0000 0.0376 DNC-EI 100 
314 FLCF Mid 18-Feb-98 1 2.9400 3 4.5900 -0.6667 -0.3595 DD-ED 100 
315 FLCF End 12-Aug-98 0 2.0400 3 8.2800 -1.0000 -0.7536 DD-ED 100 
316 FLCF Mid 17-Feb-99 0 0.3300 1 2.9400 -1.0000 -0.8878 DD-ED 100 
317 FLCF End 18-Aug-99 0 0.7200 0 2.3200 ∞ -0.6897 DI-ED 100 
318 FLCP Mid 18-Feb-98 3 -9.4500 3 -8.3700 0.0000 -0.1290 DNC-ED 100 
319 FLCP Mid 17-Feb-99 1.5 2.3300 3 -9.4500 -0.5000 1.2466 DD-EI 100 
320 FOR Mid 22-Feb-96 0.5 0.0131 0 0.0021 ∞ 5.1952 DI-EI 94 
321 FOR End 15-Aug-96 1 2.8800 0.5 1.7600 1.0000 0.6364 DI-EI 84 
322 FOR End 21-Aug-97 1 4.3500 1 2.8800 0.0000 0.5104 DNC-EI 93 
323 FOR Mid 11-Feb-98 1 1.9500 1 2.0000 0.0000 -0.0250 DNC-ED 76 
324 FOR End 24-Aug-98 3 3.9000 1 4.3500 2.0000 -0.1034 DI-ED 73 
325 FOR Mid 23-Feb-99 1 1.9600 1 1.9500 0.0000 0.0051 DNC-EI 95 
326 FOR End 31-Aug-99 3 5.0600 3 3.9000 0.0000 0.2974 DNC-EI 99 
327 FRW Mid 28-Feb-91 3 0.0789 3 0.0881 0.0000 -0.1052 DNC-ED 94 
328 FRW End 18-Sep-91 0 0.0955 5 0.0817 -1.0000 0.1688 DD-EI 95 
329 FRW End 17-Sep-92 2 0.0777 0 0.0955 ∞ -0.1862 DI-ED 100 
330 FRW Mid 4-Mar-93 2 0.0259 1.5 0.0217 0.3333 0.1964 DI-EI 100 
331 FRW End 16-Sep-93 2 0.0379 2 0.0777 0.0000 -0.5123 DNC-ED 99 
332 FRW Mid 8-Mar-94 2 0.0248 2 0.0259 0.0000 -0.0428 DNC-ED 100 
333 FRW End 25-Aug-94 0 0.0007 2 0.0379 -1.0000 -0.9827 DD-ED 100 
334 FSL Mid 25-Nov-93 3.5 0.0209 3.5 0.0588 0.0000 -0.6440 DNC-ED 96 
335 FSL End 25-May-94 6.5 0.1512 6.5 0.2073 0.0000 -0.2706 DNC-ED 86 
336 FSL Mid 29-Nov-94 3.5 0.0169 3.5 0.0209 0.0000 -0.1905 DNC-ED 65 
337 FSL End 31-May-95 8.5 0.1739 6.5 0.1512 0.3077 0.1502 DI-EI 65 
338 FSL Mid 23-Nov-95 3.5 0.0083 3.5 0.0169 0.0000 -0.5073 DNC-ED 67 
339 FSL End 29-May-96 8.5 11.9300 8.5 17.5500 0.0000 -0.3202 DNC-ED 74 
340 FSL Mid 26-Nov-96 3.5 -1.4900 3.5 0.8400 0.0000 -2.7738 DNC-ED 50 
341 FSL End 28-May-97 5 8.8900 8.5 11.9300 -0.4118 -0.2548 DD-ED 50 
342 FSL Mid 27-Nov-97 2 -2.2500 3.5 -1.4900 -0.4286 -0.5101 DD-ED 48 
343 FSL End 4-Jun-98 5 8.4900 5 8.8900 0.0000 -0.0450 DNC-ED 34 
344 FSL Mid 3-Dec-98 2 -3.9700 2 -2.2500 0.0000 -0.7644 DNC-ED 39 
345 FSL End 26-May-99 5 8.6400 5 8.4900 0.0000 0.0177 DNC-EI 50 
346 GMF End 25-Sep-90 6 -0.0806 6 0.3080 0.0000 -1.2617 DNC-ED 100 
347 GMF End 20-Sep-91 6 0.1013 6 -0.0805 0.0000 2.2582 DNC-EI 100 
348 GMF Mid 6-Mar-92 5 0.0708 5 0.0631 0.0000 0.1215 DNC-EI 100 
349 GMF End 11-Sep-92 6 0.0446 6 0.1013 0.0000 -0.5599 DNC-ED 100 
350 GMF End 14-Sep-93 6 0.1570 6 0.0446 0.0000 2.5214 DNC-EI 99 
351 GMF End 2-Sep-94 6 0.0780 6 0.1570 0.0000 -0.5034 DNC-ED 100 
352 GMF Mid 3-Mar-95 0 0.0169 5 0.0532 -1.0000 -0.6811 DD-ED 100 
353 GMF End 11-Sep-95 5 -0.0441 6 0.0780 -0.1667 -1.5657 DD-ED 99 
354 GMF Mid 7-Mar-96 2.5 0.0383 0 0.0169 ∞ 1.2627 DI-EI 99 
355 GMF End 5-Sep-96 3 8.3000 5 -18.0100 -0.4000 1.4609 DD-EI 100 
356 GMF End 5-Sep-97 3.5 10.5300 3 8.3000 0.1667 0.2687 DI-EI 99 
357 GMF Mid 6-Mar-98 3.5 5.5900 3 4.9100 0.1667 0.1385 DI-EI 99 
358 GMF End 4-Sep-98 4 11.1000 3.5 10.5300 0.1429 0.0541 DI-EI 99 
359 GMF End 3-Sep-99 4 11.1000 4 8.3100 0.0000 0.3357 DNC-EI 100 
360 GPG End 12-Mar-98 0.3 2.5900 0.25 3.1800 0.2000 -0.1855 DI-ED 100 
361 GPG End 12-Mar-97 0.25 2.5900 0.25 3.1800 0.0000 -0.1855 DNC-ED 100 
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362 GRC End 22-Nov-94 1.5 0.1203 0 -0.4557 ∞ 1.2639 DI-EI 39 
363 GRC End 30-Nov-95 0 -0.1344 1.5 0.1203 -1.0000 -2.1177 DD-ED 40 
364 HBY End 3-Sep-96 0 24.5600 1 25.1600 -1.0000 -0.0238 DD-ED 99 
365 HBY Mid 24-Feb-97 6 11.4500 6 10.4900 0.0000 0.0915 DNC-EI 98 
366 HBY End 8-Sep-97 7 24.3000 0 24.5600 ∞ -0.0106 DI-ED 99 
367 HBY Mid 23-Feb-98 7 12.8600 6 11.4500 0.1667 0.1231 DI-EI 99 
368 HBY End 4-Sep-98 7 27.2800 7 24.3000 0.0000 0.1226 DNC-EI 99 
369 HBY Mid 19-Feb-99 7 11.9800 7 12.8600 0.0000 -0.0684 DNC-ED 100 
370 HBY End 8-Sep-99 7 27.9400 7 27.2800 0.0000 0.0242 DNC-EI 100 
371 HED End 21-May-97 14.5 35.0200 15 34.9200 -0.0333 0.0029 DD-EI 72 
372 HED Mid 10-Nov-97 11 17.7000 10 20.1500 0.1000 -0.1216 DI-ED 77 
373 HED End 8-May-98 14.5 36.0200 14.5 35.0200 0.0000 0.0286 DNC-EI 59 
374 HED Mid 10-Nov-98 11 12.5600 11 17.7000 0.0000 -0.2904 DNC-ED 61 
375 HED End 11-Jun-99 12 28.3000 14.5 36.0200 -0.1724 -0.2143 DD-ED 89 
376 HLG End 2-Oct-90 1.25 0.0441 0.75 0.0350 0.6667 0.2589 DI-EI 49 
377 HLG Mid 28-Mar-91 1.5 0.0423 1.5 0.0288 0.0000 0.4699 DNC-EI 36 
378 HLG End 20-Sep-91 1.75 0.0781 1.25 0.0441 0.4000 0.7718 DI-EI 73 
379 HLG Mid 10-Apr-92 2 0.0481 1.5 0.0423 0.3333 0.1387 DI-EI 87 
380 HLG End 25-Sep-92 3.25 0.1215 1.75 0.0725 0.8571 0.6759 DI-EI 99 
381 HLG Mid 26-Mar-93 3.5 0.0861 2 0.0481 0.7500 0.7896 DI-EI 98 
382 HLG End 1-Oct-93 7 0.1934 3.25 0.1215 1.1538 0.5918 DI-EI 97 
383 HLG Mid 31-Mar-94 7 0.1030 3.5 0.0861 1.0000 0.1963 DI-EI 95 
384 HLG End 30-Sep-94 10 0.2225 7 0.1934 0.4286 0.1499 DI-EI 96 
385 HLG Mid 4-Apr-95 9 0.1132 7 0.1030 0.2857 0.0992 DI-EI 95 
386 HLG End 2-Oct-95 12 0.2265 10 0.2225 0.2000 0.0181 DI-EI 93 
387 HLG Mid 29-Mar-96 9 0.1123 9 0.1132 0.0000 -0.0085 DNC-ED 99 
388 HLG End 4-Oct-96 12 21.5300 12 22.4700 0.0000 -0.0418 DNC-ED 97 
389 HLG Mid 24-Mar-97 7 8.2900 9 11.2300 -0.2222 -0.2618 DD-ED 100 
390 HLG End 30-Sep-97 12 19.3300 12 21.5300 0.0000 -0.1022 DNC-ED 100 
391 HLG Mid 24-Mar-98 7 7.9500 7 8.2900 0.0000 -0.0410 DNC-ED 97 
392 HLG End 29-Sep-98 9 16.3200 12 19.3300 -0.2500 -0.1557 DD-ED 100 
393 HLG Mid 30-Mar-99 8 9.5900 7 7.9500 0.1429 0.2063 DI-EI 100 
394 HLG End 1-Oct-99 9 17.0700 9 16.3300 0.0000 0.0453 DNC-EI 100 
395 IFA End 30-Aug-99 1.85 -3.7600 1.3 1.7500 0.4231 -3.1486 DI-ED 80 
396 IFT End 8-May-96 1.66 0.0386 0 0.0236 ∞ 0.6380 DI-EI 100 
397 IFT Mid 23-Oct-96 0.75 0.9400 0 1.3100 ∞ -0.2824 DI-ED 100 
398 IFT End 7-May-97 2.25 4.0800 1.66 3.8600 0.3554 0.0570 DI-EI 100 
399 IFT End 22-Apr-98 3 5.2200 2.25 4.0800 0.3333 0.2794 DI-EI 100 
400 IFT Mid 20-Oct-98 2.75 4.1400 2 1.6500 0.3750 1.5091 DI-EI 99 
401 INL Mid 8-Feb-91 7 0.2771 6 0.2190 0.1667 0.2655 DI-EI 82 
402 INL Mid 21-Feb-92 7 0.1321 7 0.2101 0.0000 -0.3710 DNC-ED 91 
403 INL End 21-Aug-92 8 0.2633 7 0.1415 0.1429 0.8611 DI-EI 98 
404 INL Mid 17-Feb-95 10 0.2177 9 0.4599 0.1111 -0.5267 DI-ED 98 
405 INL End 18-Aug-95 10 0.3887 9 0.3650 0.1111 0.0650 DI-EI 99 
406 INL Mid 16-Feb-96 11 0.2015 10 0.2177 0.1000 -0.0741 DI-ED 100 
407 INL End 16-Aug-96 11 41.6400 10 38.8700 0.1000 0.0713 DI-EI 100 
408 INL Mid 24-Feb-97 11 25.3100 11 22.7900 0.0000 0.1106 DNC-EI 100 
409 INL End 15-Aug-97 12 49.9400 11 41.6400 0.0909 0.1993 DI-EI 100 
410 INL Mid 20-Feb-98 11 24.8900 11 25.3100 0.0000 -0.0166 DNC-ED 97 
411 INL End 21-Aug-98 12 44.5300 12 49.9400 0.0000 -0.1083 DNC-ED 100 
412 INL Mid 19-Feb-99 12 23.7800 11 24.8900 0.0909 -0.0446 DI-ED 100 
413 INL End 3-Sep-99 12 37.4900 12 44.5300 0.0000 -0.1581 DNC-ED 100 
274 
NO. COY INT/FIN Date DPSt EPSt DPSt-1 EPSt-1 ∆DPS ∆EPS DPSEPS Days Traded 
414 JFA End 22-Aug-97 4 7.4200 0 -7.2400 ∞ 2.0249 DI-EI 69 
415 LNN Mid 16-May-91 5.5 0.0941 5.5 0.0824 0.0000 0.1418 DNC-EI 100 
416 LNN Mid 4-May-92 5.5 0.1152 5.5 0.0941 0.0000 0.2248 DNC-EI 100 
417 LNN End 4-Nov-92 7 0.2686 7 0.1778 0.0000 0.5109 DNC-EI 100 
418 LNN Mid 5-May-93 6.5 0.1831 5.5 0.1152 0.1818 0.5886 DI-EI 100 
419 LNN End 3-Nov-93 7 0.1575 7 0.2686 0.0000 -0.4138 DNC-ED 100 
420 LNN Mid 28-Apr-94 7.5 0.2305 6.5 0.1831 0.1538 0.2588 DI-EI 100 
421 LNN End 26-Oct-94 7.5 0.4508 7 0.1575 0.0714 1.8625 DI-EI 100 
422 LNN End 26-Oct-95 8 0.3694 7.5 0.4508 0.0667 -0.1805 DI-ED 99 
423 LNN Mid 18-Apr-96 8 0.1665 8 0.2448 0.0000 -0.3199 DNC-ED 100 
424 LNN End 31-Oct-96 8 28.3900 8 40.4000 0.0000 -0.2973 DNC-ED 100 
425 LNN Mid 28-Apr-97 8 13.1800 8 16.6500 0.0000 -0.2084 DNC-ED 100 
426 LNN End 30-Oct-97 8 23.1200 8 28.3900 0.0000 -0.1856 DNC-ED 100 
427 LNN End 28-Oct-98 8 24.8500 8 23.1200 0.0000 0.0748 DNC-EI 100 
428 LNN Mid 30-Apr-99 8 15.1500 8 15.1000 0.0000 0.0033 DNC-EI 100 
429 LPC End 10-Aug-98 3.55 12.1400 3.5 12.1100 0.0143 0.0025 DI-EI 84 
430 LPC Mid 8-Feb-99 2.75 5.3500 2.75 5.4400 0.0000 -0.0165 DNC-ED 88 
431 LPC End 9-Aug-99 4.55 12.9600 3.55 12.1400 0.2817 0.0675 DI-EI 81 
432 LWR Mid 22-Feb-95 6 0.1114 5 0.1154 0.2000 -0.0347 DI-ED 95 
433 LWR End 11-Aug-95 9 0.2593 8 0.2709 0.1250 -0.0429 DI-ED 98 
434 LWR Mid 23-Feb-96 6 0.0974 6 0.1114 0.0000 -0.1259 DNC-ED 99 
435 LWR End 9-Aug-96 9 21.0900 9 25.9300 0.0000 -0.1867 DNC-ED 96 
436 LWR Mid 26-Feb-97 6 7.1600 6 9.7300 0.0000 -0.2641 DNC-ED 97 
437 LWR End 13-Aug-97 9 17.7100 9 21.0900 0.0000 -0.1603 DNC-ED 95 
438 LWR Mid 25-Feb-98 6 7.3600 6 7.1600 0.0000 0.0279 DNC-EI 90 
439 LWR Mid 3-Mar-99 4 4.5700 6 7.3600 -0.3333 -0.3791 DD-ED 95 
440 MAI End 13-Sep-90 2.5 0.1316 0 0.0824 ∞ 0.5965 DI-EI 69 
441 MAI End 26-Sep-91 0 0.1343 2.5 0.1316 -1.0000 0.0207 DD-EI 59 
442 MAI End 27-Aug-92 7.5 0.2547 0 0.1343 ∞ 0.8966 DI-EI 99 
443 MAI End 16-Sep-93 0 -0.1048 7.5 0.2547 -1.0000 -1.4113 DD-ED 98 
444 MAI Mid 16-Mar-94 0 0.0011 5 0.0644 -1.0000 -0.9821 DD-ED 97 
445 MAI End 12-Sep-95 2 0.0596 0 0.0282 ∞ 1.1097 DI-EI 92 
446 MBN Mid 3-Sep-90 8 0.2049 6 0.1679 0.3333 0.2204 DI-EI 22 
447 MBN End 8-Mar-91 12 0.3978 12 0.3763 0.0000 0.0571 DNC-EI 16 
448 MBN Mid 23-Aug-91 8 0.1226 8 0.2049 0.0000 -0.4014 DNC-ED 25 
449 MBN End 13-Mar-92 12 0.2953 12 0.3978 0.0000 -0.2575 DNC-ED 42 
450 MBN Mid 21-Aug-92 8 0.2140 8 0.1226 0.0000 0.7448 DNC-EI 42 
451 MBN End 15-Mar-93 14 0.4084 12 0.2953 0.1667 0.3829 DI-EI 50 
452 MBN Mid 23-Aug-93 11 0.2726 8 0.2139 0.3750 0.2746 DI-EI 74 
453 MBN End 14-Mar-94 22 0.6982 14 0.4084 0.5714 0.7095 DI-EI 79 
454 MBN Mid 22-Aug-94 15 0.4741 11 0.2726 0.3636 0.7394 DI-EI 70 
455 MBN End 13-Mar-95 30 0.1896 22 0.6982 0.3636 -0.7284 DI-ED 64 
456 MBN End 11-Mar-96 8 0.2072 30 0.1896 -0.7333 0.0928 DD-EI 81 
457 MBN Mid 26-Aug-96 4 11.2900 4 11.1500 0.0000 0.0126 DNC-EI 92 
458 MBN End 10-Mar-97 9 22.0800 8 20.7200 0.1250 0.0656 DI-EI 97 
459 MBN Mid 25-Aug-97 4 11.2700 4 11.2900 0.0000 -0.0018 DNC-ED 99 
460 MBN End 16-Mar-98 8.5 24.9600 9 22.0800 -0.0556 0.1304 DD-EI 87 
461 MCH Mid 25-Nov-94 0 0.0376 2 0.0680 -1.0000 -0.4474 DD-ED 26 
462 MCH End 23-May-95 1 0.0465 1 0.1256 0.0000 -0.6301 DNC-ED 13 
463 MCH End 22-May-96 2 1.4817 1 1.3559 1.0000 0.0928 DI-EI 23 
464 MCH Mid 6-Nov-96 2.5 4.1100 2 3.5100 0.2500 0.1709 DI-EI 22 
465 MCH End 15-May-97 2 5.9800 2 6.0200 0.0000 -0.0066 DNC-ED 27 
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466 MCH Mid 20-Nov-97 2 3.1500 2.5 4.1100 -0.2000 -0.2336 DD-ED 31 
467 MCH End 5-Jun-98 2 3.5200 2 5.9800 0.0000 -0.4114 DNC-ED 18 
468 MCH Mid 23-Nov-98 2 3.3500 2 3.1500 0.0000 0.0635 DNC-EI 35 
469 MCH End 11-Jun-99 2 3.4300 2 3.5200 0.0000 -0.0256 DNC-ED 25 
470 MDL End 15-Sep-97 4 26.8800 0 23.1600 ∞ 0.1606 DI-EI 33 
471 MDL End 14-Sep-98 5 36.2100 4 26.8800 0.2500 0.3471 DI-EI 21 
472 MDL End 13-Sep-99 10 47.9300 5 36.2100 1.0000 0.3237 DI-EI 22 
473 MET End 14-Mar-96 0.5 0.0102 0.5 0.0417 0.0000 -0.7561 DNC-ED 72 
474 MET Mid 2-Sep-96 1 2.5100 0.5 -0.0400 1.0000 63.7500 DI-EI 77 
475 MET End 5-Mar-97 2 6.3400 0.5 0.6900 3.0000 8.1884 DI-EI 94 
476 MET Mid 13-Aug-97 2 4.0700 1 2.5100 1.0000 0.6215 DI-EI 97 
477 MET End 3-Mar-98 3 11.1900 2 6.3400 0.5000 0.7650 DI-EI 93 
478 MET End 4-Mar-99 3 11.5900 3 11.1900 0.0000 0.0357 DNC-EI 99 
479 MET Mid 13-Sep-99 1.5 2.4400 3 6.9800 -0.5000 -0.6504 DD-ED 99 
480 MFT Mid 10-Nov-97 2.5 4.3700 2.5 4.0900 0.0000 0.0685 DNC-EI 97 
481 MFT End 11-Jun-98 3 0.5500 3 10.8400 0.0000 -0.9493 DNC-ED 90 
482 MFT End 10-Jun-99 3 10.0800 3 10.5500 0.0000 -0.0445 DNC-ED 96 
483 MFT Mid 17-Nov-99 3 4.2000 2.5 3.1800 0.2000 0.3208 DI-EI 85 
484 MHI End 23-Aug-90 2.8 0.1097 2.5 0.0957 0.1200 0.1469 DI-EI 50 
485 MHI End 21-Aug-91 2.45 0.0934 2.8 0.1097 -0.1250 -0.1489 DD-ED 54 
486 MHI Mid 18-Feb-93 1.3 0.0692 1.3 0.0831 0.0000 -0.1670 DNC-ED 98 
487 MHI End 25-Aug-93 2 0.0802 2.55 0.1038 -0.2157 -0.2275 DD-ED 95 
488 MHI Mid 18-Feb-94 1.4 0.0707 1.3 0.0692 0.0769 0.0216 DI-EI 96 
489 MHI End 18-Aug-94 2 0.0665 2 0.0802 0.0000 -0.1706 DNC-ED 90 
490 MHI Mid 15-Feb-95 2.3 0.1017 1.4 0.0707 0.6429 0.4382 DI-EI 84 
491 MHI End 17-Aug-95 2.2 0.1092 2 0.0665 0.1000 0.6423 DI-EI 97 
492 MHI Mid 16-Feb-96 3 0.1071 2.3 0.1017 0.3043 0.0530 DI-EI 92 
493 MHI End 15-Aug-96 3.5 13.7900 2.2 11.3600 0.5909 0.2139 DI-EI 92 
494 MHI Mid 25-Feb-97 3.5 11.3200 3 10.7100 0.1667 0.0570 DI-EI 93 
495 MHI End 12-Aug-97 3.5 13.3700 3.5 13.7900 0.0000 -0.0305 DNC-ED 93 
496 MHI Mid 20-Feb-98 4.5 13.6400 3.5 11.3200 0.2857 0.2049 DI-EI 75 
497 MHI End 18-Aug-98 5 18.6500 3.5 13.3700 0.4286 0.3949 DI-EI 72 
498 MHI Mid 17-Feb-99 5.5 16.9200 4.5 13.6400 0.2222 0.2405 DI-EI 82 
499 MHI End 20-Aug-99 6 22.7600 5 18.6500 0.2000 0.2204 DI-EI 82 
500 MMC End 1-Mar-93 4 0.0949 0 0.0970 ∞ -0.0210 DI-ED 94 
501 MMC End 4-Mar-94 4 0.0649 4 0.0533 0.0000 0.2169 DNC-EI 87 
502 MMC End 2-Mar-95 5 0.0553 4 0.0649 0.2500 -0.1474 DI-ED 55 
503 MMC End 11-Mar-98 2 3.5200 2 12.4000 0.0000 -0.7161 DNC-ED 93 
504 MON End 14-Sep-90 5 0.1561 5 0.2163 0.0000 -0.2785 DNC-ED 98 
505 MON End 16-Sep-91 4 0.0751 5 0.1561 -0.2000 -0.5188 DD-ED 100 
506 MON End 1-Oct-92 0 0.0555 4 0.0853 -1.0000 -0.3496 DD-ED 100 
507 MON Mid 18-Feb-98 1.5 2.6500 0 2.5800 ∞ 0.0271 DI-EI 100 
508 MON End 26-Aug-98 1.5 4.8000 0 4.6300 ∞ 0.0367 DI-EI 100 
509 MON End 17-Aug-99 3 4.8000 1.5 5.6700 1.0000 -0.1534 DI-ED 100 
510 MPL Mid 4-Dec-95 3.7 0.1069 4 0.2654 -0.0750 -0.5973 DD-ED 71 
511 MPL End 23-May-96 5.7 14.9500 3.8 15.6700 0.5000 -0.0459 DI-ED 81 
512 MPL Mid 22-Nov-96 5 10.7000 3.7 10.6900 0.3514 0.0009 DI-EI 69 
513 MTG Mid 29-Nov-91 0 0.0036 1.25 0.0141 -1.0000 -0.7482 DD-ED 64 
514 MTG Mid 20-Nov-92 0 0.0099 0 0.0036 ∞ 1.7836 DI-EI 88 
515 MTG Mid 22-Nov-93 1.25 0.0151 0 0.0099 ∞ 0.5289 DI-EI 100 
516 MTG End 10-Jun-94 1.5 0.0401 0 0.0202 ∞ 0.9863 DI-EI 100 
517 MTG Mid 18-Nov-94 1.75 0.0275 1.25 0.0151 0.4000 0.8209 DI-EI 98 
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518 MTG End 9-Jun-95 1.75 0.0493 1.5 0.0401 0.1667 0.2315 DI-EI 95 
519 NCH End 25-Aug-94 12 0.8101 6 0.4235 1.0000 0.9131 DI-EI 97 
520 NCH Mid 16-Feb-95 9 0.3071 3 0.6159 2.0000 -0.5014 DI-ED 94 
521 NCH End 24-Aug-95 13 0.5285 12 0.8101 0.0833 -0.3475 DI-ED 95 
522 NCH End 21-Aug-96 15 11.8100 13 4.8000 0.1538 1.4604 DI-EI 98 
523 NCH Mid 19-Feb-97 11 6.8200 10 6.4200 0.1000 0.0623 DI-EI 100 
524 NCH Mid 18-Feb-98 5 5.6500 11 6.8200 -0.5455 -0.1716 DD-ED 100 
525 NCH End 19-Aug-98 6 18.5400 24 13.9300 -0.7500 0.3309 DD-EI 100 
526 NCH Mid 18-Feb-99 5 6.3800 5 5.6500 0.0000 0.1292 DNC-EI 100 
527 NLL Mid 6-Mar-92 2.5 0.0820 0 0.0535 ∞ 0.5327 DI-EI 26 
528 NLL End 11-Sep-92 5 0.1965 5 0.1158 0.0000 0.6964 DNC-EI 68 
529 NLL End 14-Feb-97 5 17.1200 0 0.2000 ∞ 84.6000 DI-EI 24 
530 NLL End 25-Feb-98 10 19.7500 5 17.1200 1.0000 0.1536 DI-EI 26 
531 NLL Mid 20-Aug-98 5 15.0500 0 10.8200 ∞ 0.3909 DI-EI 22 
532 NMH Mid 26-May-98 4.25 8.2300 4 10.2000 0.0625 -0.1931 DI-ED 20 
533 NOG End 10-Sep-98 2.5 3.6000 0 1.8300 ∞ 0.9672 DI-EI 98 
534 NOG End 14-Sep-99 0 -0.6200 2.5 3.6000 -1.0000 -1.1722 DD-ED 98 
535 NPR End 7-Sep-94 5 0.0693 3 0.0790 0.6667 -0.1220 DI-ED 64 
536 NPR End 7-Sep-95 5 0.0529 5 0.0693 0.0000 -0.2366 DNC-ED 34 
537 NPR End 26-Aug-96 0 4.8200 5 5.2900 -1.0000 -0.0888 DD-ED 37 
538 NPX End 24-Aug-90 2.75 0.2564 2.75 0.1536 0.0000 0.6690 DNC-EI 20 
539 NPX End 22-Aug-91 2.75 0.1779 2.75 0.2564 0.0000 -0.3061 DNC-ED 20 
540 NPX End 21-Aug-92 4.5 0.2316 2.75 0.1779 0.6364 0.3020 DI-EI 95 
541 NPX Mid 19-Feb-93 6.5 0.1433 8.5 0.1675 -0.2353 -0.1444 DD-ED 89 
542 NPX End 20-Aug-93 8.5 0.2944 4.5 0.2316 0.8889 0.2711 DI-EI 94 
543 NPX Mid 18-Feb-94 8.5 0.1890 6.5 0.1433 0.3077 0.3186 DI-EI 90 
544 NPX End 19-Aug-94 8.5 0.3382 8.5 0.2944 0.0000 0.1485 DNC-EI 88 
545 NPX Mid 17-Feb-95 8.5 0.1909 8.5 0.1890 0.0000 0.0102 DNC-EI 76 
546 NPX End 18-Aug-95 9.5 0.3601 8.5 0.3382 0.1176 0.0650 DI-EI 93 
547 NPX Mid 23-Feb-96 10 0.2157 8.5 0.1909 0.1765 0.1299 DI-EI 88 
548 NPX End 23-Aug-96 10 40.5000 9.5 36.5200 0.0526 0.1090 DI-EI 89 
549 NPX Mid 21-Feb-97 5.5 18.8000 10 21.3300 -0.4500 -0.1186 DD-ED 96 
550 NPX End 22-Aug-97 5 29.7300 10 40.5000 -0.5000 -0.2659 DD-ED 97 
551 NPX Mid 20-Feb-98 5.5 10.2400 5.5 18.8000 0.0000 -0.4553 DNC-ED 95 
552 NPX End 28-Aug-98 5 14.9300 5 29.7300 0.0000 -0.4978 DNC-ED 100 
553 NPX Mid 26-Feb-99 5.5 10.0800 5.5 10.2400 0.0000 -0.0156 DNC-ED 99 
554 NPX End 20-Aug-99 5 21.1800 5 19.8000 0.0000 0.0697 DNC-EI 100 
555 NTH Mid 13-May-94 2.25 0.0847 2 0.0793 0.1250 0.0685 DI-EI 71 
556 NTH End 24-Nov-94 5 0.1820 4.5 0.1568 0.1111 0.1606 DI-EI 54 
557 NTH Mid 19-May-95 2.5 0.0926 2.25 0.0847 0.1111 0.0940 DI-EI 47 
558 NTH End 23-Nov-95 4.75 0.1689 5 0.1820 -0.0500 -0.0725 DD-ED 59 
559 NTH Mid 17-May-96 2.75 10.2400 2.5 9.2600 0.1000 0.1058 DI-EI 77 
560 NTH End 21-Nov-96 5.5 20.5900 4.75 16.8900 0.1579 0.2191 DI-EI 79 
561 NTH Mid 16-May-97 2.75 7.5300 2.75 10.2400 0.0000 -0.2646 DNC-ED 87 
562 NTH End 20-Nov-97 5.5 17.1700 5.5 20.5900 0.0000 -0.1661 DNC-ED 74 
563 NTH Mid 22-May-98 1.75 3.1300 2.75 7.5300 -0.3636 -0.5843 DD-ED 59 
564 NTH End 18-Nov-98 4.75 7.5900 5.5 17.1700 -0.1364 -0.5579 DD-ED 76 
565 NTH Mid 14-May-99 2 3.3600 1.75 3.1300 0.1429 0.0735 DI-EI 77 
566 NZR Mid 30-Aug-90 20 0.7122 15 0.1819 0.3333 2.9157 DI-EI 45 
567 NZR End 1-Mar-91 30 1.5564 20 0.4075 0.5000 2.8194 DI-EI 44 
568 NZR Mid 29-Aug-91 25 0.9737 20 0.7122 0.2500 0.3672 DI-EI 81 
569 NZR End 28-Feb-92 45 2.0645 30 1.5564 0.5000 0.3264 DI-EI 79 
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570 NZR Mid 27-Aug-92 50 1.0135 25 0.9737 1.0000 0.0409 DI-EI 81 
571 NZR End 25-Feb-93 75 2.0645 45 1.5564 0.6667 0.3264 DI-EI 75 
572 NZR Mid 26-Aug-93 65 1.1620 50 1.0135 0.3000 0.1466 DI-EI 93 
573 NZR Mid 25-Aug-94 65 1.2604 65 1.1620 0.0000 0.0847 DNC-EI 82 
574 NZR End 23-Feb-95 90 2.0250 80 2.3553 0.1250 -0.1402 DI-ED 67 
575 NZR Mid 1-Sep-95 50 0.5765 70 1.2604 -0.2857 -0.5426 DD-ED 68 
576 NZR End 22-Feb-96 100 2.1360 90 2.0250 0.1111 0.0548 DI-EI 84 
577 NZR Mid 29-Aug-96 75 115.0300 50 57.1500 0.5000 1.0128 DI-EI 66 
578 NZR End 27-Feb-97 85 193.9000 100 163.0700 -0.1500 0.1891 DD-EI 73 
579 NZR Mid 28-Aug-97 35 32.2900 75 115.0300 -0.5333 -0.7193 DD-ED 78 
580 NZR End 26-Feb-98 65 110.7100 85 193.9000 -0.2353 -0.4290 DD-ED 72 
581 NZR Mid 27-Aug-98 50 65.4400 35 32.2900 0.4286 1.0266 DI-EI 86 
582 NZR End 25-Feb-99 50 98.3800 65 110.7100 -0.2308 -0.1114 DD-ED 92 
583 NZR Mid 26-Aug-99 10 7.2000 50 65.4400 -0.8000 -0.8900 DD-ED 86 
584 OTR End 3-Oct-90 2.5 0.0541 2.5 0.1278 0.0000 -0.5766 DNC-ED 54 
585 OTR End 30-Sep-91 2.5 0.0943 2.5 0.0542 0.0000 0.7401 DNC-EI 72 
586 OTR End 1-Oct-92 0 0.0670 2.5 0.0943 -1.0000 -0.2896 DD-ED 90 
587 OTR Mid 15-Mar-93 2 0.0093 2.5 0.0377 -0.2000 -0.7542 DD-ED 86 
588 OTR Mid 10-Mar-94 0 0.0474 2 0.0093 -1.0000 4.1131 DD-EI 98 
589 OWN Mid 7-Dec-90 4 0.0487 0 0.0371 ∞ 0.3133 DI-EI 52 
590 OWN Mid 18-Nov-91 2 0.0543 4 0.0487 -0.5000 0.1150 DD-EI 81 
591 OWN End 2-Jun-92 4 0.1011 4 0.0917 0.0000 0.1027 DNC-EI 93 
592 OWN Mid 20-Nov-92 2.5 0.0511 2 0.0543 0.2500 -0.0590 DI-ED 98 
593 OWN End 11-Jun-93 4.5 0.1229 4 0.1011 0.1250 0.2150 DI-EI 94 
594 OWN Mid 3-Dec-93 2.5 0.0657 4 0.0528 -0.3750 0.2435 DD-EI 99 
595 OWN End 9-Jun-94 5 0.1263 4.5 0.1229 0.1111 0.0282 DI-EI 95 
596 OWN Mid 30-Nov-94 3 0.0782 2.5 0.0657 0.2000 0.1905 DI-EI 87 
597 OWN End 31-May-95 5.75 0.1546 5 0.1263 0.1500 0.2241 DI-EI 78 
598 OWN Mid 20-Nov-95 4 0.0822 3 0.0782 0.3333 0.0509 DI-EI 80 
599 OWN Mid 27-Nov-96 4 7.8600 4 7.5500 0.0000 0.0411 DNC-EI 89 
600 OWN End 29-May-98 6 12.4200 6 14.5100 0.0000 -0.1440 DNC-ED 92 
601 OWN Mid 11-Dec-98 4 4.1000 4 6.0800 0.0000 -0.3257 DNC-ED 99 
602 OWN Mid 26-Nov-99 3 3.8800 4 4.1000 -0.2500 -0.0537 DD-ED 95 
603 PBF End 13-Aug-93 4.2 0.1323 0 0.1202 ∞ 0.1011 DI-EI 98 
604 PBF Mid 11-Feb-94 2.5 0.0322 3 0.0389 -0.1667 -0.1733 DD-ED 100 
605 PBF End 12-Aug-94 3.1 0.1060 4.2 0.1323 -0.2619 -0.1989 DD-ED 98 
606 PBF Mid 20-Feb-95 2 0.0288 2.5 0.0322 -0.2000 -0.1056 DD-ED 94 
607 PBF End 15-Aug-95 2 0.0650 3.1 0.1060 -0.3548 -0.3864 DD-ED 97 
608 PBF Mid 19-Feb-96 0 -0.0383 2 0.0288 -1.0000 -2.3332 DD-ED 76 
609 PDL Mid 22-Nov-93 25 0.5156 10 0.4727 1.5000 0.0909 DI-EI 98 
610 PDL End 10-Jun-94 15 0.9746 5 0.8571 2.0000 0.1371 DI-EI 97 
611 PDL Mid 18-Nov-94 15 0.5642 15 0.5156 0.0000 0.0942 DNC-EI 87 
612 PDL End 12-Jun-95 13 1.0013 15 0.9746 -0.1333 0.0274 DD-EI 93 
613 PDL End 7-Jun-96 13 80.1100 13 102.8900 0.0000 -0.2214 DNC-ED 95 
614 PDL Mid 12-Nov-96 20 30.8300 27 56.9500 -0.2593 -0.4586 DD-ED 97 
615 PDL End 4-Jun-97 20 83.6100 13 80.3200 0.5385 0.0410 DI-EI 96 
616 PDL Mid 11-Nov-97 20 49.4100 20 30.8300 0.0000 0.6027 DNC-EI 99 
617 PDL End 15-Jun-98 20 82.7400 20 83.6100 0.0000 -0.0104 DNC-ED 87 
618 PDL Mid 19-Nov-98 20 16.3600 20 49.4100 0.0000 -0.6689 DNC-ED 99 
619 PDL End 14-Jun-99 0 12.8900 20 72.3200 -1.0000 -0.8218 DD-ED 99 
620 PDL Mid 26-Nov-99 20 22.3500 20 16.3600 0.0000 0.3661 DNC-EI 95 
621 PFI End 20-Feb-97 3.08 6.2000 2.61 7.2300 0.1801 -0.1425 DI-ED 90 
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622 PFI End 18-Feb-98 3.9 6.2700 3.08 6.5100 0.2662 -0.0369 DI-ED 87 
623 PFI End 23-Feb-99 2.43 4.8800 3.9 6.2700 -0.3769 -0.2217 DD-ED 100 
624 POA End 15-Aug-95 6 0.2113 5 0.1590 0.2000 0.3291 DI-EI 99 
625 POA Mid 13-Feb-96 8 0.1286 5 0.1037 0.6000 0.2400 DI-EI 99 
626 POA End 13-Aug-96 10 29.6200 6 21.1300 0.6667 0.4018 DI-EI 97 
627 POA Mid 18-Feb-97 9 13.1000 8 15.1700 0.1250 -0.1365 DI-ED 99 
628 POA Mid 17-Feb-98 9 15.4900 9 13.1000 0.0000 0.1824 DNC-EI 99 
629 POA Mid 16-Feb-99 9 13.1800 9 15.4900 0.0000 -0.1491 DNC-ED 99 
630 POA End 17-Aug-99 9 27.9600 9 28.3100 0.0000 -0.0124 DNC-ED 100 
631 POT Mid 5-May-93 2 0.0391 2 0.0436 0.0000 -0.1034 DNC-ED 98 
632 POT End 29-Nov-93 3 0.0790 2.8 0.0933 0.0714 -0.1539 DI-ED 100 
633 POT End 21-Nov-94 3.2 0.1020 3 0.0790 0.0667 0.2920 DI-EI 92 
634 POT Mid 8-May-95 2 0.0468 2 0.0402 0.0000 0.1651 DNC-EI 93 
635 POT Mid 16-Feb-96 2.4 0.0578 2 0.0484 0.2000 0.1934 DI-EI 88 
636 POT End 26-Aug-96 4.1 11.8500 2.1 10.5000 0.9524 0.1286 DI-EI 83 
637 POT Mid 3-Mar-97 3.5 6.9100 2.4 5.7800 0.4583 0.1955 DI-EI 95 
638 POT End 25-Aug-97 7.5 15.9800 4.1 11.8500 0.8293 0.3485 DI-EI 94 
639 POT Mid 2-Mar-98 5 8.8300 3.5 6.9100 0.4286 0.2779 DI-EI 88 
640 POT End 1-Sep-98 8 15.2400 7.5 15.9800 0.0667 -0.0463 DI-ED 81 
641 POT End 27-Aug-99 13 23.6800 8 15.2400 0.6250 0.5538 DI-EI 83 
642 PRG End 29-May-95 3 0.2288 3 0.2032 0.0000 0.1256 DNC-EI 89 
643 PRG Mid 14-Nov-95 2 0.0617 5 0.1505 -0.6000 -0.5899 DD-ED 92 
644 PRG End 29-May-96 1 7.5200 3 20.4800 -0.6667 -0.6328 DD-ED 90 
645 PRG Mid 2-Dec-96 1 2.0500 2 6.1700 -0.5000 -0.6677 DD-ED 89 
646 PRG End 3-Jun-98 3 13.7100 2 4.7500 0.5000 1.8863 DI-EI 59 
647 PRG Mid 11-Nov-98 3 6.3900 3 7.3500 0.0000 -0.1306 DNC-ED 70 
648 PRG End 15-Jun-99 0 12.9300 3 13.7100 -1.0000 -0.0569 DD-ED 77 
649 PRG Mid 2-Dec-99 0 7.5600 3 6.3900 -1.0000 0.1831 DD-EI 86 
650 PRO Mid 31-Mar-94 3.5 0.0314 5.5 0.0916 -0.3636 -0.6569 DD-ED 99 
651 PRO Mid 23-Mar-95 4 0.0458 3.5 0.0314 0.1429 0.4566 DI-EI 95 
652 PRO End 28-Sep-95 4 0.0791 3.5 0.0400 0.1429 0.9780 DI-EI 99 
653 PRO Mid 1-Apr-96 0 0.0092 4 0.0458 -1.0000 -0.7997 DD-ED 100 
654 PRO End 30-Sep-96 0 2.2800 4 8.1100 -1.0000 -0.7189 DD-ED 100 
655 PRO Mid 27-Mar-97 2 3.2300 0 0.8900 ∞ 2.6292 DI-EI 97 
656 PRO End 1-Oct-97 2.5 8.5900 0 2.2800 ∞ 2.7675 DI-EI 99 
657 PRO Mid 2-Apr-98 2 4.2900 2 3.2300 0.0000 0.3282 DNC-EI 95 
658 PRO End 15-Sep-98 3 7.5800 2.5 8.5900 0.2000 -0.1176 DI-ED 93 
659 PYN Mid 4-Nov-91 7 0.0046 0 -0.0437 ∞ 1.1063 DI-EI 20 
660 PYN Mid 30-Nov-92 0 -0.0244 7 0.0450 -1.0000 -1.5414 DD-ED 71 
661 PYN Mid 15-Nov-94 2.5 0.0704 0 0.0572 ∞ 0.2322 DI-EI 88 
662 PYN Mid 15-Nov-95 0 -0.1608 2.5 0.0704 -1.0000 -3.2839 DD-ED 86 
663 PYN End 13-May-96 0 -8.6000 2.5 15.3000 -1.0000 -1.5621 DD-ED 80 
664 RBD Mid 9-Jul-99 4.5 8.4200 3 3.9900 0.5000 1.1103 DI-EI 100 
665 RCH End 18-Sep-92 1 0.0514 0 -0.0405 ∞ 2.2669 DI-EI 100 
666 RCH Mid 18-Mar-93 1 0.0129 1 0.0292 0.0000 -0.5580 DNC-ED 100 
667 RCH End 20-Sep-93 0 -0.0193 1 0.0514 -1.0000 -1.3759 DD-ED 99 
668 RCH End 10-Mar-97 0.5 0.5500 1 -0.4900 -0.5000 2.1224 DD-EI 100 
669 RCH End 4-Mar-98 5 6.2500 0.5 0.5500 9.0000 10.3636 DI-EI 97 
670 RCH End 16-Mar-99 0 -39.9000 5 6.2500 -1.0000 -7.3840 DD-ED 99 
671 REI End 23-Aug-93 4 0.0721 4 0.0881 0.0000 -0.1817 DNC-ED 88 
672 REI End 28-Aug-95 4 0.0675 4 0.0758 0.0000 -0.1086 DNC-ED 69 
673 REI End 26-Aug-96 4 5.9200 4 6.7500 0.0000 -0.1230 DNC-ED 80 
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674 REI End 26-Aug-97 4 5.7900 4 5.9200 0.0000 -0.0220 DNC-ED 79 
675 REI End 31-Aug-98 4 6.4500 4 5.7900 0.0000 0.1140 DNC-EI 57 
676 REI End 30-Aug-99 4.5 7.1500 4 6.4500 0.1250 0.1085 DI-EI 73 
677 RIL End 28-Jun-91 9 0.2080 7 0.2507 0.2857 -0.1702 DI-ED 6 
678 RIL End 25-Jun-92 7.5 0.0916 9 0.2080 -0.1667 -0.5598 DD-ED 8 
679 RIL End 25-Jun-93 7.5 0.1236 7.5 0.0916 0.0000 0.3495 DNC-EI 13 
680 RIL Mid 10-Dec-93 4 0.0676 0 0.0516 ∞ 0.3103 DI-EI 30 
681 RIL End 29-Jun-94 0 0.0756 7.5 0.1236 -1.0000 -0.3885 DD-ED 33 
682 RNS End 12-Jun-95 5.5 0.1652 0 -0.0028 ∞ 60.7687 DI-EI 79 
683 RNS Mid 6-Aug-96 3 6.1000 2 4.2300 0.5000 0.4421 DI-EI 75 
684 RNS Mid 21-Aug-97 2 4.2700 3 6.1000 -0.3333 -0.3000 DD-ED 83 
685 RNS Mid 24-Jul-98 0 0.7300 2 4.2700 -1.0000 -0.8290 DD-ED 62 
686 ROT Mid 13-Nov-90 5 0.0789 5 0.0897 0.0000 -0.1199 DNC-ED 4 
687 ROT Mid 20-Nov-91 5 0.0821 5 0.0789 0.0000 0.0401 DNC-EI 12 
688 ROT End 20-May-92 5 0.1688 5 0.1617 0.0000 0.0437 DNC-EI 18 
689 ROT End 18-May-93 6 0.3277 5 0.1688 0.2000 0.9417 DI-EI 19 
690 ROT Mid 11-Nov-93 5 0.1860 5 0.1310 0.0000 0.4200 DNC-EI 41 
691 ROT End 25-May-94 10 0.4242 6 0.3292 0.6667 0.2884 DI-EI 59 
692 ROT Mid 15-Nov-94 5 0.1650 5 0.1860 0.0000 -0.1129 DNC-ED 32 
693 ROT End 16-May-95 7 0.2574 10 0.4242 -0.3000 -0.3931 DD-ED 13 
694 ROT Mid 22-Nov-95 5 0.1342 5 0.1650 0.0000 -0.1863 DNC-ED 19 
695 ROT End 20-May-96 7 31.1000 7 25.7000 0.0000 0.2101 DNC-EI 30 
696 ROT Mid 26-Nov-96 4 4.7900 5 13.4200 -0.2000 -0.6431 DD-ED 23 
697 ROT End 11-Jun-97 2 13.7300 7 31.1000 -0.7143 -0.5585 DD-ED 27 
698 ROT End 12-Jun-98 5 23.7400 2 13.7300 1.5000 0.7291 DI-EI 12 
699 RPA End 19-Jun-92 6 0.0997 0 0.0149 ∞ 5.6875 DI-EI 30 
700 RPA End 25-Jun-93 12.5 0.1402 6 0.0997 1.0833 0.4065 DI-EI 98 
701 RPA Mid 30-Nov-93 6 0.1109 0 0.0724 ∞ 0.5322 DI-EI 100 
702 RPA End 3-Jun-94 14 0.2688 12.5 0.1402 0.1200 0.9169 DI-EI 86 
703 RPA Mid 25-Nov-94 10 0.1638 6 0.1109 0.6667 0.4776 DI-EI 88 
704 RPA End 19-May-95 15 0.3130 14 0.2688 0.0714 0.1645 DI-EI 79 
705 RPA Mid 17-Nov-95 10 0.1578 10 0.1638 0.0000 -0.0365 DNC-ED 85 
706 RPA End 31-May-96 15 27.7100 15 31.3200 0.0000 -0.1153 DNC-ED 92 
707 RPA Mid 29-Nov-96 10 0.1578 10 0.1640 0.0000 -0.0374 DNC-ED 70 
708 RPA End 30-May-97 5 28.5800 15 27.7100 -0.6667 0.0314 DD-EI 79 
709 RPA Mid 10-Nov-97 7.5 12.8700 10 15.7800 -0.2500 -0.1844 DD-ED 69 
710 RPA End 8-Jun-98 7.5 28.9000 5 28.5800 0.5000 0.0112 DI-EI 58 
711 RPA End 31-May-99 7.5 45.0500 7.5 28.9000 0.0000 0.5588 DNC-EI 41 
712 RPA Mid 19-Nov-99 8.5 13.3300 7.5 15.5800 0.1333 -0.1444 DI-ED 70 
713 SAN Mid 2-May-91 4 0.0998 4 0.0816 0.0000 0.2230 DNC-EI 47 
714 SAN Mid 4-May-92 4 0.2133 4 0.0998 0.0000 1.1383 DNC-EI 94 
715 SAN Mid 5-May-93 4 0.2090 4 0.2133 0.0000 -0.0201 DNC-ED 100 
716 SAN End 5-Nov-93 5 0.3408 5 0.3552 0.0000 -0.0404 DNC-ED 97 
717 SAN Mid 9-May-94 4 0.1940 4 0.2090 0.0000 -0.0719 DNC-ED 93 
718 SAN End 9-Nov-94 6 0.3246 5 0.3408 0.2000 -0.0475 DI-ED 89 
719 SAN Mid 3-May-95 5 0.1731 4 0.1940 0.2500 -0.1077 DI-ED 90 
720 SAN Mid 3-May-96 5 0.1320 5 0.1731 0.0000 -0.2374 DNC-ED 82 
721 SAN Mid 7-May-97 5 7.5500 5 12.0000 0.0000 -0.3708 DNC-ED 93 
722 SAN End 7-Nov-97 6 10.1100 6 25.6700 0.0000 -0.6062 DNC-ED 98 
723 SAN Mid 6-May-98 5 9.0600 5 7.5500 0.0000 0.2000 DNC-EI 83 
724 SAN End 28-Oct-98 7 21.5500 6 18.4000 0.1667 0.1712 DI-EI 95 
725 SAN Mid 6-May-99 7 23.4500 5 9.0600 0.4000 1.5883 DI-EI 99 
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726 SCT End 8-Oct-98 5.5 13.8600 0 14.1600 ∞ -0.0212 DI-ED 98 
727 SCT Mid 9-Apr-99 4.5 6.7700 4.5 5.4900 0.0000 0.2332 DNC-EI 95 
728 SCT End 27-Oct-99 6.5 14.7700 5.5 13.8600 0.1818 0.0657 DI-EI 96 
729 SEU Mid 2-Nov-90 0.75 0.0167 0.5 0.0123 0.5000 0.3575 DI-EI 30 
730 SEU End 4-Jun-91 0.5 0.0246 1 0.0284 -0.5000 -0.1321 DD-ED 28 
731 SEU End 25-May-92 0 -0.0077 0.5 0.0246 -1.0000 -1.3126 DD-ED 81 
732 SEU Mid 4-Nov-92 0.5 0.0185 0 0.0002 ∞ 100.0000 DI-EI 83 
733 SEU End 28-May-93 1 0.0386 0 -0.0077 ∞ 6.0130 DI-EI 95 
734 SEU End 1-Jun-94 0 -0.0046 1 0.0386 -1.0000 -1.1196 DD-ED 88 
735 SEU Mid 10-May-95 0.5 0.0192 0.5 -0.0046 0.0000 5.1697 DNC-EI 57 
736 SEU Mid 2-Feb-96 1 0.1040 0.5 0.0062 1.0000 15.7453 DI-EI 87 
737 SEU End 15-Aug-96 2 2.7000 0.75 4.5500 1.6667 -0.4066 DI-ED 93 
738 SEU Mid 31-Jan-97 2 4.1900 1 1.3300 1.0000 2.1504 DI-EI 96 
739 SEU End 30-Jul-97 5 8.4200 2 2.7000 1.5000 2.1185 DI-EI 92 
740 SEU Mid 2-Feb-98 4 5.0900 2 4.1900 1.0000 0.2148 DI-EI 94 
741 SEU End 31-Jul-98 4 9.8200 5 8.4200 -0.2000 0.1663 DD-EI 82 
742 SEU Mid 12-Feb-99 4 5.0500 4 5.0900 0.0000 -0.0079 DNC-ED 94 
743 SFH Mid 21-Jun-96 0.5 -0.0129 0 -0.0027 ∞ -3.8542 DI-ED 42 
744 SFH Mid 5-Jun-97 0 0.2000 0.5 -0.3900 -1.0000 1.5128 DD-EI 57 
745 SFH End 15-Dec-97 0 0.9500 0.5 1.0400 -1.0000 -0.0865 DD-ED 49 
746 SHP End 19-Mar-91 2 0.0597 2 0.0532 0.0000 0.1239 DNC-EI 44 
747 SHP Mid 13-Sep-91 0 0.0212 2 0.0224 -1.0000 -0.0522 DD-ED 61 
748 SHP End 30-Mar-92 3 0.0434 2 0.0597 0.5000 -0.2741 DI-ED 82 
749 SHP End 26-Mar-93 0 0.0480 3 0.0434 -1.0000 0.1074 DD-EI 88 
750 SHP End 31-Mar-94 4 0.0482 0 0.0480 ∞ 0.0029 DI-EI 95 
751 SHP End 8-Mar-95 4.5 0.0435 4 0.0482 0.1250 -0.0961 DI-ED 74 
752 SHP End 12-Mar-96 4.5 0.0437 4.5 0.0435 0.0000 0.0033 DNC-EI 90 
753 SHP End 12-Mar-97 5 6.9000 4.5 5.2600 0.1111 0.3118 DI-EI 83 
754 SHP End 5-Mar-98 5 3.6900 5 5.1800 0.0000 -0.2876 DNC-ED 92 
755 SHP End 10-Mar-99 2.6 5.8300 5 5.9100 -0.4800 -0.0135 DD-ED 99 
756 SJL Mid 11-Nov-94 1 0.0014 1 0.0154 0.0000 -0.9080 DNC-ED 99 
757 SJL End 11-May-95 2 0.0531 4.5 0.0938 -0.5556 -0.4339 DD-ED 96 
758 SJL Mid 4-Dec-95 1 -0.0021 1 0.0014 0.0000 -2.5150 DNC-ED 93 
759 SJL End 17-Jun-96 1 5.1800 2 5.3100 -0.5000 -0.0245 DD-ED 90 
760 SJL Mid 10-Dec-96 1 -2.6700 1 -0.2100 0.0000 -11.7143 DNC-ED 90 
761 SJL Mid 16-Jun-97 0 1.6600 1 5.1800 -1.0000 -0.6795 DD-ED 83 
762 SJL End 17-Aug-99 2.5 7.2300 0 1.5500 ∞ 3.6645 DI-EI 85 
763 SKC Mid 20-Feb-98 12 16.7700 13 18.2000 -0.0769 -0.0786 DD-ED 98 
764 SKC Mid 22-Feb-99 17 23.0900 12 16.7700 0.4167 0.3769 DI-EI 100 
765 SKC End 12-Aug-99 26 46.8900 17 31.4600 0.5294 0.4905 DI-EI 100 
766 SKL End 11-Aug-94 4 0.1682 0 0.1300 ∞ 0.2937 DI-EI 100 
767 SKL Mid 9-Feb-95 2.5 0.1988 2.5 0.0758 0.0000 1.6245 DNC-EI 98 
768 SOU Mid 17-Feb-93 1 0.0384 0 0.0411 ∞ -0.0663 DI-ED 95 
769 SOU End 18-Aug-93 1 0.0650 0 0.0601 ∞ 0.0819 DI-EI 98 
770 SOU End 18-Aug-94 3 0.0532 1 0.0650 2.0000 -0.1815 DI-ED 99 
771 SOU Mid 20-Feb-95 1 0.0022 1 0.0217 0.0000 -0.8977 DNC-ED 93 
772 SPN End 11-Sep-95 3.75 0.1430 3.25 0.1410 0.1538 0.0138 DI-EI 87 
773 SPN Mid 26-Feb-96 2.25 0.0240 2.25 0.0540 0.0000 -0.5560 DNC-ED 90 
774 SPN End 6-Sep-96 4 10.4400 3.75 14.3000 0.0667 -0.2699 DI-ED 86 
775 SPN Mid 24-Feb-97 2.25 2.4600 2.25 2.5600 0.0000 -0.0391 DNC-ED 83 
776 SPN End 8-Sep-97 4 9.4700 4 10.4400 0.0000 -0.0929 DNC-ED 85 
777 SPN Mid 27-Feb-98 2.25 3.3300 2.25 2.4600 0.0000 0.3537 DNC-EI 70 
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778 SPN End 7-Sep-98 3 8.3100 4 9.4700 -0.2500 -0.1225 DD-ED 54 
779 SPN Mid 22-Feb-99 2 2.0800 2.25 3.3300 -0.1111 -0.3754 DD-ED 67 
780 SPN End 9-Sep-99 3.5 4.3300 3 8.3100 0.1667 -0.4789 DI-ED 64 
781 SSB Mid 12-Dec-90 3 0.0319 3 0.0382 0.0000 -0.1650 DNC-ED 47 
782 SSB Mid 12-Dec-91 3 0.0515 3 0.0319 0.0000 0.6164 DNC-EI 94 
783 SSB End 5-Jun-92 7 0.1679 4.5 0.1602 0.5556 0.0479 DI-EI 96 
784 SSB Mid 10-Dec-92 4 0.1910 3 0.0515 0.3333 2.7091 DI-EI 99 
785 SSB Mid 9-Mar-95 6 0.1202 8 0.2777 -0.2500 -0.5671 DD-ED 100 
786 STL Mid 16-Feb-96 5.67 0.1121 5.46 0.1153 0.0385 -0.0271 DI-ED 94 
787 STL End 16-Aug-96 6.63 13.7700 5.76 7.6000 0.1510 0.8118 DI-EI 94 
788 STL Mid 14-Feb-97 6.03 4.1000 5.67 3.9100 0.0635 0.0486 DI-EI 100 
789 STL End 20-Aug-98 7.77 9.3100 7.4 8.6300 0.0500 0.0788 DI-EI 100 
790 STU End 5-Jun-91 5 0.0964 5 0.1025 0.0000 -0.0592 DNC-ED 54 
791 STU Mid 3-Dec-93 10 0.2002 4 0.1572 1.5000 0.2737 DI-EI 99 
792 STU End 19-Aug-94 15 0.6027 10 0.2828 0.5000 1.1310 DI-EI 84 
793 STU Mid 10-Feb-95 20 0.3290 10 0.2002 1.0000 0.6431 DI-EI 82 
794 STU End 23-Aug-95 20 0.6269 15 0.5110 0.3333 0.2268 DI-EI 93 
795 STU Mid 21-Feb-96 20 0.3018 20 0.3290 0.0000 -0.0827 DNC-ED 100 
796 STU End 21-Aug-96 20 57.9000 20 62.6900 0.0000 -0.0764 DNC-ED 97 
797 STU End 30-Jul-98 7 13.6100 20 44.5600 -0.6500 -0.6946 DD-ED 100 
798 STU End 28-Jul-99 4 11.3100 7 13.6100 -0.4286 -0.1690 DD-ED 100 
799 TAS End 26-Aug-93 1.2 0.4796 3 0.2118 -0.6000 1.2640 DD-EI 94 
800 TAS Mid 25-Feb-94 1.6 0.2367 8 0.2756 -0.8000 -0.1412 DD-ED 97 
801 TAS Mid 21-Feb-95 1.6 0.0325 1.6 0.2367 0.0000 -0.8627 DNC-ED 93 
802 TAS End 4-Aug-95 1.6 0.0545 1.44 0.0739 0.1111 -0.2631 DI-ED 91 
803 TAS Mid 14-Feb-96 1.6 0.0140 1.6 0.0325 0.0000 -0.5680 DNC-ED 99 
804 TAS End 14-Aug-96 1.6 6.1800 1.6 6.3300 0.0000 -0.0237 DNC-ED 91 
805 TAS Mid 14-Feb-97 0 0.1500 1.6 1.4000 -1.0000 -0.8929 DD-ED 95 
806 TAS End 13-Aug-97 1.6 6.5200 1.6 6.1800 0.0000 0.0550 DNC-EI 94 
807 TAS End 10-Aug-98 3 9.1300 1.6 6.5200 0.8750 0.4003 DI-EI 92 
808 TAS End 5-Aug-99 3 6.9600 3 9.1300 0.0000 -0.2377 DNC-ED 85 
809 TAY End 29-Aug-95 2 0.0535 0 0.0084 ∞ 5.3775 DI-EI 77 
810 TAY Mid 13-Mar-96 2 0.0324 0 0.1101 ∞ -0.7055 DI-ED 67 
811 TAY End 4-Sep-96 2 7.9700 2 8.2000 0.0000 -0.0280 DNC-ED 70 
812 TAY Mid 3-Mar-97 2.5 5.0300 2 3.2400 0.2500 0.5525 DI-EI 83 
813 TAY End 10-Sep-97 2 6.1500 2 7.9700 0.0000 -0.2284 DNC-ED 88 
814 TAY Mid 25-Feb-98 2 3.7700 2.5 5.0300 -0.2000 -0.2505 DD-ED 61 
815 TAY End 3-Sep-98 2 5.4200 2 6.1500 0.0000 -0.1187 DNC-ED 67 
816 TAY Mid 15-Feb-99 2 3.9800 2 3.8400 0.0000 0.0365 DNC-EI 73 
817 TAY End 1-Sep-99 2.5 7.4700 2 5.4200 0.2500 0.3782 DI-EI 79 
818 TBK Mid 29-Nov-95 4 0.1004 4 0.0996 0.0000 0.0073 DNC-EI 100 
819 TEL Mid 17-Nov-92 7.25 0.0782 6.5 0.0767 0.1154 0.0203 DI-EI 100 
820 TEL End 18-May-93 8.25 0.0456 6.5 0.1703 0.2692 -0.7323 DI-ED 100 
821 TEL Mid 2-Nov-93 8.25 0.1064 7.25 0.0782 0.1379 0.3604 DI-EI 100 
822 TEL Mid 3-Nov-94 13.5 0.1552 8.25 0.1064 0.6364 0.4583 DI-EI 100 
823 TEL End 12-May-95 16.5 0.3282 14.75 0.2795 0.1186 0.1744 DI-EI 100 
824 THL End 8-Jun-92 3 0.1503 0 0.1193 ∞ 0.2599 DI-EI 98 
825 THL Mid 17-Nov-92 4 0.0214 3 0.0123 0.3333 0.7367 DI-EI 100 
826 THL End 27-May-93 4 0.2562 3 0.1503 0.3333 0.7049 DI-EI 99 
827 THL Mid 24-Feb-94 5 0.1147 4 0.0214 0.2500 4.3575 DI-EI 100 
828 THL End 15-Sep-94 7 0.2936 4 0.2127 0.7500 0.3805 DI-EI 100 
829 THL End 13-Sep-95 8 0.4033 7 0.2936 0.1429 0.3736 DI-EI 99 
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830 THL Mid 18-Mar-96 7 0.1114 7 0.1534 0.0000 -0.2737 DNC-ED 59 
831 THL End 12-Sep-96 8 20.2500 8 32.8800 0.0000 -0.3841 DNC-ED 96 
832 THL Mid 12-Mar-97 7 9.3600 7 11.1400 0.0000 -0.1598 DNC-ED 100 
833 THL End 12-Sep-97 0 13.8900 8 20.2500 -1.0000 -0.3141 DD-ED 100 
834 THL Mid 5-Mar-98 0 5.8600 7 9.3600 -1.0000 -0.3739 DD-ED 95 
835 TLS Mid 11-Mar-99 7 14.0700 7 12.5400 0.0000 0.1220 DNC-EI 97 
836 TLT End 28-May-98 5.2 9.3400 0 7.2400 ∞ 0.2901 DI-EI 100 
837 TLT Mid 12-Nov-98 4.5 9.3400 3.9 7.2400 0.1538 0.2901 DI-EI 100 
838 TLT End 27-May-99 5.2 13.4900 5.2 12.9600 0.0000 0.0409 DNC-EI 100 
839 TPW Mid 15-Nov-95 3.2 0.0622 2.75 0.0421 0.1636 0.4763 DI-EI 98 
840 TPW End 28-May-96 3.09 10.3600 2.52 5.3500 0.2262 0.9364 DI-EI 98 
841 TPW Mid 12-Nov-96 5.86 7.7400 3.2 5.4400 0.8313 0.4228 DI-EI 99 
842 TPW Mid 28-Nov-97 7.28 9.2500 5.86 7.7400 0.2423 0.1951 DI-EI 100 
843 TPW End 29-May-98 7.16 16.2000 5.88 13.0400 0.2177 0.2423 DI-EI 98 
844 TPW Mid 27-Nov-98 9.21 10.0200 7.28 8.6400 0.2651 0.1597 DI-EI 100 
845 TPW End 14-Jun-99 6.95 10.3300 7.16 14.9400 -0.0293 -0.3086 DD-ED 100 
846 TPW Mid 26-Nov-99 8.66 7.6400 9.21 8.8200 -0.0597 -0.1338 DD-ED 100 
847 TRH Mid 30-Jan-98 8.5 16.9500 17 19.0200 -0.5000 -0.1088 DD-ED 94 
848 TRH Mid 5-Feb-99 8.5 10.8800 8.5 16.9500 0.0000 -0.3581 DNC-ED 100 
849 TRK End 15-May-91 12 0.4001 10 0.3632 0.2000 0.1016 DI-EI 39 
850 TRK End 25-May-92 5 0.3112 12 0.4001 -0.5833 -0.2221 DD-ED 59 
851 TRK Mid 19-Nov-92 0 -0.0066 10 0.1469 -1.0000 -1.0451 DD-ED 70 
852 TRK End 1-Jun-93 0 -0.2308 5 0.3112 -1.0000 -1.7414 DD-ED 90 
853 TRK Mid 5-Nov-93 3 0.0530 0 -0.0066 ∞ 8.9985 DI-EI 80 
854 TRK End 16-May-94 5 0.1446 0 -0.2308 ∞ 1.6264 DI-EI 71 
855 TRK Mid 17-Nov-94 4 0.0862 3 0.0530 0.3333 0.6265 DI-EI 66 
856 TRK End 18-May-95 10 0.2772 5 0.1446 1.0000 0.9175 DI-EI 35 
857 TRK Mid 13-Nov-95 3 0.0620 4 0.0862 -0.2500 -0.2810 DD-ED 59 
858 TRK Mid 19-Aug-96 3 3.3100 3 2.6400 0.0000 0.2538 DNC-EI 43 
859 TTP Mid 23-Aug-96 2.25 7.3900 0 2.0100 ∞ 2.6766 DI-EI 100 
860 TTP End 17-Mar-97 2.25 7.7000 2.25 6.2300 0.0000 0.2360 DNC-EI 100 
861 TTP Mid 4-Sep-97 2.25 2.1900 2.25 5.3000 0.0000 -0.5868 DNC-ED 100 
862 TTP End 24-Feb-99 0 5.7500 2.25 5.2900 -1.0000 0.0870 DD-EI 100 
863 UBM Mid 21-Feb-92 7.5 0.2145 5 0.1880 0.5000 0.1411 DI-EI 88 
864 UBM Mid 19-Feb-93 9.5 0.2639 7.5 0.2145 0.2667 0.2303 DI-EI 97 
865 UBM End 20-Aug-93 14.5 0.6002 16 0.5848 -0.0938 0.0263 DD-EI 96 
866 UBM Mid 22-Feb-94 4 0.1766 4 0.2639 0.0000 -0.3306 DNC-ED 100 
867 UBM End 18-Aug-94 6 0.1258 14.5 0.6002 -0.5862 -0.7905 DD-ED 99 
868 UBM Mid 22-Feb-95 4 0.0949 4 0.1766 0.0000 -0.4624 DNC-ED 98 
869 UBM End 10-Aug-95 3.5 0.0911 6 0.1258 -0.4167 -0.2758 DD-ED 89 
870 UGF End 5-Oct-95 3 0.0944 2.5 0.1036 0.2000 -0.0889 DI-ED 38 
871 UGF Mid 4-Apr-96 0 -0.0534 1.5 0.0464 -1.0000 -2.1506 DD-ED 34 
872 UGF End 16-Oct-96 0 -10.6100 3 9.4400 -1.0000 -2.1239 DD-ED 80 
873 UNL End 27-May-96 25.9 32.0900 10 16.0400 1.5900 1.0006 DI-EI 81 
874 UNL Mid 27-Nov-97 11 18.2000 11 18.2400 0.0000 -0.0022 DNC-ED 99 
875 UNL Mid 12-Nov-98 11 12.3200 11 18.2000 0.0000 -0.3231 DNC-ED 97 
876 UNL End 14-Jun-99 19 26.4300 22 42.6900 -0.1364 -0.3809 DD-ED 97 
877 WAM Mid 21-Aug-90 4 0.1068 4 0.1148 0.0000 -0.0702 DNC-ED 38 
878 WAM End 5-Feb-91 6 0.2418 5 0.1711 0.2000 0.4136 DI-EI 14 
879 WAM Mid 23-Aug-91 4 0.1281 4 0.1068 0.0000 0.2003 DNC-EI 44 
880 WAM End 21-Feb-92 6 0.2676 6 0.2418 0.0000 0.1067 DNC-EI 50 
881 WAM Mid 20-Aug-92 4 0.1415 4 0.1281 0.0000 0.1043 DNC-EI 67 
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882 WAM End 1-Mar-93 6 0.3080 6 0.2728 0.0000 0.1289 DNC-EI 54 
883 WAM Mid 16-Aug-93 4 0.1540 4 0.1415 0.0000 0.0882 DNC-EI 67 
884 WAM End 28-Feb-94 7 0.3364 6 0.3080 0.1667 0.0923 DI-EI 66 
885 WAM Mid 22-Aug-94 4 0.2035 4 0.1540 0.0000 0.3219 DNC-EI 52 
886 WAM End 23-Feb-95 10 0.4239 7 0.3364 0.4286 0.2602 DI-EI 30 
887 WAM Mid 18-Aug-95 7 0.2399 4 0.2035 0.7500 0.1788 DI-EI 55 
888 WAM End 20-Feb-97 4.53 47.9500 11 49.1200 -0.5882 -0.0238 DD-ED 81 
889 WAM Mid 21-Aug-97 3.4 10.1200 8 25.6900 -0.5750 -0.6061 DD-ED 88 
890 WAM End 26-Feb-98 5.8 23.2500 4.53 47.9500 0.2804 -0.5151 DI-ED 86 
891 WAM Mid 20-Aug-98 4 12.0000 3.4 10.1200 0.1765 0.1858 DI-EI 85 
892 WAM End 25-Feb-99 6.8 27.2800 5.8 23.2500 0.1724 0.1733 DI-EI 93 
893 WEL End 22-May-96 0 13.0300 8.25 14.7600 -1.0000 -0.1172 DD-ED 91 
894 WHC End 3-Sep-90 1.5 0.0606 1 0.0123 0.5000 3.9229 DI-EI 42 
895 WHC Mid 25-Feb-91 0.5 0.0452 0 0.0044 ∞ 9.2727 DI-EI 52 
896 WHC End 5-Aug-91 1.5 0.1083 1.5 0.0606 0.0000 0.7877 DNC-EI 50 
897 WHC Mid 3-Mar-92 0.75 0.0583 5 0.0452 -0.8500 0.2888 DD-EI 77 
898 WHC End 28-Sep-92 1 0.1745 1 0.1083 0.0000 0.6110 DNC-EI 76 
899 WHC End 30-Aug-93 2 0.1749 1.5 0.1793 0.3333 -0.0248 DI-ED 97 
900 WHC Mid 7-Mar-94 3 0.1296 1 0.0818 2.0000 0.5844 DI-EI 100 
901 WHC End 19-Sep-94 4 0.1989 2 0.1749 1.0000 0.1373 DI-EI 99 
902 WHC Mid 6-Mar-95 4 0.1246 3 0.1296 0.3333 -0.0382 DI-ED 98 
903 WHC End 7-Sep-95 6 0.1668 4 0.1989 0.5000 -0.1610 DI-ED 98 
904 WHO Mid 26-Oct-90 6 0.1920 9 0.2517 -0.3333 -0.2371 DD-ED 94 
905 WHO Mid 4-Nov-91 6 0.2067 9 0.2166 -0.3333 -0.0457 DD-ED 96 
906 WHO End 31-May-93 11 0.4216 11 0.4477 0.0000 -0.0582 DNC-ED 100 
907 WHO End 30-May-94 11 0.4223 11 0.4216 0.0000 0.0016 DNC-EI 100 
908 WHO End 31-May-95 11 0.3300 11 0.4215 0.0000 -0.2171 DNC-ED 97 
909 WHO Mid 23-Aug-96 15 18.9800 19 18.9700 -0.2105 0.0005 DD-EI 100 
910 WHO End 28-Feb-97 17 40.7800 10 49.9000 0.7000 -0.1828 DI-ED 98 
911 WHO Mid 19-Aug-97 17 22.1200 15 18.9800 0.1333 0.1654 DI-EI 88 
912 WHS Mid 31-Mar-98 6.5 18.9500 6 17.3700 0.0833 0.0910 DI-EI 99 
913 WHS End 25-Sep-98 7.5 28.0200 4 23.8200 0.8750 0.1763 DI-EI 100 
914 WKL End 30-Sep-94 11 0.3001 14 0.2548 -0.2143 0.1779 DD-EI 59 
915 WKL Mid 27-Mar-95 6 0.1168 7 0.1843 -0.1429 -0.3665 DD-ED 44 
916 WKL End 2-Oct-95 9 0.2117 11 0.3001 -0.1818 -0.2945 DD-ED 61 
917 WKL Mid 1-Apr-96 6 0.1270 6 0.1168 0.0000 0.0876 DNC-EI 69 
918 WKL End 30-Sep-96 9 21.1100 9 21.1700 0.0000 -0.0028 DNC-ED 58 
919 WKL Mid 19-Mar-97 6 9.8400 6 10.4300 0.0000 -0.0566 DNC-ED 66 
920 WKL End 29-Sep-97 9 20.2800 9 21.1100 0.0000 -0.0393 DNC-ED 72 
921 WKL Mid 30-Mar-98 6 5.5600 6 9.8400 0.0000 -0.4350 DNC-ED 62 
922 WKL End 29-Sep-98 6 7.5000 9 20.2800 -0.3333 -0.6302 DD-ED 66 
923 WKL Mid 30-Mar-99 6 7.3200 6 5.5600 0.0000 0.3165 DNC-EI 72 
924 WKL End 17-Sep-99 7 14.3100 6 9.6500 0.1667 0.4829 DI-EI 56 
925 WNE Mid 27-Mar-92 0 -0.0017 2.5 0.0183 -1.0000 -1.0922 DD-ED 94 
926 WNG Mid 7-Feb-95 3 0.0906 3 0.0785 0.0000 0.1536 DNC-EI 94 
927 WNG End 8-Aug-95 7.5 0.2092 5.3 0.1654 0.4151 0.2646 DI-EI 93 
928 WNG Mid 13-Feb-96 3 0.0915 3 0.0906 0.0000 0.0104 DNC-EI 95 
929 WRI Mid 23-Feb-95 3.5 0.0450 0 0.8658 ∞ -0.9481 DI-ED 100 
930 WRI Mid 7-Mar-96 3.5 0.0340 3.5 0.0450 0.0000 -0.2444 DNC-ED 99 
931 WRI End 6-Sep-96 7 11.0600 7 14.5300 0.0000 -0.2388 DNC-ED 99 
932 WRI Mid 6-Mar-97 2.5 1.8100 3.5 3.4000 -0.2857 -0.4676 DD-ED 100 
933 WRI End 11-Sep-97 0 8.1000 7 11.0600 -1.0000 -0.2676 DD-ED 100 
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934 WRI Mid 5-Mar-98 2 3.6600 2.5 1.8100 -0.2000 1.0221 DD-EI 100 
935 WRI End 3-Sep-98 1.3 3.9400 0 8.1000 ∞ -0.5136 DI-ED 100 
936 WRI End 31-Aug-99 0 -0.7400 1.3 3.9100 -1.0000 -1.1893 DD-ED 100 
937 ZNZ Mid 20-Nov-92 1 0.0281 0 0.0706 ∞ -0.6017 DI-ED 72 
938 ZNZ End 11-Jun-93 2 0.0849 1 0.0472 1.0000 0.7994 DI-EI 70 
939 ZNZ Mid 29-Nov-93 1 0.0349 1 0.0281 0.0000 0.2418 DNC-EI 89 
940 ZNZ End 10-Jun-94 2 0.0619 2 0.0849 0.0000 -0.2704 DNC-ED 89 
941 ZNZ Mid 24-Nov-94 1 0.0172 1 0.0349 0.0000 -0.5064 DNC-ED 65 
942 ZNZ End 12-Jun-95 2 0.0289 2 0.0619 0.0000 -0.5341 DNC-ED 68 
943 ZNZ Mid 24-Nov-95 1 -0.0091 1 0.0172 0.0000 -1.5259 DNC-ED 69 
944 ZNZ Mid 29-Nov-96 1 -0.8300 1 -0.8800 0.0000 0.0568 DNC-EI 71 
945 ZNZ End 9-Jun-97 2.5 -0.7300 2.5 0.9800 0.0000 -1.7449 DNC-ED 57 
946 ZNZ Mid 27-Nov-97 1 0.1100 1 -0.8300 0.0000 1.1325 DNC-EI 80 
947 ZNZ End 4-Jun-98 0 -1.0700 2.5 -0.7300 -1.0000 -0.4658 DD-ED 41 
948 ZNZ Mid 12-Nov-98 1 0.4500 1 0.1100 0.0000 3.0909 DNC-EI 40 
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Appendix D Some Technical Details 
Appendix D.1 Software 
The following list of software used in the study lists the most recent versions of the software 
used. Most calculations have been done with the most recent version but sometimes an older 
version may have been used. 
• SAS 
• Microsoft Excel 2000. 
• Matlab 7, release 14, 6 May 2004. 
• The Econometric toolbox by James P. LeSage, Dept of Economics, University of Toledo. 
• Scilab 3.1.1, 31 May 2005. 
• Grocer 1.041 Copyright Eric Dubois et al. 2002-2005. 
• R 2.1.1 was used for cross checking some results. 
 
Appendix D.2 Working with time periods 
Allowance must be made for the fact that the days the share market is open for trading do not 
include weekends or public holidays. This made it necessary to create and maintain an index of 
trading days. All calculations requiring a specific number of days of observations can then be 
passed the correct block of data via use of this index. This becomes vital when the required 
calculation needs to be performed separately on 948 different data sets spread out over a decade. 
So a common start to Matlab routines used in this study looks like the following 12-line 
instruction, which marshalled jtR  and MtR  observations for each of 948 estimation periods and 
related test periods: 
1. for i=1:948 
2.  eventRow = find(eventDates(i)==IndexDates); 
3.  startRow = eventRow - estDays -10; 
4.  if startRow < 1 
5.  continue; 
6.  end 
7.  if IndexDates(startRow)<FirstDates(eventCos(i)) 
8.  continue 
9.  end 
10.  stopRow = eventRow + 10; 
11.  x = NZXAllIndex(startRow:stopRow); 
12.  y = ReturnIndex(startRow:stopRow,eventCos(i)); 
Line 1 sets up the loop for the code to be repeated for each announcement in the dataset. 
Line 2 finds the index of the announcement date. 
Lines 3 and 10 calculate the start and stop dates for the entire event period (estimation and test). 
The variable, ‘estDays’ is the number of days in the estimation period (set at 100) and it is set to 
finish its count 10 rows before (and clear of) the eventRow 
Lines 4 to 9 check that the start date is within the bounds of the collected dataset, and skip to the 
next event if the start date does not exist in the data set (i.e. has an index value less than 1 — the 
index’s initial and lowest value on the first trading day of 1990) or if the company did not have a 
trading record stretching far enough back to cater for that event (i.e., has a start date before 
‘FirstDates(eventCos(i))’). 
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Line 10 establishes that the last observation collected is exactly 10 days after the day of the 
event. 
Lines 11 and 12 then upload the relevant data for company/event ‘i’ from the Market Returns 
and Company Returns indices. 
 
 
Appendix D.3 Calculating Returns and transferring the Data for 
Analysis 
The Adjusted Closing Share Price data on the IRG CD ROMS have a separate table for each 
company. The data was extracted by a Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) routine directly 
from the Microsoft Access database into Microsoft Excel. 
Market returns were then calculated in Excel on the all-companies gross index by simple 
formulas on a spreadsheet, for instance: =LN(B3/B2). Company Returns were calculated by a 
VBA routine to extract the relevant share price data from a worksheet, and perform a similar 
function. 
Initially, a VBA routine was also employed in Excel to create ARs for all 948 company/event 
sets. From the output of this, the t-tests and p-value calculations reported in Chapter 5 were 
performed in Excel directly. Initially, also, this Excel output was imported into SAS via fixed-
length text files for computation of restricted least squares regressions and Kruskal-Wallis tests; 
but most of this was later redone in Matlab 7. All calculations for Chapters 6 and 7 were 
performed in Matlab 7 or Scilab 3.1. 
 
 
Appendix D.4 Performing OLS Regressions 
Excel provides a regression facility and the functions ‘INTERCEPT’ and ‘SLOPE’. 
In SAS the calculation for OLS is ‘proc reg’ and it yielded a nice set of statistics. 
The easiest way of getting a similar result in Matlab was through using the functions ‘regstats’, 
‘regress’ and the function ‘ols’ from the Econometric ToolPak, and then extracting the relevant 
statistics from each of these, since no single routine provided all the statistics required. It was 
safer to use this approach since these routines have been tried and tested rather than to write 
original routines. 
 
 
Appendix D.5 Calculation of ARs and CARs 
Initially the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns were calculated in Excel via 
simple spreadsheet functions. Later they were recalculated directly in Matlab. 
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Appendix D.6 Check for Significant Change in Returns on Specific 
Days in the Test Period 
This too was performed in Excel. Note the use of the ‘SUBTOTAL’ function. This was used so 
that when filters were applied, the values displayed were calculated on the ‘visible’ data only. 
 
Table D-1: Sample spreadsheet and formulas for calculating t-test and p-values for selected data. 
 Column W Column X 
1 Count =SUBTOTAL(2,X12:X959) 
2 Mean =SUBTOTAL(1,X12:X959) 
3 St Dev =SUBTOTAL(7,X12:X959) 
4 t-test =X2/(X3/SQRT(X1)) 
5 p-value =TDIST(X7,X1-1,2) 
6   
7 abs(t-test) =ABS(X4) 
Graphs were created in Excel. 
 
 
Appendix D.7 EPS∆ and DPS∆  and Associated Dummy Variables 
The company announcements were stored by IRG Ltd in Adobe’s “Printer Definition Files” 
(.PDF). The only way, at the time, of accessing the information, an announcement at a time, was 
via the custom interface provided by IRG. This interface allowed Microsoft Windows “.CLP” 
files to be created and stored on floppy disks so that the data could be transferred from the 
University Library. These files were then read into Microsoft Word, cleaned and organised (via a 
macro), and announcement data extracted from them onto an Excel worksheet. The change in 
earnings and change in dividends were simple calculations in an Excel Spreadsheet. The data 
was checked against hard copy company reports. 
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Appendix E Tables showing Chapter 5 Results on a One-
day Event Window 
The regression results in Chapter 5 map the fortunes of the dependent variable, CAR3Day. The 
following tables furnish the equivalent information on a single-day event window. In each 
instance, the table is cross-referenced to the CAR3Day table in the body of the chapter. The most 
important of these is Table E-4 which contains the one-day event window results for the five-
dummy RLS regression. 
Table E-1 is the one-day equivalent of Table 5-12 on page 136. 
Table E-1: Stepwise Regressions on First-order Variables for ARt0. 
Regressand
All Obs. Early
(to 8/5/96)
Late
(from 9/5/96)
N 865 441 424
(INTERCEPT) -0.0013 -0.0028 -0.0005
     (p-Value) (0.4648) (0.2470) (0.8586)
∆EPS 0.0017 0.0063 0.0009
     (p-Value) (0.0096) (0.0001) (0.2129)
F-Stat 6.7424 14.7160 1.5563
     (p-Value) (0.0096) (0.0001) (0.2129)
Adj R2 0.0066 0.0302 0.0013
(INTERCEPT) -0.0019 -0.0035 -0.0007
     (p-Value) (0.2840) (0.1317) (0.7981)
∆DPS 0.0017 0.0063 0.0009
     (p-Value) (0.0096) (0.0001) (0.2129)
F-Stat 47.5130 45.0140 13.3830
     (p-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003)
Adj R2 0.0511 0.0909 0.0284
(INTERCEPT) -0.0019 -0.0039 -0.0007
     (p-Value) (0.2759) (0.0914) (0.7971)
∆EPS 0.0006 0.0037 0.0002
     (p-Value) (0.3793) (0.0227) (0.7846)
∆DPS 0.0182 0.0255 0.0130
     (p-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0006)
F-Stat 24.1370 25.3370 6.7141
     (p-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0013)
Adj R2 0.0508 0.0996 0.0263
Regression with Change in Earnings and Dividend
ARt0
Regression with Change in Earnings Only
Regression with Change in Dividends Only EQUATION (ii)
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Table E-2 is equivalent to Table 5-13 on page 137. 
Table E-2: RLS Regression with Respect to Earnings Behaviour for ARt0. 
Regressand
All Obs. Early
(to 8/5/96)
Late
(from 9/5/96)
Coefficients of Unrestricted Regression (p-Values)
Falling earnings (INTERCEPT) -0.0073 -0.0087 -0.0050
(0.0038) (0.0140) (0.1607)
∆EPS 0.0003 0.0028 0.0000
(0.7138) (0.1102) (0.9779)
∆DPS 0.0155 0.0229 0.0111
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0050)
Rising earnings 0.0113 0.0094 0.0101
(0.0029) (0.0734) (0.0737)
N 865 441 424
Adj R2UNRESTRICTED 0.0595 0.1042 0.0314
Adj R2EQUATION (ii) 0.0508 0.0996 0.0263
Adj R2EQUATION (iii) 0.0292 0.0449 0.0167
FUNRESTRRICTED 19.2200 18.0510 5.5715
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0009)
FEQUATION (ii) 24.1370 25.3370 6.7141
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0013)
FEQUATION (iii) 26.9790 21.6820 8.1687
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0045)
FFIRST ORDER 14.8978 15.5237 4.2003
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0156)
FINTERACTION 8.9197 3.2431 3.1970
(0.0029) (0.0724) (0.0745)
Observations, Adj R2 Statistics, F-Statistics, (p-Values)
ARt0
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Table E-3 is the equivalent of Table 5-14 on page 140. 
Table E-3: Restricted Least Squares regression for change in dividends for ARt0. 
Regressand
All Obs. Early
(to 8/5/96)
Late
(from 9/5/96)
Coefficients of Unrestricted Regression (p-Values)
Falling dividends (INTERCEPT) -0.0108 -0.0020 -0.0142
(0.0075) (0.7387) (0.0100)
∆EPS 0.0005 0.0037 0.0002
(0.4253) (0.0271) (0.7977)
∆DPS 0.0113 0.0244 0.0053
(0.0021) (0.0001) (0.2594)
Rising Dividends 0.0174 0.0013 0.0239
(0.0037) (0.8835) (0.0053)
DNC 0.0076 -0.0061 0.0156
(0.1231) (0.3937) (0.0238)
N 865 441 424
Adj R2UNRESTRICTED 0.0583 0.0998 0.0407
Adj R2EQUATION (ii) 0.0508 0.0996 0.0263
Adj R2EQUATION (iii) 0.0479 0.0563 0.0417
FUNRESTRRICTED 14.3660 13.2010 5.4811
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003)
FEQUATION (ii) 24.1370 25.3370 6.7141
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0013)
FEQUATION (iii) 22.7360 14.1180 10.2090
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
FFIRST ORDER 5.7429 11.6198 0.7554
(0.0033) (0.0000) (0.4704)
FINTERACTION 4.3972 1.0759 4.1378
(0.0126) (0.3419) (0.0166)
Observations, Adj R2 Statistics, F-Statistics, (p-Values)
ARt0
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Table E-4 is the equivalent of Table 5-15 on page 142. Its results conform to those on the three-
day event window — although more interaction effects are apparently significant in Table E-4’s 
unrestricted estimation with respect to the late subsample. But neither Table 5-15 nor Table E-4 
furnish significant interaction F-statistics on the early and late subsamples. 
Table E-4: Restricted Least Squares regression with dummy variables ARt0. 
Regressand
All Obs. Early
(to 8/5/96)
Late
(from 9/5/96)
Coefficients of Unrestricted Regression (p-Values)
DD-ED (INTERCEPT) -0.0126 -0.0059 -0.0143
(0.0038) (0.3801) (0.0156)
∆EPS 0.0003 0.0027 0.0001
(0.6691) (0.1177) (0.8772)
∆DPS 0.0113 0.0237 0.0056
(0.0020) (0.0001) (0.2303)
DI_EI 0.0213 0.0078 0.0245
(0.0010) (0.4284) (0.0073)
DD-EI 0.0101 0.0147 0.0017
(0.2749) (0.2336) (0.9033)
DI-ED 0.0115 -0.0005 0.0193
(0.1694) (0.9615) (0.1419)
DNC-EI 0.0135 0.0020 0.0200
(0.0285) (0.8187) (0.0293)
DNC-ED 0.0067 -0.0059 0.0138
(0.2368) (0.4845) (0.0802)
N 865 441 424
Adj R2UNRESTRICTED 0.0594 0.1002 0.0347
Adj R2EQUATION (ii) 0.0508 0.0996 0.0263
Adj R2EQUATION (iii) 0.0499 0.0659 0.0356
FUNRESTRRICTED 8.7881 7.9958 3.1748
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0028)
FEQUATION (ii) 24.1370 25.3370 6.7141
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0013)
FEQUATION (iii) 10.0740 7.2065 4.1246
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0011)
FFIRST ORDER 5.3131 9.2989 0.8020
(0.0051) (0.0001) (0.4491)
FINTERACTION 2.5579 1.0590 1.7338
(0.0262) (0.3825) (0.1256)
Observations, Adj R2 Statistics, F-Statistics, (p-Values)
ARt0
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Appendix F Effect of Foreign Companies in the Dataset. 
As mentioned in the discussion of data gathering in Chapter 3, a number of companies listed on 
the NZX are deemed to be foreign companies on the ground that their registered offices are in 
another country. Joint-announcement observations gathered from these firms have been included 
in the data analysis. Ten foreign firms contributed 28 observations to the original set of 948 
(which included announcements of dividend initiations and resumptions). When dividend 
initiations and resumptions were deleted, bringing the sample size down to 865, the number of 
foreign observations was reduced by five to 23. In Table F-1, the full RLS procedure reported in 
Table 5-14 is repeated with those 23 data-points excluded. (No breakdown into early and late 
subsamples is provided.)183 
Table F-1: Restricted Least Squares regression for change in dividends without foreign data points. 
RLS Regression on CARs from t = -1 to t = +1 with Respect to Full Interaction between Earnings 
and Dividend Announcement Components, excluding Observations of foreign-registered 
Companies:  
(Dependent Variable: CAR3Day) 
Independent Variable Restricted Regression 1 Unrestricted Regression 
CONSTANT  -0.00296 
(-1.43) 
-0.01873 
(-3.70)** (p = 0.0002) 
DEPS 0.00153 
(1.95) (p = 0.0513) 
0.00117 
(1.48) 
DDPS 0.02022 
(6.14)** (p < 0.0001) 
0.01010 
(2.38)* (p = 0.0175) 
Dummy 1 (DI-EI) 0.03067 
(4.07)** (p < 0.0001) 
Dummy 2 (DD-EI) 0.01052 
(0.98) 
Dummy 3 (DI-ED) 0.01830 (1.85) (p = 0.0647) 
Dummy 4 (DNC-EI) 0.01962 
(2.72)** (p = 0.0066) 
Dummy 5 (DNC-ED) 0.01140 
(1.72) (p = 0.0857) 
Other Data 
R2 (Adjusted) 0.0555 0.0703 
F-Statistic 25.70** (p < 0.0001) 10.08** (p < 0.0001) 
F-Tests covering the Linked Regressions 
F-Statistic, First-Order (DF: 2, 834)  4.727614** 
F-Statistic, Interaction (DF: 5, 834)  3.671723** 
The intercept of unrestricted regression shows the DD-ED interaction effect. 
T-values are shown in brackets underneath the value of each coefficient. 
* indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5% level of error. 
** indicates a significant difference from zero at the 1% level of error. 
The probability of a Type 1 error is shown whenever a coefficient is significantly different from zero 
up to a 10% level of error. 
Critical values for the First-order F-statistic were 3.00 (5% error) and 4.61 (1% error). 
Critical values for the Interaction F-statistic were 2.21 (5% error) and 3.02 (1% error). 
842 observations were used in this set of three regressions as 23 announcement-observations of 
foreign-registered companies have been dropped, reducing the total from 865. 
In Table F-1, the first-order variable, ∆DPS becomes less significant at the five percent level of 
error, where in Table 5-14 it had been significant at the one percent level. In turn, the first-order 
                                                 
183 The format of Table F-1 is different from the rest because it is a survival from early in the study, which was not 
redone when I became aware of the EPS variance problem. It was computed using SAS. 
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F-statistic has been upgraded in significance from the five percent level to the one percent level. 
More interestingly, only three of the interaction effects continue to be significant. These are the 
good-news (DI-EI), bad-news (DD-ED) and mixed-message combination DNC-EI, which are all 
significant at the one percent level of a Type 1 error. The interaction F-statistic remains 
significant at the one percent level as before. This brings the New Zealand results more closely 
in line with Easton’s (1991) Australian results in terms of interaction effects — albeit the New 
Zealand results being uniformly more strongly significant than the Australian ones. In terms of 
first-order effects, however, the results for the two neighbouring countries diverge. Neither of 
Easton’s first-order variables achieved significance; and their associated F-statistic was 
insignificant also. However, with the exception of the lapse into insignificance of the DI-ED 
interaction, the result reported in this appendix with the dropping of 23 foreign data-points is 
substantially unchanged from that reported in Table 5-14. 
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Appendix G  Time of Year Analyses 
This appendix examines differences between mid-year and end-of-year announcements.  
In the method and data chapter it was established that there were no significant differences in the 
variables ∆DPS and ∆EPS arising from announcement timing — although there was a strong 
difference in the nature of EPS before and after May 13th 1996. However, the lack of a 
substantive mid-year versus year-end difference in variables does not rule out the possibility that 
investors build a timing aspect into their perceptions of the joint dividend-and-earnings signal. In 
this appendix, we look for differences in event window CARs (CAR3day) between mid-year and 
year-end announcements. 
However, in the current study, the need to preserve an announcement-free interval of 110 days in 
advance of each usable announcement event forced the removal of first quarter and third quarter 
disclosures from the data set. Therefore it is beyond the study’s scope to go past mid-year and 
year-end data to observe any effect on CAR3day attributable to quarterly dividend and earnings 
announcements. 
A sequence of Kruskal-Wallis tests was employed to determine if mid-year and year-end 
abnormal returns were distinguishable from each other, the results of which are reported in Table 
G-1. Panel A contains records of the following procedures: first, the event window CARs 
(CAR3day) associated with mid-year and year-end announcements are compared as 
unpartitioned blocks titled ‘Full Sample’. Second, the sample is partitioned into three subsamples 
each containing one kind of dividend change (ignoring earnings change). Third, the sample is re-
partitioned so that the two subsamples of earnings changes (ignoring dividend change) can be 
observed. And fourth, at the bottom of Panel A are the six subsamples relating to the dividend-
change and earnings-change combinations. 
It is noteworthy in both panels of Table G-1, that the full sample, undifferentiated by 
combination of earnings-change and dividend-change, has a high Kruskal-Wallis chi-square 
statistic which is strongly significant. 
Table G-1: Differences in Mid-year and Year-end Observations of CAR3Day. 
ANOVA KRUSKAL-WALLIS  DF 
Among 
DF 
Within 
F-Stat Pr > F DF χ2 -Stat Pr > χ2 
 
Full Sample** 1 865 15.2210 0.0001 1 23.2415 < 0.0001 
 
Dividend Increases** 1 306 3.4937 0.0626 1 8.0124 0.0046 
Dividend Decreases** 1 218 2.3548 2.3548 1 3.1750 0.0748 
Unchanged Dividend** 1 335 14.2763 0.0002 1 13.0070 0.0003 
 
Earnings Increases* 1 420 2.2175 0.1372 1 44.9552 0.0260 
Earnings Decreases** 1 441 16.7849 < 0.0001 1 21.0883 < 0.0001 
        
Only DI-EI * 1 242 2.1126 0.1474 1 5.3785 0.0204 
Only DD-ED 1 180 2.9368 0.0883 1 3.3525 0.0671 
Only DD-EI 1 36 0.4867 0.4899 1 0.0116 0.9142 
Only DI-ED 1 62 3.7832 0.0563 1 3.6955 0.0546 
Only DNC-EI 1 138 0.6584 0.4185 1 0.5297 0.4667 
Only DNC-ED* 1 195 18.8311 < 0.0001 1 15.9950 < 0.0001 
 
* indicates, with respect to the Kruskal-Wallis Test, less than a 5% probability of a Type 1 error. 
** indicates, with respect to the Kruskal-Wallis Test, less than a 1% probability of a Type 1 error. 
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In Panel A, this distinction (χ2 = 23.24, p < 0.0001) can be explained with reference to the 
pattern of results seated further down the same panel. The two results of interest are those for DI-
EI announcements and DNC-ED announcements. Investors quite evidently reacted differently in 
their trading response to mid-year announcements of these two types than to year-end 
announcements of the same types. The DNC-ED distinction (χ2 = 16.00, p < 0.0001) is more 
pronounced than the DI-EI subsample (χ2 = 5.38, p = 0.0204). 
The source of the DNC-ED distinction appears to have its origin in investor reactions to a 
published drop in earnings. This can be seen, yet elsewhere in Table G-1, in the behaviour of the 
mean CAR3day value when the sample is differentiated by earnings-change category only. In 
Table G-2, the mean of CAR3day observations for the 200 mid-year ‘Earnings Decrease’ 
announcements was negative 2.93 percent while the 243 year-end ‘ED’ announcements had a 
mean of merely one tenth of that magnitude at negative 0.20 percent. This, in turn is reflected in 
the result of the procedures investigating mid-year and year-end DNC-ED announcements. The 
mean for the 100 DNC-ED mid-year CAR3day observations was negative 2.65 percent in 
contrast with the 97 year-end observations’ mean of negative 0.55 percent. In other words, the 
mid-year reaction to an announced earnings decrease was much more dramatic than its end-of-
year equivalent. 
By contrast, the statistical insignificance of any difference between CAR3day observations 
associated with mid-year and year-end DNC-EI announcements in Table G-1 would seem to 
indicate that the DNC component of DNC-EI and DNC-ED announcements is of relatively little 
interest to investors timing-wise. The fact that the DNC (ignoring earnings-changes) subsample 
produced a strongly significant distinction (χ2 = 13.01, p = 0.0003) may reasonably be dismissed 
as having resulted from the confounding effect of the ED influence buried in the sample and not 
cancelled out by the presence of EI observations. 
With respect to the significance of mid-year and year-end differences in DI-EI CAR3day 
observations, in Table G-1, a similar audit trail may be followed with respect to means 
information in Table G-2. 
Table G-2: Mid-year and Year-end Mean CARs by Announcement Category. 
 Mid-year Year-end 
CAR3day Observation Count 
Mean Observation 
Count 
Mean 
 Full Sample 397 -0.0115 468 0.0064 
 
All Dividend Increases 130 0.0109 178 0.0245 
Dividend Decreases 91 -0.0347 129 -0.0169 
Unchanged Dividends 161 0.0050 176 -0.0161 
 
All Earnings Increases 197 0.0065 225 0.0155 
Earnings Decreases 200 -0.0293 243 -0.0020 
 
Only DI-EI  108 0.0140 136 0.0266 
Only DD-ED 78 -0.0400 104 -0.0171 
Only DD-EI 13 -0.0028 25 -0.0161 
Only DI-ED 22 -0.0043 42 0.0178 
Only DNC-EI 64 0.0042 76 -0.0026 
Only DNC-ED 100 -0.0265 97 0.0055 
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In Table G-2, the means of observations produced by the subsample of all DI announcements 
(ignoring earnings changes) were 1.09 percent for the 130 mid-year announcements and 2.45 
percent (more than twice as much) for the 178 year-end observations. When the focus is 
narrowed from all DI announcements to DI-EI observations only, this distinction is heightened. 
The 108 mid-year DI-EI observations yielded a mean CAR3day value of 1.40 percent in contrast 
with 2.66 percent for the 136 DI-EI year-end observations. In other words, investors pay more 
attention to a rise in announced dividends at the end of the company year than they do at the 
mid-way mark. 
On the other hand, the timing in the year of dividend decreases in general is not of strong interest 
to investors. In Table G-1, mid-year and year-end dividend decreases (ignoring all earnings 
information) are insignificantly different from each other at the five percent error benchmark 
level (χ2 = 3.18, p = 0.0748). That is not to say that investors do not worry about dividend 
decreases — but that their reactions at the mid-year point are indistinguishable from their 
reactions at the end of the company year. 
With respect to running a restricted least squares regression employing the first-order variables, a 
new dummy variable modelling mid-year announcement status was created, and the five dummy 
variables modelling direction of change were temporarily dropped. This meant that the intercept 
term would model year-end announcements. 
Table G-3: RLS Regressions with Time-of-company-year Dummy. 
Regressand
All Obs. Early
(to 8/5/96)
Late
(from 9/5/96)
All Obs. Early
(to 8/5/96)
Late
(from 9/5/96)
End of Year (INTERCEPT) 0.0054 -0.0023 0.0110 0.0039 0.0013 0.0056
(0.0766) (0.5996) (0.0061) (0.0992) (0.6902) (0.1086)
∆EPS 0.0011 0.0083 0.0001 0.0006 0.0036 0.0003
(0.1983) (0.0003) (0.8742) (0.3527) (0.0257) (0.7213)
∆DPS 0.0235 0.0339 0.0158 0.0180 0.0255 0.0127
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0008)
Mid Year -0.0177 -0.0137 -0.0206 -0.0127 -0.0107 -0.0145
(0.0001) (0.0331) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0195) (0.0065)
N 865 441 424 865 441 424
Adj R2UNRESTRICTED 0.0708 0.1244 0.0537 0.0641 0.1088 0.0411
Adj R2EQUATION (ii) 0.0550 0.1172 0.0301 0.0508 0.0996 0.0263
Adj R2EQUATION (iii) 0.0165 0.0080 0.0250 0.0139 0.0098 0.0157
FUNRESTRRICTED 22.9460 21.8290 9.0012 20.7140 18.8990 7.0384
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
FEQUATION (ii) 26.1390 30.2120 7.5538 24.1370 25.3370 6.7141
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0013)
FEQUATION (iii) 15.4850 4.5273 11.8240 13.1470 5.3405 7.7427
(0.0001) (0.0339) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0213) (0.0056)
FFIRST ORDER 26.2268 30.1748 7.4006 24.1635 25.3837 6.5963
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0015)
FINTERACTION 15.6825 4.5618 11.5236 13.1974 5.5201 7.4896
(0.0001) (0.0332) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0192) (0.0065)
Coefficients of Unrestricted Regression (p-Values)
CAR3Day ARt0
Observations, Adj R2 Statistics, F-Statistics, (p-Values)
 
The null hypothesis tested here is: 
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H0A: The CAR generated during the three-day event window will be associated in a 
RLS regression with a coefficient for interaction variable modeling mid-year 
announcements which is indistinguishable from zero at the five percent level of 
error and/or is not corroborated by an interaction F-statistic significantly different 
from zero at the five percent level of error 
The result of this regression procedure is in Table G-3, where H0A is soundly rejected in all six 
reported procedures. 
In Table G-3, EPS∆  is significant in the first half of the decade, but not in the second half; but 
DPS∆  is strongly significant in all six procedures and validated (again in all six) by strongly 
significant first-order F-statistics. The interaction F-statistics of five of the six procedures 
reported in Table G-3 are also strongly significant, with the exception (early subsample with 
ARt0 as regressand) still significant at the five percent level of error. This interaction F-statistic 
corroborates the significance of the mid-year dummy in all six procedures. The end-of-year 
effect (modelled by the intercept) is significant only with respect to the late subsample when 
CAR3day is the regressand. Hence hypothesis H0B which is identical to H0A (except for referring 
to year-end rather than mid-year announcements) can only be rejected on observations prior to 
May 13th 1996. 
Unfortunately, a similar RLS regression employing both dividend-and-earnings interaction 
dummies and an extra time-of-year dummy did not run properly, hence it was necessary to resort 
to a less direct method for determining if the direction-of-dividend–and-earnings change 
categories behaved differently at mid-year from the end of the year. This necessitates a much 
looser hypothesis test: 
 
H0C: The earnings-and-dividend interaction effects in an RLS procedure on mid-year 
announcements are indistinguishable from interaction effects in RLS procedures 
on end-of-year announcements with respect to the level of significance attained 
by their coefficients and the level of significance of their interaction F-statistics. 
Table G-4 contains the results of the first RLS procedure for the mid-year and year-end 
subsamples. The first thing to note is that the first-order variable, DPS∆  is significant at both 
times of the company year and in all subsamples except the year-end late subsample in column 
six. Its coefficient in the mid-year unrestricted regression for the early subsample (3.06 percent, 
p < 0.0002) is over twice the magnitude of the early subsample’s year-end coefficient (1.35 
percent, p = 0.0118). The other first-order variable, EPS∆  on the other hand, remains 
insignificant at both times of the company year except for the early subsample’s year-end 
coefficient. However, the first-order F-statistic is strongly significant in all three mid-year cases 
and in two of the three year-end cases — the exception being the year-end late subsample, where 
it is insignificant. 
The second noteworthy result in Table G-4 is that all three data sets furnish significant earnings 
interactions effects in the mid-year and not at the end of the year. In the early and late 
subsamples the rising earnings effect is significant at the five percent level, but the falling 
earnings effect is significant at the one percent level in all three cases. Further, all three mid-year 
data sets furnish significant interaction F-statistics while the year-end cases do not. In addition, 
the absolute value of each coefficient at the mid-year is over three times the size of its equivalent 
at the end of the year. For instance, the early subsample rising earnings coefficient is 2.37 
percent while its year-end equivalent is 0.87 percent. 
The third noteworthy item is that the R2 of the unrestricted regression with respect to the early 
subsample has climbed from 0.1457 to 0.1665. This indicates that the dummy variable 
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representing direction of earnings change this unrestricted regression has improved the 
explanatory power in the early subsample quite markedly. 
 
Table G-4: RLS Regressions with Earnings Dummies. 
Regressand
All Obs. Early
(to 8/5/96)
Late
(from 9/5/96)
All Obs. Early
(to 8/5/96)
Late
(from 9/5/96)
Falling earnings (INTERCEPT) -0.0244 -0.0276 -0.0191 0.0023 -0.0068 0.0086
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0007) (0.6290) (0.3671) (0.1496)
∆EPS 0.0000 0.0051 -0.0002 0.0038 0.0078 -0.0028
(0.9749) (0.1263) (0.7879) (0.1685) (0.0229) (0.5754)
∆DPS 0.0281 0.0306 0.0235 0.0135 0.0288 0.0133
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0026) (0.0118) (0.0031) (0.0671)
Rising earnings 0.0244 0.0237 0.0200 0.0070 0.0087 0.0062
(0.0001) (0.0134) (0.0171) (0.3342) (0.4294) (0.5268)
N 397 213 184 468 228 240
Adj R2UNRESTRICTED 0.1362 0.1665 0.1005 0.0355 0.0895 0.0098
Adj R2EQUATION (ii) 0.1045 0.1457 0.0766 0.0357 0.0910 0.0123
Adj R2EQUATION (iii) 0.0844 0.0991 0.0638 0.0125 0.0326 0.0013
FUNRESTRRICTED 21.8140 15.1120 7.8117 6.7353 8.4342 1.7917
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.1494)
FEQUATION (ii) 24.1140 19.0820 8.5931 9.6369 12.3580 2.4929
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0848)
FEQUATION (iii) 37.4810 24.3220 13.4690 6.8931 8.6476 1.3076
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0089) (0.0036) (0.2540)
FFIRST ORDER 12.8488 9.5240 4.7078 6.5701 8.0532 2.0201
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0102) (0.0015) (0.0004) (0.1349)
FINTERACTION 15.4433 6.2225 5.7939 0.9343 0.6107 0.3889
(0.0001) (0.0134) (0.0171) (0.3342) (0.4354) (0.5335)
Coefficients of Unrestricted Regression (p-Values)
CAR3Day Mid Year CAR3Day End of Year
Observations, Adj R2 Statistics, F-Statistics, (p-Values)
 
 
While not as large, there are similar rises in the other two mid-year samples. However, this is not 
the case with respect to the year-end output. In the full sample and in both early and late 
subsamples, the unrestricted equation consistently records a drop in adjusted R2 relative to the 
restricted equation labelled Equation (ii). This suggests the earnings announcement direction 
components at the year-end are relatively unimportant. On this basis, the null hypothesis, H0C is 
rejected. 
The next mid-year and year-end RLS regression procedure employs two dummies to proxy rises 
and zero change in the dividend component of announcements (ignoring direction of change in 
the earnings component). In this instance, the intercept term models a fall in the value of the 
dividend component. The results are presented in Table G-5. 
In Table G-5, the clear picture apparent in the last table disappears and it is no longer possible to 
reject H0C. In the bottom row there is only one significant interaction F-statistic — and this is for 
the full sample of year-end announcement data. Neither the early nor the late subsamples of 
either time of the year register any dividend interaction effect that can be relied upon. In the case 
of the year-end full sample, the two dividend interaction effects which achieve significance are 
the rising dividend and no change in dividend. However, the mid-year late subsample and mid-
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year full sample did register a significant falling dividend effect unsupported by the necessary 
interaction F-statistic. 
With respect to the first-order variables, the early subsample furnishes significant first-order F-
statistics at both mid-year and year-end. But while in the mid-year, both first-order variables are 
significant, only EPS∆  is significant at the end of the year. The mid-year full sample also 
achieve a significant first-order F-statistic on the basis of a significant DPS∆  in the related 
unrestricted regression. 
 
Table G-5: RLS Regressions with Dividend Dummies. 
Regressand
All Obs. Early
(to 8/5/96)
Late
(from 9/5/96)
All Obs. Early
(to 8/5/96)
Late
(from 9/5/96)
Falling dividends (INTERCEPT) -0.0186 -0.0146 -0.0219 -0.0138 -0.0208 -0.0039
(0.0114) (0.2068) (0.0156) (0.0511) (0.0925) (0.6587)
∆EPS 0.0004 0.0077 0.0000 0.0048 0.0079 -0.0002
(0.6102) (0.0170) (0.9818) (0.0737) (0.0168) (0.9658)
∆DPS 0.0283 0.0337 0.0186 0.0016 0.0129 0.0037
(0.0001) (0.0019) (0.0587) (0.8075) (0.3300) (0.6702)
Rising dividends 0.0156 0.0051 0.0236 0.0354 0.0339 0.0288
(0.1556) (0.7612) (0.0915) (0.0008) (0.0634) (0.0400)
DNC 0.0024 -0.0067 0.0122 0.0190 0.0151 0.0166
(0.7751) (0.6115) (0.2583) (0.0354) (0.3176) (0.1464)
N 397 213 184 468 228 240
Adj R2UNRESTRICTED 0.1073 0.1433 0.0811 0.0547 0.0980 0.0219
Adj R2EQUATION (ii) 0.1045 0.1457 0.0766 0.0357 0.0910 0.0123
Adj R2EQUATION (iii) 0.0755 0.0763 0.0724 0.0501 0.0773 0.0290
FUNRESTRRICTED 12.893 9.8658 5.0374 7.7525 7.1631 2.3409
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0007) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0558)
FEQUATION (ii) 24.1140 19.0820 8.5931 9.6369 12.3580 2.4929
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0848)
FEQUATION (iii) 17.1590 9.7611 8.1458 13.3060 10.5080 4.5753
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0112)
FFIRST ORDER 8.0241 9.2081 1.8535 2.1398 3.5831 0.1422
(0.0004) (0.0001) (0.1597) (0.1188) (0.0294) (0.8675)
FINTERACTION 1.5988 0.7035 1.4404 5.6790 1.8686 2.1656
(0.2034) (0.4960) (0.2396) (0.0037) (0.1567) (0.1170)
Coefficients of Unrestricted Regression (p-Values)
CAR3Day Mid Year CAR3Day End of Year
Observations, Adj R2 Statistics, F-Statistics, (p-Values)
 
 
The full five-dummy procedure modelling the directions of combined dividend and earnings 
change is presented in Table G-6. Items which have behaved much the same way as they did in 
the full sample (in the Chapter 5) will be discussed first. Then I will move on to the instances of 
divergent behaviour. I will start by looking at the table’s bottom two rows. 
In Chapter 5, the late subsample furnished insignificant first-order F-statistic and an insignificant 
interaction F-statistic when announcement observations were left unsorted by time of the year. In 
Table G-6, this same behaviour is repeated. This particular data set tells us nothing at all about 
investors reacting to a dividend signal (or any signal at all) in either the mid-year announcement 
or the year-end announcement. 
300 
Table G-6: RLS Regression with Full Dividend-and-Earnings Interaction Dummies. 
Regressand
All Obs. Early
(to 8/5/96)
Late
(from 9/5/96)
All Obs. Early
(to 8/5/96)
Late
(from 9/5/96)
DD-ED (INTERCEPT) -0.0241 -0.0259 -0.0224 -0.0129 -0.0254 -0.0007
(0.0017) (0.0385) (0.0179) (0.0983) (0.0679) (0.9433)
∆EPS 0.0000 0.0045 -0.0002 0.0049 0.0075 0.0001
(0.9962) (0.1874) (0.8405) (0.0799) (0.0304) (0.9785)
∆DPS 0.0282 0.0332 0.0191 0.0016 0.0124 0.0039
(0.0001) (0.0020) (0.0522) (0.8011) (0.3552) (0.6661)
DI_EI 0.0242 0.0212 0.0252 0.0349 0.0392 0.0262
(0.0346) (0.2463) (0.0808) (0.0027) (0.0568) (0.0817)
DD-EI 0.0362 0.0566 0.0047 -0.0042 0.0173 -0.0181
(0.0359) (0.0306) (0.8383) (0.7902) (0.4566) (0.4127)
DI-ED 0.0085 0.0066 0.0172 0.0312 0.0380 0.0194
(0.5856) (0.7620) (0.4496) (0.0316) (0.0883) (0.3557)
DNC-EI 0.0218 0.0168 0.0261 0.0151 0.0203 0.0126
(0.0314) (0.2881) (0.0465) (0.2035) (0.2730) (0.4426)
DNC-ED -0.0026 -0.0045 0.0023 0.0205 0.0190 0.0145
(0.7843) (0.7609) (0.8531) (0.0537) (0.3091) (0.2603)
N 397 213 184 468 228 240
Adj R2UNRESTRICTED 0.1304 0.1620 0.0867 0.0486 0.0880 0.0119
Adj R2EQUATION (ii) 0.1045 0.1457 0.0766 0.0357 0.0910 0.0123
Adj R2EQUATION (iii) 0.1004 0.1181 0.0772 0.0442 0.0724 0.0187
FUNRESTRRICTED 9.4854 6.8537 3.4810 4.4108 4.1286 1.4107
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0016) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.2018)
FEQUATION (ii) 24.1140 19.0820 8.5931 9.6369 12.3580 2.4929
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0848)
FEQUATION (iii) 9.8369 6.6803 4.0639 5.3235 4.5427 1.9120
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0016) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0931)
FFIRST ORDER 7.7469 6.4139 1.9191 2.0657 2.8960 0.1949
(0.0005) (0.0020) (0.1498) (0.1279) (0.0574) (0.8231)
FINTERACTION 3.3442 1.8143 1.3986 2.2693 0.8497 0.9787
(0.0057) (0.1114) (0.2270) (0.0467) (0.5159) (0.4315)
Coefficients of Unrestricted Regression (p-Values)
CAR3Day Mid Year CAR3Day End of Year
Observations, Adj R2 Statistics, F-Statistics, (p-Values)
 
 
The early subsample hardly furnishes anything more meaningful. At the end of the year, both 
first-order and interaction F-statistics are quite insignificant; and with respect to mid-year 
announcements, only the first-order F-statistic is significant. This gives support to unit change in 
DPS∆  being associated with a 3.32 percent increase in CAR3day at a one percent level of error. 
However, the DD-ED and DI-EI interaction effects do register as significant in the unrestricted 
regression — albeit unsupported by an insignficant interaction F-statistic. 
The full sample, however, furnishes strongly significant interaction first-order and interaction F-
statistics for the mid-year and a weaker, but still acceptable interaction F-statistic for the end of 
the year. With respect to the year-end, this significance is based upon positive DI-EI and DI-ED 
coefficients being significant in the unrestricted equation (in the fourth column of the table).  The 
positive DI-Ed coefficient implies that the influence of the dividend signal is stronger than that 
of the earnings signal, here. 
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With respect to the mid-year full sample result in the first column, DD-ED, DI-EI and two 
mixed-news effects (DD-EI and DNC-EI) feature as significant. This mid-year result provides a 
very strong corroboration of Kane, Lee and Marcus (1984), Easton (1991) and Lonie, Abeyratna, 
Power and Sinclair (1996).  However we learn more about the influence of an earnings signal 
here than we do about the influence of a dividend signal.  This is because the DD-EI and DNC-
EI coefficients are both positive, which implies that the movement in earnings has swamped out 
the movement in dividend.  
The lesson to be drawn from Table G-6 is that the mid-year announcement tells us more about 
earnings signals and very little about the dividend signal.  However, the effect of a dividend 
signal is much more apparent in the end-of-year-end announcement. 
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Appendix H Test Period outside the Event Window 
The five-dummy restricted least squares procedure of Section 5.4 and formulated in RLS 
Equation Set Three is now applied to the rest of the CARs in the test period excluding CAR3day. 
The reason for such an exploration is that the failure to find significant effects outside the event 
window will strengthen the case for investor reaction to a signal received from the joint dividend 
and earnings announcement released on day t0; while the advent of significant results outside the 
window will weaken the case — unless, that is, a reasonable explanation can be found for them. 
One such explanation of significant results generated on the nine-days of ARs before the event 
window would be that there is leakage of information to at least some investors prior to the 
release of information to the Stock Exchange. If significant results are generated on the nine days 
of ARs left in the test period after the event window, it might be that the market is not efficient 
— although this may be indicative of thin trading in which overall demand cannot be matched 
with overall supply or vice versa. 
The nine-day CAR results from t-10 to t-2 on the full sample are reported in Table H-1. The 
dependent variable in the restricted least squares procedure is Carprev9day. In this instance, 
neither of the first-order variables (∆EPS and ∆DPS), nor the first-order F-statistic are significant 
on the full sample or late subsample, but EPS∆  is significant at the five percent level on the 
early subsample. However, the first-order F-statistic remains insignificant for all three sets of 
observations. The full sample furnishes an interaction F-statistic significant at the five percent 
level of error, which validates three of the interaction coefficients in its unrestricted equation. 
These are a DD-ED (bad-news) effect significant at the five percent level, and the DI-EI (good-
news) and DD-EI (a mixed news dummy) significant at the one percent level of error. The DI-EI 
coefficient lapses into insignificance in the early subsample; and this subsample does not furnish 
a significant interaction F-statistic. The late subsample furnishes no significant coefficients at all. 
From this output we can infer, in terms of the full sample, that there is some evidence of leakage 
of announcement news in advance. This finding was foreshadowed by the detection of several 
signficant DI-EI, DD-ED and DD-EI group ARs some days in advance of the event window 
back in Section 5.2. The finding may be indicative of insider trading activity or, at the very least, 
of some investors receiving at least some of the relevant information prior to the release of 
financial information to the NZX. It is widely perceived in New Zealand newspapers that insider 
trading is an ongoing problem which is usually difficult to detect and almost always nearly 
impossible to prosecute. Nevertheless, there have been a couple of well-publicized prosecutions 
in the past couple of years. However, any evidence of insider trading in the full sample result is 
not supported by evidence from the two subsamples. 
303 
Table H-1: RLS for CARPrev9Day. 
Regressand
All Obs. Early
(to 8/5/96)
Late
(from 9/5/96)
Coefficients of Unrestricted Regression (p-Values)
DD-ED (INTERCEPT) -0.0128 -0.0177 -0.0068
(0.0107) (0.0316) (0.2860)
∆EPS 0.0002 0.0051 -0.0004
(0.7595) (0.0162) (0.6186)
∆DPS -0.0027 -0.0005 -0.0035
(0.5190) (0.9506) (0.4943)
DI-EI 0.0199 0.0234 0.0106
(0.0074) (0.0528) (0.2852)
DD-EI 0.0296 0.0314 0.0250
(0.0052) (0.0378) (0.0965)
DI-ED 0.0125 0.0181 0.0062
(0.1938) (0.1844) (0.6607)
DNC-EI 0.0110 0.0148 0.0036
(0.1191) (0.1653) (0.7189)
DNC-ED 0.0096 0.0147 0.0044
(0.1420) (0.1509) (0.6040)
N 865 441 424
Adj R2UNRESTRICTED 0.0079 0.0315 -0.0076
Adj R2EQUATION (ii) -0.0005 0.0289 -0.0039
Adj R2EQUATION (iii) 0.0097 0.0229 -0.0050
FUNRESTRRICTED 1.9814 3.0435 0.5439
(0.0549) (0.0039) (0.8011)
FEQUATION (ii) 0.7943 7.5377 0.1679
(0.4523) (0.0006) (0.8455)
FEQUATION (iii) 2.6881 3.0647 0.5826
(0.0202) (0.0099) (0.7133)
FFIRST ORDER 0.2306 2.9206 0.4489
(0.7941) (0.0550) (0.6386)
FINTERACTION 2.4506 1.2376 0.6951
(0.0323) (0.2904) (0.6274)
Observations, Adj R2 Statistics, F-Statistics, (p-Values)
CARPrev9Day
 
 
I will now turn to the equivalent least squares procedure covering the nine days after the event 
window which is tabulated in Table H-2, where the dependent variable is Carnext9day. Here 
evidence of any association between the nine-day CAR and the announcement information is 
even sparser. 
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Table H-2: RLS for CARNext9Day. 
Regressand
All Obs. Early
(to 8/5/96)
Late
(from 9/5/96)
Coefficients of Unrestricted Regression (p-Values)
DD-ED (INTERCEPT) -0.0154 -0.0271 -0.0040
(0.0159) (0.0148) (0.5951)
∆EPS -0.0001 0.0016 -0.0001
(0.9315) (0.5702) (0.9060)
∆DPS -0.0068 0.0065 -0.0131
(0.2062) (0.5185) (0.0300)
DI-EI 0.0229 0.0260 0.0157
(0.0158) (0.1111) (0.1793)
DD-EI 0.0039 0.0058 0.0067
(0.7718) (0.7761) (0.7046)
DI-ED 0.0230 0.0349 0.0094
(0.0607) (0.0583) (0.5763)
DNC-EI 0.0089 0.0239 -0.0081
(0.3271) (0.0984) (0.4900)
DNC-ED 0.0077 0.0080 0.0062
(0.3537) (0.5630) (0.5408)
N 865 441 424
Adj R2UNRESTRICTED 0.0007 0.0192 0.0022
Adj R2EQUATION (ii) -0.0020 0.0180 0.0036
Adj R2EQUATION (iii) 0.0011 0.0219 -0.0051
FUNRESTRRICTED 1.0889 2.2334 1.1355
(0.3682) (0.0307) (0.3396)
FEQUATION (ii) 0.1336 5.0287 1.7740
(0.8750) (0.0069) (0.1709)
FEQUATION (iii) 1.1842 2.9734 0.5670
(0.3150) (0.0119) (0.7253)
FFIRST ORDER 0.8462 0.4039 2.5435
(0.4294) (0.6679) (0.0798)
FINTERACTION 1.4704 1.1120 0.8809
(0.1970) (0.3532) (0.4937)
Observations, Adj R2 Statistics, F-Statistics, (p-Values)
CARNext9Day
 
While the full sample furnishes significant DD-ED and DI-EI interaction effects in the 
unrestricted regression, the effects are not corroborated by any significant interaction F-statistic. 
In fact neither of the subsamples furnish interaction F-statistics of any note; and all three sets of 
observations fail to furnish a significant first-order F-statistic. It is clear that there is very little 
carry-over from the event period. 
The procedure, with preceding nine-day CAR (Carprev9day) as its dependent variable, yielded 
strongly significant positive DI-EI, DD-EI and negative DD-ED interaction coefficients while 
the procedure processing nine-day CARs following after the event window (Carnext9day) 
produced significant results. These findings suggest that there is leakage in advance of 
announcements, but the market adjusts quickly once an announcement has been issued. 
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Appendix I Violations of the Normality Assumption 
In Chapters 5 and 6, the lack of normality was briefly discussed. In this appendix, further 
information is provided with respect to employment of the Market Model and RLS regression on 
the study’s 1990s data sets. 
Appendix I.1 Further Information about Observed Returns 
The kurtosis of the 100 log returns from each and every estimation dataset is shown in Figure I-1 
with outliers excluded. The horizontal axis contains the kurtosis value while the count of 
distributions returning each value can be read from the vertical axis. While there is a huge range 
of kurtosis values across the 948 distributions, the mode value, showing as 4 on the given scale, 
is actually 3.88. The mean kurtosis however, was 9.25. A leptokurtic probability density function 
has a higher, narrower peak at the mean than does a normal distribution; and its tails are 
longer.184 That distributions of stock returns tend to have a pronounced degree of leptokurtosis 
was first recorded by Mandelbrot (1963). Fama (1965 and 1976) showed that distributions of 
daily stock returns tended to have fatter tails than did normal distributions. Both were stating that 
there was a greater preponderance of outliers in return datasets than allowable in a normal 
distribution. Roll (1988) ascribed the presence of these outliers as investor reactions to news 
about or released by firms from time to time on an ongoing basis. It should be remembered that 
dividend and earnings announcements are not the only news events that have the potential to 
shift share prices. 
 
Figure I-1: Kurtosis Histogram of 948 Return Distributions. 
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184 Gujarati (1995), pp. 769 – 770. Leptokurtosis is present when the value returned by a test for kurtosis is greater 
than 3. At 3, a distribution is mesokurtic; and below 3, a diagnosis of platykurtosis is furnished. A platykurtic 
probability density function has a broader, flatter peak than does a normal distribution; and its tails are shorter and 
(Gujarati says) fatter. By contrast he calls the tails of a leptokurtic distribution long and lean, while Fama (1965) and 
Dillen and Stolz (1999) emphasise the fatness of leptokurtic tails. One suspects that the word ‘fat’ is being used in 
two different ways. 
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Figure I-2: Skewness Histogram of 948 Return Distributions. 
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With respect to skewness in Figure I-2, about half of the 948 distributions appear to exhibit zero 
skewness, which is a necessary feature of a normal distribution. However in Table I-2 the mean 
turns out to be 0.1776. 
With respect to all 948 estimation datasets, each containing 100 daily returns, the 94,800 returns 
have been recorded in a normal probability plot in Figure I-3. For every 100-return dataset in the 
figure, a solid straight line is drawn which connects the 25th and 75th percentiles and which is 
extended out as a dashed line to the first and last percentiles. If the datasets followed normal 
distributions, all of the observations (registering as “+”) would sit very close to, or on top of their 
associated straight lines. If the + signs diverge into some other pattern, then they are not 
normally distributed.185 Here they form a pronounced S-curve. 
 
Figure I-3: Normal Probability Plot of Daily Log Returns (948 x 100 Day Estimation Data Sets). 
 
In Figure I-3 the straight lines are almost vertical. This strongly indicates that half of the 
datapoints have values either very close to, or exactly zero. This is a further confirmation of the 
presence of leptokurtosis. This proximity to zero is shown even more clearly when the horizontal 
axis is trimmed to exclude extreme outliers in Figure I-4. 
                                                 
185 MATLAB Statistics Toolbox with respect to Normal Probability Plots and the command h = normplot(X). 
307 
Figure I-4: Normal Probability Plot of Daily Log Returns with Horizontal Axis truncated. 
 
The incidence of distributions of daily log returns that were not normal is shown in percentage 
form in Table I-1. Two normality tests were used, the first of which was the Jarque-Bera test. 
This is an asymptotic, or large sample test.186 The second test, the Lilliefors test, is a tool for 
measuring a sample against the shape of a normal distribution without requiring a mean of zero. 
While the Jarque-Bera test only works well on large samples, the Lilliefors test performs well on 
small ones.187 Employing both tests covered the field. Both were performed with a 5% Type I 
error level specified. This is the standard level employed throughout the chapter. 
 
Table I-1: Daily Log Return Normality Tests (Full Sample). 
Percentage (and Count) Not Normal Total No. of 
Data Sets Jarque-BeraTest LillieforsTest 
948 82% (777) 97% (924) 
 
It is clear in Table I-1 that the incidence of data sets that are judged to be not normally 
distributed by these tests is greater than 80% in every instance. The Jarque-Bera test (based on 
measures of skewness and kurtosis) furnishes a more conservative result than the Lilliefors test 
for rejecting normality. In Table I-1 and the next few tables, the sheer number of estimation sets 
has made reporting of individual procedures impractical — hence the tabulation of percentage 
summaries. 
The means of the kurtosis and skewness figures for various dividend and earnings 
announcement-related configurations of the dataset are provided in Table I-2. It is clear that the 
degrees of skewness and kurtosis in the returns in the estimation datasets is quite independent of 
the types of announcement that follow in the event window. 
                                                 
186 Gujurati (1995), p. 143. The Jarque-Bera test, published by Jarque and Bera (1987) as a paper in volume 55 of 
the International Statistical Review, operates on a null hyposthesis that the residuals of an OLS regression are 
normally distributed. The test itself is a joint test of kurtosis and skewness and the JB statistic (STAT in the current 
study) follows the chi-square distribution with two degrees of freedom. 
187 This point is made in the MATLAB help manual description of the Jarque-Bera test. 
308 
Table I-2: Mean Kurtosis and Skewness of Returns (Full Sample). 
DPS-EPS Total Mean Kurtosis Mean Skewness 
DI-EI 311 9.3667 0.2642 
DD-ED 182 9.9224 0.0121 
DD-EI 38 8.0643 0.6116 
DI-ED 80 9.3296 0.1083 
DNC-EI 140 8.2967 0.2006 
DNC-ED 197 9.3183 0.1220 
TOTAL 948 9.2500 0.1776 
     
When subjected to a Jarque-Bera test, the sample of mean returns from the 948 underlying 100-
day Market Model estimation datasets in Table I-3 returned a test value of 32.38 measurable 
against a critical value of 5.99. This result was confirmed by commensurate Lilliefors tests. 
Therefore, with reference to the Central Limit Theorem, the cross-sectional convergence of 
means toward a normal distribution, as recorded by Brown and Warner (1985) has not occurred 
in the present study. 
Each normality test furnishes four statistics. The “H” value can take on either 1 (for non-
normality) or 0 (if the distribution is normal). The p-value shows the probability of a Type 1 
error, while the “stat” provides the numerical value estimated on the distribution by each test that 
is measurable against the critical value for a 5% error provided with respect to the test’s degrees 
of freedom. In each instance the calculated statistic surpassed the critical value. 
The skewness and kurtosis results in Panel B pertain to the distribution of the 948 observations 
of log-return means. The skewness in this instance has taken on a small negative value, where 
earlier it averaged a small positive figure, while the kurtosis of the sample has diminished to 3.88 
from 8-10 range apparent in Table I-2. 
 
Table I-3: Distribution of Mean Returns (948 Observations). 
Panel A: Tests for Normality on 948 Mean Returns* 
Test H p-Value STAT Critical Value 
Jarque Bera 1 9.3074e-008 32.3797 5.9915 
Lilliefors 1 NaN188 0.0376 0.0288 
Panel B: Other Characteristics relating to the 948 Mean Returns 
Count 948 
Kurtosis 3.8790 
Skewness -0.1241 
 
*H = 1 indicates non-normal while H = 0 would have indicated a normal distribution 
 p-Value is the probability of a Type I error 
 STAT is the value of the test statistic furnished by each test. 
 Critical Value has a 5% Type I error probability. 
 
                                                 
188 The Lilliefors test p-value registered as “NaN”, which stands for “not a number”, and which indicates that the test 
statistic (3.1799e-205) lies outside the range of MATLAB’s Lillifors table; but this does not invalidate the test — it 
merely emphasises the strength of the rejection of the null hypothesis of normality registered in the H-value. 
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Appendix I.2 Further Characteristics of Residuals from the Market 
Model Estimation Sets 
In histogram form in Figure I-5, the pattern of kurtosis in the 948 Market Model estimation sets, 
again is almost indistinguishable from that shown on log returns in Figure I-1. Likewise, the 
distribution of skewness across the sets of residuals in Figure I-6 is virtually indistinguishable 
from the one on log returns in Figure I-2. 
 
Figure I-5: Histogram of Kurtosis of 948 (100-day) Distributions of Residuals. 
0 3 6 9 121518212427303336394245485154576063666972757881848790
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
Kurtosis
Co
un
t
 
 
Figure I-6: Histogram of Skewness of 948 (100-day) Distributions of Residuals. 
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The residuals also behaved in the same manner as the log returns when subjected to a normal 
probability plot in Figure I-7 in which the horizontal axis has been restricted to ±0.3. 
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Figure I-7: Normal Probability Plot of 948 sets of Residuals. 
 
 
Much the same pattern of results emerged in Table I-4 when normality tests were conducted on 
the residuals to determine if they conformed to the Central Limit Theorem. 
Table I-4: Normality Tests on all Standard Market Model OLS Residuals. 
Panel A: Tests for Normality 
Test H p-Value STAT Critical Value 
Jarque Bera 1 0 3.3300e+003 5.9915 
Lilliefors 1 NaN 0.1205 0.0288 
Panel B: Other Sample Characteristics 
Count 948 
Kurtosis 11.9633 
Skewness -1.0522 
 
*H = 1 indicates non-normal while H = 0 would have indicated a normal distribution 
 p-Value is the probability of a Type I error 
 STAT is the value of the test statistic furnished by each test. 
 Critical Value has a 5% Type I error probability. 
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Appendix J Appendices Concerning Friction Models 
In these appendices the lines of code has been assigned numbers to aid in the explanation. 
Appendix J.1 Comment on Equation (6.5) 
In the first argument of Equation(6.5), concerning the log likelihood of the lower zone returns, 
the final expression is: 
 ( )2jt Lj j MTR Rα β+ − ⋅  (1) 
From Equation (6.1) we know that *jt jt LjR R α= − . Substituting this into the above expression, we 
get: 
 ( )2*jt Lj Lj j MtR Rα α β− + − ⋅  (2) 
Further, from Equation (6.1) we know that *jt j Mt jtR Rβ ε= + . Substituting this into (2) and 
gathering terms, we get: 
 ( )2j Mt j Mt Lj Lj jtR Rβ β α α ε− − + +  (3) 
This leaves us with the squared errors, 2jtε . The same simplification also reduces the final 
expression in the third argument of Equation (6.5) to 2jtε . Further, given in Equation (6.1), that 
*
jt j Mt jtR Rβ ε= + , the estimated value of the daily company return, denoted with a hat is simply 
*ˆ jt j MtR Rβ= . 
 
Appendix J.2 Scilab Code (to_likeFriction3) for determining a 
Negative Log Likelihood 
1. function like = to_likeFriction3(b,y,x); 
2. if isreal(b) & b(4)>0.0001 
3.  pi=4*atan(1); 
4.  alphal=b(1); 
5.  alphau=b(2); 
6.  bta = b(3); 
7.  sigma = b(4); 
8.  like=0; 
9.  for i=1:100 
10.  bx =bta*x(i); 
11.  if y(i)==0 
12.  tbl =normcdf((alphau-bx)/sigma)-normcdf((alphal-bx)/sigma); 
13.  if tbl~=0 
14.  like = like + log(tbl); 
15.  end 
16.  elseif x(i)>0 
17.  like=like+log(1/sqrt(2*pi*sigma^2))-(1/(2*sigma^2))*((y(i)+alphau-bx)^2); 
18.  else 
19.  like=like+log(1/sqrt(2*pi*sigma^2))-(1/(2*sigma^2))*((y(i)+alphal-bx)^2); 
20.  end 
21.  end 
22.  like=-like; 
23.  if ~isreal(like) 
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24.  like=1e20 
25.  end 
26. else 
27.  like = 1e20 
28. end 
29. endfunction 
Notes: 
1. b in Line 1 is a 4x1 vector of parameters while y is the 100x1 vector of *jtR  observations, 
and x is the 100x1 vector of matching MtR  observations. 
2. In Line 2 the condition is imposed that the vector, b must contain real numbers and the 
fourth item (standard deviation) must be above the arbitrarily chosen minimum positive 
value stated — which is small and designed to prevent zero or negative standard 
deviations from entering the procedure and creating a mess downstream. 
3. In line 3, the value of pi is calculated as the 4 times the arctangent of 1. (Scilab does not 
supply this value automatically.) 
4. Lines 4 to 7 assigns positions for the parameters in vector b. In lines 4 and 5, alphal and 
alphau are the lower and upper alpha parameters, while Beta is shortened in line 6 to bta 
as ‘beta’ has another meaning assigned in Scilab. 
5. In line 8, ‘like’ holds the sum of likelihoods for all points in the 100-observation data set 
(for all three regions of the friction model). As a likelihood is calculated iteratively for 
each point (i), ‘like’ is assigned an initial value of zero. (The code calculates a log 
likelihood for every observation in the 100-day estimation period data set and sums them 
up.) 
6. In line 10, bx is simply MtRβ  for the given beta and the observation (i) where i = t. 
7. In lines 11 and 12, the zero region data points are processed in accordance with Equation 
(6.5) once the log instruction in line 14 is taken into account. ‘tbl’ stands for ‘to be 
logged’ and provides an interim result. This is passed to ‘like’ in line 14. Line 13 is 
necessary as the log of a number approaching zero approaches infinity. ‘log’ in Scilab 
denotes the natural log and the ‘~’ is the negation operator. 
8. Lines 16 and 17 operationalize Equation (6.5) instructions for the upper region and adds 
the result to ‘like’. Line 19 does the same for the lower region observations. 
9. Lines 20 and 21 end the loop which caters for the required 100 iterations (one for each 
observation in the estimation period data set) 
10. At line 22, the cumulated total log likelihood from 100 observations is defined as a 
negative log likelihood. 
11. In lines 23 to 25, ‘isreal(like)’ checks whether the output is a real number. Effectively, if 
the computed likelihood turns out to be an imaginary number, it is removed from 
contention by being reassigned the huge positive value, 1e20. 
12. Lines 26 to 28 perform the same re-assignment, if at line 2 the parameter vector b 
contains imaginary numbers. 
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Appendix J.3 Scilab code (normcdf(x)) for determining the 
Cumulative Normal Density Function 
30. function p=normcdf(x) 
31. n=length(x) 
32. [p,q]=cdfnor("PQ",x,zeros(n,1),ones(n,1)) 
33. endfunction 
Notes 
The item, cdfnor is a standard Scilab function which can be manipulated to return the cumulative 
density function. It was presented in a ‘wrapper’ so that it would work in the same way as a 
Matlab function of the same name. When Matlab turned out to be less effective than Scilab for 
computing MLE problems, it was scrapped in favour of Scilab. 
 
Appendix J.4 Scilab Code for determining the Minimum of all 
Negative Log Likelihoods, the Hessian Matrix and 
Standard Errors. 
34. minrng=4; 
35.  
36. nTooSmall=0; 
37. clear tooSmall 
38. opt=zeros(948,4); 
39. se=opt; 
40. fval=zeros(948,1); 
41. for i=1:948 
42.  disp(i); 
43.  eventRow = find(eventDates(i)==IndexDates); 
44.  startRow = eventRow - 110; 
45.  stopRow = eventRow - 11; 
46.  x = NZXAllIndex(startRow:stopRow); 
47.  y = ReturnIndex(startRow:stopRow,eventCos(i)); 
48.  yl = y<0; 
49.  yu = y>0; 
50.  if sum(yl)<minrng | sum(yu)<minrng; 
51.  nTooSmall = nTooSmall + 1; 
52.  tooSmall(nTooSmall)=i; 
53.  continue; 
54.  end; 
55.  [fval(i),popt]=optim(list(NDcost,to_likeFriction3, y,x),[-0.1;0.1;2;0.1]); 
56.  opt(i,:)=popt'; 
57.  h=hessian(to_likeFriction3,popt,y,x); 
58.  s=sqrt(diag(inv(h))); 
59.  if ~isreal(s) 
60.  disp "Warning non real se" 
61.  end 
62.  se(i,:)=s'; 
63. end 
Notes: 
1. In line 34, ‘minrng’ stands for ‘minumum range’. This was set at 4 observations. There 
had to be at least 4 observations in each region for the friction model to work. 
2. In line 36, ‘nTooSmall’ is a count of estimation period datasets in which there were too 
few observations in one of the regions. This function plays a role midway down the 
coding. The variable ‘tooSmall’ in line 37 is a repository for data sets that suffer the too-
few observations problem. Given that each data set has a number, this number is recorded 
and the data set does not go on to the MLE step. 
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3. In lines 38 and 39, ‘opt’ is a 948x4 matrix of zeros, and ‘se’ is a second matrix of the 
same dimensions. 
4. In line 40, ‘fval’ is a vector that will hold the values of the negative log likelihood 
function at the optimal solution. It starts life as a 948x1 vector of zeros. 
5. Lines 41 to 47 marshal estimation period data into vectors x and y. disp(i) puts the 
estimation period data set number on the computer screen to act as a counter by which the 
progress of the overall computation of 948 data set results can be monitored. 
6. In lines 48 to 52, ‘toosmall’ and ‘nTooSmall’ are calculated. Although observations are 
assigned to the upper and lower regions of the friction model by the value of the 
matching x observation (RMt), the criterion for smallness is actually on the number of 
observed company return observations ( *jtR ) of the theoretically correct sign (i.e., 
positive for positive) that end up being assigned to each region. 
7. In line 53, ‘continue’ acts as a gateway. If there are sufficient observations for the 
procedure to function properly, the data on dataset (i) is passed onward. But if it turns out 
to be tagged as ‘tooSmall’ in line 52, ‘continue’ returns to the procedure to the start of the 
loop to pick up the next (i). 
8. In line 55 is the Scilab command for evaluating the negative maximum likelihood 
function called up from the procedure in Appendix J.1. The function. ‘optim(.)’ creates 
values to be stored in ‘fval’ and ‘popt’ — which is the vector of optimised parameters. 
Within this function is the nested function, ‘NDcost’ which returns the gradient 
calculated from finite differences. This is the tool for the numerical estimation of the 
global minimum required in the (negative) MLE process. In the words of the Scilab 
online help library, “This function can be used as an external for optim to minimize 
problem where gradient is too complicated to be programmed. Only the function fun 
which computes the criterion is required. This function should be used as follows: 
[f,xopt,gopt]=optim(list(NDcost,fun,p1,...pn),x0,...).” The numbers in the square brackets 
are the starting values for the parameters in the optimisation process. On the left-hand 
side of the function, ‘popt’ is a vector of the best parameters estimated (‘xopt’ in the 
help-file). 
9. In line 56, ‘opt(i,:) is a matrix of parameters in which each row contains the optimised 
parameter of a given estimation period data set (i) associated with a particular company 
announcement event, while the columns contain the parameters by type ( ), , ,L Uα α β σ . 
In line 56, ‘popt’ is loaded into ‘opt’. 
10. In line 57, the matrix of second derivatives (hessian matrix) is calculated. Standard errors 
are calculated by finding the square root of the diagonal of the inverse of the hessian 
matrix in line 58. The MLE procedure can only be deemed to be successful if the 
standard errors are real numbers. The presence of an imaginary number (the square root 
of a negative number) is indicative of a failure to optimise a parameter. The last couple of 
lines of code collect information on this for diagnostic purposes. 
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Appendix J.5 RLS Results based on Unconditional Returns 
generated by the Friction Model on the 100-day 
Estimation Period 
With respect to the RLS regression results employing ARs derived from unconditional expected 
returns in Table J-1, two quite different stories are told, depending on whether the event window 
is construed to be a three-day, or a one-day phenomenon. If we interpret the it as a one-day 
occurrence, both first-order variables, DPS∆  and EPS∆  in the unrestricted equation register a 
significant association with ARt0 at or near the one percent level of a Type 1 error on the full 
data set of 923 company/event observations and on the 712 instances where companies traded on 
fewer than the full 100 days of the expected return estimation period. The 211 fully-traded firms, 
however, furnished a connection between DPS∆  and the dependent variable significant at just 
under the five percent level of error, while EPS∆  dropped into insignificance. These 
associations are confirmed by strongly significant first-order F-statistics on the full sample and 
on the more thinly-traded subsample — but no significant association is confirmed for the fully-
traded subsample. In addition, the good-news (DI-EI) dummy variable furnishes an association 
with ARt0 significant at the five percent level in the unrestricted equation of the full sample and 
the thinner subsample; but the corresponding interaction F-statistics remain insignificant. The 
message with respect to the one-day window is that both the dividend announcement and 
earnings announcement component possibly influence the price of shares traded on the day, but 
the two cannot easily be distinguished from each other. (Significant interaction variable effects 
would be necessary to achieve that!) An ancillary message is that the firms which trade every 
day tend to furnish no evidence of an information effect relating to the disclosure in the one-day 
event window. 
The ancillary message is also clearly apparent when the event window is expanded to three days 
— the subset of 211 fully-traded firms furnish nothing at all of significance. However, the full 
sample furnishes a significant interaction F-statistic along with a significant first-order F-
statistic. This indicates that the first-order variable, DPS∆ , which registers as significant in the 
unrestricted procedure is indeed influential. 
But more important are the strongly significant good-news and bad-news interaction dummies in 
the unrestricted procedure with respect to both the full sample and more thinly-traded subsample. 
(Three of the mixed-news combinations also furnish results significant at the five percent level.) 
These interaction effects are confirmed in their significance by interaction F-statistics with Type 
1 errors of less than one percent. The overall message one can obtain from the association 
between the announcement variables and the unconditional ARs in a three-day window context 
is that a dividend signal does appear to be being acted upon.  These results are indistinguishable 
in nature from those obtained in Chapter 5. 
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Table J-1: Restricted Least Squares Regression using Unconditional Abnormal Returns. 
Regressand
Sample by 
Days Traded All Obs. 100 Days
<100 
Days All  Obs. 100 Days
<100 
Days
Coefficient (p-Values)
DD-ED (INTERCEPT) -0.02031 -0.014476 -0.022792 -0.006968 -0.007544 -0.010076
(0.0012) (0.1101) (0.0031) (0.1365) (0.2449) (0.0797)
∆DPS 0.0015906 0.0011766 0.0014585 0.0024593 -0.002401 0.0027618
(0.0225) (0.4805) (0.0633) (0.0000) (0.0456) (0.0000)
∆EPS 0.0005262 0.0005527 0.0005427 0.0007924 0.0006913 0.000798
(0.1746) (0.5302) (0.2160) (0.0063) (0.2740) (0.0151)
DI-EI 0.035997 0.0083958 0.044016 0.014296 0.013497 0.018569
(0.0000) (0.4945) (0.0000) (0.0217) (0.1264) (0.0146)
DD-EI 0.0081844 -0.025218 0.020943 0.00358 -0.023805 0.014108
(0.5336) (0.1350) (0.2083) (0.7154) (0.0496) (0.2567)
DI-ED 0.025916 0.011295 0.03106 0.0066116 0.0055451 0.01177
(0.0137) (0.4746) (0.0148) (0.3990) (0.6243) (0.2157)
DNC-EI 0.021512 0.01119 0.025721 0.0084282 0.0048209 0.013173
(0.0150) (0.3439) (0.0200) (0.2014) (0.5692) (0.1105)
DNC-ED 0.010439 0.0074871 0.011975 0.0027466 0.0029272 0.0059295
(0.1933) (0.4993) (0.2282) (0.6466) (0.7125) (0.4246)
Observations Count R2 Statistics, F-Statistics and p-Values
N 923 211 712 923 211 712
R2UNRESTRICTED 0.0702 0.0490 0.0796 0.0873 0.0518 0.1064
R2EQUATION (ii) 0.0467 0.0256 0.0493 0.0801 0.0050 0.0970
R2EQUATION (iii) 0.0618 0.0434 0.0721 0.0525 0.0312 0.0655
FUNRESTRRICTED 9.8668 1.4947 8.702 12.501 1.5841 11.973
(0.0000) (0.1708) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1418) (0.0000)
FEQUATION (ii) 22.558 2.7309 18.382 40.059 0.52224 38.085
(0.0000) (0.0675) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5940) (0.0000)
FEQUATION (iii) 12.08 1.8608 10.967 10.164 1.3186 9.9045
(0.0000) (0.1027) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2574) (0.0000)
FFIRST ORDER 4.1258 0.5987 2.8914 17.4469 2.2062 16.0930
(0.0165) (0.5505) (0.0562) (0.0000) (0.1127) (0.0000)
FINTERACTION 4.6108 1.0000 4.6394 1.4415 2.0033 1.4773
(0.0004) (0.4188) (0.0004) (0.2068) (0.0796) (0.1950)
CAR3Day ARt 0
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Appendix J.6 Configuration of Model with Multiple Independent 
Variables 
In Chapter 6.2 LDV friction models are fitted to day zero abnormal return data and the 
independent variables, DPS∆  and EPS∆  In addition, a number of extra proxy variables are also 
included as independent variables. In terms of multiple independent variables, a more compact 
notation becomes necessary. Let X represent a set of independent variables and let Ω  bet a set of 
betas associated with those independent variables. Further, let AR* be the observed abnormal 
return — which in this case is the AR calculated from the conditional expected return. The 
model becomes: 
*
* *
*
* *
0 0
0 0
0 0
L
U
AR X
Where
AR AR if AR and X
AR if AR
AR AR if AR and X
ε
α
α
= Ω+
 = − ≠ < = = = − ≠ ≥
 
The likelihood function can then be expressed in the following terms: 
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The log likelihood function can then be expressed: 
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Note: In the case of the day zero model with two independent variables, the likelihood function 
is effectively: 
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Appendix J.7 Code for Day Zero Friction Model 
The code in this section produced the day zero LDV friction model with two independent 
variables. The code for producing the model with two interaction variables is in Appendix J.9. 
Code: PCI_P.sce 
64. e=ea(opt(:,3)~=0); 
65. d=da(opt(:,3)~=0); 
66. ar0=arc0(opt(:,3)~=0); 
67.  
68. ep=e(d>=0 & e>0); 
69. dp=d(d>=0 & e>0); 
70. ar0p=ar0(d>=0 & e>0); 
71. dtp=dta(d>=0 & e>0); 
72.  
73. en=e(d<=0 & e<0); 
74. dn=d(d<=0 & e<0); 
75. ar0n=ar0(d<=0 & e<0); 
76. dtn=dta(d<=0 & e<0); 
77.  
78. eb = [ep;en]; 
79. db = [dp;dn]; 
80. ar0b=[ar0p;ar0n]; 
81. dtb=[dtp'; dtn']; 
82.  
83. //eb=eb(dtb==100); 
84. //db=db(dtb==100); 
85. //ar0b=ar0b(dtb==100); 
86.  
87. [f,popt]=optim(list(NDcost,to_like, ar0b,db,eb),[-0.1;0.1;0.1;0.1;0.1]); 
88. h=hessian(to_like,popt,ar0b,db,eb) ; 
89. hi=inv(h); 
90. s=sqrt(diag(hi)); 
91.  
92. alpha=0.05; 
93. probs=[alpha/2;1-alpha/2]; 
94. p = repmat(probs,1,length(popt)); 
95. q=1-p; 
96. pci=cdfnor("X",[popt'; popt'], [s'; s'],p,q)' 
97. n=length(eb) 
98. disp(n) 
99. disp([pci(:,1) popt pci(:,2)]) 
100. [pv,qv]=cdfnor("PQ",abs(popt),zeros(5,1),s); 
101. //[pv,qv]=cdfchi("PQ",abs(popt),[n-6;n-6;n-6;n-6;n-6]) 
102. mprintf('%f\n',qv) 
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Code: to_like.sci 
103. function like = to_like(b,y,xD,xE); 
104. if isreal(b) & b(5)>0.0001 
105.  pi=4*atan(1);  
106.  //3.14159265358979; 
107.  alphal=b(1); 
108.  alphau=b(2); 
109.  btaD = b(3); 
110.  btaE = b(4) 
111.  sigma = b(5); 
112.  
113.  like=0; 
114.  for i=1:length(xD) 
115.  bxD =btaD*xD(i); 
116.  bxE =btaE*xE(i); 
117.  if y(i)==0 
118.  tbl =normcdf((alphau-bxD-bxE)/sigma)-normcdf((alphal-bxD-bxE)/sigma); 
119.  if tbl~=0 
120.  like = like + log(tbl); 
121. // else 
122. // like = 1e20; 
123. // break; 
124.  end 
125.  elseif xE(i) > 0 
126.  like=like+log(1/sqrt(2*pi*sigma^2))-(1/(2*sigma^2))*((y(i)+alphau-bxD-
bxE)^2); 
127.  else 
128.  like=like+log(1/sqrt(2*pi*sigma^2))-(1/(2*sigma^2))*((y(i)+alphal-bxD-
bxE)^2); 
129.  end 
130.  end 
131.  like=-like; 
132.  if ~isreal(like) 
133.  like=1e20 
134.  end 
135. else 
136.  like = 1e20 
137. end 
138. endfunction 
 
 
Appendix J.8 Code for Day Zero Friction Model partitioned into 
Deciles by Company Market Capitalisation 
File: PCI_Pd.sce 
139. e=ea(opt(:,3)~=0); 
140. d=da(opt(:,3)~=0); 
141. ar0=arc0(opt(:,3)~=0); 
142. mda=mktcapdec(opt(:,3)~=0); 
143. dt=dta(opt(:,3)~=0); 
144.  
145. ep=e(d>=0 & e>0); 
146. dp=d(d>=0 & e>0); 
147. ar0p=ar0(d>=0 & e>0); 
148. dtp=dt(d>=0 & e>0); 
149. mdp=mda(d>=0 & e>0); 
150.  
151. en=e(d<=0 & e<0); 
152. dn=d(d<=0 & e<0); 
153. ar0n=ar0(d<=0 & e<0); 
154. dtn=dt(d<=0 & e<0); 
155. mdn=mda(d<=0 & e<0); 
156.  
157. eb = [ep;en]; 
158. db = [dp;dn]; 
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159. ar0b=[ar0p;ar0n]; 
160. dtb=[dtp'; dtn']; 
161. mdb=[mdp;mdn]; 
162.  
163. for k=1:10 
164.  disp(k) 
165.  ebt=eb(mdb==k); 
166.  dbt=db(mdb==k); 
167.  ar0bt=ar0b(mdb==k); 
168.  
169.  [f,popt]=optim(list(NDcost,to_like, ar0bt,dbt,ebt),[-0.1;0.1;0.1;0.1;0.1]); 
170.  h=hessian(to_like,popt,ar0bt,dbt,ebt) ; 
171.  hi=inv(h); 
172.  s=sqrt(diag(hi)); 
173.  optd(k,:)=popt'; 
174.  fd(k)=f; 
175.  sd(k,:)=s' 
176.  
177.  alpha=0.05; 
178.  probs=[alpha/2;1-alpha/2]; 
179.  p = repmat(probs,1,length(popt)); 
180.  q=1-p; 
181.  pci=cdfnor("X",[popt'; popt'], [s'; s'],p,q)' 
182.  n=length(ebt) 
183.  disp(n) 
184.  disp([pci(:,1) popt pci(:,2)]) 
185.  [pv,qv]=cdfnor("PQ",abs(popt),zeros(5,1),s); 
186.  //[pv,qv]=cdfchi("PQ",abs(popt),[n-6;n-6;n-6;n-6;n-6]) 
187.  mprintf('%f\n',qv) 
188. end 
This procedure calls up to_like.sci, the code for which is in Appendix J.7. 
 
Appendix J.9 Code for Day Zero Friction Model with Interaction 
Variables 
Code: PCI_Pdummies.sce 
189. e=ea(opt(:,3)~=0); 
190. d=da(opt(:,3)~=0); 
191. ar0=arc(opt(:,3)~=0,11); 
192. dpseps=ddps_deps_dpseps(opt(:,3)~=0,3); 
193. len=length(e); 
194. dc=zeros(len,1); 
195. dnc=zeros(len,1); 
196.  
197. dc(dpseps==1)=1; 
198. dc(dpseps==2)=-1; 
199. dnc(dpseps==5)=1; 
200. dnc(dpseps==6)=-1; 
201.  
202. ep=e(d>=0 & e>0); 
203. dp=d(d>=0 & e>0); 
204. ar0p=ar0(d>=0 & e>0); 
205. dcp=dc(d>=0 & e>0); 
206. dncp=dnc(d>=0 & e>0); 
207.  
208. en=e(d<=0 & e<0); 
209. dn=d(d<=0 & e<0); 
210. ar0n=ar0(d<=0 & e<0); 
211. dcn=dc(d<=0 & e<0); 
212. dncn=dc(d<=0 & e<0); 
213.  
214. eb = [ep;en]; 
215. db = [dp;dn]; 
216. ar0b=[ar0p;ar0n]; 
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217. dcb=[dcp;dcn]; 
218. dncb=[dncp;dncn]; 
219.  
220. [f,popt]=optim(list(NDcost,to_like2, ar0b,db,eb,dcb,dncb),[-
0.1;0.1;0.1;0.1;0.1;0.1;0.1],iter=1000); 
221. h=hessian(to_like2,popt,ar0b,db,eb,dcb,dncb) ; 
222. hi=inv(h); 
223. s=sqrt(diag(hi)); 
224.  
225. alpha=0.05; 
226. probs=[alpha/2;1-alpha/2]; 
227. p = repmat(probs,1,length(popt)); 
228. q=1-p; 
229. pci=cdfnor("X",[popt'; popt'], [s'; s'],p,q)' 
230. n=length(eb) 
231. disp(n) 
232. disp([pci(:,1) popt pci(:,2)]) 
233. [pv,qv]=cdfnor("PQ",abs(popt),zeros(7,1),s); 
234. //[pv,qv]=cdfchi("PQ",abs(popt),[n-6;n-6;n-6;n-6;n-6]) 
235. mprintf('%f\n',qv) 
Code: to_like2.sci 
236. function like = to_like2(b,y,xD,xE,xDC,xDNC); 
237. if isreal(b) & b(7)>0.0001 
238.  pi=4*atan(1);  
239.  //3.14159265358979; 
240.  alphal=b(1); 
241.  alphau=b(2); 
242.  btaD = b(3); 
243.  btaE = b(4); 
244.  btaDC=b(5); 
245.  btaDNC=b(6); 
246.  sigma = b(7); 
247.  
248.  like=0; 
249.  for i=1:length(xD) 
250.  bxD =btaD*xD(i); 
251.  bxE =btaE*xE(i); 
252.  bxDC=btaDC*xDC(i); 
253.  bxDNC=btaDNC*xDNC(i); 
254.  if y(i)==0 
255.  tbl =normcdf((alphau-bxD-bxE-bxDC-bxDNC)/sigma)-normcdf((alphal-bxD-bxE-
bxDC-bxDNC)/sigma); 
256.  if tbl~=0 
257.  like = like + log(tbl); 
258.  end 
259.  elseif xE(i) > 0 
260.  like=like+log(1/sqrt(2*pi*sigma^2))-(1/(2*sigma^2))*((y(i)+alphau-bxD-
bxE-bxDC-bxDNC)^2); 
261.  else 
262.  like=like+log(1/sqrt(2*pi*sigma^2))-(1/(2*sigma^2))*((y(i)+alphal-bxD-
bxE-bxDC-bxDNC)^2); 
263.  end 
264.  end 
265.  like=-like; 
266.  if ~isreal(like) 
267.  like=1e20 
268.  end 
269. else 
270.  like = 1e20 
271. end 
272. endfunction 
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Appendix K Further Explorations of Conditional Abnormal 
Returns and both ∆EPS and ∆EPS 
With respect to friction models, we have so far only observed what happens when all one-day 
event window observations are processed as one undifferentiated sample. What happens if one 
distinguishes between announcements in terms of the announcement-making firms’ thinness of 
trading (as measured in the estimation period) and by company market capitalisation? Is there 
any difference between the day t0 effects of mid-year and end-of year announcements? Further, 
is there any distinction in behaviour between day t0 and the surrounding days in the rest of the 
test period? These issues are explored here. 
Appendix K.1 Trading Thinness 
In Table K-1, the data set is cut down so that it includes only company/events associated with 
estimation periods in which the company’s shares traded every day. These company/events show 
much less responsiveness to DPS∆  and to EPS∆ . In fact, for these firms, the price response to a 
dividend signal lapses into insignificance as measured by the β∆DPS p-value.  
Table K-1: Equation (6.11) Model on Day Zero restricted to Shares traded on all available Days. 
Parameter MLE 95% Conf. Int 
Lower Bound 
95% Conf. Int 
Upper Bound 
p-Values 
αL -0.0246 -0.0319 -0.0173 0.0000 
αL 0.0075 0.0008 0.0143 0.0143 
β∆DPS 0.0011 -0.0016 0.0037 0.2145 
β∆EPS 0.0015 -0.0001 0.0030 0.0297 
σ 0.0357 0.0317 0.0398 0.0000 
185 observations based on DAYSTRADED = 100 (DD-EI and DI-ED excluded) 
 
The earnings response is also muted down, but is still significant at the five percent level of 
error. This finding agrees with the RLS regression results reported in Chapter 5 Section 5.6, 
where they are partitioned into results for fully-traded firms and for firms that have not had their 
share traded every day of the 100-day estimation period used for expected returns calculation. 
Generally, firms that have their shares traded on all 100 days furnish insignificant results. 
But when these 185 observations are excluded from the data set and the model is run on the 
remaining 622 observations of company/event whose associated shares traded with varying 
degrees of thinness (from 99 days active trading down to less than 20), the pattern observed in 
Table 6-9 re-emerges. The results for this analysis are in Table K-2. All of the parameters are 
again strongly significant; and the beta for DPS∆  is again more than four times the size the beta 
for EPS∆ . 
Table K-2: Equation (6.11) Model on Day Zero restricted to Shares traded on less than all Available 
Days. 
Parameter MLE 95% Conf. Int 
Lower Bound 
95% Conf. Int 
Upper Bound 
p-Values 
αL -0.0630 -0.0723 -0.0537 0.0000 
αL 0.0315 0.0233 0.0397 0.0000 
β∆DPS 0.0060 0.0046 0.0074 0.0000 
β∆EPS 0.0018 0.0010 0.0027 0.0000 
σ 0.0764 0.0712 0.0816 0.0000 
622 observations based on DAYSTRADED < 100 (DD-EI and DI-ED excluded) 
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It is clear, as in the earlier RLS regression material, that well-traded shares are more efficiently 
priced (in terms of the efficient market hypothesis), and that less well-traded shares are more 
prone to yielding ARs when a company announcement is made. This is not new news to the 
discipline of Finance; but it has been determined here, in a joint dividend and earnings 
announcement event context, in a new way. 
 
Appendix K.2 The Size Effect 
The original 948 company/event sets were partitioned by company market capitalisation, where 
members of the 10th decile were the largest companies. With the reduction of the sample size 
from 948 down to 807 observations, the original equally-sized deciles have become a little 
uneven. The parameter estimates and their associated p-values are furnished for each decile in 
Table K-3. 
 
Table K-3: MLE Parameter Estimates on Day Zero by Market Capitalisation Decile. 
Decile N αL αU β∆DPS β∆EPS σ 
10 85 -0.0158 
(0.0000) 
0.0072 
(0.0065) 
0.0001 
(0.4882) 
0.0005 
(0.3698 
0.0195 
(0.0000) 
9 78 -0.0243 
(0.0000) 
0.0132 
(0.0007) 
0.0038 
(0.0123) 
0.0008 
(0.1779) 
0.0232 
(0.0000) 
8 75 -0.0231 
(0.0000) 
0.0192 
(0.0000) 
0.0042 
(0.0278) 
0.0040 
(0.0007) 
0.0237 
(0.0000) 
7 84 -0.0395 
(0.0000) 
0.0159 
(0.0004) 
0.0035 
(0.0041) 
0.0029 
(0.0158) 
0.02722 
(0.0000) 
6 85 -0.0458 
(0.0000) 
0.0104 
(0.0274) 
0.0040 
(0.0193) 
0.0002 
(0.3828) 
0.0337 
(0.0000) 
5 82 -0.0373 
(0.0000) 
0.0153 
(0.0005) 
0.0006 
(0.3205) 
0.0017 
(0.0544) 
0.0276 
(0.0000) 
4 83 -0.0694 
(0.0000) 
0.0276 
(0.0048) 
-0.0026 
(0.0678) 
0.0018 
(0.0040) 
0.0671 
(0.0000) 
3 82 -0.0388 
(0.0000) 
0.0225 
(0.0002) 
0.0029 
(0.0483) 
-0.0010 
(0.1732) 
0.0325 
(0.0000) 
2 89 -0.0648 
(0.0000) 
0.0383 
(0.0000) 
0.0058 
(0.0034) 
0.0014 
(0.0149) 
0.0438 
(0.0000) 
1 64 -0.1666 
(0.0000) 
0.0927 
(0.0005) 
0.0013 
(0.1984) 
0.0018 
(0.0614) 
0.0998 
(0.0000) 
Total 807 
In each cell, the upper figure is the MLE parameter estimate and the lower figure in brackets is the 
associated p-value. 
 
With respect to the beta parameters associated with company size deciles, there is no 
immediately clear pattern — as some of them are significant and others of them are not; and they 
vary in magnitude, as can be seen in Figure K-1. But one should not be hasty in dismissing size-
based beta effects. The top decile has an insignificant beta parameter that is very close to zero 
while those of all other deciles are further away. The miniscule beta associated with the top 
decile is indicative of a relative lack of a dividend signalling effect vis-à-vis the other deciles. 
However, there is no immediately plausible explanation as to why the beta for the 4th decile 
should be negative while all others are positive. However, it is insignificant. 
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Figure K-1: Day Zero ∆DPS Coefficients by Deciles of Market Capitalisation. 
 β∆DPS for deciles of Company Size based on Market Capitilisation
(Error bars = 95% Confidence Interval)
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The pattern with respect to the betas associated with EPS∆  in Table K-3 and Figure K-2 is more 
complex. The 7th and 8th deciles furnish significant positive betas with high values relative to all 
other deciles, while the top decile furnishes the beta that is closest to zero — and which is 
insignificant. In terms of the top decile, this result shows the absence of reactivity which has 
been apparent in all results associated with companies whose shares traded on 100 days out of 
100 during the expected return estimation period, since, generally speaking, large firms tend to 
enjoy their shares being traded on a more frequent basis than do smaller firms. The beta close to 
zero suggests that a larger shift in earnings is required to achieve a change in share price (as 
measured by ARt0 here). 
Figure K-2: Day Zero ∆EPS Coefficients by Deciles of Market Capitalisation. 
β∆EPS for Deciles of Company Size based on Market Capitilisation
(Error bars = 95% Confidence Interval)
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I turn now to the pattern of changes with respect to the size of the friction-region between αL and 
αU. As company size increases though the deciles, the friction region tends to shrink as shown in 
Figure K-3.189 This has a very interesting implication. It suggests that smaller firms have to 
produce larger changes before the friction effect can be overcome. 
 
Figure K-3: Day Zero Alpha Coefficients by Deciles of Market Capitalisation. 
Alphas for deciles of company size based on Market Capitilisation
(Error bars = 95% confidence interval)
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It is useful to include 95% confidence intervals in Figure K-3. These are large for the lowest 
decile observations and become quite narrow for the top decile observations. This suggests that 
not only do the friction regions shrink with increasing company size, but the boundaries become 
increasingly certain as well. 
The final parameter estimated in the MLE procedures, σ, also tends to decrease in value 
(although not monotonically) as we step up through the deciles. The bottom decile furnishes the 
largest standard deviation (approximately 10%) while the top decile furnishes the smallest 
(approximately 2%). Again this suggests that the ready stream of news associated with large 
firms enables investors to act with more certainty in their pricing and trading decisions than is 
the case with small companies for which there is no such high-frequency stream. In the presence 
of such a stream, dividend and earnings announcements are likely to have been anticipated in 
advance from other news items, while in the absence of a steady news stream, the dividend and 
earnings announcements are likely take on a much more iconic role — where ‘iconic’ entails, in 
the minds of investors, heightened attentiveness to details and wider-ranging guesstimation of 
implications. 
 
                                                 
189 In this figure, lines have been drawn between the points to emphasise the narrowing effect. The lines do not 
imply a continuous spectrum. 
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Appendix K.3 Mid-year versus End-of-year Announcement Effects 
A second question of interest is whether there is any tangible difference between mid-year 
company announcements and year-end announcements. The results for the mid-year 
announcement events are furnished in Table K-4. Both DPS∆  and EPS∆  have strongly 
significant mid-year betas which do not differ markedly in size. The DPS∆  beta is a little less 
than 50% larger.  
With respect to the size of change needed to overcome friction to furnish a signal that is acted 
upon, the region in which friction is greater than any pressure for price to change is 
approximately 0.07 in this table and also in Table K-5 with respect to the end-of-year 
announcements. There appears not to be much variation in this aspect of the results. The size of 
this region seems to be roughly constant. 
 
Table K-4: Equation (6.11) Model on Day Zero restricted to Mid-year Company Announcements. 
Parameter MLE 95% Conf. Int 
Lower Bound 
95% Conf. Int 
Upper Bound 
p-Values 
αL -0.0385 -0.0473 -0.0298 0.0000 
αU 0.0312 0.0232 0.0392 0.0000 
β∆DPS 0.0062 0.0046 0.0078 0.0000 
β∆EPS 0.0049 0.0033 0.0065 0.0000 
σ 0.0587 0.0537 0.0636 0.0000 
384 observations based on INTFIN = 1 (DD-EI and DI-ED excluded) 
 
I now turn to the end of year announcements in Table K-5.  Here, in Table K-5, both variables 
are significant and it is clear that the beta associated with year-end DPS∆  is close to three times 
larger than that of EPS∆ . In both Table K-4 and Table K-5, the parameters are all strongly 
significant in terms of their p-values. But with respect to the relative sizes between mid-year and 
year-end, the mid-year coefficients for both are much larger in Table K-4 than at the end of the 
year in Table K-5. 
 
Table K-5: Equation (6.11) Model on Day Zero restricted to Year-end Company Announcements. 
Parameter MLE 95% Conf. Int 
Lower Bound 
95% Conf. Int 
Upper Bound 
p-Values 
αL -0.0660 -0.0764 -0.0556 0.0000 
αU 0.0174 0.0082 0.0267 0.0001 
β∆DPS 0.0042 0.0025 0.0061 0.0000 
β∆EPS 0.0015 0.0007 0.0024 0.0002 
σ 0.0715 0.0657 0.0772 0.0000 
423 observations based on INTFIN = 2 (DD-EI and DI-ED excluded) 
Appendix K.4 Distinction between Day t0 and other Days in the 21-
Day Test Period 
There is an announcement of dividends and earnings on day t0 only. In all other days of the test 
period, ARs are either related to other phenomena or to an anticipation of, or maybe a belated 
reaction to the day zero disclosure. DPS∆  and EPS∆  are now applied as leading or lagged 
independent variables in a series of procedures on the daily ARs — one procedure for each day 
of the 20 other days of the 21-day test period. 
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Table K-6: Parameter Estimates for All Days in the Test Period. 
Day αL αU β∆DPS β∆EPS σ
-0.0428 0.0222 0.0010 0.0006 0.0389
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0034) (0.0017) (0.0000)
-0.0398 0.0176 0.0011 0.0008 0.0336
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0000)
-0.0386 0.0197 0.0013 0.0002 0.0353
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.1967) (0.0000)
-0.0354 0.0175 0.0012 0.0006 0.0312
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000)
-0.0335 0.0145 0.0008 0.0001 0.0290
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0037) (0.2334) (0.0000)
-0.0377 0.0212 0.0019 0.0003 0.0371
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0574) (0.0000)
-0.0456 0.0228 0.0017 0.0004 0.0401
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0609) (0.0000)
-0.0340 0.0139 0.0007 0.0006 0.0322
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0139) (0.0014) (0.0000)
-0.0393 0.0178 0.0008 0.0006 0.0344
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0120) (0.0019) (0.0000)
-0.0446 0.0225 0.0006 0.0010 0.0405
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0674) (0.0000) (0.0000)
-0.0533 0.0257 0.0055 0.0017 0.0680
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
-0.0404 0.0200 0.0022 -0.0001 0.0484
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3333) (0.0000)
-0.0429 0.0211 0.0009 0.0003 0.0396
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0124) (0.0605) (0.0000)
-0.0351 0.0176 0.0014 0.0006 0.0345
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0007) (0.0000)
-0.0378 0.0185 0.0015 0.0005 0.0351
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0084) (0.0000)
-0.0351 0.0155 0.0015 0.0002 0.0299
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1448) (0.0000)
-0.0364 0.0166 0.0015 0.0004 0.0344
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0255) (0.0000)
-0.0389 0.0185 0.0009 0.0003 0.0345
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0038) (0.0988) (0.0000)
-0.0375 0.0178 0.0013 0.0008 0.0314
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
-0.0366 0.0173 0.0015 0.0004 0.0336
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0135) (0.0000)
-0.0341 0.0159 0.0008 0.0005 0.0298
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0041) (0.0027) (0.0000)
10
In each cell, the upper figure is the MLE parameter estimate and the lower 
figure in brackets is the associated p-value.
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A priori, one would expect very little change in the daily friction regions (between αL and αU). 
However, there should be steeper linear associations (captured by the betas) between the day 
zero ARs and the independent variables than with the ARs of any other day. That is, of course, 
328 
unless there is leakage of the dividend and earnings information in advance.  The summary 
results are laid out in Table K-6 and the next four three figures. 
In Table K-6, all but one of the DPSβ∆  are significant at the five percent level of error or better; 
and there is a strong upward spike (0.0055) on day zero which is close to ten times the size of the 
beta for the preceding day (0.0006). This is about triple the size on all other days. It is illustrated 
in Figure K-4. 
 
Figure K-4: ∆DPS Coefficients over the 21-Day Test Period. 
Betas for Change in Dividends over the 21 Day Test Period
(Error bars = 95% Confidence Interval)
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This indicates that investors react to the dividend information and in doing so increase the ARs 
earned on day t0 in a manner that can be captured linearly (ie, the larger the change in dividend, 
the larger the associated AR). Arguably, the slight rises on days t-5 and t-4 could be interpreted as 
investors acting on either anticipated or insider information; and the day t2 beta, which is the 
second highest in the test period could be seen as a belated reaction by late receivers of the 
disclosure. 
A similar pattern is observed in Figure K-5 with respect to the EPSβ∆  results. However, the day 
zero spike (0.0017) is only one third of the magnitude of the day zero spike observed with 
respect to DPSβ∆  (0.0055). Further, there is a drop on day t1 which suggests that on that day there 
is next to no association between the earnings news and the new day’s trading. This really does 
suggest that the NZX is an efficient market — at least in the processing of earnings information. 
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Figure K-5: ∆EPS Coefficients over the 21-Day Test Period. 
Betas for Change in Earnings over the 21 Day Test Period
(Error Bars = 95% Confidence Interval)
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Figure K-6 contains the plots of αL and αU. There is a slight widening of the friction region on 
day t0; but this widening is hardly significant when one takes the 95% confidence intervals into 
account. 
 
Figure K-6: Alpha Coefficients over the 21-Day Test Period 
αL and αU over the 21 Day Test Period
(Error bars = 95% Confidence Interval)
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Appendix L Four-state Models 
The models used in the state model chapter were all based on estimation periods of exactly 100 
days; but Norsworthy et al (2004) used estimation periods which were up to fifteen years long. 
The estimation procedure in this appendix was performed with estimation periods that were 500 
days long — which entailed encompassing multiple prior dividend-and-earnings announcement 
events. Nevertheless, it was of interest to see if an increased estimation period brought the 
current study’s results more into line with those of Norsworthy et al and also Jokung and 
Meyfredi (2003). Each state was required to have a minimum of six observations in it. 
The counts and percentages of datasets which actually did produce coefficients with –p-values 
that were below the five percent benchmark level for this model were: 
Table L-1: Incidence of Significant Results. 
Coefficient N % 
βQ1 758 93.93% 
βQ2 802 99.38% 
βQ3 800 99.13% 
βQ4 757 93.80% 
βQ1RMt 448 55.51% 
βQ2RMt 62 7.68% 
βQ3RMt 418 51.80% 
βQ4RMt 44 5.45% 
 
It is of note that more than half of the datasets furnished significant results with respect to the 
first and third quadrants. This is an improvement on the 100-day estimation period version in 
Chapter 7 where 30 percent of the datasets produced significant the first quadrant coefficients 
and 23 percent produced significant third quadrant coefficients. 
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Table L-2: Four-state Unrotated Model with 500 Days. 
Mean Min Max St Dev
F 38.5527 15.0732 69.1690 8.1749
Sig. F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R2 0.4592 0.0297 0.7886 0.1147
Adj R2 0.4515 0.0159 0.7855 0.1163
Variance 0.0003 0.0000 0.0157 0.0008
Durbin-Watson1.9810 1.4824 2.9554 0.1498
βQ1 0.0072 -0.003 0.021 0.0034
t-Stat   4.695 -1.0113 10.7176 1.7558
p-Value 0.0178 0.0000 0.8338 0.0820
βQ2 -0.0221 -0.7661 -0.005 0.0301
t-Stat   -6.1272 -12.5261 -0.5631 1.6526
p-Value 0.0027 0.0000 0.5736 0.0299
βQ3 -0.0198 -0.1934 0.0343 0.0143
t-Stat   -7.2519 -15.1804 1.5128 2.1515
p-Value 0.0019 0.0000 0.6367 0.0245
βQ4 0.0076 0.0004 0.0326 0.0034
t-Stat   3.9992 0.2898 8.181 1.2606
p-Value 0.0158 0.0000 0.7721 0.0686
βQ1RMt 0.3954 -0.9599 2.3633 0.3717
t-Stat   2.9183 -2.003 17.6097 2.9821
p-Value 0.1864 0.0000 0.9982 0.2774
βQ2RMt 0.0268 -11.2921 84.8627 3.1934
t-Stat   -0.1118 -7.3452 10.4484 1.2148
p-Value 0.5080 0.0000 0.9975 0.3030
βQ3RMt 0.518 -2.9606 31.1889 1.2714
t-Stat   3.0313 -3.7586 24.492 3.3495
p-Value 0.2122 0.0000 0.9973 0.2926
βQ4RMt 0.1163 -0.9329 2.5313 0.2686
t-Stat   0.4601 -2.9198 2.8781 0.9156
p-Value 0.4845 0.0037 0.9995 0.2921
N 807
 
